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JUSTICE JAMES K. GROVES
i'm PAF- o IIA
JAMES K. GROVES-THE COMPLEAT MAN
It is difficult to put into mere words the emotions, the deep respect, the
overwhelming awe I had over our forty years of friendship for the warm
compassionate intellect that was Jim Groves. You will read the statistical
and biographical details of his life in other pages of this volume, but as I
recall him, I see a man whose goal was always the same-ultimate concern
for the welfare of his fellow citizen.
I knew of his quiet, unpublicized charities, of his deep feeling for the
disadvantaged (although some completely misinterpreted his words in this
respect), of his hope for the future in the young people, of his dedication to
the principles of honesty and integrity, and of his fervent devotion to his
religion. The legal community will miss Jim Groves, the lawyer and justice,
but all of society will miss Jim Groves, the compleat man.
The Honorable Edward E Pringle
Former ChiefJustice Colorado Supreme Court
IN MEMORIAM
The Judiciary of Colorado and the legal profession suffered a tremen-
dous loss with the death of Colorado Supreme Court Justice James K.
Groves. Justice Groves died April 6, 1980, after being hospitalized for a
stroke and resulting complications. He was appointed to Colorado's high
court by Governor John A. Love in April, 1968. Justice Groves was the first
appointee to the court under the merit system of selection.1 As an Associate
Justice during his twelve years on the supreme court bench, he authored
more than 540 opinions-many of which are recognized as landmark deci-
sions.
Justice Groves was born on August 29, 1910, in Grand Junction. He
attended Mesa College and received his undergraduate degree in 1932 from
the University of Colorado. He was graduated with honors from the Univer-
sity of Colorado law school in 1935.
Following law school, Justice Groves returned to Grand Junction where
he began building a reputation as one of the state's best trial attorneys. As a
private practitioner, he specialized in the areas of water and mineral law.
From 1940 to 1944, he served as a Mesa County Deputy District Attorney
and in 1948 became an Assistant District Attorney. In 1952, he became
Grand Junction's city attorney and remained in that capacity until 1956.
Justice Groves was one of the founders of the Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Foundation, a nationally recognized institution which publishes an an-
nual legal journal utilized by many practitioners in the mineral law area.
He served as its president in 1935. Another significant legal accomplishment
was his membership, since 1958, in the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association. 2 In 1972, he was installed as chairman of this arm of the
ABA-the second highest position in the organization. He served in such
capacity until 1974. Justice Groves also served as president of the Colorado
Bar Association in 1949 and president of the Mesa County Bar Association
in 1938.
While in law school, Justice Groves was editor-in-chief of the Rocky
Mountain Law Review. He also served as co-editor of the American Law of
Mining and wrote several law review articles. Among the awards he re-
ceived were the Colorado Bar Association's Award of Merit in 1959, the
Mesa College Distinguished Alumnus Award in 1969, and the University of
Colorado's William Lee Knous Award in 1969. In 1977, he was awarded a
doctor of law degree from the William Mitchell College of Law at St. Paul,
Minnesota. Justice Groves was also a fellow of the American College of
Trial Lawyers and the American Bar Foundation.
The remainder of this remembrance is dedicated to a discussion of some
1. Prior to selection ofJustices based upon the merit system, the Colorado Supreme Court
positions were filled in popular elections.
2. The House of Delegates is the American Bar Association's policy-making branch.
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of the many significant Colorado Supreme Court decisions Justice Groves
authored.
Signiftcant Water Law Decisions
Late in 1978, over 100 water applications involving claims for
thousands of wells and over twenty million acre feet of water in underground
reservoirs were filed in Colorado by various individuals, groups, and joint
venturers. The Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District and
others3 commenced an original proceeding in the Colorado Supreme Court
requesting that the water cases be consolidated for a determination of com-
mon questions of law.
4
In Southeastern Colorado Water Conservang District v. Huston, 5 Justice
Groves granted relief for the petitioners. On the basis of the supervisory
powers granted to the court by the Colorado Constitution,6 Justice Groves
ordered consolidation of the water cases and provided for the appointment
of a special water judge to make a determination of various threshold ques-
tions of law. 7 He ruled that the various petitioners had standing to seek
consolidation of the cases for determining these common legal issues.,
The threshold legal questions, resolution of which will represent a
landmark for Colorado water law, are (1) whether non-tributary waters in
Colorado are subject to appropriation; (2) if so, by what authority can such
water be appropriated; (3) can non-tributary waters outside the boundaries
of designated ground water basins be appropriated by persons having no
property interest in the surface; (4) can non-tributary waters outside the
boundries of designated ground water basins be appropriated for use by per-
sons other than the claimant or those whom the claimant is authorized to
represent; and (5) can applications for non-tributary waters outside the
boundaries of designated ground water basins be filed (a) without first ob-
taining permits from the state engineer and, if so, (b) without first applying
for such permits.9 Because these issues were not settled by constitutional
3. The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District and the Southwestern Colorado
Water Conservation District were also petitioners.
4. The basis for the proceeding was the supreme court's supervisory powers granted by
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 2(1): "The supreme court, except as otherwise provided in this consti-
tution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the state, and shall
have a general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such regulations and limi-
tations as may be prescribed by law."
5. 593 P.2d 1347 (Colo. 1979).
6. See note 4 supra.
7. 593 P.2d at 1349-51. Because the special water judge was temporarily assigned as an
additional water judge for each of the seven water divisions, original jurisdiction of the water
judges was not deprived and an improper change of venue did not occur. Id. at 1351-52.
8. Id. at 1352.
9. Id. at 1349. In a supplemental order, the court approved consideration of the following
additional issues by the waterjudge in his discretion: (1) can a decree be obtained for a right to
store tributary water in an underground reservoir created by the impoundment of water behind
a naturally-occurring glacial terminal moraine; (2) are non-tributary waters obtained from wells
in underground non-tributary aquifers subject to appropriation under the Colorado Constitu-
tion; (2)(a) if not, under what legal authority or status, and with what limitations, if any, does
any right to such water exist; (2)(b) under what procedure, if any, may or must such rights be
determined or confirmed; (3) when non-tributary, or de mrnrhnux tributary water infiltrates un-
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law, statutory provisions, or judicial decision, Justice Groves ruled that as-
signment of the issues to a special water judge for a consolidated ruling did
not deny the respondents due process or equal protection of the law. 0
There is no doubt that Justice Groves' expertise in the water area and
consideration of these issues would have had a significant impact upon the
ultimate outcome of the consolidated cases. He would have had the oppor-
tunity to author another decision of landmark importance in Colorado water
law. The decision will have tremendous legal and social significance affect-
ing the rights of Colorado landowners and governing future developments. " I
In Fellhauer v. People, 12 a water division engineer shut off thirty-nine
wells in the Arkansas River alluvium without any written rules, regulations,
or prescribed guidelines. Since the Arkansas River Basin was over-appropri-
ated, the action was taken in order to make more water available for satisfy-
ing adjudicated, senior surface rights. While the legislation (then in effect)
under which the engineer was acting was deemed a proper grant of author-
ity,' 3 Justice Groves ruled that for such action to be constitutional under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution and the due process clause in article II, section 25 of the Colo-
rado Constitution, it must be performed pursuant to and "in compliance
with reasonable rules, regulations, standards and a plan established by the
state engineer prior to the issuance of the regulative orders."' 4 After the
decision, the state engineer began to promulgate rules and regulations for
administering tributary ground waters.'
5
derground structures and such infiltrating water would, if not intercepted, reach a natural
stream, may an applicant who does not allege ownership, or is not an owner of such structure,
obtain a decree for such water which is free from the call of the river; (4) are unconsumed
withdrawals, return flows or waste water from non-tributary sources which are not recaptured
by the developer, subject to claim under any right (appropriation or otherwise) independent of
claims on the stream or aquifer to which such waters ultimately discharge or return; (4)(a) if so,
what is the nature of such right; (5) can a decree be obtained for the right to store in a non-
alluvial aquifer; (6) regarding issue (1) in the initial opinion, (a) may such waters be appropri-
ated pursuant to the doctrine of prior appropriation, (b) may such waters be appropriated
under a theory of "developed water," and (c) can such waters be appropriated by persons hav-
ing no property interests in the surface but having the knowledge or consent of the surface
owner or agreements between the claimant and the surface owner; and (7) is the owner in fee of
the surface land also the owner of the non-tributary ground water lying under the land by
virtue of his capacity as an owner or is such water to be claimed and decreed in accordance with
the doctrine of appropriation by such owner. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist.
v. Huston, No. 79 SA 38 (Colo., Aug. 29, 1979) (supplemental order considering additional
questions of law).
10. 593 P.2d at 1353-54.
11. A decision in the consolidated cases is expected to be rendered by the special water
judge, Judge Shivers, in 1980. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. Huston, No.
79 CW I (Arapahoe County Dist. Ct., Colo., filed Apr. 16, 1979).
12. 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
13. Id. at 330, 447 P.2d at 991.
14. Id. at 334, 447 P.2d at 993. Two additional requirements were noted:
(2) Reasonable lessening of material injury to senior rights must be accomplished by
the regulation of the wells.
(3) If by placing conditions upon the use of a well, or upon its owner, some or all of its
water can be placed to a beneficial use by the owner without material injury to senior
users.
id.
15. Greer, A Review of Recent Activity in Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 181, 186 (1970).
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Of significant importance is Justice Groves' amplification of the Colo-
rado Constitution's 16 establishment of the prior appropriation doctrine for
acquiring rights in the waters of any natural stream:
It is implicit in these constitutional provisions that, along with
vested rights, there shall be maximum utlhzation of the water of this
state. As administration of water approaches its second century the
curtain is opening upon the new drama of maximum utilizati'on and
how constitutionally that doctrine can be integrated into the law of
vested rights. We have known for a long time that the doctrine was
lurking in the backstage shadows as a result of the accepted,
though oft violated, principle that the right to water does not give
the right to waste it.1
7
The Colorado legislature reacted favorably to the introduction of the new
era of maximum utilization of water in the state. Comprehensive legislation,
the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969,18 was en-
acted to provide for the administration, distribution, and regulation of all
surface and underground water in or tributary to all natural streams in Col-
orado.' 9 While the doctrine of maximum utilization is subject to restrictions
against waste, it is unsettled whether the doctrine is readily applicable to
non-tributary ground water, when one considers the over-appropriated con-
ditions of tributary surface and ground waters and the significant value of
scarce, easily accessible non-tributary ground water sources to the surface
owner.
20
Four additional issues were presented in Fellhauer but were not directly
ruled upon.2 1 Justice Groves noted that "subsurface channel," while incapa-
ble of precise definition and determination, generally referred to the portion
of the alluvium beneath and adjacent to the surface channel. 22 Relative to
ground water administration, he noted that date of priority was not the sole
consideration for determining which wells were to be shut off first. Other
factors such as proximity, actual effect, futile calls, supply predictions, and
economic planning were noted. 23 However, a determinative resolution of
these issues and others pertaining to the right of senior users to support
surface flow by uplifting groundwater was reserved.
24
16. "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses
shall never be denied. Priority of approporation shall give the better right as between those
using the water for the same purpose. ... COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
17. 167 Colo. at 336, 447 P.2d at 994 (emphasis in original).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-101 (1973).
19. See Kuiper v.Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 126, 490 P.2d 268, 271
(1971).
20. The scope of maximum utilization of water in Colorado will be more defined after
resolution of the consolidated cases. See note 11 supra.
21. 167 Colo. at 337, 447 P.2d at 994.
22. Id. at 337-38, 447 P.2d at 995. Because the defendant's well was determined to be
within the "subsurface channel," a legislatively created rebuttable presumption regarding lack
of injury to vested rights could not operate in his favor. Id.
23. Id. at 341-42, 447 P.2d at 996-97 (quoting Morgan, Appropriation and Colorado's Ground
Water A Continuing Dtlema?, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 133, 138, 139-40 (1967)). The trial court
disposed of defendant's argument that later priority wells be shut off first by noting that defend-
ant's rights were so junior to affected senior rights that no consideration need be given to prior-
ity dates. Id. at 340, 447 P.2d at 996.
24. Id. at 342-43, 447 P.2d at 997.
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Cit and County of Denver v. Fulton Ir'gating Ditch Co.2 5 involved a declara-
tory judgment action commenced by Denver and the Adolph Coors Com-
pany to determine Denver's rights in water obtained through transmountain
diversions. The diversions involved a transfer of water from the Colorado
River Basin on the Western Slope to the South Platte River Basin on the
Eastern Slope. The defendant ditch companies diverted water from the
South Platte River downstream from the discharge point of a sewage plant
which processed Denver's sewage. A goal of minimum use of imported water
was recognized in a United States District Court decree which fixed the pri-
orities of Blue River water imported by Denver.
26
Denver wished to know whether it could make successive uses of the
transmountain water while its dominion over the water continued. 27 De-
fendants' principal argument was that Denver could not make a disposition
of the water after use. The defendants feared Denver would use primarily
imported water during the irrigating season with recaptured portions going
to its transferees and primarily South Platte River water in the non-irrigat-
ing season thereby depriving the defendants of imported water returned to
the river.
28
Writing for the court, Justice Groves held that Denver, in the absence of
agreement otherwise, could re-use, make a successive use of, and after use
make a disposition of imported transmountain water.29 The court felt this
would be the law even absent a statute30 apparently giving Denver such
rights.3 1 An analogy was drawn from the law of developed water. Devel-
oped water is that which has been added to the supply of a stream and
which never would have come into the stream but for the efforts of the per-
son producing it. Developers of such water are entitled to use, re-use, make
successive use of, and dispose of the water. 32 No distinction was made be-
tween the rights of a developer in developed water and those of Denver in
imported water.33 In effect, a downstream appropriator has no right to rely
on the discharge of foreign water into a stream following its use, re-use, and
successive use by the importer. 34
Justice Groves also established the following definitions:
"Re-use" means a subsequent use of imported water for the
same purpose as the original use.
"Successive use" means subsequent use by the water importer
for a different purpose.
25. 179 Colo. 47, 506 P.2d 144 (1972).
26. Id. at 54-55, 506 P.2d at 148.
27. Another issue was whether Denver could exchange water under a 1969 agreement with
Coors. Because of an earlier agreement entered into by Denver, the court ruled that Denver
could not exchange water under the Coors agreement. Id. at 51, 59-64, 506 P.2d at 146, 150-53.
28. Id. at 55, 506 P.2d at 148-49.
29. Id. at 51, 506 P.2d at 146.
30. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83-101 (1973).
31. 179 Colo. at 52, 506 P.2d at 147.
32. See Ripley v. Park Center Land & Water Co., 40 Colo. 129, 90 P. 75 (1907).
33. 179 Colo. at 53, 506 P.2d at 147.
34. Id. at 53-54, 506 P.2d at 147-48. See also Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124
Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
[Vol. 58:1
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"Right of disposition" means the right to sell, lease, exchange
or otherwise dispose of effluent containing foreign water after dis-
tribution through Denver's water system and collection in its sewer
system.3
5
Regarding defendants' primary argument noted above, Justice Groves
held that such a pattern of use by Denver would be unreasonable and would
unconstitutionally deprive defendants of their water rights in the South
Platte River.3 6 He ruled that Denver was not to depart substantially from
its past practice of returning water originating in the South Platte basin dur-
ing the irrigation season. 37 Justice Groves also reversed the lower court's
determination that Denver lost dominion over water when it was delivered
to the customer's tap on the ground that Denver controls the amount of
water it treats and the amount passed on to other treatment facilities.
38
Moreover, the delivery of imported water to an agent of Denver for treat-
ment did not constitute an abandonment of this water because the City did
not so intend to abandon.
39
In Kuiper v. Lundvall,4° the defendant had three wells each located in a
quarter section pumping from a designated ground water basin. His appli-
cation for a well on a fourth quarter section was denied on the ground that
the area was over-appropriated. He then began to transport water from one
of the existing wells to irrigate the quarter section having no well. The state
engineer brought an action to enjoin the defendant from transporting this
water since under the Central Yuma County Ground Water Management
District's rules, designated ground water could not be used on land other
than that described in the permit. The defendant counterclaimed asking
that the Colorado Ground Water Management Act 41 be declared unconsti-
tutional. The lower court, finding the water was tributary, held the Act to
be unconstitutional.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. At
the outset, Justice Groves held that water taking over a century to reach the
stream is of a e mtnimus tributary character and therefore not tributary to
the stream.4 2 Without reaching the constitutionality issue, the court re-
versed the lower court's finding that the Colorado Ground Water Manage-
ment Act as applied to tributary ground water was unconstitutional.
Justice Groves also reversed the lower court's finding that the Act was
unconstitutional because it delegated judicial functions to an administrative
agency. He ruled that the Colorado Constitution does not prevent the legis-
lature from placing jurisdiction for water administration in an agency, even
35. 179 Colo. at 52, 506 P.2d at 146-47.
36. Id. at 56, 506 P.2d at 149.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 56-57, 506 P.2d at 149.
39. Id. at 58-59, 506 P.2d at 150.
40. 187 Colo. 40, 529 P.2d 1328 (1974), appeal diszwsed, 421 U.S. 996 (1975).
41. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-18-1 to -38 (1965 Penn. Supp.) (currently CoLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-90-101 (1973)).
42. 187 Colo. at 44, 529 P.2d at 1331.
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though water adjudication has been traditionally in the courts. 43
Justice Groves again noted the concept of maximum utilization he in-
troduced in Fellhauer.4 4 He recognized that the Colorado legislature, in the
Colorado Ground Water Management Act, had provided a means by which
the maximum utilization of designated, non-tributary ground water in Colo-
rado can be obtained.4 5 He also noted that the state engineer and ground
water commission were proceeding under this Act consistently with the doc-
trine of maximum utilization.
46
The above cases represent only a few of the significant water law deci-
sions authored by Justice Groves. Altogether, he wrote more than fifty water
law opinions. He will be long remembered for his vast and important contri-
butions to the development and growth of Colorado water law.
Other Signifant Dectst'ons
Justice Groves also wrote landmark opinions in areas other than water
law. In Lovato v. Dzstrict Court,4 7 the Colorado Supreme Court was asked to
resolve a difficult controversy about the proper legal definition of death.
The mother and guardians ad/item of an infant commenced an original pro-
ceeding seeking review of a district court's order directing the guardians to
execute a document authorizing the treating physician and hospital to re-
move all life support systems if, in the doctor's opinion, the child was legally
dead.
After ruling that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to order the re-
moval of the life support system sustaining the infant, Justice Groves re-
viewed the petitioners' allegation that the juvenile court had exceeded its
jurisdiction and abused its discretion in recognizing the concept of brain
death.48 He held that the absence of a legislative answer to the question
whether an irreversible cessation of brain functioning can be used to deter-
mine death did not preclude the court from resolving the issue.
49
Thus, relying on current scientific views and medical opinions, judicial
decisions, and legislation enacted in other states, the court established for
Colorado the proposed Uniform Brain Death Act which defines legal death
as an irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain. 50 This test was
adopted as an alternative to the traditional standard of death based upon
total stoppage of blood circulation and a cessation of vital functions such as
respiration and pulse.
5 1
43. Id. at 46, 529 P.2d at 1332 (quoting Larrick v. North Kiowa Bijou Management Dist.,
181 Colo. 395, 404, 510 P.2d 323, 328 (1973)).
44. 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
45. 187 Colo. at 45, 529 P.2d at 1331.
46. Id.
47. 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979).
48. Id. at 1075.
49. Id. at 1081.
50. Id. " 'For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible ces-
sation of all functioning of the brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination under
this section must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards.' " Id.
51. Id. at 1076.
[Vol. 58:1
JA MES K GROVES
In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc. 52 the operators of an antique shop
brought a libel action against a newspaper for publication of material con-
cerning the purchase for resale of allegedly stolen goods. The Colorado
Supreme Court was asked to fashion a standard of liability applicable to a
publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual but involving a matter of general public interest.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,53 the United States Supreme Court ex-
pressly gave the states authority to create appropriate standards for such
situations. Accordingly, Justice Groves, speaking for a majority of the Colo-
rado court, adopted the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. 54 He held that the publisher of a defamatory statement con-
cerning one who is not a public official or public figure but involving a mat-
ter of public concern will be liable to the person defamed only if the
publisher knew the statement was false or if the statement was made with a
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.
55
Justice Groves qualified the adoption of the Rosenbloom rule, however,
with the limitation that a finding of reckless disregard need not be based
upon a finding that the publisher actually had serious doubts about the
truth of the statement published.56 Justice Groves noted that his holding
was based on the court's conclusions that a simple negligence rule would
result in such a chilling effect on the media that only insufficient facts would
be printed in order to protect itself against libel actions and this insufficiency
would be more harmful to the public interest than an absence of adequate
compensation to a defamed private individual.
5 7
Hitgel v. General Motors Corp.5 was a products liability suit presenting
the issue whether a manufacturer's failure to warn of dangers inherent in the
use or misuse of a product can render defective a product that is otherwise
free of defect. The case involved an action by the purchaser of a motor
home against the manufacturer and retailer for damages resulting when the
rear wheels separated from the vehicle during operation. The supreme
court, through Justice Groves, expressly adopted for Colorado the doctrine
of strict liability in tort as articulated in section 402A of the second Restate-
ment of Torts.5 9 He then pronounced the existence of a duty to warn of
potential hazards and held that a failure to comply with this duty may make
a product defective when the proximate cause of an injury is a breach of this
52. 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
53. 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974).
54. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
55. 188 Colo. at 98-99, 538 P.2d at 457.
56. Id. at 98, 538 P.2d at 457.
57. Id. at 99, 538 P.2d at 458.
58. 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975).
59. Id. at 63, 544 P.2d at 987. This portion of the Restatement is as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial




The court disagreed with the lower court's ruling that the plaintiff was
precluded from recovery by reason of his general experience and knowledge
as to wheel maintenance. Justice Groves held that the general knowledge of
wheel maintenance and of the fact that stud nuts must be kept tight was not
the legal equivalent of knowledge of the manufacturer's torque require-
ments. Only relevant knowledge and understanding of the plaintiff, for ex-
ample, if the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter
a known risk, could amount to a defense under section 402A's'strict liability
theory.
6 1
Justice Groves further ruled that the duty to warn is not satisfied by
instructions about use of the product which say nothing about inherent dan-
gers likely to arise if the instructions are not followed. 62 Additionally, the
court extended the doctrine of strict liability to cover damage done to the
defective product as well as harm caused the ultimate user or consumer and
his property. However, the court declined to extend this doctrine to cover
commercial or business loss. 6 3 And, finally, Justice Groves announced that
where a component part is incorporated without change into some larger
product, the remote manufacturer will be strictly liable to the ultimate user
or consumer for damage resulting from defects in the part.
64
CONCLUSION
Despite his wide travels and significant legal accomplishments, Justice
Groves remained in his heart a Western Slope citizen. He was very devoted
to his wife, Verna, and his three children. His high dedication to the legal
profession is reflected in an outstanding scholastic record as a law student,
his success and national reputation as a private practitioner, and his regard
as a hard working, outstanding, and distinguished jurist on the Colorado
Supreme Court. This dedication to the law and a desire for improving judi-
cial processes resulted in his significant contribution to the body of Colorado
law. This contribution, in turn, is one of the reasons Colorado's judicial sys-
tem enjoys a fine national reputation. The memories of Justice James K.
Groves as an outstanding person, lawyer, and jurist will long remain.
65
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1979).
60. 190 Colo. at 63, 544 P.2d at 988.
61. Id. at 64, 544 P.2d at 988.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 64-65, 544 P.2d at 989.
64. Id. at 65, 544 P.2d at 989.
65. The DENVER LAW JOURNAL wishes to recognize Randall J. Feuerstein, Diane L. Burk-
hardt, and Stephen M. Brown for their efforts in the preparation of this article.
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THE PROBLEM OF DELAY IN THE COLORADO
COURT OF APPEALS
BY JOHN A. MARTIN*
AND ELIZABETH A. PRESCOTT**
In the past two decades, state appellate courts have experienced a dra-
matic increase in both caseload volume and delay. In many jurisdictions,
average case processing times are no longer a matter of days but are mea-
sured in terms of months and years.
Delay is more than a statistical curiosity. Courts render decisions which
may permanently alter the quality of individuals' lives. Appellate courts
often determine whether a person will be compensated for injury or loss,
released from custody, or incarcerated for a lengthy period of time. Lives
may be seriously disrupted as individuals, unable to plan for the future,
await the final disposition of their cases.
Although the existence of delay in state court systems has been gener-
ally recognized,' its causes are still primarily a matter of speculation. Simi-
larly, solutions offered 2 remain largely untested, their effects largely
unknown.
This article assesses the impact of volume and delay in the Colorado
Court of Appeals. The court is one of eleven, across the nation, examined by
the staff of the Appellate Justice Improvement Project, a research effort con-
ducted under the auspices of the National Center for State Courts.3 Project
findings are based on data from a sample of 863 cases filed during 1975 and
1976. Additionally, judges and members of the court staff were interviewed
* Staff Associate, National Center for State Courts; B.A., Fort Lewis College; M.A. Uni-
versity of Colorado; PhD candidate University of Colorado.
** Staff Associate, National Center for State Courts; B.A., University of Louisville;
M.S.J.A., J.D., University of Denver College of Law.
This research was conducted under Grants No. 78-DF-AX-0021 and No. 79-DF-AX-0082,
awarded to the National Center for State Courts by the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration of the U.S. Department of Justice. Additional funding was supplied by the Charles E.
Culpeper Foundation. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the au-
thors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice, the Charles E. Culpeper Foundation, the National Center for State Courts, or the pro-
ject advisory board. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration reserves the right to
reproduce, publish, translate, or otherwise use, and to authorize others to publish and use, any
or all parts of the copyrighted material contained in this article.
1. See notes 4-12, 15-21 infra and accompanying text.
2. Id.
3. Besides the Colorado Court of Appeals, the courts studied in the project were: the
Florida Supreme Court; the Florida First District Court of Appeal; the Illinois Appellate Court,
First District; the Indiana Court of Appeals; the Montana Supreme Court; the Nebraska
Supreme Court; the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division; the Ohio Court of Appeals,
Eighth District; the Oregon Court of Appeals, and the Virginia Supreme Court. The studies
are published individually by the National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Virginia.
The entire study is hereinafter cited as Volume and Delay Staff Study Series.
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to provide information on the operation of the court. Thus, both quantita-
tive and qualitative data are used to explain the phenomena observed.
The article focuses on the rules and procedures of the court of appeals.
It notes delay has been a problem, locates the primary source in the pre-
decision phase of the appellate process, and explores the causes for excessive
case processing time. Suggestions for alleviating the delay problems are also
offered.
I. ASSESSING APPELLATE COURT DELAY
Previous studies have dealt extensively with the sources of delay in ap-
pellate courts and courts in general. These studies have suggested a myriad
of responses available to courts challenged by expanding caseloads and un-
acceptable case processing times. Although the scope of prior efforts to iden-
tify the loci of delay has varied, the conclusions of these studies have, for the
most part, isolated three potential sources:
1) Caseload; i.e., appellate courts simply do not have the person-
nel or resources to keep up with increasing case volumes:
When all is considered, there is little that can be
done about volume. The tide of affairs which
produces litigation and appeals is largely be-
yond our control. . . . In the end, if appellate
justice is to be provided, there is no alternative
to the erection of a judicial system of a size suffi-
cient to accommodate the needs of all citizens
seeking just decisions.
4
2) Inefficiency; i.e.,judges and other appellate court personnel do
not use their time effectively. Courts are poorly organized and
inadequately administered. Even if appellate court resources
were increased, litigants would still encounter substantial case
processing time delays;5 and
3) A combination of both groups 1 and 2 above. There are too
many cases, courts lack sufficient resources and are poorly
organized and administered.
6
As might be expected, suggested solutions to appellate delay vary with
the perceived source of the problem. A recent survey 7 has classified solutions
into two general categories. Adding resources is the response recommended
for a burdensome caseload, and restructuring existing resources is the re-
sponse to inefficiency. The first category takes a volume oriented approach
to delay while the second seeks to directly attack delay.
A. Volume Onented Approach to Delay
Solutions placed in the "adding resources" category are volume ori-
4. P.D. CARRINGTON, J. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 136 (1976).
5. See, e.g., O'Connell, Streamlining Appellate Procedures, 56 JUDICATURE 234 (1973).
6. E.g., J. OSTHUS & S. SHAPIRO, CONGESTION AND DELAY IN STATE APPELLATE
COURTS (1974); THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAw ExPLOSION (-I. Jones ed. 1965).
7. S.L. Wasby, T.B. Marvel, and A.B. Aikman, Volume and Delay in State Appellate
Courts: Problems and Responses, chs. IV-V (1979) (published by National Center for State
Courts).
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ented. Although differing in the degree to which volume is emphasized, they
are all designed to decrease the ratio of cases to personnel. They assume if
more people are available to handle fewer cases, the time required to process
cases will decrease appreciably. Examples of such solutions include: more
judges;8 more law clerks, central staff, and administrative personnel;9 estab-
lishing intermediate appellate courts;10 transferring appeals from mandatory
to discretionary jurisdiction," and unitary review in criminal cases.'
2
A problem with volume oriented solutions is they require enlisting the
aid of other governmental units. Constitutional and statutory provisions de-
fine the scope of the court's legal and geographic jurisdiction. Caseloads will
increase if jurisdiction, or the population the courts serves, expands. The
resources needed to meet greater demands on the court might include a
larger budget, more judges and support staff, and better facilities. The au-
thority to allocate such resources, however, generally lies with state legisla-
tures, and not the courts.
The Colorado Court of Appeals is an intermediate appellate court. It
hears appeals from district court judgments and directly reviews decisions of
the Industrial Commission and other specialized boards. 13 The court was
created on January 1, 1970, to expedite the processing of civil appeals. On
July 1, 1974, its jurisdiction was expanded to include criminal cases. At the
same time, the court was increased in size from six to ten judges, at which
size it remains today.
The caseload of the court of appeals has expanded dramatically in re-
cent years, and not all of the increase is explained by the modification of
jurisdiction. The data on which this study is based was drawn from cases
filed during calendar years 1975 and 1976. In FY 1975, 858 appeals were
filed, an increase of 414 cases, or 93%, over FY 1974.14 Though some 283 of
these cases were criminal appeals, civil appeals increased by almost 30%.' 5
The court's caseload continued to increase in FY 1977 and FY 1978, with
1,128 and 1,119 filings, respectively.'
6
Volume oriented delay has not yet become a major problem in the Col-
orado Court of Appeals. The number of filings-per-judge was 86:1 in 1975
and 92:1 in 1976. This compares favorably with caseloads of over 200
filings-per-judge in other state appellate courts.
17
8. See CARRINGTON, MEADOR, & ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 137.
9. Id. at 113.
10. See R.A. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 66
(1976).
11. See ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, § 3.10 & Commentary (1977).
12. See D.J. MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPEALS: ENGLISH PRACTICES AND AMERICAN RE-
FORMS 178-84 (1973); Robinson, Proposal and Analysis of a Undaqy System for Revzew of Criminal
Judgments, 54 B.U. L. REV. 485 (1974).
13. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-4-102 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
14. OFFICE OF THE ST. COURT ADM'R, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT OF THE COLO-
RADO JUDICIARY 56 (1979).
15. Id.
16. id.
17. See Volume and Delay Staff Study Series, supra note 3 Filings-per-judge ratios in some
of the other sample courts were:
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A volume oriented approach to delay in the Colorado Court of Appeals
indicates there is a reasonable balance between the quantitative demands
placed on the court and the existing resources able to meet those demands.
Caseloads, themselves, are not a major source of delay. However, if individ-
ual cases are processed inefficiently, delay will be a direct result.
B. Delay Directed Approaches
When inefficiency is perceived to be the source of appellate delay, pro-
posed solutions are concerned with the restructuring of existing resources.
This may involve caseflow management,' pre-argument settlement confer-
ences,1 9 case screening, 20 abbreviated briefs,
2' use of panels or divisions,22
and memoranda2 3 or unpublished opinions.2 4 Such solutions can be viewed
as more specifically delay directed.
Delay directed solutions do not assume large case volume is necessarily
the only, or even primary, cause of delay. They emphasize delay must be
attacked directly by implementing procedural changes that would reduce
the case processing time of various phases of the appellate process. Delay
directed solutions can be considered elements of a case management system,
whereby an appellate court controls and monitors its caseload from lower
court judgment to mandate.
The rules and procedures of the Colorado Court of Appeals are its pri-
mary means of directing delay. In examining the appellate process, proce-
dures were divided into two general categories. The pre-decision phase
marks the interval between entry of the lower court judgment and the re-
ceipt of all documents necessary for the appeal. The decision phase marks
the interval between perfection of the appeal and the appellate decision.
C. Colorado Appellate Procedures
1. The Pre-Decision Phase
Notices of appeal were filed in the district court within thirty days of the
1975 1976
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division 207:1 230:1
Virginia Supreme Court 218:1 239:1
Florida First District Court of Appeal 333:1 375:1
Oregon Court of Appeals 256:1 308:1
18. See M. SOLOMON, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT 4 (ABA COMM'N
ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTING STUDIES No. 2, 1973).
19. See Goldman, The Appellate Settlement Conference.- An Efective Procedural Reform? 2 STATE
COURT J. 3, 4-8 (1978).
20. See Haworth, Screenihg and Summay Procedures in the United States Court of Appeals, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 257.
21. See D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOL-
UME 101 (1974).
22. See L.M. HYDE, METHODS OF REACHING AND PREPARING APPELLATE COURT DECI-
SIONS 6-8 (1972).
23. See English, Cruis i'n Civil Appeals, 50 CHI. B. REc. 231 (1969).
24. See COMM. ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPEL-
LATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 2 (1973).
[Vol. 58:1
PROBLEM OF DELA Y
entry of final judgment, 25 unless an extension was granted by the trial
court. 26 Appellant's attorney also filed, within ten days of the notice of ap-
peal, a designation of record with the clerk of the trial court.
2 7
The record was due in the trial court forty days after its designation. 28
The trial court could grant one extension of up to fifty days for filing the
record.2 9 Subsequent extensions could be30 and were granted by the court
of appeals. When the record was filed with the clerk of the court, appellant's
counsel was required to file a designation of parties and to pay a docketing
fee.
3'
Once the record was received by the court of appeals, the attorneys
were mailed a notification of record filing.3 2 The appellant was then re-
quired to file his brief within forty days of notification.3 3 The appellee's
brief was due thirty days thereafter, and the appellant's reply brief, if any,
fourteen days later.34 Extensions to the briefing schedule were granted by
the clerk of the court.
35
Once all briefs were received, the case was designated "at issue." Unless
a staff attorney reviewed the case, it was then considered ready to be sched-
uled for oral argument.
2. The Decision Phase
The court of appeals sits in three panels of three judges each. The chief
judge acts as substitute panel member when an absence occurs through ill-
ness, vacation, or disqualification. These panels rotate every four months so
that, each year, each judge sits with every other judge.
Whenever a court sits in panels, differences in the resolution of some
legal questions are bound to arise. To identify interpanel conflicts, the court
conducts a weekly all-court conference. All opinions to be issued are distrib-
uted to the members prior to the conference. In this way, all judges are kept
informed of each panel's decisions. The conference, thus, allows any con-
flicts to be readily identified.
The chief judge assigns cases to the panels. No individual assignments
are made until after oral argument, which is scheduled automatically in
most cases. The three division judges normally decide informally among
themselves as to particular writing assignments.
Draft opinions are circulated among panel members for final approval.
25. CoLO. App. R. 4(a); see id. 3(a).
26. Id. 4(a).
27. Id. 10(b). Adoption of a pre-argument settlement conference procedure in 1976
changed this process slightly. Designation and preparation of the record could be deferred
pending the conference. See id. 33 and text accompanying notes 52-54 inhfa.
28. CoLo. App. R. I I(a).






35. See id. 26(b) (appellate court may grant time extensions for good cause shown but not
for filing notice of appeal).
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Once approved, opinions are distributed to the entire court. At the weekly
all-court conference, the court reviews all opinions proposed for publication.
It also reviews any opinion not proposed for publication which the author or
another judge wishes discussed. This review is directed at both the form and
substance of the opinion.
II. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF APPELLATE DELAY
A. General Framework
To determine if delay exists and in turn to identify its causes, one must
first measure case processing time. In this study, case processing time is de-
fined as the number of days that elapse between judgment in the initial fo-
rum, usually a trial court, and the date a final mandate is issued by the
appellate court. This is not the interval which the courts, themselves, tend to
regard as the appellate case processing time. They customarily measure
from the time of the filing of the appeal to the release of the opinion. This
study uses a more comprehensive time frame because it represents the total
time the litigants are involved in the appeal and thus is the basis by which
they assess appellate delay.
In addition, a comprehensive time frame views the appeals process as a
system whose efficient operation is dependent on the actions of a variety of
actors. It emphasizes the important roles played by lower court judges and
clerks, attorneys, appellate court judges and their staff, and, where applica-
ble, supreme court judges and their support personnel.
Table 1 presents a data summary of the number of days required by the
Colorado Court of Appeals to process cases through the entire appellate sys-
tem, from lower court judgment to mandate. On the average, a total of 431
days were required to process cases. Oral argument cases took longer, aver-
aging 475 days while non-oral argument cases averaged only 315 days.
36
TABLE 1
TOTAL AVERAGE CASE PROCESSING TIME
Standard
Total Processing Time: Mean Median Deviation N
All Cases 431 days 418 days 194 days 660
Oral Argument Cases 475 days 431 days 183 days 482
Non-Oral Argument Cases 315 days 286 days 174 days 177
Although total case processing time is a useful measure of the appellate
system's overall performance, the time interval was divided in order to iso-
late specific problem areas. The division corresponds to the pre-decision and
decision phases of the Colorado appellate process but with several refine-
ments. The time between the appeal's decision and the issuance of a man-
date, Step 3, was evaluated independently, and, in cases having oral
argument, the decision phase was further divided into two parts: step 2A is
36. When compared with other jurisdictions studied, the Colorado mean case processing
time, for both oral and non-oral argument cases, is about average. Seegnera/ly Martin & Pres-
cott, State Appellate Courts. The Problems of Delay, 4 STATE COURT. J. 9, 10 (1980).
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the time between perfection of the appeal and date of oral argument; step 2B
the time between oral argument and the date the decision is announced.
B. Existence of Delay zn the Court of Appeals
Information presented in Table 2 points to step 1, the pre-decision
phase, as a particular area of concern in the Colorado process. The interval
between trial court judgment and receipt of all necessary documents by the
appellate court averaged 47% of the total case processing time. In contrast,
the proportionate time figures for the decision and mandate phases were 36%
and 17%, respectively, for oral argument cases and 32% and 16% for cases
submitted on the briefs.
TABLE 2
STEPS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CASE PROCESSING TIME
STEP I STEP 2A STEP 2B STEP 3 TOTAL DAYS
ORAL ARGUMENT CASES:
I = 224 days 2A = 106 days 2B = 69 days 3 = 81 days 480 days
47% 22% 14% 17% (N = 446)
NON-ORAL ARGUMENT CASES:
I = 227 days 2A & B = 141 days 3 = 71 days 439 days
52% 32% 16% (N = 51)
A lengthy preparation phase is not a phenomenon unique to the Colo-
rado appellate system. Analysis of case data from other courts included in
the study revealed that, for oral argument cases, the average elapsed time
during this phase ranged from a low of 153 days in the Oregon Court of
Appeals, 37 to a high of 383 days in the Illinois Appellate Court, First Dis-
trict.38 Although the specific number of days differed from court to court, in
all but one of the courts, pre-decision processing time represented the largest
percentage of total case processing time.
39
Whether a given case processing time is acceptable or not (whether or
not it constitutes "delay") is largely a perceptual matter. A year to complete
an appeal may be acceptable to some individuals but not to others, or may
be acceptable in one state but not in another. More objective criteria for
37. J.A. Martin & E.A. Prescott, Volume and Delay in the Oregon Court of Appeals 32
(1980); see note 3 supra.
38. J.A. Martin & E.A. Prescott, Volume and Delay in the Illinois Appellate Court, First
District 36 (1980); see note 3 supra.
39. Pre-decision time ranged from 41% of the total appellate process in the Florida Court
of Appeal to 62% in the New Jersey Superior Court. Volume and Delay Staff Study Series,
supra note 3.
The exception was the Ohio Court of Appeals, Eighth District. In Ohio, the appellate rules
provide that all issues raised on appeal must be addressed in the opinion. Writing time is sub-
stantial. Consequently, the judges arbitrarily limit the number of cases to be heard at each
session of oral argument, causing more cases to come to issue than can be heard by the court.
The largest percentage of time elapses in this period, not in the materials preparation phase. See
J.A. Martin & E.A. Prescott, Volume and Delay in the Ohio Court of Appeals 39 (1980).
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determining the acceptability of case processing time, however, are avail-
able. The court of appeal's own rules governing time requirements and the
standards advanced by the American Bar Association 40 are used in this
study's examination of the Colorado appellate process.
An examination of the components of total case processing time con-
firms that problems associated with preparation and transmittal of docu-
ments to the court of appeals are a major source of delay. Table 3 compares
average case processing time from different steps in the appellate process
with a time requirement specified in the court rules and the standards estab-
lished by the American Bar Association. Specifically, 66% of all cases
processed exceeded the maximum time prescribed by the court rules for
perfecting an appeal. 41 Approximately 80% of the Colorado cases exceeded
the ABA standard.
42
In addition, in 76% of the cases, filing the appellant's brief took longer
than the forty days prescribed by the court rules. 43 Filing the appellee's
brief took longer than the thirty days specified by the court rules in 66% of
the cases.
4 4
The decision phase of the appellate process appears to be a relatively
minor source of delay. Data presented in Table 3 reveal that an average of
113 days elapsed between the date when cases were ready to be heard and
the date of oral argument. This waiting time is relatively short compared
with other courts included in this study.
4 5
The court of appeals has no rules specifying how fast cases should be
decided after oral arguments have been heard although there is an informal
policy that majority opinions are due ninety days after argument.4 6 How-
ever, the ABA standards47 do provide some guidance. Data presented in
Table 3 for the decision phase reveal that 28% of all oral argument cases had
decisions announced by the court in a period of thirty days or less after oral
argument while 55% were completed in the sixty day maximum time period
established in the ABA standards. Moreover, 74% of the oral argument cases
were heard within ninety days after materials had been filed, while over 85%
were completed within 120 days.
40. ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING
To APPELLATE COURTS (1977) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
41. The total time limit prescribed for the pre-decision phase by the Colorado Court of
Appeals is 164 days. See notes 25-34 supra and accompanying text. This time limit does not
reflect changes made in 1976 to accomodate pre-argument settlement conference procedures.
See text accompanying notes 52-54 zn/fa.
42. See ABA STANDARDS, srupra note 40, §§ 3.13, 3.52.
43. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
44. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
45. Only the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Montana Supreme Court, and the Nebraska
Supreme Court had waiting averages of less than 100 days. Martin & Prescott, supra note 36, at
1I; see Volume and Delay Staff Study Series, supra note 3.
46. Interviews with Harry S. Silverstein, Chief Judge Colorado Court of Appeals, in Den-
ver (July-Aug., 1978).
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In cases submitted without oral argument, decision time is measured
between the date all materials were filed and the date when the court an-
nounced a decision. Table 3 indicates non-oral argument cases were gener-
ally processed more quickly than oral argument cases, but the specific times
involved were usually in excess of the ABA standards. Only 2% of the cases
involved decision processing times of less than the thirty day average recom-
mended by the ABA, and only 7% fell below the sixty day maximum stan-
dard. Moreover, only 67% of the non-oral argument cases were processed in
under 120 days.
The large average of 142 days may reflect problematic aspects of the
scheduling procedure in effect during the period when data for this study
were collected. Non-oral argument cases were assigned the next available
spot on the court's calendar and considered in sequence. Consequently, non-




Finally, Table 3 reveals that the time between announcing decisions in
the court of appeals and issuing mandates averaged eighty-two days. The
eighty-two day average is perhaps misleading because it had been inflated
by cases which took an extraordinarily long period of time. The 39 day
median more accurately reflects post-decision time for the majority of cases.
For example, 44% of all cases decided by the court exhibited times between
decision and mandate of less than thirty days, and 60% took less than sixty
days. Twenty-two percent exhibited post-decision times of between 60 and
120 days. The remaining 12%, cases which took over 120 days, were almost
exclusively those in which petitions for certiorari were filed with the Colo-
rado Supreme Court.
III. THE CAUSES OF APPELLATE DELAY
A. Sources
The case processing time data indicated there was delay in the Colo-
rado appellate process, especially in the pre-decision phase. Sources of delay
can be found in the interactions among the organizational aspects of a court,
the activities of the persons in that court, and the cases filed in it. These
elements are explored to identify the causes of delay in the Colorado Court
of Appeals.
1. Inter-Court Relations
The lack of efficient coordination between trial and appellate courts is a
significant factor at the pre-decision phase. The court of appeals was re-
stricted in managing its caseload at this crucial stage because the first five
months of the appellate process were in the hands of the lower courts. 48
Trial court clerks failed to monitor the flow of case materials to insure that
the time limits fixed by the appellate rules were met. As a result, the prepa-
ration and filing of records and transcripts were frequently delayed.
Trial judges may be contributing to the problem by not consistently
following any established policies governing the granting of extensions for
filing notices of appeal, records, and transcripts. They are apt to accord
little priority to monitoring preparation of the record, feeling their active
involvement with the case ended when judgment was entered.
A more basic problem is the conflicting goals of the trial and appellate
courts when a record is delayed by a tardy court reporter. The appellate
court may want the record prepared promptly at whatever cost, even remov-
ing the reporter from the courtroom if necessary. The trial judge, however,
has a vested interest in keeping that reporter in the courtroom to prevent
delay in the processing of his docket. Trial judges, then, are not want to
pressure reporters to prepare transcripts diligently.
48. Notices of appeal are filed with the trial court. Trial courts are also responsible for
preparation of the record, and trial judges may grant extensions for the filing of the notice of
appeal and transcript. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
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2. Brief Filing
The late filing of briefs and other documents by attorneys is another
prime source of delay. Delay in preparing the transcripts and lower court
records undoubtedly accounted for some of the time between judgment and
the filing of the appellant's brief. Clearly, attorneys would have difficulty
trying to prepare briefs without having full information available concerning
proceedings in the lower court.
Excessive brief time is probably not a result of attorneys preparing ex-
ceptionally long or complex briefs. On the contrary, briefs filed with the
court of appeals are short and rarely exceed the page limits specified in its
rules.49 The excessive average brief preparation time may reflect, in part,
the fact that a significant number of briefs took an extraordinarily long time
to file, thereby dramatically skewing the average.
3. Case Characteristics
Relationships between case characteristics and case processing time in
the court of appeals were examined in depth. Civil appeals constituted 70%
of the total case load, with commericial and property cases being most com-
mon. The remaining 30% of the caseload consisted of criminal appeals, prin-
cipally robbery, burglary, assault, theft, and narcotics cases. Private
attorneys represented over one-half of all the litigants in the court of appeals.
The Public Defender's Office represented 21% of all the appellants, and the
Attorney General's Office represented 34% of all appellees, making those
bodies significant forces in the Colorado appellate system.
Generally, no significant relationship was found between case charac-
teristics and case processing time. Case processing time did not significantly
vary with the type of appellants and appellees involved in the case, the type
of attorneys, the subject matter, the issues raised as grounds for appeal, or
the source of appeal.
A noteworthy exception was criminal cases. Criminal appeals, espe-
cially those involving the Public Defender's Office, averaged ninety process-
ing days longer than other cases. Criminal appeals, although a minority of
the total caseload, may have been a major source of excessive brief prepara-
tion time.
4. Court Rules and Procedures
The rules and procedures of the Colorado Court of Appeals has occu-
pied a central position in this study of delay. Conceptually, rules are an
expression of the court's goals; procedures are means to implement those
goals. The rules also serve as a benchmark for assessing the performance of
the court: Are the participants meeting the time requirements set by court
rule?
Data generally indicated the court was operating efficiently at the deci-
49. J.A. Martin & E.A. Prescott, Volume and Delay in the Colorado Court of Appeals 24
(1980); see note 3 supra.
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sion stage of the appellate process. Cases were being decided, opinions as-
signed and written, decisions announced, and mandates issued in a relatively
short period of time. However, the court's rules for filing pre-decision mater-
ials were not being consistently followed.
Delays in the preparation of trial materials and attorneys' briefs re-
sulted in the routine granting of time extensions by the court of appeals. On
the average, 2.5 motions for time extensions were requested per appeal,
many to file the same document. Such requests were granted 99.5% of the
time. Among the eight sample courts for which information was available,
only the Illinois Appellate Court [Chicago] exceeded Colorado with 3.5 aver-
age extensions per case. 50
Most requests for extensions were for the filing of briefs. There was no
uniform policy for enforcing the rules requiring the prompt preparation and
submission of briefs. Sanctions against dilatory attorneys were rarely, if ever,
imposed. Briefs from the Public Defender's Office were, particularly, chroni-
cally overdue, but the court perceived it was bound by constitutional man-
dates not to dismiss these appeals, no matter how delayed the brief.5
B. Procedural Responses to Perceived Delay Problems
The court's own perception of delay can affect the processing of appeals.
This perception may be either of specific cases which are considered to re-
quire a fast disposition, or of the caseload as a whole. In the former instance,
the perception of urgency can prompt special treatment of the cases in ques-
tion. In the latter, the perception of systemic delay can prompt both in-
creased individual productivity, and reexamination and possible revision of
the appellate system. The Colorado Court of Appeals has modified a
number of procedures since the statistics for this study were gathered.
1. Pre-Argument Settlement Conferences
In 1976, the court began the routine use of pre-argument settlement
conferences5 2 for civil appeals, a practice which continues at the present
time. During 1976, pre-argument settlement conferences were held in 535
cases. 53 Most conferences were conducted at the court's headquarters in
Denver, but conferences have been held around the state, especially when
several can be scheduled in one location.
Conference procedures can have the positive effect of streamlining the
pre-decision phase of the appellate process. After filing the designation of
parties, attorneys file pre-argument statements. Upon receipt of these docu-
ments, cases are randomly assigned to a "reviewing judge." During the set-
tlement conference process, preparation of the record is suspended. If there
is no settlement, the pre-argument judge enters orders regarding filing of the
record and briefs.
50. J.A. Martin & E.A. Prescott, supra note 38, at 9.
51. See COLO. CONST. art. II, §§ 6, 16, 25; Haines v. People, 169 Colo. 136, 454 P.2d 595
(1969). See a/so Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
52. COLO. App. R. 33.
53. Statistics provided by the Colorado Court of Appeals.
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To date there has not been any structured evaluation of the conference
procedure. However, statistics and records were kept by each of the judges
on dispositions through the settlement conference procedure. Most of the
judges indicate support for the conferences. They note higher dismissal
rates54 in recent years reflect an increased number of settlements.
2. Staff Attorney Processing
Since August, 1977, the court has employed two staff attorneys to assist
in the disposition of appeals. These staff processing procedures can result in
greater time efficiency at the decision phase of appeals.
The staff attorneys screen cases once they are perfected and prepare
research memoranda. Once the research is complete, the cases are assigned
to a division, usually in lots of three, so that there is one staff attorney case
per judge. The division to which the case is assigned reviews the memoran-
dum and, if the preliminary work is satisfactory, notifies the attorneys for the
parties that oral argument is not deemed necessary. Attorneys may, of
course, insist that oral argument be scheduled despite the court's request for
waiver. If there is no argument, the case will then be assigned to a judge for
opinion.
3. Accelerated Docket Program
In May 1978, the court of appeals began an Accelerated Docket Pro-
gram 55 to expedite the processing of civil appeals. The objective of the pro-
gram is to dispose of more appeals in a period of increasing case volume
through shorter records, briefs, and limited, if any, oral argument. It may
also help resolve appeals at reduced costs to litigants.
The Accelerated Docket Program has been applied to cases where a
transcript is unnecessary or where the transcript is not more than twenty-five
pages long.56 It requires trial court clerks to foward the notice of appeal
immediately to the court of appeals, a procedure which though required,
was not always followed in the past. The court then sends instructions to
counsel containing information about the accelerated docket and a request
for the filing, within fourteen days, of a preliminary statement, the designa-
tion of parties, and the docketing fee. The preliminary statement must con-
tain a description of the case, the listing of the issues to be raised on appeal,
and a designation of the parts of the record deemed necessary to resolve the
appeal.
These statements are reviewed by a staff attorney, who recommends to
the accelerated docket division which cases should be so processed. Counsel
are notified by a judge of the division upon approval of that recommenda-
tion.
Assignment to the accelerated docket changes the time requirements
54. Id.
55. COLO. App. R. 10.1.
56. See Danford, Improvements in the Colorado Court ofAppealr Docket Aogram, I App. COURT
AD. REV. 15 (1979).
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during the pre-decision phase. For example, the abbreviated record and
opening brief in accelerated cases are due within fifteen days and the answer
brief fifteen days later. A reply brief, if any, is due within five days. No
opening or answer brief may exceed twenty pages, nor may replies exceed
ten pages.
The accelerated docket can also change the time standards for the deci-
sion phase of the appellate process. If the case is accelerated, the court will
usually request that counsel waive oral argument although limited (fifteen
minute) argument may be granted. When oral argument is waived, appeals
on the accelerated docket are decided on a separate schedule. It is the intent
of the judges that opinions for accelerated docket cases will issue more rap-
idly as well.
The court has experimented with the accelerated docket program for
about two years, and at present, it appears that the court will continue to use
the procedure.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Colorado Court of Appeals has encountered numerous problems in
the management of its appellate caseload. The source of lengthy case
processing time is centered in the pre-decision phase of the appellate process.
The court's rules specifying the time limits for perfecting an appeal were not
being consistently followed by trial court clerks, court reporters, and attor-
neys. Extensions for the filing of transcripts, records, and briefs were granted
as a matter of course.
This study indicates caseload volume, per se, has not yet become a ma-
jor source of delay. Judicial workloads in the Colorado Court of Appeals are
relatively light compared with other jurisdictions. It is the delay directed
solutions, such as procedural modifications, that are likely to have the great-
est impact on appellate inefficiencies.
There have been some procedural changes since the statistics for this
study were gathered, although it is impossible to know to what degree the
court has benefited. Notices of appeal are now fowarded by the trial court
immediately to the court of appeals. Time extension requests are subject to
greater scrutiny as the court attempts to enforce substantial compliance with
court rules. In some instances, the time to file appellate documents, espe-
cially briefs, has been reduced.
All of these changes are important steps to assure the rapid processing of
appellate cases. Simply focusing attention on the pre-decision phase will
likely reduce elapsed time. The data from all the courts point to one critical
fact: where the court chooses to ignore the process, elapsed time for that step
(or those steps) lengthens dramatically.
The implementation of the Accelerated Docket Program is the most im-
portant of the changes introduced by the court. The accelerated docket pro-
vides an alternate processing track for certain kinds of civil appeals. It is in
part likely to be successful because it circumvents two often-delayed steps in
the appellate process: preparation of the record and the scheduling of oral
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argument. Its procedure insures early communication between court and
counsel and provides the court with accurate and readily accessible case-
tracking information.
Further steps could be taken by the court to decrease processing time.
The implementation and enforcement of rules that vest all authority for the
management of appeals in the appellate court would eliminate some delay
that results from the current trial-appellate court overlap. The court might
also develop and implement a uniform policy with regard to time extensions.
The cooperation of counsel is vitally important to the efficient process-
ing of appellate cases. Any procedure, no matter how carefully developed
and administered, may be subverted by counsel. The court is making a sin-
cere effort to deal with the problems of delay; the solutions it has chosen
appear to effectively address the issue of lengthening processing time. But
the court and the attorneys who appear before the court of appeals must
work together to see that cases are processed promptly. Ultimately, it is in
the best interests of both to assure that appeals are routed through the court
to a swift decision.

MEDIA ACCESS AND A FREE PRESS: PURSUING
FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES WITHOUT
IMPERILING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
DON LIVELY*
The concept of free expression was constitutionalized' at a time when
public communication was highly personalized 2 and the roles of speaking
and listening were easily interchanged. Nearly two centuries later, however,
first amendment guarantees operate in a technological context that has oper-
ated to dichotomize those roles and create distinct classes of speakers and
listeners. The evolution of public expression, from a setting characterized by
unamplified speech, community forums, and hand printed or set publica-
tions, to one dominated by prolific and pervasive media forces has created
great "distortions in [the] system of free expression.
' ' 3 Media concentration 4
and scarcity of media outlets5 have lowered the ratio of communicators to
receivers and have contributed to the decline of face-to-face dialogue and the
rise of institutionalized information brokers.
6
The consequences of those changes have occasioned protective efforts to
safeguard first amendment values (if not always first amendment rights) by
attempting to regulate diversity into the mass media. Such diversification
schemes rest upon the principle that dissemination of information:
with as many different facets and colors as . . .possible . . . is
closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected
by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are
* Law clerk for Hon. Jim R. Carrigan, Judge, United States District Court, Denver,
Colorado (1979-80). J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; M.S., Northwestern Univer-
sity; A.B., University of California, Berkeley.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.
2. See Minow in S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA at ix (1978);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974).
3. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 653 (1970).
4. From 1923 to 1973, the percentage of American daily newspapers engaged in direct
competition withered from 60% to 5.4%. B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
49 (1975). By the early 1970's, about half of the nation's daily newspapers were chain owned.
H. BRUCKER, COMMUNICATION IS POWER 333 (1973). Newspaper publishing thus had become
dominated by national newspaper chains and wire services. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249 (1974). Meanwhile, much of the programming control in broadcast-
ing had come under the control of three major networks. See Robinson, The Federal Communica-
tions Commzstn. An Essay on Regulatoy Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 260 (1978).
5. Between 1910 and 1978, the number of daily newspapers in the United States dimin-
ished from about 2,600 to about 1,750. See Comment, Local Monopoly in the Daly Newspaper
Indust, 61 YALE L.J 948, 949 n.12 (1952); 1979 Ed. & Pub. Int'l Y.B. (1979) pt. 1. Scarcity has
been engineered into radio and television broadcasting. The AM broadcasting band, which
runs from 535 KHz to 1605 KHz, includes 107 assignable channels. FM broadcasting, which
occupies frequencies between 88 KHz and 108 KHz, provides 100 assignable channels. M.
FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 546-47 (1977). The Federal Communication Commission's tele-
vision assignment plan provides for 620 VHF and 1400 UHF stations in the nation. Sixth
Report and Order on Television Allocations, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905, 1 R.R. 91:601 (1952).
6. See C. MILLS, POWER, POLITICS AND PEOPLE 353-55 (1963).
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most likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.
7
Government policies designed to promote diversity of expression in the
mass media have focused primarily upon broadcasting. Although the public
possesses a paramount right of access to information in the electronic fo-
rum,8 it only has limited speaking rights therein. Access rights arise only
upon the presentation of a controversial view on an issue of public impor-
tance,9 broadcast of a personal attack, 10 or appearance of a legally qualified
political candidate.11 Such opportunities create only narrow and contingent
access rights for ideas and individuals. Even such rudimentary access rights,
however, exceed those available in the print media, where the public has no
first amendment right of expression or information reception.
12
Efforts to structure diversity into the media 3 by providing special ac-
cess rights have sought to correct imbalances in first amendment rights and
privileges. ' 4 Limited access has not proved to be entirely fit for that pur-
pose, but so far proposals to carve out more expansive access rights have
failed to win lasting judicial favor.1 5 Despite no record of significant victo-
ries on the legal battlefield, the banner of broader access rights continues to
lead a pursuit of first amendment values in the mass media. The purpose of
this article is to: (1) examine existing opportunities for limited access; (2)
ascertain why the concept of broader access rights survives despite judicial
rebukes; (3) assess the constitutional hurdles that a more sweeping access
system must clear; (4) suggest an access plan that would pass tests of consti-
tutionality and practicality; (5) evaluate the implications of access for the
print media; and (6) consider whether access concepts may be rendered ob-
solete by the continuing evolution of the media.
7. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), af'd 326 U.S.
1 (1945).
8. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
9. In the Matter of the Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine and the
Public Interest Standard of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 19 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Fairness Report].
10. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1977).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1977).
12. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
13. Policies for promoting diversity of information in the mass media may be broken down
into categories of direct and indirect content regulation. Indirect content regulation consists of
policies intended to structure the media so that it is more conducive to multiple views. Promi-
nent examples of indirect content regulation include the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-04 (1976), which is designed to save failing newspapers through rules limiting the
number of broadcasting outlets a single entity may own. See Multiple Ownership Rules, 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1979). Direct content regulation is restricted to the electronic
forum, which is governed by fairness rules and regulations providing limited access opportuni-
ties upon the airing of controversial views, personal attacks, or appearances of political candi-
dates. See Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 1; 47 C.F.R. § 73.369 (1977); 47 U.S.C. § 315.
14. See Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Rght, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641,
1647-48 (1967).
15. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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I. THE EXISTING CONTOURS OF ACCESS
Media access rights range from limited to none depending upon the
nature of the media form. In the print media, editors have the sole discre-
tion in deciding what material to print. 6 Although any enforceable right of
access to newspaper space may conflict with the first amendment,' 7 re-
stricted access rights in the electronic forum so far have survived such consti-
tutional confrontation. 18 Thus the Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, encased and elevated the public's right in broadcasting "to re-
ceive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and
experiences."' 9 Those access rights, however, have been specifically and nar-
rowly drawn and reflect a general regulatory strategy of promoting fair and
balanced programming.
2 0
The most conspicuous manifestation of that approach, and most promi-
nent right of access in the electronic forum, is embodied by the fairness doc-
trine. 21 The underlying premise of fairness regulation, that the public
interest requires opportunities for expression of contrasting viewpoints on
issues of public importance, dates back more than half a century.22 Essen-
tially, the fairness doctrine obligates broadcasters to set aside reasonable
amounts of air time for coverage of public issues and to provide opportuni-
ties for contrasting points of view.2 3 By properly discharging their fairness
duties, broadcasters presumably provide their audiences a balanced diet of
information on public issues.
24
Fairness obligations arise upon presentation of "a controversial issue of
public importance. '25 However, the duty to provide balanced program-
ming does not vest any person or group with the right to present an opposing
viewpoint.2 6 Instead, broadcasters retain discretion to "decide what issues
are 'important,' how 'fully' to cover them, and what format, time and style
of coverage are 'appropriate.' "27 Access rights under the fairness doctrine
thus operate on behalf of ideas rather than exponents of ideas and are
designed to meet a first amendment standard requiring not "that everyone
16. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
17. Id at 254.
18. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973); Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
19. 395 U.S. at 390. The public's right to receive information in the electronic forum arose
from a balancing of the first amendment interests of broadcasters and the public in a context
"[w]here there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequen-
cies to allocate." Id at 388. Given the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies, and the danger that
some ideas and views might go unexpressed, the Court concluded that the first amendment was
not a bar to government regulations obligating broadcasters to function as fiduciaries and pre-
sent representative voices and opinions. Id at 389.
20. A right of access arises only in response to the broadcasting of controversial views,
personal attacks, or appearance of political candidates. See supra notes 9-11.
21. See Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 7.
22. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n App. Rev. 32 (1929); rev'd on
other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. d.mised, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
23. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 7.
24. Id
25. Id at 10.
26. Id. at 18.
27. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 189 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said." 28 The resulting
"separation of the advocate from the expression of his views" leaves broad-
casters rather than the public with the power to initiate debate and maintain
editorial control of it.
2 9
When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) receives a com-
plaint that a broadcaster's programming is one-sided, 30 the licensee's edito-
rial judgment is tested against a standard of reasonableness and good faith.
3 1
If the Commission finds merit in the complaint, it ordinarily asks the broad-
caster to provide air time for a balancing viewpoint.
32
A broadcaster's affirmative duty under the fairness doctrine to cover
issues of public importance 33 is the only obligation licensees have to provide
programming opportunities for such matters. That responsibility may be
attenuated at the expense of robust debate, though, if programming deci-
sions reflect anxieties that controversy may alienate audiences and advertis-
ers.34 Even a program with a large audience would be unprofitable if
advertisers did not want to be identified with it. But the suggestion that it is
"bad business to espouse . . . the heterodox or controversial . . . 35 or that
advertisers are paranoid about being identified with controversy 36 is capable
of being stretched too far. To the extent that advertising is an essential step
toward commercial profit, 37 in a nation where the electronic media are
plugged into more than ninety-eight percent of the homes38 and operate in a
context of spectrum scarcity,39 it is less than a foregone conclusion that con-
troversy necessarily will lead to self-censorship or non-sponsorship.
Although fairness regulation relies heavily upon good faith licensee de-
cisions, its history is not devoid of triumphant moments. The fairness doc-
trine, for instance, was the triggering mechanism for a widespread
information campaign to counter cigarette advertisements and educate the
public about the hazards of cigarette smoking. 4° Any such specific benefits,
however, must be measured not only against the overall performance of fair-
28. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTrrUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEO-
PLE 25-28 (1960).
29. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S 94, 189 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30. The Commission depends upon the public to bring fairness problems to its attention.
Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 18.
31. Id at 20.
32. Id at 17.
33. Id at 7.
34. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187-89 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications ress, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 231-32; Com-
ment, Enforcing the Obligation to Present Controversial Issues." The Forgotten Half of the Fai ness Doctrine,
10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 137, 148-50 (1975).
35. 412 U.S. at 187.
36. 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 148-50.
37. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771, n.24 (1976).
38. By 1978, 98.6% of the nation's homes had at least one radio and 98% of them had at
least one television. Broadcasting Y.B. Section C, at 341 (1979).
39. The FCC limits and assigns broadcasting frequencies to avoid confusion and chaos on
the airwaves. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76, nn.4 & 5, 388
(1969); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943). See also supra, note 5.
40. The FCC, upon determining that cigarette advertisements implied that smoking was
healthful, ordered broadcasters to furnish free air time for anti-cigarette spots. WCBS-TV, 8
[Vol. 58:1
MEDIA ACCESS
ness in promoting first amendment values but also its compatibility with the
first amendment itself. And "[u]nlike some venerable institutions, . . . old
age has hardly secured the fairness doctrine from the tarnish of corrosive
controversy."
4 1
Fairness policing poses the most potent threat to first amendment guar-
antees of free speech and press. By directing licensees to provide opportuni-
ties for balancing viewpoints, the FCC elevates its own editorial judgments
over those of broadcasters. Fairness enforcement, therefore, requires the
Commission at times to arrogate to itself the reins of editorial control.
In striving to accommodate the competing concerns of diverse informa-
tion and government restraint, the FCC has pursued a general philosophy of
least possible intrusion. Policy manifestations of that regulatory attitude in
fairness matters have included agency reliance primarily upon licensee judg-
ment and discretion. The Commission thus operates under the assumption
that the public is best served, not by having the agency make decisions as to
what is desirable in each situation, but "by a system which allows individual
broadcasters considerable discretion in selecting the manner of coverage, the
appropriate spokesmen, and the techniques of production and presenta-
tion."'42 Given the potentially unlimited number of controversial issues in
some communities, agency deference to reasonable and good faith licensee
judgment4 3 evinces a realistic sense of regulatory limitations.
Nonetheless, a fundamental and persisting problem with fairness regu-
lation is not merely that the standard is "difficult to determine, but the fact
that someone other than the speaker . . .with far-reaching enforcement
powers . . . has the task of determining it."' 4 4 It already is established that
the Commission is "more than a traffic policeman concerned with the tech-
nical aspects of broadcasting and that it [may interest] .. .itself in general
program format and the kinds of programs broadcast by licensees."'45 If the
FCC were to conclude that licensees were too timorous in their program-
ming, it would have wide-ranging enforcement powers at its disposal.
46
Fairness enforcement at the very least contemplates agency oversight of
and balancing supplements for a broadcaster's own programming decisions.
However, the Commission's arsenal of enforcement weapons includes its li-
cense granting, renewing, and revoking authority47 and power to impose
fines.48 In a zone where the FCC's "lifted eyebrow" may be sufficient to
achieve regulatory objectives, 49 the mere availability of powerful enforce-
F.C.C.2d 381, aJf'don rehearng, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), afd sub nom Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
41. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 703 (1976) (Commissioner
Robinson dissenting).
42. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 16.
43. Id at 11.
44. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 707-08 (Commissioner Robin-
son dissenting).
45. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395 (1969).
46. d at 393.
47. The Commission may revoke a station's license, issue a short-term renewal or refuse to
renew a license. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 312(b) (1976).
48. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1976).
49. Regulation by lifted eyebrow may occur in the form of a letter or phone inquiry from,
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ment devices and potential for their misuse create a lingering threat to ex-
pression. Fairness controls enable "administration after administration [if
they so choose] to toy with radio or TV in order to serve . . . sordid or...
benevolent ends."
50
In any event, the Commission, through its general policy of deference to
licensee discretion, so far has endeavored to minimize government influence
upon broadcast fare. 5 1 Thus the agency has concluded that "further govern-
ment intrusion is less desirable than the possibility of occasional licensee
lapses."'52 Accordingly, the FCC's record as a disciplinarian is devoid of any
punishment for a broadcaster who failed to comply with the fairness doc-
trine.53 The agency's reluctance to become entangled in fairness complaints
is illustrated by the rarity of fairness findings against licensees.
54
The advantages of such leniency and restraint, however, do not dimin-
ish the generally negative effects and potential of fairness regulation. Fair-
ness cannot optimally promote diversity unless energetically enforced, but
aggressive policing creates a danger of undue government influence in pro-
gramming. No matter how administered, therefore, the fairness principle
translates into an unsatisfactory proposition.
Despite its drawbacks and dangers, fairness regulation continues to gov-
ern the electronic forum on the assumption that it enhances rather than
abridges the first amendment guarantees of free speech and a free press.
55
Fairness in practice, however, creates a hierarchy of free speech rights. The
unusual ordering of rights, 56 that makes paramount the public's right to in-
formation, 57 allows some persons or government to "snuff out"58 the first
amendment rights of others. Fairness regulation at its constitutional worst,
therefore, creates gradations of speaking rights and restricts the speech of
some members of society to magnify the relative voice of others.
59
Policymaking presuming that a more regulated press necessarily will
translate into a more perfect press must assume whatever risk that attaches
to disregarding past lessons of tampering with individual speech and pub-
and expression of concern by the agency's staff to a licensee. Robinson, The FCC and the First
Amendment- Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 119-20
(1967).
50. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 154 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
The regulatory process for broadcasting has tempted past presidential administrations to ma-
nipulate it for mischievous purposes. See S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE ME-
DIA 219-20 (1978); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213,
244-51; Comment, Power in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Fainess Doctin)e and the First Amendment,
52 TEX. L. REV. 727, 763-64 (1974).
51. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 8, 23.
52. Public Communications, Inc., 50 F.C.C.2d 395, 401 (1974).
53. M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 748 (1977).
54. During the sample years of 1973 and 1974, for instance, only 19 out of 4,280 fairness
complaints received by the Commission resulted in findings against licensees. Reconsideration
of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 709 (Commissioner Robinson dissenting).
55. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
56. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973).
57. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
58. Id at 387.
59. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
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lishing rights. 60 The Sedition Act, for instance, purportedly was conceived
to elevate the level of public discourse - but more accurately could be cata-
logued as a government "attempt to eliminate political criticism, create a
one-party press in the country, and by controlling public opinion insure...
victory in the elections." '6 1 Especially given such lessons in government per-
version of first amendment rights in the name of first amendment values, the
fairness concept should be recognized as a regulatory form of suspect and
potentially damaging character.
6 2
II. THE PURSUIT OF MORE ACCESS
A general right of access for multiple voices, as well as views, was con-
ceived to equalize the power to communicate ideas and to protect rights of
expression by creating more opportunities for their exercise. 63 Essentially, a
public right of access would lower media barriers to the entry of unedited
community voices. The proffered basis for such a right to be heard is the
interest in confrontation of ideas from more voices. 64
The first major constitutional showdown over access occurred in the
electronic forum, where limited access inroads, carved out by fairness regula-
tion, already had been made. Initially, but only temporarily, it was deter-
mined that a blanket prohibition on paid public issue advertising
contravened the first amendment. 6 5 That expansion of access rights, how-
ever, failed to survive an appeal to the Supreme Court which, in CBS v.
Democratic National Committee,6 6 concluded that the public's right to informa-
tion already was protected adequately by the fairness doctrine. 6 7 In the
past, the Court had suggested a possible reevaluation of fairness regulation if
it failed to measure up to expectations.68 Despite the demonstrated flaws of
fairness, however, the Court refused to abandon such regulation in favor of
access. Rather, a right of access was rejected as "too radical a therapy" that
exceeded the FCC's authority.69 Although the Court reaffirmed the public's
paramount right of access to information in the electronic forum, 70 a right of
public expression in that arena remained illusory.
71
60. Brandywine Main-Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 79 (1972) (Bazelon, J., dis-
senting).
61. L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY
OF SUPPRESSION 258 (1960).
62. Even backers of fairness acknowledge that it "has not always brought to the public
perfect or, indeed, even consistently high-quality treatment of all public events and issues
." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 130-31 (1973).
63. Barron, Access to te Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1647-
48 (1967).
64. Id at 1678.
65. Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir.
1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
66. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Despite its willingness to uphold limited access rights created by
fairness regulation, the Court rejected the argument that broadcasters were constitutionally ob-
ligated to sell at least some of their time for unedited discussion of public issues.
67. Id
68. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969).
69. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973).
70. Id at 102.
71. Id at 130-31.
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The failure to secure broader access rights in a forum characterized by
spectrum scarcity augured unfavorably for the prospect of access in a me-
dium distinguished by multiple channel capacity. Accordingly, an effort to
establish a foothold for access in cablecasting failed to survive judicial scru-
tiny.72 The FCC, which in CBSv. Democratic National Committee had opposed
radio or television access, nonetheless had determined that cable access chan-
nels served a useful social purpose. 73 Consequently, it had directed cablecas-
ters to furnish public, governmental, educational, and leased access
channels.74 Despite the agency's assertion that cablecasting access served
first amendment values by facilitating an exchange of ideas, 75 the Supreme
Court in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. concluded that such regulatory provi-
sions exceeded the FCC's authority. 76 Since cable operators are not com-
mon carriers, 77 the Court disallowed imposition of common carrier duties
upon them.78 In so doing, it reiterated that such intrusions "on the journal-
istic integrity of broadcasters would overshadow any benefits associated with
the resulting public access."
79
Shortly after the Court's second rebuff to broader access rights, the ac-
cess issue resurfaced again when a corporation attempted to purchase net-
work time for presentation of its own editorial advertisements.80 The
networks, at least partly out of concern that the messages would be too con-
troversial, refused to sell the air time.8 ' Since the advertiser's purpose was to
present its views and take stands on controversial public issues, fairness obli-
gations probably would have been triggered by such messages.8 2 The com-
pany, by insisting that its first amendment rights had been infringed, and
the networks, by refusing to sell air time,8 3 merely replayed the same right of
access versus editorial control arguments aired in CBS v. Democratic National
Committee. Given the case law on the networks' side, their position for practi-
cal purposes was legally unassailable.
Although government is "constitutionally disqualified from dictating
the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may ad-
dress a public issue,"8 4 a licensee's refusal to admit speakers into the elec-
tronic forum does not necessarily constitute government action.
8 5
72. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
73. Report and Order in Docket No. 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 296 (1976).
74. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254 (1977).
75. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 695 (1979).
76. Id at 708.
77. Common carriers make "a public offering to provide [communicatons facilities]
whereby all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or
transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing .. " Report and Order, Industrial
Radiolocation Service, 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (1966). See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
78. 440 U.S. at 708-09.
79. Id at 705.
80. Newsweek, July 2, 1979, at 57.
81. Id
82. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 23.
83. Newsweek, July 2, 1979, at 57.
84. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978).
85. In CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), three justices concluded that
licensee action in refusing to sell time for editorial advertisements did not amount to govern-
ment action. Id at 117-19. One justice was unwilling to decide the issue. Id at 146 (White, J.,
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Consequently, the first amendment may preclude government from channel-
ing the flow of ideas and views,8 6 but media operators have been left free
(subject only to such specialized restrictions as fairness) to function as forum
bouncers.
8 7
Despite two adverse decisions by the Supreme Court in less than a dec-
ade, media access has not been abandoned as a promotional vehicle for first
amendment values. The continuing pursuit of access, in fact, derives a meas-
ure of its lingering vitality from the Court's own observation that "at some
future date Congress or the Commission - or the broadcasters - may de-
vise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and desira-
ble."' 8 Although the Court twice has struck down access schemes, it has
refused to bury the concept completely. Still, the future of access hinges
upon the structuring of a system that can prove itself to be "practicable and
desirable."
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ACCESS
Although broad public access is cosmetically alluring as a means for
advancing the cause of diversity, it also may pose significant constitutional
hazards. By downgrading the speaking rights of broadcasters and upgrading
those of the public, media access as a matter of right leaves nobody constitu-
tionally whole. Even if a redistribution of first amendment rights may repre-
sent a "delicately balanced system of regulation intended to serve the
interests of all concerned," 89 such a scheme also may be pregnant with mis-
chief.
The First Amendment may indeed belong to everybody-but it
cannot truly belong to everybody unless it first belongs to each and
every particular somebody. To deny the individual right in the
name of the collective right transforms the First Amendment from
a guarantee of individual freedom into its very opposite, rule by
public clamor.
90
Since an unusual ordering of speech rights has been permitted for pur-
poses of fairness regulation, conceivably such a hierarchy could pass judicial
muster for purposes of broader access. If so, media access - like fairness
regulation - might be justified upon grounds of spectrum scarcity. 9 ' A re-
newed life for the scarcity rationale, however, would prolong the mythology
that special operating circumstances of broadcasting require special regula-
concurring). Two justices concluded that the issue was irrelevant. Id at 148 (Blackmun and
Powell, JJ., concurring). Two justices reasoned that because government regulated broadcast-
ing, and the airwaves are part of the public domain, government action existed. Id. at 174-79
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Theoretically, therefore, the goVernment action argu-
ment still is alive.
86. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978).
87. Segenerally CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973).
88. Id at 131.
89. Id at 102.
90. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 707 (Commissioner Robinson
dissenting).
91. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-92 (1969). Se generally, NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
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tion.9 2 In reality, newspapers (which are not subject to any form of access
regulation) already had become more scarce than broadcasting outlets when
the Supreme Court lent its imprimatur to the scarcity rationale for fairness
regulation. 93 Although the scarcity dogma continues to operate, widespread
criticism 94 may deplete it of any supportive strength if and when broader
access rights emerge. Consequently, the pursuit of access may necessitate a
search for more persuasive rationales.
One proposed justification for access, that actually preceded the scarcity
rationale, is that a community's interest and dependence upon the media
warrant reasonable access thereto. 95 Another suggested rationale posits that
a right of free speech presupposes a right of access to the instrumentalities of
expression, because speaking rights are meaningless absent effective means
for communicating.96 Such proposed foundations for access rights essen-
tially invite balancing the public's interest in expression against the interests
of media operators. In so doing, they too would foster a hierarchy of rights
similar to what exists under the fairness doctrine.
It also has been propounded that "the constitutional values of equality
and liberty are fundamentally linked by the notion that equal access to cer-
tain institutions . . . is a prime component of any meaningful liberty."
'9 7
Such an "equality principle suggests that if government surveillance can be
minimized and compulsion over the private owners of the medium limited to
a content-neutral principle, such as a statutory right to paid advertising,
then a court should view sympathetically government action to overcome
the impact of private censorship. '"98
Despite the ingenuity of the equal liberty premise, it too abandons first
amendment rights in a rush toward first amendment values. Media access
rights inevitably diminish broadcasters' expression rights by confiscating
time that could have been devoted to their own presentations. 99 Program-
92. Scarcity of frequencies is one reason why broadcasting has been subjected to constitu-
tional standards different from those applied to other media forms. Mt. Mansfield Television,
Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1971). Other perceived characteristics used to justify
broadcasting regulation include its "uniquely pervasive" and intrusive nature. FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 128
(1973).
93. Robinson, The Federal Commnuications Commission: An Essay on Regulatog Watchdogs, 64
VA. L. REV. 169, 257 (1978).
94. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 699 (1978); Karst, Equality as a Central
Pnnaple of the Fist Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 49-61 (1975).
95. An Ohio court, without addressing the constitutional implications, upheld a right to
purchase newspaper advertising on that basis. Uhlman v. Sherman, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (1919).
96. Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 284, 379 P.2d 481, 486, 29 Cal. Rptr.
1, 6 (1963).
97. Karst, supra note 94, at 43-44.
98. Id at 51.
99. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974). The
Supreme Court has recognized that compelling a publisher to print material, that he otherwise
might not publish, deprives him of space that might be used for other purposes including self-
expression. Id The Court has refused to apply the logic of that principle to broadcasting,
although it has been urged to do so. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969). Despite basing its holding in Red Lion upon the principle of spectrum scarcity, it refused
in Tornillo to carry the newspaper scarcity analogy as far, or even to mention the contrasting
decision in Red Lton.
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ming decisions concerning content, treatment, and exposure constitute the
exercise of journalistic discretion and editorial control.' 00 Any encroach-
ment thereon will inevitably affect the editorial process and product.' 0 '
Since the curbing of some rights of expression to enhance the voice of
others is foreign to the first amendment, 10 2 it is difficult to rationalize access
rights without the aid of factual or legal fictions and without ultimately der-
ogating the first amendment's protection against press abridgment. Al-
though promotion of first amendment values may be a worthy undertaking,
the principal guideline for such a venture is the first amendment; "and one
hard and fast principle that it announces is that Government shall keep its
hands off the press."' 10 3 Even if the government may endeavor to promote
robust and vigorous discourse, "it is precluded by the First Amendment from
.. .suppressing expression, even where government would justify such in-
trusion on personal liberty as a pursuit of First Amendment values."'
' 0 4
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICABLE ACCESS PLAN
Creation of an access system that does not abridge first amendment
rights requires voluntary rather than compulsory participation by media op-
erators. A voluntary scheme would not transgress the law enunciated in CBS
v. Democratic National Committee, since the Court addressed the issue of
mandatory rather than optional access.10 5 Before any such plan could leave
the drawing board, however, it would have to pass a four-part test devised
by the FCC. Specifically, no access system would be acceptable unless it
assured that: (1) important issues did not escape timely discussion; (2) licen-
see discretion was maintained; (3) no right of access accrued to particular
persons and groups; and (4) government was not drawn into deciding who
received air time and when.'
0 6
The "first serious attempt"'1 7 to meet those criteria would afford broad-
casters an option to provide an hour of public access time each week. 10
Instead of being obligated to balance programming on controversial matters
of public interest, licensees who opted for such an access would be in pre-
sumptive compliance with fairness requirements.' 0 9 Although the FCC orig-
inally determined that the access proposal was neither perfected nor ready
for adoption as a rule," 0 it since has undertaken to reevaluate the plan."l
100. 418 U.S. at 258.
101. Chatzky and Robinson, A Constztutonal Right of Access to Newspapers. Is There Life afler
Tornillo?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 453, 480 (1976).
102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1974).
103. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 160-61 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
104. L. TRIBE, supra note 94, at 604.
105. See 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 712,
n.26 (Commissioner Robinson dissenting).
106. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 699.
107. Id.
108. See Id at 712; National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1112
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
109. 567 F.2d at 1112.
110. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 699.
111. A federal appeals court determined that the Commission may have "overlooked" and
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Essentially, the scheme would provide access in two separate ways. Half
of a station's access time would be allocated on a first come, first served
basis." 12 To prevent system monopolization, the remaining access time
would be provided to representative speakers. 1 3 Even though the Commis-
sion originally rejected the proposal, it may have underestimated the plan's
capacity for meeting the agency's standards."
14
Even if a broadcaster furnished time merely to a reasonable spectrum of
views, greater programming diversity probably would result than when an
individual broadcaster reserves all content decisions for himself. 1 5 A belief
that important issues would not escape timely discussion in such a setting to
some extent rests on faith. However, "[i]f an issue is truly of public impor-
tance, it is reasonable to presume that it will reach the public forum that an
adequate access policy would provide." ' 1 6 Especially in comparison to fair-
ness regulation, it is less likely that pertinent public issues would escape at-
tention. Although a broadcaster has an affirmative obligation under the
fairness doctrine to cover public issues, only in rare circumstances will the
FCC determine that a public issue is so important that it would be unreason-
able for a licensee to neglect it entirely."
17
Licensee discretion, which the FCC and the Supreme Court insist must
not be "subordinate[d] to private whim,"" 8 would be preservable under a
voluntary access plan. If licensees could choose freely whether to adopt an
access system, selection of that option alone would seem to be an exercise of
licensee discretion. Merely affording broadcasters that opportunity to select,
however, may not withstand agency or judicial scrutiny. Both the Commis-
sion and a court have insisted upon preserving the discretion to determine
what issues merit coverage initially and what coverage necessitates the pres-
entation of balancing views." '9 Even if voluntary access vested non-media
operators with editorial control, broadcasters who adopted such a scheme
still would have unimpaired discretion to initiate and pursue coverage of
issues that they chose themselves. Voluntary access, therefore, would impose
no undue restraints upon overall licensee discretion.
Both the Supreme Court and the FCC have expressed apprehension of
and opposition to any access scheme that would allow any individual or
not have fully understood the proposal. Consequently, it remanded the matter to the agency.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
112. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 692.
113. Id
114. See National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
115. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 713 (Commissioner Robinson
dissenting).
116. Petition of Committee for Open Media for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of the
Fairness Report at 12 (F.C.C., filed Aug. 12, 1974). Experimental use of public access "free
speech messages" has yielded wide-ranging public participation and discussion on issues of pub-
lic concern. See id at 12 and Attachment A.
117. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 10.
118. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 692; CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123 (1973).




group to purchase or otherwise obtain a dominant position in the system. 120
Even under a first come, first served plan, it has been suggested that "the
views of the affluent could well prevail over those of others, since they would
have it within their power to purchase time more frequently."' 2 1 Voluntary
access, however, need not be vulnerable to any special access privilege or
leverage. The possibility of undue influence seemingly could be minimized
by allocating half of a station's access time to representative spokespersons
who would qualify to speak, for instance, by collecting a certain number of
signatures on a petition circulated in their community or group. Although it
is unlikely that any allocation scheme would be tamper proof against manip-
ulations by bad faith or biased licensees, it is equally improbable that-oppor-
tunities for abuse would be any greater than under the fairness doctrine.
122
Moreover, such anxieties over apportionment rest upon presumptions rather
than actual evidence that wealthy voices necessarily would be more inclined
to speak or have significant influence if they did. 123 It also seems unreasona-
bly speculative to assert a risk of monopolization by the affluent, given fund-
ing possibilities for others from foundations, public interest groups, and
resource pooling.
124
In any event, concerns that some categories of individuals or ideas may
have more exposure than others are antagonistic to the first amendment.'
25
In evaluating the viewpoints expressed by any speaker, the public may con-
sider the source of the message and credibility of the advocate. 126 The mere
disclosure of a speaker's identity probably would suffice to alert the public,
if necessary, to evaluate the views they hear. The Supreme Court has ob-
served that only in broadcasting does limited access to the channels of com-
munication not contravene the first amendment.' 2 7 Yet, no less with
electronic transmissions than any other means of communication, the public
may judge and evaluate the relative merits of conflicting viewpoints. 128
Even though the framers of the first amendment may not have anticipated
the emergence of the electronic media, the possibility that the public might
not scrutinize the information and ideas communicated is a danger they con-
templated and a risk they assumed.
129
It may be impossible to strike a perfect balance of viewpoints and safe-
guard against all potential abuses in a voluntary access system, but such
incapabilities should not unduly demean such a system. Rather it probably
120. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123 (1973).
121. Id
122. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 713-14 (Commissioner Robin-
son dissenting).
123. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978).
124. See Jaffe, The Editoria/ Responsibility of the Broadcaster. Refections on Fairness and Access, 85
HARV. L. REv. 768, 787 (1972). Public interest groups themselves have complained about the
reluctance of broadcasters to sell them air time for editorial advertisements. See Airing of Public
Service Announcements by Broadcast Licensees, 43 Fed. Reg. 37725, 37726, n.12, Aug. 24,
1978.
125. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 163 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
126. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978).
127. Id. at 792 n.30.
128. Id at 791.
129. Id at 792.
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is more useful to measure voluntary access not against perfection but against
the performance of fairness regulation. Although some questions about ac-
cess may be answerable only from experience, experience with fairness tends
to suggest that "the law couldn't be any worse than it now is."
130
A voluntary access plan finally would remove the FCC farther away
from programming decisions. 13 1 Under a fairness system, wherein licensees
without public input determine the coverage of public issues, government
interference, in the form of agency second-guessing and content review, is
unavoidable. 132 Government participation in programming decisions is
contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the FCC's stated refusal to be drawn
into deciding who should receive air time and when. 133 An access system, in
contrast, would diminish the government's supervisory function. No scheme
short of complete agency abdication would eliminate government monitor-
ing altogether, but access would alter oversight responsibilities to those of
making quantitative rather than qualitative judgments.
Although it is possible to structure a voluntary access system that works
on paper, it is essential that such access provide meaningful speaking oppor-
tunities for the public. If, for example, access time were relegated to hours of
low audience potential, such a system would be seriously flawed. 134 A gov-
ernment directive requiring access programming at particular times would
undermine the voluntary (and thus constitutional) nature of access. Consis-
tent with notions of voluntariness, though, the FCC could create incentives
designed to encourage access programming during preferred viewing hours.
Non-compulsory encouragement of access programming would fit
within a broader category of diversity promoting policies for the mass media.
Especially since some diversity-oriented policies are burdensome to or restric-
tive of licensees, the possibility of regulation trade-offs or immunities exists as
inducement for excellence in access programming. Such flexible regulation
seemingly would serve the public interest efficiently by custom tailoring to
specific circumstances those policies that best would facilitate the interests of
diversity. 135
A "practicable and desirable" access system, for instance, would serve
directly the same goal that station ownership restrictions serve indirectly and
130. Study of Fairness Doctrine, 30 F.C.C.2d 26, 36 (1971) (Commissioner Johnson concur-
ring).
131. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1114 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
132. Id.
133. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 699.
134. The Commission has noted that the effectiveness of public affairs type programming
depends upon audience size and variety, which in turn depends upon the time such program-
ming is scheduled. See Rose Broadcasting Co., 68 F.C.C.2d 1242, 1253 (1978); United Broad-
casting Co., 59 F.C.C.2d 1412, 1415 (1976); The Outlet Co., 57 F.C.C.2d 611, 613 (1975);
Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650,
678-79 (1971).
135. The FCC may "seek in the public interest to certify as licensees those who would speak
out with fresh voice, would most naturally initiate, encourage and expand diversity of approach
and viewpoint." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denzed, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). In a similar spirit, the Commission might target its rules in a
manner that would most effectively enhance diversity of ideas and information.
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less effectively.' 3 6 Such rules have been designed to procure diversity of
views from diversity of ownership.' 3 7 That purpose, however, is impaired by
a frequency allocation scheme 38 that curtails the availability of outlets in a
community and by the failure to resolve the problem of horizontal concen-
tration that limits a viewer's choice primarily to the offerings of the national
commercial networks.1 39 If an effective access system, therefore, would pro-
vide the diversity sought by ownership limitations, the Commission properly
might consider loosening those restrictions for broadcasters with impressive
access records.
The licensing process itself provides ample room and opportunity for
encouraging excellence in access programming. By regarding access pro-
gramming during peak viewing hours as "superior service" 4° or "meritori-
ous programming"'' 4 1 for renewal purposes, for instance, the FCC might
foster more access programming during desirable time slots. Extensive and
well placed access programming, especially during prime viewing hours,
might even create a rebuttable presumption that a broadcaster operated in
the public interest during the term of his license.'
42
In providing incentives for access, it is necessary that some caution be
exercised to assure that inducements are not actually a guise for regulatory
coercion. The distinction between blandishment and subtle arm-twisting
may be a fine one. However, the boundaries of impropriety are probably
best drawn at the point where free choice becomes encumbered by suspect
alternatives. An offer to eliminate fairness duties in exchange for adopting
an access scheme, for instance, would seem to be a proposition crossing that
line. By conditioning freedom from a constitutionally suspect system upon
136. A broadcast licensee is not allowed to own more than one station of the same type in
the same market. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(a), 73.240(a)(1), 73.636(a)(1) (1979). Nor may a single
licensee own more than seven AM, seven FM and seven television stations. 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.35(b), 73.240(a)(2), 73.636(b)(2) (1979).
137. See Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1108 (1975), aJ'd in part, vacated in part
sub noma. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1978), a 'd
in part, rev'd in part 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
138. See supra note 4.
139. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission." An Essay on Regulatog, Watchdogs, 64
VA. L. REV. 169, 260 (1978).
140. A superior service rating gives a licensee a plus over any competitor for his license in a
renewal proceeding. Superior service has been found to be "highly relevant . . .and might be
expected to prevail absent some clear and strong showing by the challenger." Central Florida
Enterprises v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
141. A meritorious programming rating may neutralize the significance of a licensee's mis-
conduct or rule violations during a license term. Set Rust Communicatons Group, Inc., 54
F.C.C.2d 419 (1975); Oil Shale Broadcasting Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 1167 (1975); Action Radio, Inc.,
51 F.C.C.2d 803 (1975); Friendly Broadcasting Co., 35 F.C.C.2d 611 (1972).
142. Such credit for excellence in access programming would recognize contributions that
likely would be directed toward "[tlhe major elements usually necessary to meet the public
interest includ[ing]: (1) Opportunity for Local Self-Expression, (2) The Development and Use
of Local Talent, (3) Programming for Children, (4) Religious Programs, (5) Educational Pro-
grams, (6) Public Affairs Programs,. . . (8) Political Broadcasts, (9) Agricultural Programs, (10)
News Programs,. . . (12) Sports Programs (13) Service to Minority Groups, (14) Entertainment
Programming. Those elements of the public interest unlikely to be served by access (i.e., (7)
Editorialization by Licensees. . . (11) Weather and Market Reports. . .) ordinarily would be
performed by the licensee. Granting of a radio or television license is conditioned upon the
FCC's determination that "the public convenience, interest or necessity would be served thereby
. .. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976).
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enactment of a different diversification plan, the offer would deny broadcast-
ers the opportunity to determine whether they wanted any access system
whatsoever - and thus would undermine any genuine voluntariness. Since
voluntary adoption of access probably is the most fundamental element of a
constitutional access plan, it is essential that a broadcaster's decision not be
occasioned by illusory choices.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRINT MEDIA
Even if a practicable and desirable access plan were structured for the
electronic forum, such a system would not necessarily be constitutionally
transferable to the print media. Although the Supreme Court has noted that
some form of access eventually may be acceptable in broadcasting, 143 it has
been unable to conceive how governmental regulation of the print media's
editorial process can be exercised consistent with first amendment guaran-
tees of a free press.
1 44
The Court's willingness to consider access in the electronic but not the
print media reflects a dualistic perspective that has permitted deeper regula-
tory incursions into broadcasting than into publishing. ' 45 The variable stan-
dards are an outgrowth of the premise that different media forms have
different characteristics warranting different types and measures of regula-
tion. 146 Consistent with such a compartmentalized philosophy of media pol-
icy review, the Court has concluded that "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every indi-
vidual to . . . publish."'
147
By insisting upon regarding different media forms in different ways, the
Court has afforded publishers constitutionally preferred treatment. 148 But
despite "the sweeping and conclusive fashion in which the Court rejected the
constitutionality of access [in the print media, the rebuff] . . . may prove less
durable than less categorical arguments against broad access require-
ments."' 149 Even in the face of more intense judicial scrutiny or resistance, a
voluntary access system in the print media need not occasion rejection on
constitutional grounds. So long as voluntariness were the hallmark of the
scheme, media operators would be under no "compulsion to publish that
which 'reason' tells them should not be published.' 50
The success of a voluntary access plan, as in broadcasting, would de-
pend upon the willingness of media operators to effectuate it. Again, as in
143. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131 (1973).
144. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
145. Both broadcasters and publishers may be, and have been, subject to general laws not
directed toward the editorial process. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33
(1937). Government intrusion into editorial decision-making, however, has been limited to the
electronic forum.
146. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). See Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
147. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973), citing Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
148. 395 U.S. at 388.
149. B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC AccEss 13 (1976).
150. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
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the electronic forum, adequate and non-coercive incentives would be avail-
able for at least encouraging experimentation. The Newspaper Preservation
Act (NPA),' 5 ' for instance, might be amended so that the availability of its
benefits were conditioned upon the willingness of publishers to adopt access.
The NPA was conceived as a rescue device for failing newspapers.
152
The Act permits newspapers in the same community to combine their busi-
ness operations if: (1) one is in danger of probable failure,' 53 and (2) edito-
rial and reporting functions are maintained independently. 54 If those
prerequisites are met and a joint operating agreement reached, the combina-
tion is immune from antitrust laws.'
55
Such efforts to promote diversity by protecting endangered newspapers
operate to preserve existing voices rather than attract new ones. An antitrust
exemption actually may place non-combination publishers at a competitive
disadvantage and thus discourage new publishing voices from competing
within and diversifying the media marketplace.156 Especially given such in-
herent disadvantages in the NPA's indirect diversification strategy, a volun-
tary access provision would seem to be an attractive way of enhancing the
NPA's effectiveness. By attaching the access condition to the NPA, commu-
nities endangered by the possible loss of a newspaper might be afforded an
additional measure of diversity insurance.
Although a voluntary access system may represent a form of govern-
mental regulation which is consistent with first amendment rights, 5 7 it is
arguable that such public outlets as letters to the editor and op-ed sections in
newspapers already minimize the need for access in the print media. Selec-
tion and publication of letters and guest editorials, however, are controlled
by a newspaper editor's discretion. Under a voluntary access plan, space
would be available to the public without that screening. Absent such
editorial filtering, the public would have some "opportunity to take the initi-
ative and editorial control into their own hands"' 58 - thus contributing to
more uninhibited public discussion from a multitude of tongues.
VI. THE FUTURE OF ACCESS
Even if broader access opportunities were to materialize, the long term
future of access still would be shrouded in doubt. Access essentially is a re-
medial device arising from the principle "that a right of expression is some-
what thin if it can be exercised only at the sufferance of the managers of
mass communication."' 59 Access, therefore, ultimately is a response to the
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976).
152. Id § 1801.
153. Id § 1803(b).
154. Id § 1802(2).
155. Id § 1803.
156. Newspapers protected by the NPA may realize economies of scale and advertising rate-
to-circulation ratios that may place competitors at a distinct disadvantage. See Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 624-26 (1953).
157. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
158. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 189 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).




"vast changes [that have placed] in a few hands the power to inform the
American people and shape public opinion."1 60 Those underlying condi-
tions, however, soon may be consigned to the past, thus disposing of the
concerns' 6 ' that have engendered the access concept.
Lack of competition within a particular medium has become one of the
most compelling arguments for expanding access rights.162 Such a premise,
which disregards and thus tends to undervalue any intermedia competition,
is the product of the compartmentalized perspective favored by the courts in
assessing different media forms. Aside from inadequately perceiving the
quality of competition in the information marketplace, such a disunified per-
spective of the mass media is unlikely to appreciate fully technological con-
tributions toward creating new opportunities for multimedia competition
and expression.163 Even if progress did not improve the climate for diversity
within a given media form, diversity might flourish anyway if new media
forms expanded the contours and capabilities of the mass media. The evolu-
tion of the communications universe and intermedia competition to a higher
level could transform access into regulatory flotsam.
At the same time that government has endeavored with one hand to
promote diversity within the electronic forum, it has with the other delayed
the fruits of emerging or developing media forms. ' 64 By protecting over-the-
air broadcasters until recently from the competition of cable or subscription
television, for instance, the FCC obstructed the overall objective of diversity.
Such favoritism has been unraveling in the wake of court decisions striking
down protective policies 165 and in the face of agency and congressional de-
regulatory ambitions. 166 Pending the arrival of any new media order, af-
fording inherent opportunities for multiple voices and views, access may be
the most acceptable means of promoting first amendment values without
burdening first amendment rights. Much as the access concept itself seeks to
dislodge poorly drawn but entrenched policies, access should carry the re-
minder that even if it is suitable for present needs it may become outmoded
and thus should be easily disposable if the future no longer requires its pres-
ence.
160. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250 (1974).
161. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 158, n.8 (1974) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). See BARRON, supra note 14, at 1678.
162. BARRON, supra note 14, at 1678.
163. Developing media technologies include satellite and laser transmission capabilities,
videocassettes and videodiscs, and cable and subscription television. Barrow and Manelli, Com-
munications and Technolog--A Forecast of Change (Part ), 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 205 (1969).
Cablecasting's multiple channel and two-way capacities may play particularly prominent roles
in converting spectrum scarcity into abundance and diversifying programming. Note, Cable
Television and Content Regulation. The FCC, the First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51
N.Y.U. L. REv. 133, 134, 137 (1976).
164. For a review of FCC rules that until recently governed and inhibited cable and sub-
scription television, see Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
165. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
166. See BROADCASTING, May 8, 1978, at 32, Jan. 2, 1978, at 46-48.
[Vol. 58:1
COAL GASIFICATION: THE CRITICAL ISSUES
BY
C. PETER GOPLERUD, III*
KEVIN C. O'NEIL**
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy availability, now and for the future, is a critical concern in
America today. The United States has been involved in an ongoing war
with itself concerning energy usage and production since about 1950. It now
appears to be losing. Prices for energy have risen with inflation. Supplies
and recoverable resources are dwindling. Twice since 1973 the country has
witnessed the frustration of waiting in long lines at gasoline stations. The
United States today relies heavily upon imported oil for energy needs. It is
thus at the mercy of political and social occurrences beyond its control. For-
eign oil has become so important that the government is apparently willing
to go to war to protect it.
Demand for energy in the United States in the year 1900 was about ten
quads.' By 1970 it had increased to approximately sixty quads, and should
exceed ninety quads this year.
2 
Current reserves are estimated to be 5,729
quads, of which coal accounts for nearly eighty percent.
3 
It is clear that coal
is our most abundant resource and will have to play a key role in future
energy policies.
The energy shortage has arisen in large part because of the way in
which the country uses its supplies. Oil and gas account for approximately
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law, B.A., J.D. Univer-
sity of Kansas.
** B.A. Wittenberg University; J.D. University of Akron School of Law, expected June
1981; M.T. University of Akron College of Business Administration, expected June 1983.
On June 30, 1980, President Carter signed into law a bill creating the United States Syn-
thetic Fuels Corporation (Pub. L. 96-294), discussed under the name of the Energy Security
Corporation in Section III(A) of this article. The corporation will manage the $20 billion
earmarked to help develop the synthetic fuels industry by giving loans, loan guarantees, price
guarantees, and purchase guarantees.
Three days earlier, however, the House of Representatives voted to recommit to the Con-
ference Committee legislation which would create the Energy Mobilization Board, also dis-
cussed in Section III(A) of this article. There is still time for the Energy Mobilization Board
legislation to be reworked by the Committee and passed prior to the fall 1980 adjournment of
Congress. The possibility of that occurrence appears highly unlikely, however. The reader
should nonetheless be familiar with the concepts involved because it is probable that some sort
of legislation for expedition of energy projects will be enacted in the near future.
1. McGee, Diverszfation of Energy, 7 EXPLORATION & ECON. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 1, 7
(1969). A "quad" represents one quadrillion BTUs, a measure of heat output.
2. Id.
3. Moyer, The Role ofCoal. Aoblens and Pohzees, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 761, 765 (1978).
Moyer notes the breakdown of recoverable reserves as estimated by the National Coal Associa-
tion to be as follows: coal - 4557 quads; petroleum - 197 quads; natural gas - 258 quads; natural
gas liquids - 26 quads; oil in bituminous rocks - 7 quads; shale oil - 450 quads; and uranium
oxide - 234 quads.
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seventy percent of the American energy usage.4 This figure is not likely to
decrease. In fact, the United States will undoubtedly continue to be depen-
dent upon oil and gas into the next century. Where does that leave a nation
whose needs are based directly upon what it has the least of in energy terms?
It obviously puts the country in the position of a net importer. But, even the
supplies which are imported may not allow the U.S. enough for its current
demand. Studies indicate a future need for synthetic liquid and gaseous fu-
els.5 To alleviate this problem, President Carter has stated a strong desire to
develop synthetic fuels (synfuels) as one solution to current high energy de-
mands.
6
There are many types of synthetic fuels made from various minerals.
The focus of this article will be synthetic gaseous fuel, specifically High-BTU
Synthetic Gas (HBSG) derived from coal. The development of this "new"
energy source brings with it significant issues, legal and otherwise, in a multi-
tude of areas. These issues can be found from the mining of the coal to be
processed to the closing of the plant facility. The issues may include, among
others, environmental, social, economic, technical, health, and, of course, le-
gal.
It is the legal issues surrounding the development of synfuels, primarily
HBSG, which will be the focus of this article. Initially the nonlegal aspects
of the process itself will be discussed and analyzed. Then will follow a brief
analysis of legislation designed to, among other things, promote the develop-
ment of synfuels. These are the acts establishing the Synthetic Fuels Corpo-
ration and the Energy Mobilization Board. Then the article will turn to
legal issues dealing with actual location of synfuel plants. Particular atten-
tion will be paid to environmental legislation, such as the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act. Water supply and general land use issues will be
noted also. The thesis of this article is that synfuel development should be
rational. It should not be a program which ignores the demands of the peo-
ple and environment most directly affected. The value of this energy source
can be more readily realized if developers are fully cognizant of the legal and
nonlegal issues present. 7 This article therefore exposes the most significant
legal issues confronting the synfuel industry and its opponents.
4. Department of Energy Fiscal Year 1979 Authorization. Hearings on S 2692 and S 2693 before the
Subcomm. on Energy Research and Development of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1978) (statement of George Fumich, Jr.) [hereinafter referred to as 1979
Authorization Hearingsj.
5. See, e.g., Mills, Coal and Shale - Alternattwe Fuels for the Midterm, 16 EXPLORATION &
ECON. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 229 (1978).
6. Speech delivered to the nation by President Jimmy Carter (July 15, 1979).
7. The authors of this article will not attempt to editorialize on the value of synfuels over
other forms of energy. Comparisons to some conventional energy sources will be made solely to
form a reference point for synfuel data presented. The authors themselves are actually not in
agreement as to the appropriate energy policy approach for the nation, particularly with regard
to solar energy development and conservation measures. The purpose here, however, is to pres-




II. GAS FROM COAL: THE PROCESS AND PROSPECTS
A. General Considerations
The need for supplemental supplies of gas that have properties
equivalent to those of natural gas (substantially all methane) is well docu-
mented.' U.S. reserves of natural gas will soon be less than adequate.9 Part
of this problem is due to price regulation which has made domestic explora-
tion for new fields less than profitable.' 0 In addition, the artifically low cost
of gaseous fuels hampered profitable development of new technologies.
However, diminished supplies of oil and natural gas should soon lead us to a
point where new technological development will be cost efficient. It has
been stated that we are entering a transition period between an era of cheap
energy and a future of solar and hydrogen power.It The key to this transi-
tion period is coal. One critical use of coal is for HBSG.
There are five major coal producing regions of the country.' 2 Each is
capable of supplying the coal necessary for a synfuel program over the eco-
nomic life of such a program. These areas include: the Appalachian Re-
gion, located in West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky; the
Eastern Interior Region, located primarily in Illinois and Indiana; the Pow-
der River Region, located in southeastern Montana and northeastern Wyo-
ming; the Fort Union Region, located in northeastern Montana and western
North Dakota; and the Four Corners Region located in southwestern Colo-
rado and northwestern New Mexico.' 3 The United States has total coal
reserves, both identified and postulated, of approximately 3,000 billion tons,
of which about 2,000 billion tons could be obtained through mining. 14 Plac-
ing the current annual national usage of natural gas at approximately 25
trillion cubic feet, the above figure would convert to 1,280 years' supply of
synthetic gas from coal.15 However, the actual amount of coal which could
be mined within current economic and technical constraints is approxi-
mately 437 billion tons. 16 Obviously not all of this can be directed to an
8. Schora, Berkowitz, Hegarty, ei al., Fuel Gases from Coal (1976).
9. Introduction to Symposium on Energy Issues and the Legal System, 11 CONN. L. REV. 367, 370
(1979).
10. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. 11 1978) should alleviate
some of the price constraints to HBSG development. The Act provides for gradual decontrol of
natural gas pricing by the federal government. The ultimate goal is no price controls at all. For
analysis of problems and pitfalls associated with the Act see, Morgan, Apphicatin and Enforcement
of the Natural Gas Poly Act of 1978: Admnistrative and Legal Problems, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 13-1 (1979); Comment, For Gas, Congress Spells Relief N-G-P-A: An Analsis of the Natural Gas
Poh Act of 1978, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 429 (1979).
11. ERDA Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization" Hearings on S 1340, S 1341, and S 1811 Before the
Subcomm. on Energy Research and Development of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1460 (1977) (statement of John McCormick) [hereinafter cited as 1978Authoriza-
tion Hearings].
12. ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT FOR ALTERNATIVE FUELS DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM S-4 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SYNFUEL EIS].
13. Id.
14. Cochran, Conversion of Coal to Oiland azs, 10 ExPLORATION & ECON. PETROLEUM IN-
DUSTRY 169 (1972).
15. Id. at 170.




These coal reserves should satisfy much of our energy requirement be-
tween 1985 and approximately 2020.17 However, efforts in this direction
will be affected by the constraints of the Clean Air Act. I8 One way to signifi-
cantly increase coal usage without a significant increase in pollution is
through utilization of HBSG. Generally this process involves the reaction of
coal at high temperatures in an atmosphere deficient in oxygen to produce a
combustible gas.19 This yields methane, basically indistinguishable from
natural gas. Essentially the process takes a solid, dirty, inconvenient-to-
transport product and changes it into a clean burning, readily transportable
and easily stored energy source. As will be seen, there are economic and
legal obstacles to full-scale development. However, before discussing those
factors, an understanding of the technology involved is necessary.
B. Technology
The technology for converting coal to gas has been known since 1926.20
The synthetic gas technology was developed in Germany prior to World
War II and was used to produce synthetic fuels for that country. The tech-
nique was the Lurgi process and is currently utilized in South Africa.2 1
Much of the early development efforts focused on Medium-BTU (MBSG) or
Low-BTU synthetic gasification (LBSG). Both technologies consist mainly
of hydrogen and carbon monoxide and have a heating value of 300
BTU/cubic foot or lower. The most recent technological developments are
in the area of HBSG, which, as noted above, is almost entirely methane.2 2 It
is pipeline quality gas. HBSG can be commingled with natural gas and
transported economically in pipelines in excess of 1,000 miles. 23 Medium
and Low-BTU gas, on the other hand, can only be economically transported
by a separate pipeline and only about a distance of 200 miles. 24 HBSG can
be used for commercial or domestic use; MBSG or LBSG are suitable only
for commercial and industrial use.
25
The commercial HBSG plant should be large enough to take advantage
of economies of scale. 26 The general technological goals which the synfuels
industry has set for HBSG are to develop transferable technology that will
convert domestic coal into substitute natural gas of pipeline quality, with
heating value of 950-1000 BTU/cubic foot, in an environmentally safe and
17. 1979 Authorization Hearings, supra note 4, at 834 (statement of G. Lawrence).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. 11 1978).
19. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, OCCUPATIONAL ExPOSURES IN COAL GASIFICATION
PLANTS 105 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NIOSH].
20. McGee, supra note 1, at 15.
21. Swabb, Coal Gasifcaton and Liquefaction in Pierspective, 16 ExPLORATION & ECON. PE-
TROLEUM INDUSTRY 257, 263 (1978).




26. NIOSH, supra note 19, at 115.
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economically sound manner. 27 The general concept of generating gas from
a heated particle of coal is relatively simple. All that is needed is carbon,
hydrogen, and oxygen. 28 Coal provides the carbon, steam provides the hy-
drogen, and the oxygen comes from the air.
29
The production of the end product is a bit more involved. The Lurgi
process, which is currently the most utilized, involves approximately thirteen
steps. Included are coal handling, coal preparation, coal feeding, coal gasifi-
cation, ash removal, quenching, shift conversion, gas cooling, gas purifica-
tion, methanation, sulfur removal, byproduct storage, and cleanup.30 The
process will be either fixed-bed or fluidized-bed in nature. The fixed-bed is
primarily used for processing of noncaking coals. In this process crushed
coal is fed into a pressure gasifier where gasification takes place at 350 to 450
pounds per square inch of pressure. Steam and oxygen are introduced below
a grate at the bottom of the gasifier. The grate is rotated and ash is collected
in a hopper. Gasification temperatures range between 11500 and 1400'F
with residence time of one hour. Crude gas leaves the gasifier at between
700' and 1 100'F.3 1 Varying percentages of tar, oil, naptha, penols, and am-
monia must all be removed through further processing of the gas.
3 2
The fluidized-bed process adds a step at the beginning. The coal is pre-
treated to destroy any caking qualities. This means more types of coal can
be utilized. Under this technique crushed and dried coal is fed to the
fluidized-bed pretreater. About twelve percent of the total steam and oxy-
gen required is fed to the pretreater, which operates at 800°F. Coal, along
with separated volatile matter and excess steam, is fed to the top of the gasi-
fier. Steam and oxygen are introduced at the bottom. The gasifier operates
at 1800'F and 500 to 1000 pounds per square inch pressure. Char and ash
are removed from the bottom and raw gas leaves the top.
33
Both fixed-bed and fluidized-bed have their advantages and disadvan-
tages upon comparison. Fluidized is generally more costly in terms of energy
usage and requires a significantly greater amount of water and oxygen.
However, it allows all types of coal to be utilized and produces fifty percent
of the HBSG in the first step, thus decreasing the amount of processing
needed in the methanation stage.
34
The techniques being developed for future use, "third generation"
processes, will utilize a spray catalyst solution. This solution will be sprayed
on the coal prior to feeding it into a fluidized-bed reactor at only 1300'F.
The synthetic natural gas is made directly. This process is much lower in
cost than existing technology. 35 The efficiency of this process is also greater.
27. 1979 Aulhoriwalin Hearings, supra note 4, at 113.
28. YOUNG, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, POTENTIAL HEALTH HAZARDS IN-
VOLVED WITH COAL GASIFICATION 86 (1978) [hereinafter cited as HAZARDS].
29. Id.
30. NIOSH, supra note 19, at 19.
31. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at 11-8.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 11-9.
34. Id. at 11-8,9.
35. Swabb, supra note 21, at 265.
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A final note on these technologies is in order at this point. All of these
processes use water in one or more parts of the process (e.g., washing coal,
cooling, pollution control). Research is currently underway to develop
plants which would recirculate the water within a plant, the ultimate goal
being zero discharge. This would help to solve two problems, pollution and
conservation of water.36 These are particularly critical problems in the west-
ern part of the United States.
C. The Resources
Coal obviously is the main ingredient in HBSG. Types of coal and coal
content differs from region to region, and even within regions. It is not a
single material, but rather is a family of related materials, differing widely in
heat content, contaminants (e.g., sulfur and ash), and physical properties
(e.g., caking and hardness). 37 It is generally ranked according to volatile
matter and heat content (BTU/pound). These rankings work from low rank
lignite through subbituminous and bituminous to high rank anthracite. 38
Anthracite is the hardest, most dense, and therefore contains less water. The
lower the percentage of water content the greater amount of heat generated
per pound when the coal burns.39 Approximately seventy percent of our
U.S. coal reserve is bituminous or subbituminous, while only one percent is
anthracite.4 °
As was noted earlier, some processes cannot utilize caking bituminous
coals found extensively in the eastern half of the country. 41 When heated,
this coal forms "a sticky, lumpy mass, which subsequently becomes hard"
when it cools. 42 It tends to clog and generally causes problems in the gasifi-
cation process. A plant using these coals with caking properties will have to
pretreat the coal in order to offset these tendencies.
The total amount of coal needed for the projected HBSG program for
1985 has been measured in different ways. One method is to compare to
equivalent barrels of oil per day. If the plants produced approximately
350,000 barrels of oil per day, 690 million tons of coal would have to be
committed over a twenty year projected life span for the plants. This repre-
sents about 3/10 of a percent of the total, currently recoverable reserves in
the five coal regions. 4 3 If the plants produced one million barrels per day,
2.98 billion tons of coal would have to be committed over a twenty year
period. This represents about 1.2% of recoverable reserves.4 4 One million
barrels per day is generally considered to be about the maximum projected
36. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at IV-32.
37. Mills, supra note 5, at 231-32.
38. NIOSH, supra note 19, at 111.
39. Swabb, supra note 21, at 258.
40. HAZARDS, supra note 28, at 10.
41. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, Final Task
Force Report-Project Independence Blueprint 117 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PROJECT INDEPEN-
DENCE].
42. Swabb, supra note 21, at 259.




production for 1985. 45
In addition to coal, the gasification process is also a heavy user of water,
both as a raw material and as a cooling and cleaning ingredient. The higher
the BTU involved, the greater is the water requirement. 46 It should also be
noted that water requirements for each region will be different. In the Ap-
palachian and Eastern Regions, where more plants will be located, water
requirements are approximately 70,605 tons per day for fixed-bed gasifiers
and about 130,000 tons per day for fluidized-bed gasifiers. 41 In the Powder
River, Fort Union, and Four Corners Regions, the raw water intake for
fixed-bed units would be approximately 30,000 tons per day and roughly
60,330 tons per day for fluidized-bed operations. 48 Water appears to be
available in sufficient quantities for both the Appalachian and Eastern Re-
gions. The three western regions, however, are far more arid and suffer from
uncertainties about Indian water rights, federal government rights, and the
amount of water represented by presently existing rights. The Four Corners
Region suffers particularly from low annual flows which could hamper
HBSG development.
If water is to be obtained in the western areas, the rights most likely will
have to be obtained from farmers or others who use substantial quantities for
irrigation. In these regions, approximately ninety percent of the water is
used for irrigation purposes. 49 Conflict may occur over these rights since low
flow usually occurs at a time when irrigation requirements are at their
height. Constraints on water will be further tightened by the fact that water
will also be required for developments accompanying synfuel production, for
the population influx associated with the development, and, in the western
portion of the country, for reclamation purposes. It is clear that for a
number of the regions, careful study of the water requirements and water
availability will have to be done to determine the feasibility of plant siting.
Because of the water problems, it would appear that the best place to
site the first plants would be in the East and Midwest. A further reason to
encourage development in those areas would be the high number of people
who would benefit readily from the gas produced. The trade-off is that sev-
enty percent of the coal east of the Mississippi River is high in both sulfur
and caking properties.50 A solution to this might be to transport western
coal, low in both sulfur and caking properties, to the East. However, western
coal is also composed of a high percentage of both water and ash, which
makes it uneconomical to transport in a raw state. It may be possible in the
future to process the coal and remove most of the ash, thus making it eco-
nomical to transport it to HBSG sites in the East.
51
Yet another resource problem associated with HBSG plants is the efflu-
ents produced during the gasification process. These effluents and the final
45. Id.
46. PROJECT INDEPENDENCE, supra note 41, at 88.
47. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at IV-30, 31.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 111-168.




byproducts will have to be treated so as to minimize any effect on the envi-
ronment. While this subject will be dealt with further below, it is important
to note the effluents in the HBSG process. The major pollutants will include
sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, particulates, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide,
and aledehydes. 52 Most of these are produced in the gasifier, and subse-
quent reactions during the process will destroy the bulk of these sub-
stances. 53 In addition, materials known to be hazardous to human health,
such as chrysene, are likely to be produced during the plant operation.
54
Liquid byproducts, ammonia, and raw materials for the process may be
shipped to and from the site by rail and truck. A coal feed rate of 22,000
tons per day would yield about 145,000 gallons per day of liquid byprod-
ucts. 55 Storage of some of this material might be possible, but the majority
of the liquid effluent would have to be treated in on-site waste water treat-
ment facilities. A plant may be designed to eliminate most water discharge,
but under this system solid waste would increase directly. 56 If a coal mine is
contiguous or nearby, one method of solid waste disposal might be to bury
the material at the mine site. 5 7 The land used, in addition to deep mine
burial for disposal of ash and other waste, would not be suitable for agricul-
tural purposes. In some instances this may, as noted below, cause conflict
with the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act.5 8 The land may, however,
be suitable for industrial facility siting or recreational purposes. The esti-
mated amount of solid waste generated would be about 14.8 million tons per
year, or about 296 million tons over the twenty year life of an HBSG plant.
59
D. Economics
The major reason the United States does not currently have an HBSG
plant in commercial operation is because the end product would be too ex-
pensive. It could not compete with the current cost of regulated natural
gas.6° However, this picture is rapidly changing due to government poli-
cies,6 ' legislation, 6 2 and foreign political maneuvering. 6 3 The question has
changed from if HBSG will be produced, to when it will be produced.
To the detriment of HBSG development, the pricing of natural gas is,
and has been, a political issue. The current and past prices of natural gas
52. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at S-18.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. NIOSH, supra note 19, at 31.
56. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at IV-37.
57. Id.
58. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1979).
59. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at XI-l 1. This solid waste may well be subject to severe
regulations and restrictions pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
42 U.S.C. § 6901 (Supp. 11 1978), and recently promulgated Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulations implementing RCRA, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,722 (1980)(to be codified in 40 C.F.R.
§ 260).
60. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at S-I.
61. The Carter Administration favors decontrol of energy prices generally.
62. Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. II 1978).
63. Current difficulties in the Middle East, attempts to purchase Mexican natural gas, and
arrangements with Canada for a pipeline to transport Alaskan natural gas all have an impact
on the current market.
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have a direct relationship with the point when HBSG becomes profitable to
produce. Until about 1978 the energy policy in this country was basically to
keep the cost of energy to the consumer at the lowest possible levels. For
nearly thirty years the Federal Power Commission"34 set the price of natural
gas at artificially low levels in the belief that it was providing protection for
the consumer.6 5 This policy greatly increased demand for a product which
began to be in short supply. As documented elsewhere, legislation was
passed by Congress in 1978 which requires a phasing out of price controls on
natural gas over a several year period. 66 The end result of this policy will, of
course, be higher natural gas prices. Such action will bring HBSG much
more competitively into the picture. Energy shortages also work to increase
and hasten the viability of HBSG.
Presently the actual development of HBSG industry is being funded by
the federal government, as well as private corporations. The combination of
the extremely high cost of the plants and the difficulty industry has had in
obtaining financing has led to the partnership with the federal government.
Each plant is estimated to cost in excess of one billion dollars, which exceeds
the net worth of all but the largest natural gas companies.67 Private lending
institutions have been concerned about financing these plants because of the
risks involved. Many uncertainties exist with regard to legal hurdles, gov-
ernment regulation, and the fact that plants of this size have not been built
anywhere previously. Private lenders could be left holding a one billion dol-
lar white elephant if something should go wrong.
Because of the public interest at stake, the government has felt it neces-
sary and appropriate to take part in this development process. Presently the
American Gas Association and the Department of Energy (DOE) are jointly
financing several development projects. Private financing may become more
available as the process is refined and risks go down. If the Synthetic Fuels
Corporation (SFC) legislation works to the satisfaction of Congress, neces-
sary financing and incentives will become more available.
The incentives which are preferred by private industry fall into four
basic categories: (1) free-market price for the products, (2) investment tax
credits, (3) rapid depreciation, and (4) a cash grant convertible to a loan."8
The funding for fiscal year (FY) 1979 for coal gasification by DOE was
$186,646,000. 69 Previously, FY 1978 funding had been $212,000,000. 7o At
the time it was stated that the reduction was due to changes in emphasis
64. The responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission have been assumed by the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission under The Energy Reorganization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7171, 7172 (Supp. II 1978).
65. Cochran, supra note 14, at 41.
66. See note 10 supra.
67. 1978 Authortzatton Hearings, supra note 11, at 1502. (statement of American Gas Associa-
tion).
68. Swabb, supra note 21, at 271. See Part II of this article for structure and analyses of the
Energy Security Corporation legislation which will govern the financing of snyfuel plants for
the future.
69. 1979 Authoriwain Heartigs, supra note 4, at 128 (Appendix I).
70. Id. at 820.
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rather than decrease in support. 7 It was argued that several of the HBSG
"pilot plants" were nearing the end of their operating schedules, thus neces-
sitating a decrease in funding.72 The SFC legislation clearly represents a
turn around in funding intensity. While not as high as President Carter
desired, the legislation clearly indicates a new congressional emphasis on
HBSG development.
E. Soci'ological Impacts
The sociological effects of the HBSG program will be many and varied.
Each specific plant will have an impact in the areas surrounding it and could
have an indirect effect on other areas. Where multiple plants will be sited in
specific regions the effects will, of course, be more pronounced. The influx of
large numbers of people into a region as a result of HBSG development will
be one influencing factor. It is estimated, for example, that HBSG develop-
ment is likely to cause a two percent increase in population in the Eastern
regions. 73 By contrast, development in the West could result in increases up
to seventeen percent.7 4 In actual numbers this could mean permanent re-
gional population increases of up to 68,000 persons in the Appalachian re-
gion, 54,000 in the Eastern Interior, 24,000 in the Powder River, 26,000 in
the Fort Union, and 19,000 in Four Corners. 75 Most of these population
increases would be the result of construction personnel and later on, opera-
tion personnel. Associated population increase would also occur in the form
of families of the above workers, health care specialists, other industries,
commercial figures, and others. The population associated with HBSG de-
velopment would increase rapidly during the construction period before sta-
bilization during the operational phase. 76 There would be an increase of
approximately 8,000 during construction and a drop to about 3,400 in the
operational phase. 77 The emigration of a new industry into a given area
would cause a shift of labor from one region of the U.S. to another. This
would increase the "gross regional product" of one region and possibly re-
duce the regional product of another. 78 Such a shift could also relieve unem-
ployment, welfare roles, and overcrowded conditions in other regions.
79
Land requirements for each plant would include not only that land for
the plant complex, but also land for housing, recreation, and open space. A
71. Id. at 129.
72. Id. at 129. It might be noted that at the time the 1979 authorizations were being
debated the various plants were in the following stages:
Pilot Plant, Chicago, Illinois--Operational
Pilot Plant, Homer City, Pennsylvania-Operational




1979 Authortizaftn Hearings, supra note 4, at 73.
73. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at S-22.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at IV-54.
77. Id.
78. Id. at VII-38.
79. Id. at S-23.
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community near a HBSG plant should plan on needing at least 300 acres for
housing developments and another thirty acres for recreational needs.80
Rapid influxes of people into an area will add to inflation, social ten-
sion and a shortage of housing and necessary public services and facilities.
There is, of course, the possibility of severe social problems if the influx of
people is different from the existing population in terms of race, age, ethnici-
ty, occupation and income.
The so called boom town syndrome has been seen at various times in
this country's history, often bringing with it some of the problems noted
above. In the past decade several communities in the West have become
energy boom towns. In fact Wyoming has what might be termed a boom
county, Sweetwater County. Within this county are the towns of Green
River and Rock Springs. The population of the county primarily in these
two communities, doubled during the four year period of 1970-1974.81
Housing shortages and school impacts were severe. This area's problems
with crime and corruption have been thoroughly documented by the news
media. It is merely the most sensational of the boom areas.
The Green River-Rock Springs area is typical of energy boom towns in
that it is predominately a rural area. If energy concerns were to construct
an HBSG plant in more heavily populated Eastern areas the impact would
not be nearly so substantial. It has been estimated that the most communi-
ties can annually absorb is about a five percent population growth.
Problems begin to arise when the growth rate approaches fifteen percent.
82
A regional population increase of 68,000 persons in the Appalachian region
will have far less impact than 19,000 additional persons on the Four Corners
Region.
83
Underpopulated rural areas generally are not equipped to cope with
the boom. The property taxes to be paid by an HBSG plant operator may
not be sufficient to pay for the community needs generated by the construc-
tion of the plant. The facilities of this nature bring with them uncertainty
and transiency. 84 Most construction workers and support personnel will
move on following completion of the plant. Studies of boom towns have
shown high rates of divorce, drug use, alcoholism, and suicides.85 Perform-
ance by school children is below the norm and deliquency and truancy rates
are above average. 86 Generally, rural communities are homogeneous and
relatively conservative. The population coming into such an area as the
result of energy development will be substantially more diverse and liberal.8 7
The boom communities have generally been termed a "bad place to live
... .[and] a bad place to do business." 88 The situation in these communi-
80. Id. at IV-58.
81. Daley, Financing Housing and Publi& Facilities in Energy Boom Towns, 22 ROCKY MT. MIN.
L. INST. 47, 50 (1976).
82. Little, Some Social Consequences of Boom Towns, 53 N.D.L. Rev. 401, 402 (1977).
83. See text accompanying note 74 supra.








ties could well hit a low point after plant construction and particularly to-
ward the end of the plant's life, as phase-out approaches.
89
F. Enironmnenial and Health Efc/s
HBSG plants will not be without environmental and health impacts.
The legal restraints and issues will be dealt with below, but a brief summary
of these effects is in order here. The primary health hazards of HBSG are
most likely to be localized. There will also be some hazardous conditions for
construction workers during the construction phase and employees during
actual operation of the plant.
Air quality will naturally be affected, as with any other use of fossil
fuel techniques. While the emissions from the standard size HBSG plant
will not be as substantial as from a coal-fired power plant, they will be signif-
icant. Emissions will trigger the preconstruction review procedures for pre-
vention of significant deterioriation (PSD) under the Clean Air Act 90 or the
offset requirements for nonattainment areas under the same act. 9' The ma-
jor pollutant emitted from an HBSG plant is sulfur dioxide (SO2). The
amount of SO 2 under controlled (usually the use of flue gas desulfurization
or scrubbers) conditions will amount to less than one-tenth of the emissions
from a coal-fired power plant. 92 This should not be enough to violate the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). There will also be less
significant emmissions of nitrogen oxides (NO.) and hydrocarbons (HC).
Emissions of particulates and carbon monoxide will be negligible.93 Other
significant air quality impacts will come from development related to the
construction and operation of a coal gasification plant. Expansion of
nearby towns, road construction and intensified mining activities will be
likely to increase peak-ground level particulates, NO, and HG.
9 4
Effects on water quality will be more significant than those from air
quality.9 5 As noted elsewhere water quantity will be a major problem for
western development and should be considered in conjunction with water
quality analysis. Water quality problems will affect all HBSG plants,
though some will be more intense than others. Water pollutants from a typi-
cal HBSG plant will include dissolved solids, suspended solids, nondegrad-
able organic compounds, and will contribute to salinity and pollutant
89. Id.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (1977).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 7501 (1977).
92. Energy from the West, Impact Analysis Report (Vol. 1), Interagencg Energy/Environment
R&D Program Report, at 52 (1979). [hereinafter cited as Energy from the West]. The actual
figures are, on the basis of pounds per hour, as follows: 1) Lurgi coal gasification process -520
pounds/hour and 2) coal fired power plant (assuming scrubbing) -5,800-14,000 pounds per
hour. Phrased in another way the Lurgi process would have emissions of.05 pounds per million
BTUs heat output. Under recently issued New Source Performance Standards for coal fired
power plants under the Clean Air Act the maximum a new plant can emit is 1.2 pounds per
million BTUs. Some older power plants are currently emitting up to 10 pounds per million
BTUs.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 60.
95. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at IX-2.
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concentrations downstream from the point of the water diversion. 96 In the
West it is likely efforts will be made to keep water discharges to a minimum,
perhaps even zero, in order to conserve water. But this adds to consumptive
use and related hardships and legal confrontations. 97 Zero discharge will
also create a significant solid waste problem. 98 Finally, related develop-
ments will, just as with air pollution, add to water quality problems. In-
creases in population of nearby towns will contribute to additional salts,
nutrients, organic materials, bacteria, fertilizers, and pesticides. 99 There will
also be significant overloading of existing sewage treatment facilities in the
towns near the plants. 00
As noted above there will be a significant solid waste problem. Gener-
ally the wastes generated will fall into three categories - ash, tar, and elemen-
tal sulfur.' 0 ' Disposal of solid wastes may result in the covering of
productive soil. 10 2 Ash, once thought to be innocuous, is now suspected of
carrying undesirable components which are capable of leaching into ground-
water.' 0 3 Tar and oil contain known carcinogens and thus are very hazard-
ous. 104
HBSG plants will have substantial land use impacts, both at the plant
site and in related activities. The needed coal will either be surface or deep
mined. Both processes have adverse effects on the land. In the West surface
mining will be required for most of the coal recovery operations. This can
utilize as much as ten times more land than required for deep mining.'
0 5
Land will be required for the plant itself. In order to transport the coal to
the plant, land will be used for either roads, railroad spurs, or coal slurry
pipelines. Gas pipelines will be necessary to transport the finished product
to its end destination. In the nearby towns land will, of course, be required
for housing needs, recreational uses, and support industries.
The largest obstacles for development of HBSG plants are political,
financial, and legal. Discussion of these follows.
III. LEGAL BARRIERS AND BOOSTERS
A. Federal Fi'nancial and Procedural Assistance
The major financial, political, and legal issues surrounding develop-
ment of a synthetic fuel plant may well be taken care of in the future by two
pieces of legislation. This legislation would create the Synthetic Fuels Cor-
poration (SFC) to aid in financing plants and an Energy Mobilization Board
(EMB) to aid developers in overcoming legal and political obstacles.
10 6
96. Id.
97. See discussion of water rights issues in text accompanying notes 224-38.
98. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at IV-34-36.
99. Id. at IX-2.
100. Id.
101. National Energy Plan II, 11-36 (1979).
102. SYNFUEL EIS, supra note 12, at IX-3.
103. National Energy Plan II, supra note 101, at 11-36.
104. Id.
105. Energy From the West, supra note 92, at 118.
106. As of this writing, the Senate and the House have passed the bill creating the Synthet-
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Both concepts were proposed by President Carter in his July 15, 1979 na-
tional energy policy address. Both concepts had, however, surfaced earlier in
Congress. Essentially President Carter proposed the creation of the SFC to
lead an effort of replacement of two and one half million barrels of imported
oil per day. 10 7 The President asked for $88 billion for the synthetic fuels
program. The proposal called for the SFC to be an independent, govern-
ment sponsored entity managed by a seven-member board. The board
would include, among others, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and one other Cabinet level chief.' 0 8 The President envisioned
that the board would decide how to invest the $88 billion and might even
develop synfuel plants to be owned and operated by the government. 0 9 In
should be noted that not all of this money was earmarked for coal gasifica-
tion facilities.
In addition to the SFC, President Carter called for the creation of the
EMB in order to make sure that nothing would stand in the way of the work
of the SFC and private enterprise. The purpose behind the EMB was to
alleviate delays which have historically occurred with energy related projects
due to local, state, and federal land use and environmental regulations and
statutes. The President's concept was to have a three-member board which
would be part of the Executive Office of the President and would have the
authority to designate nonnuclear projects as priority energy projects. 10
The EMB could then set a deadline by which all responsible officials and
decision makers would have to act. If there were a failure to comply with
the timetable, the Board would be empowered to make the decision.' " The
President proposed that the Board would have the authority to waive proce-
dural requirements of applicable federal, state, and local laws, was well as
procedural and substantive laws enacted after construction had begun."
12
The President stated: "We will protect the environment. But when this na-
tion critically needs a refinery or pipeline, we will build it."
1 13
Congress responded to the President's charge by moving ahead with
consideration of similar legislation already introduced. After much debate
and political maneuvering, the Senate passed a bill on October 4, 1979,
which creates a four-member Energy Mobilization Board. 1 4 The Board
could set deadlines for various agencies to act. It could alter or waive proce-
dural rules, but not substantive ones.' 1 5 If a deadline was missed, the Board
would be empowered to make the decision. Finally, a waiver of legislation
or regulations passed after commencement of construction is possible."
16
ics Fuel Corporation. The present bill authorizes $20 billion to stimulate the production of
synthetic fuels from coal and oil shale. On June 27, the House voted 232-131 to send the bill
creating the Energy Mobilization Board back to the Senate-House Conference Committee.
107. CONG. Q. WEEKLY 1437 (July 21, 1979).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1437-38.
Ill. Id. at 1438.
112. Id. at 1438-39.
113. /d. at 1472.
114. S. 1308, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).




On November 1, 1979, the House of Representatives also passed legisla-
tion creating an Energy Mobilization Board.'" 7 The House version sets up a
five-member panel, also having the authority to act in place of local, state, or
federal officials failing to make a timely decision.' 1 The House-created
EMB would have the power to waive substantive federal law if the President
and both houses of Congress agreed to such a waiver.'" 9
The two measures are currently before a Conference Committee which
is deadlocked over one key issue. The conferees are, as of this writing, unable
to agree on the waiver of substantive laws issue. A limited "grandfather
Clause" allowing exemption from federal, state, or local laws or regulations
passed after construction has started has been agreed to by the conferees.
The length and reviewability of these waivers has not been agreed to. 120 It
will apparently be several months before a finished bill emerges. It is clear
that some sort of EMB will be authorized and will have an impact on energy
development. It is likely that some HBSG plants will be affected by the
EMB and may escape some of the legal obstacles noted elsewhere in this part
of this article.
Following President Carter's July speech, both houses accelerated work
on legislation to aid in the financing of synfuel programs. The House has
passed one measure authorizing $3 billion in price supports for synfuels prior
to the July speech. 12' It quickly became clear that while Congress agreed
that financial assistance was needed for synfuel development, neither house
felt it appropriate to authorize anywhere near the amount of money which
President Carter had proposed. On November 8, 1979, the Senate passed a
bill authorizing a five-year, $20 billion synfuel program. 122 This bill creates
a synthetic fuels corporation to manage the program. A Conference Com-
mittee has formally approved this aspect of the bill. ' 23 The Corporation will
offer loan and price guarantees to encourage private industry to develop
synfuels. Until the corporation is set up the President is authorized to use up
to $3 billion to aid industry. 124 The Corporation will be able to enter into
joint ventures with private industry as well as help finance related mining
and transportation support developments. It is clear that the federal govern-
ment will shortly be much more financially active in synfuel development.
This financial involvement appears to be far more rational than the head-
first plunge proposed by the Administration.
Once having obtained assistance from the Synthetic Fuel Corporation,
an organization contemplating construction of an HBSG plant must prepare
to deal with other legal issues and concerns. The following section will detail
the more significant concerns facing an energy company proposing construc-
tion of an HBSG plhant.
117. H.R. 4985, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
118. 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 2447 (Nov. 3, 1979).
119. Id.
120. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
121. H.R. 3930, 96th Cong., ist Sess. (1979).
122. S. 932, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
123. 38 CONG. Q WEEKLY 677 (March 8, 1980).




The responsibilities associated with the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), 125 while burdensome, may actually prove to be helpful in rela-
tion to dilemmas under other statutory schemes. NEPA is generally intended
to be a tool for environmental full disclosure and environmentally well rea-
soned decisionmaking by federal agencies. 126 Federal agencies are to inte-
grate environmental concerns into the decisionmaking process itself.'
2 7
However, nothing in NEPA requires that the responsible federal agency
must necessarily make an environmentally sound decision or even give envi-
ronmental factors determinative weight. 128 The purposes of NEPA and re-
sponsibility for carrying out the purposes pertain to federal agencies. The
bulk of this article has dealt with private development of HBSG plants.
Why then is NEPA even a factor?
The so called action-forcing portion of NEPA is Section 102(2)(c).
129
Essentially it requires federal agencies to prepare detailed Environmental
Impact Statements (EIS) for "every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
human environment." For purposes of discussion here, the relevant concern
is whether a given project is a major federal action significantly affecting the
human environment. Federal courts in the last ten years have consistently
held that situations can exist where the working relationship between a pri-
vate entity and a federal agency is such as to make a project a "federal ac-
tion." 130 It is equally clear where an agency grants a permit or issues an
authorization necessary for a project by a private entity, such action may be
deemed a federal action. 13 1 The Council on Environment Quality (CEQ)
has recently promulgated regulations governing the EIS process which also
define "federal action" in this manner.132 The question then arises as to
whether the construction by a private energy corporation of an HBSG plant
will constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the human envi-
ronment.
As should be obvious from discussion above the average HBSG plant
will have a significant impact on the environment. The determination of
whether such a project is a federal action is less obvious. If substantial
financial assistance from the federal government makes the project possible,
then NEPA will be triggered. 133 Here, involvement of the Synthetic Fuels
Corporation or DOE will be most likely a factor. One of these agencies, not
the private developer, will be responsible for preparation of the EIS. How-
ever, the corporate officials had better be prepared to cooperate with the
125. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
126. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 100 S. Ct. 497 (1980).
127. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S. Ct. 2335 (1979).
128. 100 S. Ct. at 500.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(1976).
130. Scottsdale Mall v. State of Indiana, 549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008
(1977); Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (lst Cir. 1973).
131. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Int. Res. Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Wyo-
ming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
132. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1979).
133. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1979).
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federal agency during the EIS preparation. The corporation will likely have,
at its disposal, much of the information needed to make the EIS thorough
and legally adequate. Indeed, the corporation may have to do the bulk of
the preparation of the EIS.
If the developer chooses to forego federal financial assistance, NEPA
considerations may still be a factor. The developer will have certain respon-
sibilities pursuant to the Clean Air Act. Preconstruction review under either
nonattainment or prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) provisions of
a relevant state implementation plan will be necessary.134 However, neither
these requirements nor any similar requirements resulting from provisions of
the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) will trigger NEPA. Con-
gress has determined that any actions by the U. S. EPA under the Clean Air
Act are exempt from NEPA requirements.' 35 EPA actions pursuant to the
Clean Water Act are likewise generally exempt from NEPA.' 36 Therefore
even though a developer may be required to obtain a permit to discharge
pollutants into navigable waters, NEPA will not necessarily be triggered.
The only relevant exception to that policy is with regard to new sources. (Of
course, an HBSG plant would be a new source.) As discussed below, the
Clean Water Act sets up a permit program for polluters.' 37 This program is
envisioned to be run by the individual states following delegation by EPA.
If the particular state where a plant is to be built has control of the permit
program, then no EIS will be necessary. On the other hand, if EPA is still
administering the program, then it will be required to comply with NEPA
prior to issuance of a permit. Finally, hazardous wastes generated by a
HBSG plant may well require issuance of an EIS. Recently promulgated
regulations for the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)138 set
up elaborate permit requirements for "cradle to grave" handling of hazard-
ous wastes. 139 Issuance of permits to an HBSG plant, particularly for any
on-site disposal of wastes, should clearly be deemed a major federal action.
As should be clear, it is quite likely that an EIS will be necessary for an
HBSG plant. The developer should include preparation time in any timeta-
ble for construction. While the CEQ regulations are intended to streamline
this process, it still will require several months for preparation. The EIS
should be prepared and ready for issuance at the time the federal action,
whatever it may be, is proposed. 140 The CEQ regulations require that the
responsible federal agency contemplate an early and open process for deter-
mining the scope of issues to be addressed in the EIS. 4 ' This process,
largely untried at this writing, should aid interested parties in clarifying en-
134. See discussion of issues and procedures arising under requirements of the Clean Air Act
in text accompanying notes 143-82 in/fa.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1)(Supp. II 1978)(amending 15 U.S.C. § 783(c)(1)(1976)).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1)(1976).
137. 33 U.S.C. § § 1311, 1342 (1976 and Supp. 11 1978).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976 and Supp. 11 1978).
139. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,722 (1980)(to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 260).
140. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1979).
141. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1979).
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vironmental issues and hurdles facing an HBSG plant. '4 2 This should be an
excellent document to clarify for the developer all of the possible roadblocks
or obstacles to be faced during construction. It should also serve to open the
eyes of the developer to environmentally protective action needed. This will
also be an early opportunity for the public to have input into the HBSG
plant planning process.
C. The Clean Air Act
As noted above, an HBSG plant will not present the same magnitude of
air pollution problems as those posed by a coal-fired electric power plant.
Nonetheless, pollution will be significant enough to trigger various regula-
tory aspects of the Clean Air Act. The Act itself is structured in such a way
as to encourage maximum state control and administration of the require-
ments. Much of this control is delegated to the state only after careful in-
spection of ability and authority by EPA. The key to state programs is the
State Implementation Plan (SIP) required by Section 110 of the Act.' 4 3 The
plan must set out schedules, emission limitations, assurances of adequate
funding and personnel, a plan for prevention of significant deterioration, a
plan for dealing with pollution in so called nonattainment areas, ability to
inspect and monitor sources, and, in some instances, vehicle inspection and
maintenance plans. 44 In theory, negotiations for permits, preconstruction
review, and emission limits will be conducted with state government. How-
ever, circumstances presently are such in most states that the key aspects of
the Act are being federally administered.
In 1977, Congress passed significant amendments to the Act which clar-
ified and codified state responsibilities for PSD and established new responsi-
bilities for dealing with areas failing to attain the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards. Less than speedy promulgation of regulations and litiga-
tion have left EPA in control of these areas in most every state. Therefore
any developer planning an HBSG plant will probably be negotiating with
EPA. Depending upon the location of a proposed facility, these negotiations
will either be pursuant to Part C of the Act (PSD) or Part D of the Act
(Nonattainment).
The concept underlying PSD is that areas of the country which pres-
ently have clean air should remain that way. Development is not totally
forbidden in these areas however. Initially the clean air areas are invento-
ried or designated pursuant to Section 107.145 All of these areas are then
classified either Class I, Class II, or Class III.146 Most of the areas will be
Class II. (It should be noted also that many of the areas in the West, which
may well be sites for HBSG plants, are PSD areas. Areas in the East likely to
be chosen for plants are more likely to be nonattainment areas). Within
142. Goplerud, NEPA at Nine." Alive and Wel, or Wounded in Action, 55 N.D. L. Rev. 497
(1979).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. U 1978).
144. Id.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (Supp. 11 1978).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 7472 (Supp. 11 1978).
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these areas varying increases in amounts of key pollutants, at this point sul-
fur dioxide and particulates, will be allowed. Class I areas allow the least
increase, thus the least development; Class III allows the most increases,
thus the most development. 147 Other pollutants emitted by HBSG plants
are also subject to controls. The "increments" will be tabulated from a base-
line point which is determined as of the time of application for the first per-
mit in an area.' 48 In order to fully understand this program, it is perhaps
initially important to see what type of project triggers PSD factors and re-
quirements.
Only major sources of pollution are subject to the intricate preconstruc-
tive review and permitting requirements. Section 169(1) defines major
source as any one of numerous listed types of facilities which emit, or have
the potential to emit, 100 tons per year of any pollutant.' 49 The section also
includes any other source, not set out in the list, which has the potential to
emit over 250 tons per year of any pollutant. There has been dispute be-
tween EPA and industries as to whether the section should be read as relat-
ing to controlled or uncontrolled emissions. This dispute has been resolved
in favor of a definition which relates to controlled emissions.'5° Among the
listed sources under Section 169(1) are fuel conversion plants. As noted
above, the emissions for an HBSG plant will be more than 100 tons per
year. 151
What must an HBSG plant developer do in order to obtain a permit for
construction and how much of a delay factor will this work into a project?
Section 165 of the Act sets out the general requirements for preconstruction
review and permit processing.1 52 The Statute expressly requires emission
limitations for anj pollutant emitted to be based upon a case-by-case deter-
mination of best available control technology (BACT). 153 It should be un-
derscored that this applies not simply to SO 2 and particulates, but for "each
pollutant subject to regulation" under the Act. 154 The developer must also
conduct an air quality analysis for the area impacted by the project.1 55 The
developer must also carry out such monitoring as may be necessary to deter-
mine the effect of the project's emissions on the area.1 56 A public hearing
must be held prior to issuance of a permit. Added protections and consulta-
tion requirements are imposed for sources which will impact on federal pub-
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (Supp. 11 1978).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(4)(Supp. II 1978). The increments are the amount of SO 2 and/or
particulates which may be added to existing air quality levels.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 74 79(I)(Supp. H 1978).
150. Alabama Power Company v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979). This case in-
volved challenges to regulations promulgated by EPA dealing with prevention of significant
deterioration concepts. The case is a primary starting point for consideration of PSD issues.
Equally important are new proposed regulations responsive to this decision. (40 C.F.R. § § 51-
52 (1979)).
i51, See note 92 supra.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (Supp. 11 1978).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4)(Supp. H 1978).
154. Id.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(6)(Supp. I 1978).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)( 7 )(Supp. H 1978).
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lic lands. 157  Western HBSG plant developers should pay particular
attention to these requirements.
The administrator of EPA promulgated regulations implementing and
clarifying portions of the 1977 Amendments regarding PSD on June 19,
1978.158 These regulations were quite controversial and naturally were chal-
lenged by both industry and environmental groups. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals decided initial issues pertaining to the effective
date of preconstruction review and permit requirements in March of
1979.159 The more substantive issues were decided by the court in the case
of Alabama Power Company v. Costle, handed down in per curiam form in June
of 1979160 and followed by a detailed opinion in December of the same
year.' 6' Some of the regulations were approved and numerous significant
regulations were disapproved and remanded for reconsideration by the ad-
ministrator. Many of the issues decided have little bearing on the applica-
tion for construction of an HBSG plant. Several do, however, and will be
briefly summarized. 1
6 2
Probably the most crucial consideration for a developer is the need to
put together plans for a project and begin the review process as soon as possi-
ble. Waiting too long may prove fatal. The allowed increments in a given
PSD area may already have been used by other projects. This is already
happening in some areas.16 3 Some mitigation of this need for speed is pro-
vided in the Alabama Power Court's analysis of the issues surrounding calcula-
tion of the baseline. It is this baseline from which the increments are
calculated. EPA had defined baseline concentration in terms of actual air
quality as of August 7, 1977, the date of the signing by President Carter of
the 1977 Amendments to the Act.' 64 This definition was clearly contrary to
the express language of the Act which defined baseline as the air quality at
the time of the first application for permit in a given PSD area. 165 The court
had little difficulty in holding the administrator had no authority to set the
uniform baseline. 1
66
Another issue which faced the Alabama Power court was whether a
source should be subject to PSD regulations only if it is located in a PSD
area or, in addition, if it will impact on one. EPA's regulations imposed
157. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d)(Supp. I 1978).
158. 43 Fed. Reg. 26,380; 26,388(1978).
159. Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
160. [1979] 13 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) 1225 (D.C. Cir).
161. 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
162. The court dealt with the issues in a fashion which also included consideration of nonat-
tainment issues. The agency has now proposed new regulations to replace the invalidated ones
(see note 149 supra) and has also stayed the effect of the old regulations (45 Fed. Reg. 7800
(1980)). The issues dealt with by the court included: the definition of potential to emit, exemp-
tion of small sources, protection of the increments, application of PSD permits to sources in
nonattainment areas, fugitive dust sources, the baseline date for increment calculations, model-
ing, stack heights, bubble policies, pollutants subject to the various regulations and determina-
tion of dates for commencement of construction.
163. [1979] (Current Development) ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1640-41.
164. 40 C.F.R. § 51.24(b)(11)(1979).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 74
7
9(4)(Supp. I 1978).
166. 606 F.2d at 1089.
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preconstruction review upon all sources, wherever they might be located, if
their emissions would have an impact on any clean air area. 167 The court
found that the language of Section 165, which utilizes the phrase "con-
structed in any area to which this part applies," limits the application of the
PSD requirements to facilities locating in clean air areas rather than to those
facilities which may impact on clean air areas.' 68 The court added that this
holding applied to those situations involving interstate pollution. That is,
Section 165 preconstruction review and permit requirements will not apply
to major sources which are to be sited in nonattainment areas of one state
and will adversely impact a clean air area in a neighboring state. 169 As
noted below in the discussion of nonattainment area requirements, a major
source located in an area near a PSD area will not be free from any controls
or reviews. Such sources will, however, escape the rigors of Section 165
preconstruction review.
If, on the other hand, the developers of an HBSG plant decide to locate
the facility in a dirty air or nonattainment area, a different set of ground
rules will apply. Areas are, of course, designated nonattainment for each of
the various pollutants pursuant to Section 107. The developers should im-
mediately determine the pollutants for which the area is nonattainment If
the plant will cause or contribute to concentrations of these pollutants, then
a number of issues arise. The initial matter for consideration is whether the
area presently has a ban on construction of major sources. After July 1,
1979, there can be no construction of major sources of pollution in nonat-
tainment areas unless the state in which the area is located has submitted
and had approved a plan for attaining the ambient air quality standards by
December 31, 1982.170 Because of delays by states in submitting plans and
subsequent delays by EPA in reviewing them, the construction ban applies
in most nonattainment areas. Presumably this will have changed by the
time intense HBSG development begins.
Once a plan is in place it will require that a major source, such as an
HBSG plant, obtain a permit prior to commencement of construction.' 7' No
permit can be issued unless it is part of a program to assure a net reduction
of total emissions in the area. The Act requires reasonable progress toward
attainment and new construction is allowed only within that framework. 172
The states have two choices in allowing for industrial growth. They can
require existing sources to clean up only to a level of attainment. 173 Individ-
ual states may, on the other hand, want to build in a growth margin and
require existing sources to clean up beyond attainment levels, thus allowing
new sources an opportunity to add to existing pollutants without creating
violations of air quality standards.1
74
167. 40 C.F.R. 51.24(i)(1)(1979).
168. 606 F.2d at 1082 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 1084.
170. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410 and 7502(a)(Supp. 11 1978).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)(Supp. 11 1978).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(3)(Supp. II 1978).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 7503()(A)(Supp. I 1978).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(l)(B)(Supp. I 1978).
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It is likely that many states will choose the former, thus utilizing the
emissions offset system already in place. 17 5 This system essentially allows
emissions from the new source to be offset by reductions in emissions from
existing sources. For example, an HBSG developer seeking to offset S02
emissions would seek out an existing source of SO 2 emissions and put to-
gether a plan to reduce those emissions. The HBSG developer would pro-
vide the capital for such reductions. They must be reductions not required
under the SIP and they must be more than the emissions produced by the
HBSG plant. 17 6 This may even involve obtaining reductions at more than
one location. If the project is vital to the area, it should not be altogether
unreasonable to anticipate government assistance in obtaining the offsets. 1
77
It is important to note that the offsets must be of like pollutants. That is,
SO 2 must be traded for SO 2 or particulates must be traded for particu-
lates. 178 The offsets, in order to be valid, must be legally binding, i.e., part of
the SIP.1
79
In order to obtain a permit to construct and operate an HBSG plant in
a nonattainment area, a developer will need more than offsets. The plant
must comply with the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER).' 8 0 The de-
veloper must show that all other sources owned or operated by it in the
particular s/ate are either in compliance, or on a schedule for compliance,
with the applicable SIP.' 8 ' Finally, it must be shown that the SIP is being
"carried out" for the nonattainment area where the source is to be lo-
cated. 1
82
HBSG plants will be far less harmful to air quality than coal fired elec-
tric generating plants. HBSG plants will undoubtedly be allowable in some
PSD areas and some nonattainment areas. The developer should be aware
of the permit requirements under both parts of the Act. The developer
should realize that while EPA hopes to makes these procedures efficient and
speedy, they will be time consuming. It may be that the Energy Mobiliza-
tion Board will aid the process, but absent this help, many months' work and
waiting may be anticipated. A final caveat is in order. The developer
should be aware of the possibility that in a given area the HBSG plant pro-
posal may be subject to both PSD and nonattainment requirements. Areas
are, after all, designated under Section 107 for each pollutant.
D. The Clean Water Act
The typical HBSG plant will have a significant impact on the water
quality of the particular area in which it will locate. Assuming that the
175. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976), revtsedat 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979).
176. 44 Fed. Reg. 3284 (1979).
177. Quarries, Federal Regulations of iVew Industrial Plants, 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 18 (Mono-
graph No. 28, May 4, 1979).
178. The EPA Emission Offset Interpretive Ruling of Jan. 16, 1979, holds that only in-
trapollutant emission offsets will be acceptable (i.e., hydrocarbon increases may not be offset
against S02 reductions). 40 C.F.R. § 51, App. S, at 143 (1979).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. 11 1978).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(z)(Supp. 11 1978).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(3)(Supp. 11 1978).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(4)(Supp. 11 1978).
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developers do not opt for a zero discharge unit, the plant will discharge sig-
nificant quantities of pollutants. These discharges will subject the facility to
the provisions of the Clean Water Act.' 8 3 The basic premise of the Clean
Water Act is that the navigable waters of this control continue to be signifi-
cantly polluted, and industrial and municipal sources discharging into
streams and lakes are the villains in this whole scheme. Congress therefore
devised a framework within which sources of pollutants may discharge into
navigable waters only after having obtained a permit to do so.'8 4 This pro-
gram, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),
18 5
ideally will lead to a situation where, by 1985, there are no discharges of
pollutants in the United States.
186
The permit system established under Section 402 of the Act is the key to
state and federal cooperative efforts in controlling water pollution. Just as it
had under the Clean Air Act, Congress determined that primary responsibil-
ity for the administration and enforcement of the Act should be with the
states. Thus, under the Act, the authority for operation of the permit pro-
gram may be delegated to the states. As of this writing, thirty-three jurisdic-
tions have assumed responsibility for the program. Therefore, it is highly
likely that the developer of an HBSG plant will be dealing with state offi-
cials regarding a permit. The system has procedural and substantive import
for a synfuel plant.
The procedures for obtaining a permit have recently been extensively
revised by EPA. 187 These procedures are generally applicable regardless of
whether the particular state or EPA is running the program. Several points
should be noted with regard to the procedural regulations. First, they are
presently the subject of litigation.188 Second, EPA has proposed regulations
which would establish a consolidated permit program covering permits nec-
essary pursuant to the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Air Act.' 8 9 These
regulations could have a positive impact on industry generally. Third, the
developer should be aware that it is necessary that an application for a per-
mit be filed at least 180 days prior to commencement of discharge by the
source. 19° This is an important consideration in terms of planning a con-
struction timetable. The developer should be thoroughly familiar with the
specific procedures necessary for application and securing of the permit. Fi-
nally, even if the state is administering the permit program, EPA retains a
veto authority over issuance of individual permits. 191
183. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
184. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (1976). "Navigable waters" is defined broadly under the Act
such that it is difficult to imagine any water utilized by an industrial discharger which would
not be covered by the Act.
185. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
186. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
187. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122, 123, 124 (1978).
188. Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. EPA, 610 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1979). Only a small
procedural issue has been decided. The remaining substantive issues are pending before several
circuit courts awaiting consolidation and assignment to one court.
189. 44 Fed. Reg. 34,244 (1979).
190. 40 C.F.R. § 122.10(c)(1978).
191. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1976).
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The substantive requirements for an HBSG plant will be contained in
the permit. The Act establishes technology standards and receiving water
quality standards which must be adhered to by a discharger. The technol-
ogy standards established pursuant to Sections 301 and 304 of the Act'
9 2
govern, unless there is going to be an interference with attainment of water
quality sufficient to support wildlife, recreation, public health, and agricul-
ture. 19 3 If this is the case then more stringent requirements become part of
the permit. The technology standards are dealt with at several different
levels by EPA.
The Clean Water Act, in a manner similar to that found in the Clean
Air Act, establishes more stringent controls for new sources. These new
source performance standards must yield a level of effluent limitation or op-
erating requirements achievable through the use of best available control
technology. 194 A synfuel plant such as is the focus of this article would, of
course, be a new source. But, will it be for purposes of the Clean Water Act?
At this point it would not be. EPA has not promulgated or proposed new
source performance standards for coal gasification plants. A source will be
subject to NSPS only if the agency has issued or proposed standards prior to
commencement of construction. 19 5 This does not leave the HBSG plant be-
tween the cracks of the Act. It will be treated as if it were an existing facility.
As amended in 1977, the Act requires discharge of conventional pollu-
tants to be subject to best conventional pollutant control technology (BCT)
by July 1, 1984.196 Discharge of toxic pollutants must be controlled by best
available technology (BAT) no later than July 1, 1984.197 Finally, noncon-
ventional pollutants will be subject to BAT by July 1, 1984, or within three
years after an effluent limitation has been established. In no event may com-
pliance be later than July 1, 1987.198 HBSG plants would discharge effluents
subject to all three categories. These control technologies are to be estab-
lished on an industry-by-industry basis. In other words, EPA is required to
issue effluent limitation guidelines for specific categories of industrial
sources.1 99 These guidelines are to aid the permit issuer in establishing
source specific effluent limitations and compliance schedules. Such limits
become the key elements of the NPDES permit. 20 0 As in the case of the new
source performance standards, EPA has yet to issue effluent guidelines for
coal gasification units. The developer will thus be subject to an individual-
ized determination of limitations and compliance schedules necessary to
achieve the goals of the Act.20 ' A final note is in order with regard to the
192. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314 (1976).
193. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a)(1976).
194. 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976).
195. Id.
196. 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(z)(E)(1976). Conventional pollutants include biochemical oxygen
demand (BOD), total suspended solids (TSS), pH, fecal coliform, and oil and grease. (40
C.F.R. § 401.16)(1978)).
197. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(1976). The EPA has established an initial list of toxic pollu-
tants which can be found at 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (1978).
198. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(F)(1976).
199. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314 (1976).
200. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1976).
201. The Administrator is given authority in § 4
0 2
(a)(1) to act on a case-by-case basis where
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Clean Water Act. If a developer determines it is more economically sound to
avoid direct discharge into a river or stream, consideration of discharging
into a publicly owned treatment works (POTW) is advisable. This allows
the source to avoid the rigors of obtaining a permit. In this case it would be
the POTW which would be discharging into the navigable waters. The
HBSG plant would, however, be required to meet certain standards for pre-
treatment of effluents.
2 0 2
It is clear that an HBSG plant which does not utilize a closed system for
water usage will come within the parameters of Clean Water Act. It may be
that a particular developer will decide that in the interests of maintaining
water quality and reducing administrative and monetary costs, a closed sys-
tem is advantageous. It appears likely tha.t western plants will use a zero
discharge approach. 20 3 As shown below, this approach does not free the fa-
cility from the regulatory realm.
E. Resource Conservation and Recovey Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)20 4 is
yet another piece of environmental legislation of which the HBSG facility
developer must be aware. The plant will generate wastes, likely to be termed
hazardous by EPA, as by-products of its air pollution control equipment.
These will include scrubber sludge and ash. In addition, if the developer
determines it to be cost effective to construct a closed system for water han-
dling there will be hazardous wastes which must be removed from lagoons or
holding ponds on the premises. The generation, storage and/or removal of
these wastes may well subject the plant to the terms of RCRA and regula-
tions promulgated thereunder.
There is an inherent difficulty in analyzing the applicability of RCRA
to a particular facility. The Act was passed in 1976. Congress mandated
that regulations be promulgated within eighteen months of enactment, April
21, 1978, to implement the requirements of listing substances and controlling
their disposal, storage, or transport. 20 5 The regulations were not even pro-
posed by EPA until December 18, 1978.206 This came about only after litiga-
tion was initiated by the state of Illinois and various environmental groups
to challenge EPA's failure to meet the statutory timetable. 207 A portion of
the regulations was issued in final form on February 26, 1980.208 To add to
the confusion, the regulations which remain to be promulgated will be ones
providing definitions of "hazardous waste" and "hazardous waste genera-
tor." They will also detail testing methods for determining if a particular
no guidelines have been established. This section states a facility may be subjected to "such
conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(1976).
202. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1976).
203. Remarks of David Abbey at Energy and the Public Lands IV Conference, Salt Lake
City, Utah (Apr. 18, 1980).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1976).
206. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,956 (1978).
207. Illinois v. Costle, [19791 12 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) 1597 (D.D.C.).
208. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,722 (1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 260).
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waste is hazardous, as well as providing a list of specific hazardous wastes.
These regulations were issued on May 19, 1980.209 The final act for this
theatre of the uncertain will undoubtedly be litigation challenging the valid-
ity of the regulations.
Despite the confusion and uncertainty, the developer of an HBSG
should be aware of the general scheme of the Act and be able to anticipate
its application to specific situations. The Act speaks to both hazardous and
nonhazardous solid wastes. The most stringent requirements for the HBSG
developer are going to involve hazardous wastes. The developer should, of
course, be cognizant of any state or local legislation which might affect its
generation of nonhazardous wastes. It should be noted that while the term
"solid waste" is utilized in the Act, the definition of this term is much
broader than one might normally think.2 10 With regard to regulation of
hazardous wastes, the Act establishes a "cradle to grave" control program.
In other words, the Act requires notice, monitoring, and substantive regula-
tions which originate with the generator of the waste and continue through
to the storage of the waste.
The initial step for an HBSG facility in this whole process will be to
determine whether indeed it is generating hazardous wastes. At the very
least the wastes generated by the air pollution control equipment will be
included under the definition of solid waste.211 The wastes from a closed
water usage system may also fit within the Act. The next question will be
whether these are hazardous wastes. The wastes generated by the HBSG
facility will be considered hazardous if they are on the EPA's list of particu-
lar hazardous wastes. 21 2 If they are not on the list then the generator must
evaluate them according to the Act's criteria for determining what wastes
are hazardous. These include ignitability, corrosiveness, reactivity, and tox-
icity.21 3 Assuming for the moment that the wastes are determined to be
hazardous, a number of procedural and notice requirements are then im-
posed upon the facility's operator.
The cradle to grave concept is implemented through an elaborate rec-
ord keeping and manifest system. It begins with notifying EPA of the gener-
ation of hazardous wastes. 2 14 The facility must obtain an EPA identification
number.21 5 Prior to having the wastes removed from the plant site, the gen-
erator must prepare a manifest containing information about the wastes, the
generator, transporter, and the receiving facility. 2 16 The wastes must be
209. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066-33,285 (1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. §§ 261-265).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27)(1976).
211. Id.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a)(1976). These wastes are included in the portion of the final regu-
lations not yet promulgated.
213. Id.; 43 Fed. Reg. 58,954-58,955, 58,957 (1978). The particular methods for testing for
these characteristics are also part of the proposed regulations.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 6930(a)(1976).
215. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,733 (1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 262.12).
216. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.20, 262.21. The names, addresses, and EPA identification num-
bers of the generator, transporter, and receiving facility must be included. The manifest must
also contain a description of the wastes, both quality and quantity. These descriptions and




packaged, labeled, and marked according to U. S. Department of Transpor-
tation regulations for hazardous materials.2 t 7 Before turning the wastes over
to the transporter, the generator must certify by signing the manifest that all
transportation requirements have been met. 218 If delivery cannot be made
to the designated facility or a designated alternate, the transporter may well
have to return the wastes to the generator. Finally, it is clear that an HBSG
operator could have wastes transported only by an EPA registered hauler and
transported only to an EPA registered storage and treatment facility.
2 1 9 Ul-
timate liability for any deviations falls to the generator of the material. 220 It
therefore will behoove the HBSG developer to carefully monitor the haulers
and waste disposal site owners it chooses.
The HBSG plant operator has one other alternative with regard to haz-
ardous wastes which it may generate. It may choose to treat and store these
wastes on site. If it does so, it becomes in effect a hazardous waste manage-
ment facility. It would be subject then to the substantive standards EPA will
promulgate for facilities which treat, store, or dispose of wastes.
As noted above, confusion has been the rule with RCRA. It is likely to
continue for some time. As with the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act,
RCRA provides the opportunity for states to take over the administration
and enforcement of hazardous waste control. 22 1 It should also be noted that
RCRA provisions are included as part of EPA's proposed consolidated per-
mit program. 222 Finally, the Love Canal and Valley of the Drums discover-
ies have caused a significant government and public uproar over hazardous
wastes. It is therefore likely that enforcement of RCRA provisions will be
vigorous. Indeed, it is one portion of EPA's domain which will get a big
budgetary shot in the arm in 1980.223
F. Water Rights Issues
Water is a vital element in the operation of an HBSG plant. Water
availability thus is crucial to the planning and development of such a facil-
ity. The amount of water available for an HBSG plant and the ease of ob-
taining it* will depend upon where the plant will be located. Water
availability should not pose a significant problem in the eastern part of the
country. Water will, however, be quite difficult to obtain in the West, even
for those plant utilizing a zero discharge approach.
Most any area in the East which might support an HBSG plant will
have a sufficient quantity of water from which to draw. The significant is-
sue, therefore, will be the relative ease of obtaining it in a legal sense. Obvi-
ously, in order to be absolutely certain of rights to water for energy
development, the developer must consult the specific laws of the particular
jurisdiction involved. Generally speaking, eastern states have based the right
217. 45 Fed. Reg. 17,733 (1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.30, 32).
218. Id. (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 262.21(b)).
219. Id. (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 262.12(c)).
220. Id. (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 262.10(e)).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 6941 (1976).
222. 44 Fed. Reg. 34,244 (1979).
223. [1980] 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1920 (increase of $5.5 million and 155 personnel).
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to use water on the concept of riparian rights. 22 4 Riparian rights are based
upon traditional property concepts. That is, the owner of the property, in
this case, water, may use it as he or she sees fit, so long as there is no resulting
injury to other property owners. This property right gives to a landowner
whose property touches a stream the right to make reasonable use of the
water.22 5 This is a right to use the water, not actual ownership.2 26 Gener-
ally, the use must be on the so called riparian land, although the developer
should analyze the laws of the particular jurisdiction involved. Some have
become more liberal in their views of where the water may properly be used.
The key to riparian rights is that the user must not do anything to infringe
on the downstream riparian owner's right to also make reasonable use of the
water. Similarly, the user would have an action against any upstream user
who impaired his supply of water.227 It should be noted that no quantified
right is involved, as with western water law. Any amount of water may be
used so long as no downstream owner is injured.
As with other issues, water availability will be particularly troublesome
for anyone planning an HBSG plant for the western part of the country.
Most of the jurisdictions in the West, including those with the most coal
reserves, have adopted the law of prior appropriation for determination of
water rights. 228 Prior appropriation is based upon a "first in time" concept.
The first person or entity to take water from a stream or watercourse and put
it to a beneficial use has the right to continue to do so. This right generally
will be superior to subsequent appropriatiors along the same stream. In
many of the jurisdictions which are governed by prior appropriation, the
administration of the system is governed by constitutional or statutory provi-
sions.229 The crucial policy consideration in the western states is that the
water belongs to the public and not the owner of the land through which the
water passes. 230 Thus, the availability of the water is in no way connected to
ownership of land. Generally speaking, the rights, once established, are held
until abandoned. 23 1 The rights to already appropriated water may be trans-
ferred from one party to another in some instances.232 Usually, such a trans-
fer will be in the form of a sale. The HBSG developer should be aware of
the procedures required for transfer in any given jurisdiction.2 33 Part and
parcel of this process would, of course, be a determination as to whether the
new use would be a "beneficial" use. This term is generally defined by stat-
224. F. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER Lxw 10 (2d ed. 1974).
225. Id.
226. J. MACDONALD & J. BEUSCHER, WATER RIGHTS 79 (2d ed. 1973).
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979).
228. F. TRELEASE, supra note 222.
229. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102 (Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-
1-101 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (1978).
230. WYO. CONST. ART. VIII, § 1; COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-101; MONT. REV. CoDEs
ANN. § 85-2-101; UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-5.
231. J. MACDONALD & J. BEUSCHER, supra note 224, at 92.
232. Holland, Mixing Oil and Water- The Efeet ofPrevaihng Water Law Doctrines on Oil Shale
Development, 52 DEN. L.J. 657 (1975); Trelease, Changes and Transfers of Water Rights, 13 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 507 (1967).
233. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302 (1973 & Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3
(1978); Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-104 (1977).
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ute.234 Most will include generation of power of industrial uses as beneficial.
The HBSG plant's place in the overall western water picture is a bit
uncertain. Much of the water in the West is already committed. Most of it is
committed to irrigated agriculture. 235 As the most recent entrant into the
water sweepstakes, the energy industry, in this instance HBSG developers,
must be prepared to purchase rights. Negotiations with farmers and ranchers
may not be easy despite the existence of monetary resources on the part of
the developer. The energy industry is intruding upon established lifestyles
and is not necessarily universally welcome. The price is likely to be high.
State law will be the dominant focus of water rights questions in the
West. 236 The developer must be aware, however, of rights accruing to the
federal government and to native Americans. Whenever the government
withdraws land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose,
such as a national park or forest, it also reserves, by implication, appurtenant
unappropriated water. This water is in an amount necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation. 237 Essentially, the same right has been extended
to Indian tribes. The Supreme Court has held that whenever the United
States withdraws lands for the establishment of an Indian reservation, it im-
pliedly withdraws unappropriated appurtenant water in an amount neces-
sary for the purposes of the withdrawal.
238
Water availability, both factually and legally, is a very significant issue
for the HBSG developer desiring to locate in the West. The developer will
not only have to determine who has how much for sale, but will be undoubt-
edly forced to negotiate delicately for it. The developer may also find him-
self in competition with other energy concerns for water. The difficulty in
obtaining water may cause the developer to give second thought to eastern
locations away from the plentiful western coal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Coal gasification specifically and synfuels generally are likely to be vital
sources of energy in the next twenty to thirty years. Clearly, development is
not going to occur overnight. Government financial assistance is going to be
critical. Social and political acceptance, particularly in the West, will be
crucial. The ability to recognize and deal with significant legal issues will
also be invaluable.
239
234. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-2-102(2)(1979); WYo. STAT. § 41-3-102 (1977).
235. In the Four Corners Region, 80% to 90% is committed to agriculture. Ingram, Laney,
& McCain, Water Scarcity and the Pohics of Plenty in the Four Corners States, 32 W. POL. Q. 298
(1979).
236. This dominant role has been reinforced recently by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
237. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
238. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
239. In addition to those dealt with in the body of the article, other issues may well arise. At
the state level, many states now have Major Facilities Siting Acts. These are complex procedu-
ral and review-oriented laws designed to give state governments maximum control over location
and design of power plants and major industrial facilities. Such laws are prevalent in both the
East and the West. In addition, many states now have enacted legislation similar to NEPA.
Such laws might require a developer to prepare an EIS even if the project had no federal in-
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Development of low and medium BTU projects continues on a small
scale. Most of the major companies seeking to build HBSG facilities are
apparently waiting for a clear financial and legal road. Texaco, Southern
California Edison, and several other concerns are well into planning for
what will be the nation's first commercial sized plant. The facility, to be
located near Daggett, California, is scheduled for operation in 1983.240 Even
with this plant, complete funding has yet to be obtained.
The HBSG developer will have to be patient and resourceful. Above
all, in order to "sell" the product and the facility, the plants must be
planned, built, and operated in a responsible manner. This includes envi-
ronmental, economic, social, and political responsibility. If done in such a
manner, synfuel can be a valuable near term energy source.
volvement. Local land use laws may have a significant impact; as may considerations for road,
railroad, and pipeline rights-of-way.
At the federal level the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976), may prove to be
a factor. For a project which is integrated with mining operations, the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976), should be thoroughly analyzed. As
noted, many of these legal obstacles may be smoothed over by the Energy Mobilization Board.
240. 105 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 66 (1980).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Preface
This article focuses on the history, outline, and implementation of the
new Federal Coal Management Program (FCMP) which has preoccupied
the Department of Interior during the administrations of at least three presi-
dents. This introduction will briefly review the coal resource in the United
States in general and the federal coal resource in particular. Part II outlines
the history of the federal coal leasing program over the decade of the 1970's.
This is followed in Part III by a detailed discussion of the new FCMP which
has been developed over the last two years and is now in the initial stages of
implementation. Part III will focus on the principal differences between the
old and new coal programs. Part IV provides a critical review of the new
program and discusses recommendations for revisions. Part V presents brief
conclusions on the future of federal coal leasing.
B. The Coal Resource
1. Types of Coal
Types of coal are generally classified on the basis of fixed carbon or
calorific value as:
(1) Anthracite (hard coal) with an energy content of approxi-
mately 25 million BTU's per ton;
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(2) Bituminous with an energy content in the range of 21 to 28
million BTU's per ton;
(3) Subbitumious with an energy content in the range of 16.6 to 23
million BTU's per ton; and
(4) Lignite (brown coal) with an energy content in the range of 12
to 16.6 million BTU's per ton.'
Over 97 percent of the total identified reserves of anthracite found in
the United States are in Pennsylvania, with minor reserves in Alaska, Arkan-
sas, Colorado, New Mexico, and Virginia.2 Bituminous coal, on the other
hand, is found in thirty-two states, with major deposits in Colorado, Illinois,
and West Virgina.3 Subbituminous coal is found in at least eight states,
4
and the major reserves of lignite in the United States are found in North
Dakota and Montana.
5
2. Surface and Underground Coal Resources
Energy fuels are generally quantified as either total resources6 or
reserves, the latter being comprised of resources that may be currently avail-
able under existing economic and technological conditions. 7 The World En-
ergy Conference in 1974 estimated that the United States retains 57 percent
of the total world resources of coal.8 Further, it is estimated that the United
States retains over 30 percent of the total recoverable reserves in the world. 9
Of the 437 billion tons of coal reserves in the United States, 300 billion
tons are recoverable by underground mining methods, while 137 billion tons
can be reached by surface mining methods.' 0 Despite the fact that under-
ground coal reserves total more than twice the recoverable surface coal
reserves, half of the coal production in the United States from 1971 through
1975 was from surface mines. I I A variety of factors contribute to the coal
industry's preoccupation with surface mining techniques. The primary rea-
son is the increased productivity per man/day that surface mining enjoys
over underground mining. For example, a person working on a surface mine
in 1975 produced 30 short tons of coal as compared with 9.5 short tons for
I. ASTM STANDARDS - PART 19, STANDARD SPECIFICATION FOR CLASSIFICATION OF
COALS BY RANK, ASTM DESIGNATION D 388-66 (1972).
2. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, BULL. No. 1412, COAL SOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES
81 (1974).
3. Id. at 30.
4. Id. at 42. Note, these states include Alaska, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, Washington, Wyoming.
5. Id. at 81. Montana and North Dakota combined contain 96.8 percent of the total U.S.
reserves of lignite.
6. "Total resources" are materials that have present or future value and comprise identi-
fied or known materials plus those not yet identified, but which on the basis of geologic evidence
are presumed to exist. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, BULL. No. 1450-A, PRINCIPLES OF THE
MINERAL RESOURCES CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM OF THE U.S. BUREAU OF MINES AND THE U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY A-I (1976).
7. Id.
8. A. MCRAE & J. NUDUS, THE ENERGY SOURCEBOOK 308 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
ENERGY SOURCEBOOK].
9. Id.
10. BUREAU OF MINES, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DEMONSTRATED COAL RESERVE BASE
OF THE UNITED STATES BY SULFUR CATEGORY 32 (1975).
11. ENERGY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 303.
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someone working in an underground mine. 12 Additionally, the require-
ments of the federal Clean Air Act 1 3 make low-sulfur coal reserves extremely
attractive, particularly in the West where massive reserves of coal lie near the
surface. 14
3. Relation to Other Energy Resources
In spite of the massive coal reserves this country retains, coal is used to
meet a disconcertingly small portion of the country's energy demands. Fig-
ure 1 shows this surprising disparity.' 5 While over 90 percent of the energy
reserve base of the United States is comprised of coal, it provided only 18
percent of the country's energy demand in 1977. The imbalance between
use of limited oil and gas resources and coal is caused by the distinctive
properties of petroleum and natural gas, which permit these products to be
produced, transported, stored, and used in ways that are cheaper, easier,
safer, and cleaner than coal.
The domestic supplies of both oil and natural gas, however, are dwin-
dling so rapidly that they may be exhausted early in the 21st Century. The
fact that this country possesses over half of the world's known coal resources
(a figure that far exceeds the energy equivalent of the petroleum reserves
owned by the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries) serves as the primary foundation for our current preoccupation with
coal. Recognition of our great coal wealth, however, does nothing to bring
this nation closer to energy independence. The increasing vulnerability of
our economic system to the vagaries of the imported oil market mandates
that we develop our most abundant energy resource as rapidly as possible
without sacrificing environmental and societal values. The new FCMP is
the latest federal attempt to balance this country's interest in economic, en-
vironmental, and socio-economic well-being in relation to development of
our coal resources.
C. Federal Coal-A Western Phenomenon
1. The Public Land States
The federal government plays a major role in the daily lives of every
citizen to one extent or another. The significance of that federal role in-
creases geometrically in the western "public land states" where the federal
sovereign owns a major part of the real estate. As a percentage of the total
land acreage in the 13 states west of the 100th meridian, the amount of fed-
erally owned and managed land varies from a comparatively insignificant
9.9 percent in Hawaii to an astronomical 87.6 percent and 90.5 percent in
12. Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976), amending andrecodihing the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858 (1976).
14. ENERGY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 301, 302.
15. ENERGY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 240. For an extensive discussion of the esti-
mated resources, problems, and promise of U.S. coal production see, U.S. GENERAL AccOuNT-
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Nevada and Alaska, respectively. 16 The ten other western states and the
percent of federally owned land in each are:
17











The one other state with significant federal land and federal coal resources is
North Dakota, with federal land areas totaling 5.3 percent of the total land
acreage of the state.' 8
The cumulative figures for coal resources in the United States total
nearly 1.6 trillion short tons of all four varieties of coal-anthracite, bitumi-
nous, subbituminous, and lignite. 19 Of the fourteen public land states listed
above, ten contain nearly 60 percent of the 1.6 trillion tons of U.S. coal re-
sources. 20 Figure 2 identifies the coal fields of the United States. 2' As indi-
cated in the figure, western coal fields are located principally in the Rocky
Mountain states and the Northern Great Plains region.
2. Federal Lands Coal Production
Fifty-four percent of the total coal reserves in the United States are lo-
cated west of the Mississippi River. 22 More significantly however, over 99
16. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS].
17. Id.
18. Id. Including Alaska and Hawaii, the gross area of the United States is 2.3 billion
acres. The federal government has, at various times in its history, held title to about four-fifths
of the nation's gross area. Today, federal civil and defense agencies administer about 762 mil-
lion acres, or about one-third of the gross area.
The Bureau of Land Management in the Department of Interior has exclusive responsibil-
ity for about 60 percent, or 427 million acres, of federally owned lands. More than half of this
area is in the state of Alaska.
Other major land holding agencies in the Department of Interior include the National
Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Reclamation. The Forest Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, has jurisdiction over 24 percent of the total federally owned land.
See generally PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND,
(1970) [hereinafter cited as ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND]; P.W. GATES & R.W. SWEN-
SEN, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC LAND
LAW DEVELOPMENT].
19. Total estimated identified coal resources of 1,580,987,000,000 tons are distributed by
coal types as follows:
Btiuminaus resources of 686,033,000,000 tons; Subbtumous resources of 424,073,000,000
tons; Lignie resources of 449,519,000,000 tons; and Anthracite and Semi-anthracite re-
sources of 21,362,000,000 tons.
See P. AVERETT, COAL IN UNITED STATES MINERAL RESOURCES: U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
PROF. PAPER 820 (1973).
20. Id.
21. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1979
(1980) [hereinafter cited as FISCAL 1979 COAL REPORT].
22. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT - FEDERAL COAL
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 2-1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL COAL EIS].
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percent of thefederal coal resources and reserves are located west of the Mis-
sissippi River. 23 These federal reserves, until recently, played only a limited
role in the nation's coal production. Western coal production has increased
rapidly in the past few years, however, and this upward trend is expected to
continue as coal becomes an increasingly important contributor to this coun-
try's energy supplies for electric power generation and synthetic fuel devel-
opment.
About 60 percent of all western coal is owned by the federal govern-
ment, with another 20 percent of coal reserves dependent on the availability
of federal coal for its production. 24 Western coal, and thus federal coal, is
expected to grow in importance in our nation's coal production. This in-
creased importance stems primarily from the facts that (1) the proportion of
surface mineable coal reserves in the West is significantly larger than for the
nation as a whole, and (2) western coal reserves are significantly lower in
sulfur content than eastern coal, thus making western coal more attractive
for purposes of meeting restrictions imposed by the federal Clean Air Act.
2 5
For example, 74 percent of the surface mieable reserves are located west of the
Mississippi River.26 Western reserves occur in thicker beds with less over-
burden, resulting in relatively lower mining costs. Generally, coal with less
than one percent sulfur by weight is considered "lower sulfur" coal.
Whereas only 16 percent of eastern coal is considered lower sulfur, 71 per-
cent of western coal falls into this category. 2 7 Thus, 84 percent of the na-
tion's low sulfur coal is located in the West.
28
23. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1978,
at 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FISCAL 1978 COAL REPORT].
24. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 2-1. This additional 20 percent of non-federal
coal is dependent upon the availability of federal coal principally because of the interspersed
and checkerboarded nature of federal, state, Indian, and private fee lands. The checkerboarded
nature of land holdings in the West is the result of the tortured history of public land settlement
and disposition over the 200 years of this nation's existence. A brief history of public land
development in the United States is provided by the Public Land Law Review Commission in
its report to the President and the Congress in 1970. See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND,
supra note 18, at 28.
25. Sulfur content is a key factor in assessing the value of coal. The sulfur content of coal
in the United States generally ranges from 0.2 to 7.2 percent by weight. The presence of sulfur
lowers the quality of coke and the resulting iron and steel products. Sulfur also contributes to
corrosion and to the formation of boiler deposits. Sulfur compounds may react with water to
form sulfuric acid, which is one of the major deleterious substances in acid mined waters con-
tributing to stream pollution. Most importantly, sulfur compounds are a major source of air
pollution, particularly in the form of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ).
Industrial interest in development and use of "low-sulfur" coal reserves stems primarily
from the limitations imposed by the Clean Act Act on the emission of SO 2 from industrial air
pollution sources such as coal-fired electric power plants.
The statutory framework for regulating air pollution starts with the directive to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency to identify pollutants and their known control techniques.
Determination of the levels in ambient air at which these pollutants could be conservatively
demonstrated to have health or welfare impacts resulted in promulgation of primary and secon-
dary national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). NAAQS have been issued for sulfur
oxides, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, photochemical oxidants, nitrogen
dioxide, and lead. Parish, Enforcement and Litigation under the Clean Air Act Amendments of /977, 9
NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 435, 455-70 (1979). See also Quarles, Federal Regulation of New Industrial
Plants, 10 ENv. L. REP., MONOGRAPH No. 28 (1979).
26. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 2-2.
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Federally owned coal is concentrated in six western states--Colorado,
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. In 1977, these
six states accounted for 71 percent of the production of all western coal.
29
Of the twelve coal regions recently established by the Department of Interior
for purposes of developing the Federal Coal Management Program, 30 the
federal government administers large quantities of coal in six of these re-
gions: the Fort Union, Powder River, Green River-Hams Fork, Uinta-
Southwestern Utah, San Juan River, and Denver-Raton Mesa coal regions.
Smaller quantities of federal coal are located in three other regions: the
Western Interior, Central, and Southern Appalachian regions. Generally, it
is these nine regions that are the functional geographic areas for the new
FCMP.
3 1
Of total coal reserves in the West, approximately two-thirds (66 per-
cent) are located in the Powder River coal region. Other major coal regions
include Fort Union (11 percent), Western Interior (7 percent), and the
29. Id. at 2-1. Other federal coal is located in Oklahoma, Alabama, Washington, Ken-
tucky, and in small amounts in other states. Production of federal coal in these areas could be
significant regionally or for specialized types of metalurgical or coking coal. See FEDERAL COAL
EIS, supra note 22, at 2-1.
30. The data for the regional and U.S. demonstrated coal reserve base and production
levels are presented in the following table contained in the FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at
2-3.
RESERVE BASE PRODUCTION 1976
COAL REGION (millions of tons) (thousands of tons)
UNDER- UNDER-
GROUND SURFACE TOTAL GROUND SURFACE TOTAL
Appalachian
Northern 59,266 6,292 65,558 92,028 83,931 175,959
Central 27,321 7,589 34,910 125,928 80,889 206,817
Southern 1,963 250 2,213 8,605 14,783 23,388
Eastern Interior 71,110 17,801 88,911 55,366 81,075 136,441
Western Interior 10,125 4,467 15,592 339 11,111 11,450
Texas 0 3,271 3,271 0 15,063 14,063
Powder River 86,500 56,024 142,524 119 37,290 37,409
Green River-Hams
Fork 13,396 2,147 15,543 768 24,916 25,684
Fort Union 0 23,101 23,101 0 11,414 11,414
San Juan River 1,906 2,258 4,164 17 8,824 8,841
Uinta-Southwestern
Utah 6,915 262 7,177 10,144 0 10,144
Denver-Raton
Mesa 3,865 0 3,865 1,453 409 1,862
Total of 12
Regions 282,367 124,462 406,829 294,767 368,750 663,472
U.S. Total 296,976 141,361 438,337 294,771 383,914 678,685
Region as Percent
of U.S. 95.1 88.3 92.8 100 96.0 97.8
31. Id. at 2-2.
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Green River-Hams Fork (7 percent). 32 Until 1973, western coal production
never exceeded 10 percent of the entire national production. Western pro-
duction had risen to 27 percent of national production by 1978, however,
and is continuing to grow rapidly. Western production rose by 23 percent in
1976, 22 percent in 1977, and 8 percent in 1978. In contrast, eastern produc-
tion as a percentage of total national production rose by 1 percent in 1976
and then declined by 4 percent in 1977 and 9 percent in 19 78 .
3 3
Growth in federal coal production has paralleled the growth in western
coal production. In 1973, federal coal production constituted only 17 per-
cent of total western production. By 1978, this percentage had doubled to a
total of 34 percent. The rate of federal coal production growth has been
rising rapidly, increasing 24 percent in 1976, 35 percent in 1977, and 15
percent on 1978, and thus reaching 9.2 percent of total national coal produc-
tion in 1978 (60.2 million tons).
34
Projections of future coal production have been developed for the De-
partment of Interior (Interior or DOI) to serve principally as the foundation
of the new FCMP. Interior asked the Leasing Policy Development Office of
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to prepare "Federal Coal Leasing
and 1985 and 1990 Regional Coal Production Forecasts," which were re-
leased in June 1978. 3 ' The DOE projections incorporated assumptions on
future electric power requirements, oil and gas prices, and nuclear power
development. Other assumptions factored into the projections involved air
quality controls, transportation costs, and labor cost escalation. The as-
sumptions varied for three scenarios developed by DOE, which included low,
medium, and high projections of western coal development. DOE used a
computer model to develop the forecasts, which calculated the lowest cost




33. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, FEDERAL COAL MAN-
AGEMENT PROGRAM 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT].
34. Id.
35. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FEDERAL COAL LEASING AND 1985 AND 1990 REGIONAL
COAL PRODUCTION FORECASTS (1978) [hereinafter cited as COAL PRODUCTION FORECASTS].
36. Id. Three scenarios were developed by the Department of Energy for each of the fore-
cast target years 1985 and 1990. These scenarios represent the circumstances and policies that
are expected to result in varying degrees of coal demand, .e., low coal demand, mid-range
demand, and high demand. Next, forecasts from the Department of Energy's Project Indepen-
dence Evaluation System (PIES model) were modified to obtain equilibrium forecasts of indus-
trial sector energy prices and supply quantities consistent with the assumption specified in each
scenario. Some modifications were made to the basic PIES forecast. Third, the PIES forecast of
industrial sector prices in quantities, and the associated projection of industrial activity (consis-
tent with the macro-economic assumptions in the scenarios), were analyzed by the Energy Envi-
ronmental Analysis, Inc.'s model (the "EEA" model). The EEA model determines the
industrial demand, by type, for coal in each demand center of the United States. Finally, the
EEA coal demand forecast, along with the scenario-specific forecasts of electricity demand, were
analyzed by the ICF, Inc. National Coal model to determine the regional coal production re-
quirements necessary to supply the projected levels of coal demand. (A complete discussion of
the methodology for developing national and regional coal production requirements is con-
tained in COAL PRODUCTION FORECASTS, supra note 35, at 37-59.)
Coal production projections are subject to many major uncertainties. The recent increased
oil supply instability in Iran, and the Middle East generally, and the nuclear accident at Three
Mile Island have illustrated how energy fuel availability can change rapidly. Since the DOE
[Vol. 58:1
COAL MANAGEMENT
Because circumstances and assumptions changed since the initial devel-
opment of the coal forecasts in 1978, DOE has prepared a new set of coal
production projections based on adjusted assumptions and using a somewhat
more technically refined computer model procedure. These 1979 DOE pro-
jections indicate overall national coal production will rise from 687.7 million
tons in 1977 to 1.03 billion tons in 1985 and 1.46 billion tons in 1990.
3 7
DOE further projects a large-scale shift in the national distribution of coal
production from the East to the West. The DOE projection shows western
production increasing from 27 percent of national production in 1978 to 36
percent in 1985 and 47 percent in 1990.38 This increase would bring western
coal production in line with the western share of national coal reserves.
By far the greatest proportion of projected federal coal production will
come from the Powder River region. By 1985, for example, DOE indicates
approximately 50.6 percent of federal coal will come from this region, repre-
senting 21 percent of total national production.3 9 The Green River-Hams
Fork region contains the second largest share of projected federal coal pro-
duction-27 percent for 1985. These two regions, then, account for 78 per-
cent of total projected 1985 federal coal production.40 The other four major
coal producing regions (Fort Union, Uinta-Southwestern Utah, San Juan
River, and Denver-Raton Mesa) are projected to have modest levels of pro-
duction by 1985, ranging from less than 10 to approximately 30 million tons
per year.4 1 By 1990, DOE's most likely projections show an even greater
concentration of federal coal production from the Powder River and Green
River-Hams Fork regions, accounting for 88 percent of 1990 projected pro-
duction. The most likely production for federal coal regions altogether
would rise by approximately 118 percent in the five years from 1985 to
1990.42
These DOE projections contrast somewhat with a U.S. Geological Sur-
vey (GS) report published in March 1978 and updated in October 1978 list-
projections were made in June 1978, a number of other important factors have changed. There
has been a new recognition of the huge size and importance of Mexican oil and gas reserves and
the significant oil and gas potential of the Overthrust Belt in the western United States. At least
a temporary glut of natural gas developed in the United States over the last year, caused partly
by the impact of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 in shifting natural gas from the intrastate
to the interstate market. Other factors, including overly optimistic projections for synthetic fuel
development, rapidly rising railroad rates for transporting coal, new regulations for clean air,
New Source Performance Standards for sulfur emissions, and a significantly lower electric
power growth rate in 1978 as compared with earlier years acted to decrease projections of
western coal production.
Because of the many changes in circumstances, the Department of Interior asked DOE to
prepare a new set of updated 1979 projections to provide a basis for evaluating options for
possible early federal coal lease sales. These updated projections were based on somewhat dif-
ferent computer modeling procedures as well as technical refinements in the DOE coal model-
ing. For a complete discussion of the updated DOE western coal projections, see SECRETARIAL
ISSUE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 5.








ing currently planned coal production by coal companies in 1985. 4 3 The GS
study was based on mine plans for federal coal development either approved
by or pending before GS. Currently planned production for 1985 in federal
coal regions as a whole is 365 million tons. Confirming DOE projections, GS
estimates the largest share of this planned production will occur in the Pow-
der River region, which will produce approximately 219.1 million tons or 60
percent (compared to DOE's 50.6 percent) of all federal coal production in
1985. 4 4 Currently planned production for the Green River-Hams Fork and
Uinta-Southwestern Utah regions total 49.8 and 47.2 million tons respec-
tively.
4 5
No attempt has been made to summarize the statistics for each of the
federal coal regions. 46 However, the preceeding discussion has demonstrated
that western and federal coal production will grow at astounding rates over
the next ten years. Western states will be faced with significant environmen-
tal and socioeconomic impacts as a result. The future for coal and fossil fuel
production becomes more clearly defined with each jump in world oil prices.
The United States has more energy potential lying within its borders than
the total of world oil resources. Excluding more exotic energy sources such
as solar related resources, coal makes up the greatest portion of that resource
base and will undoubtedly be perceived as the most readily attainable an-
swer to our energy woes, particularly over the next fifteen to twenty years.
The federal government fully intends to take advantage of its coal wealth in
the West and is in the midst of implementing a federal coal leasing and
management system that will attempt to balance energy production goals
with its concurrent interests in maintaining social and environmental integ-
rity. This recently developed federal coal management system, including its
history, implementation and problems, provide the substance of this article.
43. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES INFO. CIR. 8772, PROJECTS TO EXPAND
ENERGY SOURCES IN THE WESTERN STATES - AN UPDATE OF INFO. CIR. 8719 (1978).
44. SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 9.
45. Id. In addition to currently planned production, other potential sources of production
that do not depend on a new federal coal leasing include production from existing federal leases
and production from Indian and other non-federal lands, for which there are at present no mine
plans.
Fifty-four percent of existing federal lease reserves-generally those of highest quality-
have already been committed to currently planned mines. The remaining reserves in existing
leases provide potential for further production without any new federal leasing. Many of these
reserves, however, are poorly located, contain poor quality coal, are in leases too small to be
developed by themselves, have environmental problems, or have other developmental problems.
In the federal coal regions, Indian and other non-federal reserves constitute about 30% of
total coal reserves. Major Indian coal reserves are owned by the Crow and Cheyenne Tribes in
the Montana part of the Powder River region and by the Navajo Tribe in the San Juan River
region. There is a high potential for production of Indian coal, but also many major uncertain-
ties. The Cheyenne Tribe has indicated that for the time being at least it opposes coal develop-
ment on its reservation. Existing coal leases on the Crow reservation are presently in litigation.
Other non-federal coal also faces important limitations on its production potential. More
than one-third of the non-Indian, non-federal coal is in checkerboard areas where it should be
developed jointly with federal coal. Considerable additional non-federal coal is scattered in
small irregular parcels, which also require acquisition of complementary federal coal to be de-
veloped. In all, less than 50 percent of non-federal coal is estimated to be developable without
the availability of complementary federal coal. Id. at 13-21.
46. Summary coal data tables for each of the six major western coal regions are provided
as Appendix A at the end of this article.
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II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL COAL LEASING
A. Moralon'um on Leasing-1971
Coal development on federal lands was governed between 1873 and
1920 by a law controlling land entry and sale.4 7 Under this law, a maxi-
mum of 160 acres could be granted to an individual; up to 640 acres were
allowed to groups of four or more persons who could 1) making a showing of
an expenditure of at least $5,000 in work and improvements, 2) identify
where mines had been opened and improved, and 3) state the date when the
group had taken actual possession of the land.48 After fulfilling the above
criteria, an individual who discovered coal on public domain land could
purchase and receive title to the mineral.
49
Congress enacted a radical policy change for disposal of federal coal
lands when it passed the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.50 Federal coal was no
longer available for sale, and an individual was required to obtain a pros-
pecting permit and lease issued by the Department of Interior in order to
obtain the right to explore for, develop, and remove the coal. 5' In the fifty
47. 17 Stat. 607 (1873), superseded by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287
(1976).
48. Id.
49. Id. For general discussions of early coal legislation, see B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF
THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 518-25 (1924) (1965 reprint); ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE
223, 346, 370-71 (1960); PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 724-30.
50. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976).
51. Id. § 201. Coal prospecting permits were issued by the Department of the Interior only
in areas where no known coal deposits existed. The permit granted the exclusive right to the
holder to prospect for coal. Each permit had an initial two-year term, but could be extended for
an additional two years if the permittee were unable, with the exercise of reasonable diligence,
to determine the existence or workability of coal deposits in the permit area. Permittees were
entitled to preference right leases if they could demonstrate that the lands contained coal in
commercial quantities.
Lands containing known coal deposits were not subject to prospecting permits. Instead, the
lands were divided into leasing tracts and leases were awarded competitively. The competitive
leasing system adopted by Interior was designed to award leases to the highest bidder. A lump
sum cash bonus was collected at the time the lease was awarded.
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 restricted the acreage that could be held by one party in
one state. Originally, the law allowed only one lease per person in each state. The limits were
raised several times until, in 1964, they allowed a holding by any person of up to 46,080 acres
(approximately 72 square miles) in one state.
The Act also required that leases be issued for an indeterminate period as long as condi-
tions of diligent development and continuous operations were satisfied. These conditions could
be waived if operations were interrupted by strikes, the elements, or casualties not attributable
to the holder of the lease. Lease terms and conditions became subject to readjustment at the
end of 20-year periods. In addition, leases could not be assigned or sublet without the consent of
the Department.
Other major provisions of the Act include:
(1) Leases could be modified by an additional 2,560 contiguous acres;
(2) Additional tracts up to 2,560 acres could be leased if workable deposits of coal
would be exhausted within 3 years;
(3) Single leases could contain noncontiguous tracts;
(4) Royalties were set at not less than five cents a ton of coal;
(5) Annual rentals were set at not less than 25 cents, 50 cents, and one dollar for the
first, third through fifth, and sixth year onward from lease issuance, respectively;
and,
(6) Limited licenses or permits could be issued to municipalities (without royalties) if
the coal mined was sold without profit to local residents.
See scattered sections contained at 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1976).
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years between passage of the act in 1920 and 1970, Interior issued coal leases
on federal land almost automatically to anyone who requested such leases.
Lease requests were processed on a case-by-case basis. In essence, little con-
sideration was given to the total federal coal reserves under lease or the ge-
neric need for additional leasing. Further, the environmental impacts of
coal production under the terms of the lease were not addressed.
A study issued in 1970 by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),
HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL COAL LEASES, reported that,
although federal coal acreage under lease grew from roughly 80,000 acres in
1945 to approximately 788,000 acres in 1970 (nearly a ten-fold increase),
federal coal production had actual4' dropped from 10 million tons in 1945 to 7.4
million tons in 1970.52 Thus, over 90 percent of the total coal acreage under
lease was not producing coal. Similar conclusions indicating the strongly
speculative nature of federal coal leasing in years prior to the early 1970's
were reached in a report prepared by the Council on Economic Priorities in
1974. 53 Therefore, the Secretary of Interior in 1971 informally ordered the
BLM to stop issuing federal coal leases and prospecting permits under the
requirements of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. This informal moratorium
continued for nearly two years as Interior debated which course to follow to
renew federal coal leasing.
54
B. Short-Term Leastng Criteria-1973
The informal moratorium initiated in 1971 was replaced on February
17, 1973, with a limited coal leasing policy designed to provide needed
reserves to continue existing mine operations and to supply existing mar-
kets. 55 At the time the short-term leasing policy was announced, the Interior
committed itself to preparing an environmental impact statement to ex-
amine the effects of the continuation of the existing program and develop-
ment of a new coal leasing policy for public lands.
Long-term actions initiated by the department were designed to de-
velop comprehensive planning systems to determine the size, timing and lo-
cation of future coal leases. Short-term actions included the moratorium on
the issuance of new prospecting permits and the near-total moratorium on
the issuance of new federal coal leases. This short-term policy was outlined
in BLM instructions implemented in July 1973.56 In essence, the instruc-
tions authorized the issuance of new leases based on a showing that the pro-
posed lessee needed coal to satisfy an existing market or intended to begin
52. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, HOLDINGS AND DEVEL-
OPMENT OF FEDERAL COAL LEASES (1970).
53. 5 COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES No. 1, LEASED AND LOST (1974).
54. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 1-9. The informal teasing moratorium was fol-
lowed by a formal Secretarial order on February 17, 1973, which placed a moratorium on the
further issuance of coal prospecegpermits. Secretary Morton emphasized that all pending appli-
cations for such prospecting permits would be rejected but that the order would not adversely
affect the rights of current permit holders nor their opportunity to receive a preference right
lease upon a showing of commercial quantities. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, INTERIOR SECRE-
TARY ORDER No. 2952 (1973).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1-10.
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development of federal coal within three years of the issuance of the lease.
Ten leases covering 30,246 acres were issued between 1974 and April 1, 1978.
Most of these leases were for extensions of existing operations, and seven of
the leases were producing coal by the end of 1977.
5 7
C. The Coal Programmatic EIS and EMARS-1975
On May 9, 1974, the Department of Interior published the draft
programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) describing DOI's
newly proposed coal leasing system. The final EIS was issued in 1975.58
The department's final EIS outlined three essential phases of the revised
leasing system: (i) nominations and programming, (ii) scheduling, and (iii)
leasing. Essentially, nominations were to be accepted from the industry for
any area, with information on where and how much to lease provided by the
industry. At the same time, public identification of areas of concern (dis-
nominations) would also be provided. Following the nominations and dis-
nominations, Interior proposed to prepare land use plans and environmental
analyses designed to resolve and mitigate resource conflicts and to hold lease
sales where coal development was found to be compatible with the environ-
ment.
59
In January of 1976, then Secretary of the Interior Kleppe announced a
new federal coal leasing policy. The policy included:
(1) The adoption of the Energy Minerals Activity Recommenda-
tion System (EMARS II);
(2) The adoption of a totally competitive leasing system;
(3) The establishment of final regulations setting conditions for
mining;
(4) The preparation of environmental impact statements on a re-
gional basis;
(5) Continuation of the short-term leasing criteria;
(6) The issuance of diligent development requirements;
(7) The development of commercial quantities criteria to deter-
mine whether existing preference right lease applications
should be granted; and
(8) Official lifting of the five-year moratorium on leasing of fed-
eral coal.6°
A virtual flood of public criticism followed the issuance of the final EIS
in September of 1975 and Secretary Kleppe's announcement in January
1976 of the new federal coal leasing policy. A suit was filed shortly after
release of the final EIS by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against then Assistant
Secretary of Interior Royston Hughes.
6 1
Major criticism of DOI's new coal program stemmed from concern that
57. Id.
58. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED FEDERAL COAL LEASING PROGRAM (1975).
59. Id. at 1-4.
60, FISCAL 1978 COAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 5.
61. NRDC v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1977), modifed, 454 F. Supp. 148 (D.D.C.
1978). See text accompanying notes 112-20 infra.
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alternatives to increased federal coal leasing were not considered and that
enough federal coal was already under lease to meet immediate needs for the
future. Commentators also expressed considerable uncertainty as to whether
the program had been adequately described or that leasing goals and plans
had been adequately defined. Criticism was generated from both industry
and environmental representatives who were concerned that the new pro-
gram could not resolve conflicts with a reasonable degree of certainty and
with clearly identifiable consequences.
62
D. Legislaton, Regulations, and Lawsuits
1. Legislation
a. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act. While Interior was develop-
ing the new coal program, Congress was debating coal-related amendments
to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. The amendments were designed to pro-
vide an orderly procedure for leasing and development of federal coal re-
sources and to assure federal coal was developed in a manner more
compatible with the public interest. Congress enacted the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1975 (FCLAA), overriding President Ford's
veto.63 Three major impacts on coal leasing resulted from the FCLAA.
First, the Act eliminated the authority of DOI to issue noncompetitive coal
leases through the prospecting permit-preference right lease procedure.64
Second,.the Act mandated the preparation of a comprehensive land use plan
before issuance of new coal leases.6 5 Finally, the Act revised federal coal
lease terms and strengthened diligent development requirements by setting a
fixed term for development of coal leases.
66
b. Federal Land Polzcy and Management Act of 1976. Congress, over the
years, had passed a tremendous number of public land laws which governed
the management and disposal responsibilities for a variety of federal land
managing agencies. A review of these laws in the late 1960's by the Public
Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) resulted in its recommendation to
the President and Congress that the majority of the statutes be revised and a
clear set of goals established for the management and use of public lands.
6 7
Although the work of the PLLRC has affected the activities of all federal
land management agencies to some extent, perhaps the most significant out-
come of the Commission's report was the passage of the Federal Land Policy
62. Id. 437 F. Supp. at 983.
63. 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-214 (1976). In his veto message to the Senate returning the Federal
Coal Leasing Amendment Bill, President Ford stated, "S. 391 is also littered with many other
provisions which would insert so many rigidities, complications, and burdensome regulations in
Federal leasing procedures that it would inhibit coal production on Federal lands, probably
raise prices for consumers, and ultimately delay our achievement of energy independence." 12
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc., VETO OF THE FEDERAL COAL LEASING AMENDMENTS BILL,
1121 (1976).
64. Id. § 201(a)(1).
65. Id. § 201(3)(A)(i).
66. d. § 202(a).
67. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, supra note 18.
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and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).6 8
BLM has responsibility within Interior for the vast majority of public
lands in the country, managing approximately 60 percent of all federal
lands. 69 BLM's land management practices, then, received the greatest at-
tention from the passage of the FLPMA. Title II of FLPMA provides the
statutory framework for land use planning of public lands under BLM con-
trol. 70 The principal factors for the development of BLM land use plans
include:
i. Application of the multiple use and sustained yield princi-
ples; 
7 1
ii. Recognition that the protection of areas of critical
environmental concern should receive top priority for historic,
cultural, or scenic values as well as fish and wildlife resources;
iii. Consideration of present as well as future public land uses;
and
iv. Coordination of BLM planning activities with other federal,
state and local agencies.
72
c. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. Congress passed
the first comprehensive federal statute to regulate the surface impacts of coal
mining on a national scale through the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
68. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as FLPMA].
69. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 16, at 31.
70. FLPMA, supra note 68, at § 1712 (Supp. 1979).
71. FLPMA defines the term "multiple use" as:
[T]he management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they,
are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the
American people; making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these
resources or related services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for
periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; the use of
some land for less than all of the resources; a combination of balanced and diverse
resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations for
renewable and nonrenewable resources, including, but not limited to, recreation,
range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and
historical value; and harmonious and coordinated management of the various re-
sources without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality
of the environment with consideration being given to the relative values of the re-
sources and not necessarily to the combination of uses that will give the greatest eco-
nomic return or the greatest unit output.
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1976).
The term "sustained yield" is defined as "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity
of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the pub-
lic lands consistent with multiple use. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(h) (1976).
The definitions of "multiple use" and "sustained yield" preserve essentially their same
meaning as used in the Forest Service Multiple Use Act of 1960 and in the now-expired Public
Land Classification and Mulitiple Use Act of 1964. See H.R. REP. No. 1163, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1976), reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6179.
72. FLPMA, supra note 68, at §§ 1711-1722 (1979). The implementation of FLPMA and
its impacts on public land policy and management have been examined in several recent arti-
cles including: Kapaloski, Power Plant Sh)g on Public Lands.- A Proposalfor Resolving the Environ-
mental-Development Conflict, 56 DEN. L.J. 179 (1979); Symposium. The Federal Land Potcy and
Management Act of 1976, 21 ARiZ. L. REv. 331 (1979); Morrison, Rights-of-way on Federaly Owned
Land: A Journey Through the Statutes by Way of the Federal Land Policy and ,Management Act of 1976, 9
TRANSP. L.J. 97 (1977); Olson, Toward a Pub/i Lands Ethic. A Crossroads In Publcly Owned Natural
Resources Law, 56 U. DET. URB. L. 739 (1977); Federal and State Cooperation in the Management of
Public Lands, 5J. CONT. L. 149 (1978); Symposium-Pubic Land Law, 54 DEN. L.J. 281 (1977).
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mation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).7T The regulatory scope of SMCRA is lim-
ited to surface coal mining and the surface effects of underground coal
mining. 4 SMCRA establishes a uniform national program for reclaiming
surface areas affected by coal mining on federal, Indian, state and private fee
lands. As such, SMCRA preempts state, Indian and local regulation of rec-
lamation activities on all coal lands in the United States. Nevertheless, the
individual states and Indian tribes are recognized as the primary regulatory
authorities for implementation of SMCRA.7 "
SMCRA has a variety of requirements which are directly relevant to
the new federal coal program. Of particular importance are the environ-
mental protection performance standards established in Title V of the act
and more specifically in Section 515. 7 6 The following is a list of standards
required of coal operators by this section:
77
(1) Conduct operations to maximize utilization and conserva-
tion of the coal resource;
(2) Restore the land to a condition at least capable of support-
ing premining uses;
(3) Backfill and compact the area affected to restore the land to
the approximate original contour. Exceptions are permitted
in certain situations for backfill and compaction to achieve
the lowest practicable grade or the lowest grade, neither of
which may be more than the angle of repose;
(4) Stabilize and protect surface areas to effectively control ero-
sion and attendant air and water pollution;
(5) Remove and segregate layers of topsoil or other strata which
are best able to support vegetation;
(6) Restore the topsoil or the best available subsoil which is best
able to support vegetation;
(7) Segregate, replace, and redistribute natural soil on prime
farmlands under rules to be established by the Secretary of
Agriculture;
(8) Construct and manage permanent water impoundments ac-
cording to detailed guidelines;
(9) Conduct augering operations to maximize coal slurry recov-
ery and seal all auger holes with impervious and noncombus-
tible material;
(10) Minimize disturbances to the hydrologic balance at the
mine-site and off-site areas and to the quality and quantity
of water;
(11) Stabilize, regrade, and revegetate waste piles;
(12) Preclude surface mining within 500 feet of underground
mining operations (exceptions are permitted in certain situa-
tions);
(13) Design, construct, and remove all existing and new coal
73. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. II 1978).
74. II.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., st Sess. 57-60, reprii/ediu 119771 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 593, 595-97.
75. 30 U.S.C. § 1300 (Supp. 11 1978).
76. Id. § 1265.
77. The numbers herein correspond to the numbers in § 515(b) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1265(b) (Supp. II 1978).
[Vol. 58:1
COAL MANAGEMENT
waste piles according to standards set by the Secretary of In-
terior after consultation with the Chief of Engineers of the
U.S. Army;
(14) Insure that all potentially fire-hazardous materials are bur-
ied or otherwise disposed of;
(15) Insure that explosives are used only according to state and
federal laws;
(16) Insure that all reclamation efforts proceed in an environmen-
tally sound manner simultaneously with the surface coal
mining operation;
(17) Insure that access roads are constructed and maintained to
prevent erosion and damage to water, wildlife or public and
private property;
(18) Refrain from construction of roads or access ways up stream
beds or so close to channels as to seriously alter the normal
flow of water;
(19) Revegetate all affected lands with the same premining or
better cover;
(20) Assume responsibility for revegetation for five full years from
the last year of augmented seeding, fertilization, irrigation or
other work. Where the average annual precipitation is 26
inches or less, this responsibility lasts for ten full years;
(21) Protect off-site areas;
(22) Place and manage all excess spoil material;
(23) Meet other criteria necessary to achieve reclamation accord-
ing to SMCRA, taking physical, climatological, and other
site-specific characteristics into account.
(24) Use the "best technology currently available" to the extent
possible to minimize disturbances and adverse impacts of the
operations on fish, wildlife, and related environmental val-
ues, and enhance these resources where practiceable; and
(25) Provide a natural barrier to slides and erosion.
78
Section 522 establishes procedures to designate lands unsuitable for coal
mining operations. 79 The provisions of this section are prospective in that
they do not apply where surface coal mining operations were being con-
ducted on August 3, 1977 (date of enactment of SMCRA), or where "sub-
stantial legal or financial commitments" were in existence prior to January
4, 1977.1° The Secretary of Interior determines unsuitability on federal
lands, and the states have authority to determine unsuitability for non-fed-
eral lands.8 ' Areas on both federal and non-federal lands are designated
unsuitable following a petition filed by any interested person.82 Specific cri-
78. Certain exceptions to the requirement to return the mined areas to the approximate
original contour are provided in circumstances involving mountain top mining, as well as in
cases where an industrial, commercial, agriculture, residential, or public facility use is proposed
for the post-mining use. Finally, certain additional performance standards are provided for
steep-slope mining. Steep-slope operations are defined as mining taking place on any slope
above 20 degrees, or such lesser slope, as determined by the regulatory authority. See 30 U.S.C.
§ 1265(c), (d) (Supp. I 1978).
79. Id. § 1272.
80. Id. § 1272(a)(6).
81. Id. § 1272(a)(1).
82. Id. § 1272(c).
1980]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
teria are outlined for designating areas unsuitable,8 3 and before an area can
be designated following the filing of the petition, the regulatory authority
must prepare a statement analyzing the potential coal resources of the area,
the demand for coal resources, and the impact of designation on the environ-
ment, the economy and the supply of coal.
8 4
A great deal of controversy arose as to whether the petition process of
Section 522 applied to federal lands as well as state and private lands after
the proposed permanent rules to implement SMCRA were published.8 5
Much evidence was produced from the legislative history of SMCRA to sug-
gest federal lands were excluded from operation of the Section.8 6 However,
the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (established by
the Act to implement SMCRA) rejected these contentions and issued Part
769 of the rules to cover the petition process relative to federal lands.8 7 DOI
has been developing unsuitability criteria for federal lands since November
1977. These specific unsuitability criteria are discussed more fully in Parts
III and IV of this article, particularly as they relate to the new FCMP.88
Other SMCRA provisions relevant to the new FCMP include:
(1) Authority to exchange federal lands already under lease but
which have been included in an alluvial valley floor and are
subject to the grandfather clause in Section 510(b)(5) of SM-
CRA;89 and
(2) A requirement for the consent of private surface owners
before Interior can lease federal coal under land on which the
surface is privately owned. 90
d. Department of Energy Organzzation Act. Congress created the U.S. De-
partment of Energy (DOE) in 1977.91 While this legislation did not change
the primary responsibility of the Secretary of Interior over federal mineral
leasing, including coal leasing, or other land use planning and environmen-
tal requirements, the Act did transfer certain authorities to the Secretary of
Energy. Specifically, the new DOE has responsibilities for federal mineral
leases to:
(1) Set production rates;
(2) Foster competition among coal and other federal mineral pro-
ducers;
(3) Implement alternative bidding systems;
83. Id. § 1272(a)(3). These criteria include:
(1) mining would be incompatible with land use programs;
(2) mining would adversely affect historically and archeologically sensitive areas;
(3) mining would substantially endanger life and property or result in a substantial
loss in water supply or in production of food and fiber.
84. Id. § 1272(d).
85. See preamble to final permanent program regulations implementing SMCRA, 44 Fed.
Reg. 15007 (1979).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 15347, codified at 30 C.F.R. § 769 (1979).
88. See notes 183-84 and 265-83 and accompanying text, infra.
89. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5) (Supp. 11 1978).
90. Id. § 1304(c) Indian lands are explicitly excepted from this section. Id. 1304(f) (1979).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. 11 1978).
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(4) Establish diligence requirements for operations on federal
lands; and
(5) Specify the procedures, terms, and conditions for the acquisi-
tion and disposition of federal royalty-in-kind.
9 2
All authorities not specifically transferred under Section 302 of the Act
were retained by the Secretary of Interior. Thus, Interior continues to be
solely responsible for the issuance andsupervision of federal mineral leases and
the enforcement of all regulations applicable to the leasing of mineral re-
sources-including, but not limited to, lease terms and conditions and pro-
duction rates.
93
To facilitate coordination between the two departments, the Act estab-
lishes a Leasing Liaison Committee.4 The Committee is composed of an
equal number of representatives from each department. A charter for the
Committee was signed in May 1978 by the Secretaries of Interior and En-
ergy, which assigned the Committee responsibility to:
(1) Identify and solve problems-between the departments relating
to federal energy leasing;
(2) Provide timely information exchange;
(3) Expedite consideration and resolution of interdepartmental
matters generally;
(4) Insure cooperation and assistance in preparing annual reports
and reports to the Congress; and
(5) Facilitate consultation relative to technical matters of concern
to both departments.
95
According to its charter, the Committee is not a policy-making body; how-
ever, it may address policy issues and make recommendations to the respec-
tive Secretaries.
96
While the statutes listed above have the most direct impact on the de-
velopment of federal coal resources, a significant number of other federal
statutes have at least indirect impacts on such development. These federal
laws are summarized here in tabular form for easy reference with a summary
description of their major relevance with regard to federal coal management
and production.
97
92. Id. § 7152.
93. Id. § 7153. The two departments are required by the Act to coordinate their activities,
especially the following:
(1) Energy must consult with Interior on the preparation of regulations and give it
30 days to comment on proposed regulations, and
(2) Interior must give Energy 30 days to approve lease terms and conditions relating
to transferred responsibilities--no term or condition can be included in a lease if
Energy disapproves.
42 U.S.C. § 7153(b), (c)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
94. Id. § 7140.
95. U.S. GENERAL AccouNTNG OFFICE, No. EMD-79-60 FEDERAL LEASING POLICY-Is
THE SPLIT RESPONSIBILITY WORKING? 2, (1979) [hereinafter cited as GAO FEDERAL LEASING
REPORT].
96. Id. For an expanded discussion of the split responsibilities between the departments
specifically in relation to federal coal leasing, see text at notes 252-64 and accompanying text
s *fa.
97. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 1-17 through 1-23.
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A veritable deluge of regulations has been promulgated under each of
the federal statutes listed above. This part of the article on the history of the
federal coal leasing system, however, will make no attempt to inventory all
these regulations. Reference should be made to applicable parts of the Code
of Federal Regulations for applicable rules.98 This section of the article will,
however, provide a brief description of federal regulations issued to imple-
ment the FCLAA discussed above. 99
Shortly after passage of the FCLAA, Interior issued regulatory changes
to its EMARS leasing system to make this system compatible with the new
law.' ° Regulations were also issued for diligent lease development and
competitive coal leasing procedures as well as rules governing the issuance of
licenses for coal exploration on public lands. For purposes of easy reference,
and to provide a foundation upon which to compare and contrast the new
FCMP, the regulations which were issued pursuant to the FCLAA in 1976
and 1977 have been summarized below.' 0 '
Table II
Section
of PL Date of Title 43
94-377 Rulemaking CFR Part Summary of Regulation
5 12/29/76 3500.0-5 Defined logical mining unit (LMU) diligent develop-
ment and continued operation.
2 1/25/77 3500.0-5 Defined public bodies and government entities. Es-
3502.9 tablished public bodies/government entities qualifica-
tion criteria.
I1 1/25/77 3501.1-4 Established 46,080-acre lease and permit holding
limitation for one State and 100,000-acre lease and
permit holding limitation nationwide.
16 1/25/77 3501.1-5 Excludes coal leasing on National Parks System, the
3501.2-1 National Wildlife Refuge System, the National Wil-
derness Preservation System, the National System of
Trails and Wild and Scenic River Systems.
14 1/25/77 3503.3-1 Allows rental payments to be credited against royal-
ties on leases issued prior to the Act. Excludes such
credits on leases issued subsequent to the Act.
6 12/29/76 3503.3-2 Clarified payment of advanced royalty and distin-
guished advance royalty payments on leases issued
prior to and subsequent to the date of the Act.
98. See, e.g., regulations implementing SMCRA at 30 C.F.R. §§ 700-890 (1979); coal min-
ing operating rules enforced by the U.S.G.S., 30 C.F.R. § 211 (1979); public land resource plan-
ning rules of the BLM, 43 C.F.R. § 1600 (1979).
99. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
100. On July 19, 1979, Interior issued new rules implementing the 1920 Act, as amended.
Although the rules have been renumbered, they do not differ materially from their predecessors
summarized in Table II. 44 Fed. Reg. 42584 (1979).
101. Rules issued after enactment of the FCLAA and summarized in Table II were codified
in 43 C.F.R. § 3500 (1979).
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of PL Date of Title 43
















Eliminated all references to coal prospecting permits.
Coal exploration licenses.
Duration of leases issued or readjusted after the date
of Act shall be 20 years and as long thereafter as the
lessee produces commercial quantities annually.
Diligent development and advanced royalties.
Establish logical mining units and logical mining unit
reserves.
6 12/29/76 3522.2-1 Coal leases subject to readjustment at end of 20 years
and every 10 years thereafter.
6 12/29/76 3523.2-1 Coal leases shall be terminated or subject to cancella-
tion upon failure to comply with diligent develop-
ment.
13 1/25/77 2524.1-1 Revoked old and established new lease modification
limitation.
3525 Conformed the Energy Minerals Activity Recommen-
dation System - the Department's coal leasing
system to the Act.
2 1/25/77 3525.1 Included the Act in Authorities section and estab-
lished competitive sales as only method for disposing
of coal leases.
2 1/25/77 3525.3 State government participation and surface manage-
ment agency consent.
3 1/25/77 3525.4 Included production within 10 years after lease
issuance as a prerequisite to acquiring new leases.
12 1/25/77 3525.5 Included authority to lease land withdrawn from
military or naval purposes subject to consent of
Secretary of the Department of Defense.
1/25/77 3525.6
1/25/77 3525.7
Leasing to public bodies.




a. Kleppe v. Si'erra Club. The Supreme Court provided the first ex-
tensive treatment of the environmental impact statement requirements of
NEPA 10 2 as they relate to federal coal activities in 1976 with its decision in
Kleppe v. Sierra Club.' °3 The litigation, which took over three years to reach
the Supreme Court, centered on the Sierra Club's contention that coal devel-
opment in the Northern Great Plains area 10 4 could not be approved by fed-
eral agencies without preparation of A comprehensive environmental impact
statement (EIS) for the entire region.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit found that although there was no federal regional plan or program for
coal development in the Northern Great Plains area, federal agencies had
contemplated such a regional plan and thus an EIS on a regional basis was
required. 10 5 The Court of Appeals enjoined Interior from approving four
mining plans in the eastern Powder River Coal Basin covering a two-county
area in Wyoming. 10 6 The court also proposed a four-part balancing test to
determine when a regional EIS must be prepared during the contemplation
of a plan or action. The aspects of the test included:
(1) The likelihood that the program would soon be initiated;
(2) The extent to which information would be available on the
effects of program implementation;
(3) The extent to which irreversible commitments of resources
were being made or options were being precluded; and
(4) The severity of the resultant environmental impacts.' 0 7
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and held
that NEPA did not require a regional EIS for the Northern Great Plains
area.' 0 8 The Court found that an EIS may be required at the time a federal
agency makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action.
Nevertheless, mere contemplation of action would not trigger the require-
ments for preparation of an EIS, and the Court of Appeals balancing test
was thus eliminated. '
0 9
Although a region-wide EIS was not required by the Court, Interior,
following rather strong intimations by the Supreme Court, has determined
that statements will be prepared for regions where several related projects
are pending at the same time.' 10 Further, it is clear that an EIS will have to
102. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
103. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
104. Id. at 396. The Northern Great Plains region encompasses portions of four states-
northeastern Wyoming, eastern Montana, western North Dakota, and western South Dakota.
105. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd sub noma. Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). The defendant agencies were ordered by the Circuit Court to
inform the lower court of their role in the further development of the region; if they decided to
control that development, an environmental impact statement would be required.
106. 514 F.2d at 859-60.
107. Id. at 880.
108. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 394 (1976).
109. Id. at 404.
110. Id. at 411.
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be prepared on a site-specific basis prior to the approval by Interior of any
particular coal mining plan. I I
b. NRDC v. Hughes. The primary impetus for development of a
new federal coal program was the decision issued by Federal District Judge
Pratt on September 27, 1977, in NRDCv. Hughes. 1 2 The Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the validity of the final EIS for the
proposed federal coal leasing program (the EMARS system) in U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia on October 21, 1975. The final EIS was
challenged principally for its failure to discuss the need for additional federal
coal leasing. 1 3 At the time the lawsuit was filed federal coal production
comprised only three percent of all coal mined in the United States. The
plaintiffs in the case cited DOI coal reserves statistics which indicated that
approximately 26 billion tons of potentially recoverable federal coal were
presently under lease in 1975. At an estimated federal coal production rate
projected from 1985 of 320 million tons per year, plaintiffs alleged that out-
standing federal coal leases would provide coal for the next 121 years.
114
The Court addressed two principal issues: first, whether a new program
for federal coal leasing should be undertaken at all; and, second, if such a
program were necessary, the type of leasing system that should be initi-
ated.'15 In concluding that the "no action" alternative had not been ade-
quately discussed in the final EIS, the Court ordered Interior to prepare a
supplemental draft EIS stating:
The cursory treatment of the "no action" alternative provided in
the final EIS does not satisfy the mandate of Section 102(C) of
NEPA. . . .The Department did not take a "hard look" at this
policy option during its decision-making process. . . . To con-
clude, the environmental consequences of any national coal leasing
program cannot be gainsaid and require no elaboration. The pro-
11. Id. at 414. Justice Marshall tempered even this site-specific environmental statement
requirement when he stated:
Nor is it necessary that petitioners always complete a comprehensive impact statement
on all proposed actions in an appropriate region before approving any of the projects.
As petitioners have emphasized, and respondents have not disputed, approval of one
lease or mining plan does not commit the Secretary to approval of any others; nor,
apparently, do single approvals by the other petitioners commit them to subsequent
approvals. Thus, an agency could approve one pending project that is fully covered
by an impact statement, then take into consideration the environmental effects of that
existing project when preparing the comprehensive statement on the cumulative im-
pact of the remaining proposals.
Id. at 414 n.26.
112. 437 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1977), amended, 454 F. Supp. 148 (D.D.C. 1978).
113. Id. at 991. Judge Pratt summarized this particular allegation:
Defendants' position in support of the [EMARS'] program, i.e., that because federal
coal production is rapidly increasing more federal coal must be leased, is countered by
the plaintiffs' response that the argument ignores the magnitude of the amount of coal
currently under lease. Plaintiffs site the BLM coal reserve statistics which reveal that
approximately 26 billion tons of potentially recoverable federal coal are presently
under lease. At the estimated 1985 rate of federal coal production (320 million tons
per annum) plaintiffs state that these outstanding leases would provide enough coal
for the next 121 years. [Footnotes and citations omitted.]
Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 990.
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gram under consideration was the result of a decision apparently
made long before and apart from the preparation of the draft
EIS. .... 116
Judge Pratt's order of injunction reads, in relevant part:
Ordered, that federal defendants . . . , are enjoined from taking
any steps whatsoever, directly or indirectly, to implement the coal
leasing program, including calling for nominations of tracts for fed-
eral coal leasing and issuing any coal leases, except when the pro-
posed lease is required to maintain an existing mining operation at
the present levels of production or is necessary to provide reserves
necessary to meet existing contracts and to the extent the proposed
lease is not greater than is required to meet these two criteria for
more than three years in the future .... 1 7
A modified order was issued by Judge Pratt on June 14, 1978, authoriz-
ing substantially more leasing before the new EIS was issued. 118 Under the
agreement, federal coal leasing could take place under the following circum-
stances:
(1) By-Pass Leases would be permitted where federal coal would
otherwise be lost if not developed by an existing mine because
subsequent costs would be too high. By-pass leases could be
issued for up to five years, but mining operations had to be in
existence on September 27, 1977;
(2) Employment Leases could be issued to maintain production and
employment for mines in existence on September 27, 1977,
which were running short of reserves or where additional
reserves were needed to meet existing contracts. Employment
leases could be issued for up to eight years of reserves;
(3) ERDA Project Leases could be issued to support Energy Re-
search and Development Administration (ERDA) Projects
which were authorized under Section 908 of SMCRA. These
leases could be issued for no more than 500,000 tons of coal
per year and only under circumstances showing that the coal
production technology under assessment could not be demon-
strated on existing leases or private coal holdings;
(4) Lease Exchanges were permitted pursuant to the exchange au-
thority for alluvial valley floors under Section 510(b)(5) of
SMCRA;
(5) Hardship Leases were authorized for seven specific lease appli-
cations which were pending during the suit. Each of these
particular leases had some special circumstance or hardship
which justified lease issuance prior to completion of the new
EIS;
(6) Non-Competitive (Preference Right) Lease Apphcatons could be
processed but not issued for the twenty applications which Inte-
rior deemed to have the least environmental impact. Prefer-
ence was to be given to those applications for tracts where
90% of the reserves could be mined by deep mining methods
and for those applications for tracts which would not require
116. Id. at 991.
117. Id. at 993.
118. 454 F. Supp. 148, 150.
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substantial additional transportation facilities, water storage
or supply systems.' 19
Interior estimated that as many as thirty-five leases involving 275 to 300
million tons of coal reserves were involved in the amended order. Assuming
the leases were granted, the increased annual production from federal coal
lands would be as much as 13 to 17 million tons. This compares with ap-
proximately 96 million tons of federal coal which were produced in 1977.
The original order issued by Judge Pratt would have only permitted the
issuance of six leases resulting in about 10 million tons of production.
120
c. NRDC v. Berklund. Preference right lease applications (PRLAs)
were the subject of a law suit filed in U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia and decided in 1978. NRDC v. Berklund 2 I addressed the issue of
whether the Secretary of Interior was under a duty to issue a non-competi-
tive coal lease to an otherwise qualified holder of a PRLA. Plaintiffs sought
a declaratory judgment that:
(1) The Secretary of Interior has discretion under the Mineral
Lease Act of 1920 and the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) to reject preference right lease applications on envi-
ronmental grounds; and
(2) The Secretary must prepare an environmental impact state-
ment on any proposed issuance of a preference right coal lease
where the issuance would constitute a major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment. 1
22
Defendants maintained that under the terms of the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920123, the Secretary of Interior was required to issue a preference
right lease where the holder of the prospecting permit authorized by the Act
finds coal in "commercial quantities."' 24  Defendants also claimed that
NEPA, while granting broad discretion to the Secretary to set federal coal
lease terms, gives the Secretary no added discretion to reject a lease on
119. Id. In addition to these six situations, Interior could process but not issue one specific
lease sought by Edison Development Corporation.
120. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 1-14.
121. 458 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1978).
122. Id. at 928.
123. 30 U.S.C. § 201(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
124. A permittee is deemed to have discovered "commercial quantities" of coal where the
mineral deposit discovered under the prospecting permit was of such a character and quantity
that a prudent person would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means with
a reasonable prospect of success in developing a valuable mine. The prospecting permittee is
also required to present sufficient evidence to show that there is a reasonable expectation that
his revenues from the sale of the coal will exceed his costs of developing the mine, and ex-
tracting, removing, and marketing the coal. See 43 C.F.R. § 3520.1-1(c) (1979).
One significant revision has been made to the definition of "commercial quantities" in final
regulations implementing the Department of Interior's new federal coal management program.
In the July 19, 1979, final regulations (44 Fed. Reg. 42628-42652) Interior added the following
statement to the above-stated definition of commercial quantities: "The costs of development
shall include the estimated cost of exercising environmental protection measures and suitably
reclaiming the lands and complying with all applicable federal and state laws and regulations."
43 C.F.R. § 3430.1-2(b) (1979). Thus, recipients of a federal coal preference right lease must
now explicitly estimate the costs of complying with state and federal environmental regulations
to meet the commercial quantities test.
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purely environmental grounds once the requirement of commercial quanti-
ties has been met. As such, the defendants argued an EIS should be pre-
pared on the proposed lease terms, not on the proposed issuance of the
lease. 125
A detailed discussion of the NRDC v. Berklund suit is not appropriate for
this article.' 26 For our purposes, a brief summary of the two principal deci-
sions issued by the court will suffice. Judge Green stated that:
(1) Provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 do not vest the Sec-
retary of Interior with the discretion to reject preference right coal
lease applications when an applicant has made a showing that
commercial quantities of coal exist within the proposed lease area;
and,
(2) If issuance of a preference right coal lease could constitute a major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment, the Secretary of Interior must prepare an appropriate
EIS prior to such lease issuance.'
2 7
Although an EIS may well be necessary before coal mine plan approval or
the issuance of a mining permit under SMCRA, the court held that NEPA
"demands, nevertheless, that a detailed and informed analysis of the envi-
ronmental cost be prepared and available prior to the issuance of the
lease."
' 12 8
d. Peabody Coal Company v. Cecil D. Andrus, el al. In 1977 the DOI
Solicitor determined that an application for an extension of a coal prospect-
ing permit to the Department of Interior was not a valid existing right
within the meaning of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of
1976.129 Based on the opinion, BLM rejected pending applications for ex-
tensions of coal prospecting permits. These rejections were appealed to the
125. 458 F. Supp. 925, 928 (D.D.C. 1978).
126. For such a discussion, see Johns, Federal Preference Right Coal Leases: How Much "Right"
Realy Arz~ts?, 12 NAT. RESOURCE LAW. 389 (1979). The implications of recent changes in
statutory and regulatory provisions governing existing federal coal leaseholds are examined in
Humphreys, Existing Federal Coal Leaseholds-How Strong is the Hold', 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 5-1 (1979). Mr. Humphreys poses an essential question relative to whether or not the new
federal coal regulatory system, which purports to apply to existing as well as new federal coal
leases, when implemented, constitutes an unlawful "taking" of private property as proscribed by
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. Mr. Humphreys concluded, in part,
that:
It seems apparent that the statutory requirements of, and certainly the regulatory re-
quirements flowing out of, the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments of 1975 are consti-
tutionally suspect, both on the basis of their complete frustration of investment-backed
expectations of those owning existing federal coal leases and on the basis that the
requirements, particularly the production requirements imposed by regulation, have
the effect of (and in the case of the regulations have as their real purpose) a forced
transfer of coal resources from the private sector to the United States.
Thus, in any challenge of the new requirements which the Federal government
purports to apply to existing federal coal leaseholds, the lack of a sound constitutional
basis for the requirements should be considered.
Id. at 5-12.
127. 458 F. Supp. 925, 935, 939 (D.D.C. 1978).
128. Id. at 939.
129. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, Sohitor's Opin. No. M-36894, Authority to Extend Coal Prospecting
Penits: Efect of Section 4 of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975 (July 21, 1977).
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Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), which affirmed the BLM rejec-
t ions. 130
Peabody Coal Company appealed the IBLA opinion in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Wyoming. 13 1 Peabody challenged Interior's
refusal to extend the term of the prospecting permits as arbitrary and capri-
cious and an abuse of administrative discretion. The plaintiff asked the
court to reverse and set aside the IBLA decision -and order Interior to grant
the extension of the term of the coal prospecting permits or, in the alterna-
tive, to issue the preference right leases based on a demonstration of discov-
ery of commercial quantities.
In holding that Peabody was entitled to a two-year extension of its pros-
pecting permit, District Judge Kerr in Wyoming Federal Court stated,
The agency delay disclosed by the record is inexcusable. In
light of that delay, the Government's position that Peabody Coal
has no "valid existing rights" under the savings clause of the
FCLAA becomes untenable. The Government's acts were arbi-
trary and capricious in failing to approve plaintiff's 1972 applica-
tions for permit extensions prior to the 1976 enactment of the
FCLAA and it would be inconsistent with basic principles of fair-
ness to allow the Government to prevail in these circumstances.
The decision of the Secretary of the Interior is in conflict with
the settled administrative practice of the Interior Department and
with the various Secretarial Orders that were issued at the time in
question.
Przor to 1970, the coal leasing polcy followed by the Interior Depart-
ment was rehable. A party would receive a two year coal prospecting
permit and, if the party complied with the statutory and regulatory
requirements, the permit would be extended for two years. In most
cases, the permit would ripen into a preference right coal lease. In
the early 1970's, without legislative action or agency hearing or
rulemaking procedures, the Interior Department began an unoffi-
cial moratorium on approving coal leasing permits, extensions, or
preference right leases. It was not until 1973 that the Interior De-
partment publicly announced that such a moratorium was in ef-
fect.
The Interior Department relies on their discretionary author-
ity to approve permit extensions. Such discretion is not boundless;
statutes, regulations, agency procedures and agency orders all de-
lineate the parameters of that discretion. Delay tactics have no
place in that framework.
132
130. Peabody Coal Co. v. Andrus, 36 IBLA 242 (1978).
131. Peabody Coal Co. v. Andrus 477 F. Supp. 120 (D. Wyo. 1979).
132. Id. at 123-24. A similar decision was rendered by Judge Kerr reversing another Inte-
rior Board of Land appeals opinion in Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, No. C78-261k (D.
Wyo., Oct. 17, 1979).
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e. Utah International, Inc. v. Andrus. This case attempted to carry
the position stated in the NRDC v. Berklund suit a step further.' 33 Utah In-
ternational sued for a writ of mandamus to force the issuance of a preference
right coal lease from DOI. A certification that commercial quantities of coal
existed as of 1977 in the proposed lease area had been made by BLM. Nev-
ertheless, BLM refused to issue a lease. The U.S. District Court in Colorado
issued a decision on January 24, 1979, that "this nine year delay and inac-
tion on the part of the defendants is unconscionable, is unreasonable and
arbitrary, and violates the requirements of due process of law."1 34 The court
refused, however, to issue a writ of mandamus to the Secretary of Interior.
Rather, the court ordered the Secretary to initiate final administrative ac-
tion on the lease application within 120 days of the court's decision. The
court stated,
It is beyond the scope and authority of this Court at this time to
order by mandamus that the defendants herein issue a specific
lease; however, it is within the scope and power of this Court to
direct that the defendants issue a decision which shall be a final
administrative decision with respect to the plaintiff's pending ap-
plication. 135
Secretary Andrus, nevertheless, decided not to issue the lease to Utah Inter-
national, in part as a result of the court order in the NRDCv. Hughes case. 
1 3 6
On April 25, 1979, Interior issued a decision which constituted final
administrative action for the application which, in essence, states that Utah
International's PRLA must be run through the new regulatory "mill" to
determine the right to a lease. The Colorado District Court, as of this writ-
ing, has not yet ruled on Secretary Andrus' decision. Since Interior is no
longer bound by the NRDC v. Hughes decision, Utah International's PRLA
will be processed to completion, unless the court orders otherwise, along with
all other pending PRLAs, by December 1, 1984.137
III. THE NEW FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
A. Development of the Program
As the previous section indicates, a variety of factors led to the ultimate
decision to develop a new federal coal program. Of primary importance, of
course, was the decision by Judge Pratt in NRDCv. Hughes.1 38 Congress was
also preoccupied with federal coal authorities and policies, however, and re-
formed the statutory basis for the management of federal coal by enacting
133. See notes 112-20 and accompanying text, supra.
134. Utah International, Inc. v. Andrus, No. 77-k-595 (D. Colo. 1979).
135. Id.
136. NRDCv. Hughes enjoined the Secretary from issuing any new federal coal leases except
those allowed in the amended court order. See notes 112-20 and accompanying text, supra.
137. Telephone interview with Don Humphreys, Senior Counsel, Utah International, Inc.,
April 21, 1980. See also FISCAL 1979 COAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 31.
138. See notes 112-20 and accompanying text, supra. Two other articles, both written in
1978, provide somewhat different perspectives on federal coal management. See McGee &
Dahl, Federal Coal Leasing Wa/tz, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 455 (1978); Krulitz, Management of Federal
CoalReserves, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 139 (1978) (Mr. L. M. Krulitz was Solicitor of the
Department of Interior at the time the above article was written.)
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the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976,139 the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976,140 the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977,141 and the Department of Energy Organization
Act of 1977.142
During this same period, President Carter outlined the administration's
coal policy in two messages to Congress. His energy message of April, 1977,
presented the National Energy Plan, calling for doubling of national coal
production by 1985 and emphasizing the role of coal in reducing the coun-
try's dependence on imported oil and gas.
1 43
President Carter's environmental message of May, 1977, expressed the
Administration's policy to increase coal production without increasing envi-
ronmental damage and extreme socio-economic impacts from such produc-
tion. The President emphasized his balanced approach to the development
of the Nation's coal resources by stating:
The newly enacted Coal Leasing Amendments and the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act provide the Secretary of the
Interior with the necessary authority to carry out environmentally
sound, comprehensive planning for the public lands. His duty now
is to implement an affirmative program for managing coal lands
and associated resources in a manner that fully protects the public
interest and respects the rights of private surface owners.
144
A memorandum from the President to Secretary Andrus dated May 24,
1977, directed the Secretary to: "Manage the coal leasing program to assure
that it can respond to reasonable production goals by leasing only those ar-
eas where mining is environmentally acceptable and compatible with other
land uses."
145
While the decision in the NRDC v. Hughes suit was still pending, Secre-
tary Andrus ordered a full-scale inter-agency coal policy review to assess the
need for leasing federal coal and to initiate the development of a new man-
agement program. A review committee comprised of the Solicitor and the
Assistant Secretaries of Interior was formed and the Office of Coal Leasing,
Planning and Coordination (OCLPC) was established at the departmental
level to coordinate the federal coal review. 146
This section of the article will briefly outline the principal federal
agency responsibilities for development of the new coal program, the
139. 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-214 (Supp. 11 1978). See notes 63-66 and accompanying text, supra.
140. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. 11 1978). See notes 67-72 and accompanying text, supra.
141. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1308 (Supp. 11 1978). See notes 73-90 and accompanying text, supra.
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. I 1978). See notes 91-96 and accompanying text, supra.
143. The Energ Problem. The President's Address to the Nation, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 560, 564 (Apr. 18, 1977). See also National Energy Program. Fact Sheet on the President's Pro-
gram, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 573, 580 (Apr. 27, 1977).
144. The Environment- The President's Message to the Congress, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 782, 787 (May 23, 1977).
145. SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 4. The President further directed
that the Department of Interior, "scrutinize existing Federal coal leases (and applications for
preference right leases) to determine whether they show prospects for timely development in an
environmentally acceptable manner, taking steps as necessary to deal with non-producing and
environmentally unsatisfactory leases and applications." Id.
146. Id. at 5.
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programmatic environmental impact statement, and the series of events
which led to issuance of the final EIS and the regulations implementing the
new federal coal program.
1. Principal Federal Agency Involvement
Federal coal management functions and responsibilities are shared by
several bureaus and offices in Interior. Secretary Andrus delegated oversight
responsibility to the Under Secretary for all phases of the department's coal-
related activities. This responsibility covered federal coal policy as it existed
before the new program as well as development of the new coal policy man-
dated by President Carter. The following offices are specifically involved on
a continuing basis for development of the new program: the Office of Coal
Leasing, Planning and Coordination; the Bureau of Land Management; the
U.S. Geological Survey; the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and En-
forcement; and the Fish and Wildlife Service.
The Office of Coal Leasing, Planning and Coordination (OCLPC) served as the
focal point for conducting the department's coal policy review and develop-
ment of a federal coal management program as mandated by the President
in his National Energy Plan and Environmental Message. 147 OCLPC is
now the key point of contact with DOI's coal management program for state
and local governments, industry, environmental groups, and other Federal
agencies.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has the responsibility for inven-
tory, land-use planning, and multiple-use management of the public lands.
BLM's Office of Coal Management (OCM) is responsible for overseeing the
development and implementation of BLM's coal management program, in-
cluding the programmatic and regional environmental statements, the short-
term leasing program established under the NRDCv. Hughes amended order,
policy development in conjunction with the OCLPC, and the lead responsi-
bility for the automated coal lease data system. 148 Operationally, the coal
management program is carried out through the individual BLM State Of-
fices and their respective District and Area Offices.
The US Geological Survey (GS) is responsible for establishing coal re-
source estimates, both quantity and quality, and for preparing coal resource
economic value reports for lands proposed for leasing. It provides technical
background information necessary for BLM's land-use planning activities.
GS establishes known recoverable coal resource areas (KRCRA's). KR-
CRA's are areas in which sufficient coal resource data have been obtained to
determine that the federal coal within those areas is recoverable.
14 9
The GS has several other important coal management functions. As a
result of determining coal resource economic values, GS recommends to
147. See notes 143-45 and accompanying text, supra.
148. See notes 240-51 and accompanying text, infra, regarding the new automated coal lease
data system and other data generating problems which the program is facing.
149. "Known Recoverable Coal Resource Area" is defined by regulation as an area, includ-
ing federal lands, which meets minimum standards for recoverable coal deposits in accordance
with accepted mining practices, as determined by the Director, Geological Survey. The Federal
lands in a KRCRA are classified for coal leasing. 43 C.F.R. § 3400.0-5(x) (1979).
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BLM lease bond amounts, royalty type, and the amount of royalty or rent.
GS approves the formation of logical mining units and exploration plans. It
reviews exploration license applications and mine plans on federal coal leases
for conformance with the mineral leasing laws regarding conservation of re-
sources, diligent development, and continuous operations. Finally, GS
monitors production from leases to assure compliance of the lessee with dili-
gent development and continuous production requirements.
15
The OJfice of Surface Minng Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) is responsi-
ble for establishing and enforcing minimum national standards to protect
the public and the environment from the potential adverse effects of surface
coal mining and for administering the national abandoned mine land recla-
mation program, as provided by SMCRA, to correct the degradation of the
environment and the hazards that were caused by past mining practices.
OSM shares with GS the responsibility for recommending approval of
mine plans and mine plan modifications. It conducts inspection and en-
forcement actions and is responsible for taking necessary action in the event
of an environmental or public safety emergency at a coal mine site. OSM
conducts inspections prior to abandonment, approves abandonment proce-
dures, and manages the petition process designating lands unsuitable for coal
mining. 15 1 OSM encourages and assists states in carrying out the control
and reclamation program as provided by SMCRA.
The Fish and Wilife Service (FWS) conducts research to further wildlife
conservation through all stages of coal production and consumption. FWS
collects basic information on fish and wildlife for use in BLM's land-use
planning and coal activity planning and in OSM's mining regulation activi-
ties. It monitors coal-related activities relative to impacts on wildlife and
transmits information to state and coal industry decision-makers.
152
Other Department of Interior Bureaus and Offices with important tasks
to perform in coal management are:
153
Bureau or Office Principal Coal Function
Heritage Conservation and Preservation of historical and
Recreation Service cultural landmarks
Bureau of Mines Coal mining safety research and
development and coal
mining technology
Bureau of Reclamation Water availability for coal-
related projects
Office of Policy Analysis Coal policy development
Office of Environmental Projects Environmental analysis reviews
Bureau of Indian Affairs Support for Indian
management of coal
150. These GS responsibilities, in essence, designate GS as the technical supervisor of spe-
cific coal mining operations on federal lands.
151. See notes 265-83 and accompanying text, znfra, regarding unsuitability criteria.
152. As such, the FWS retains very little "on-the-ground" implementation authority.
Rather, the FWS serves as an in-house consultant, of sorts, to other agencies with direct supervi-
sory authority as GS, OSM, and the Forest Service.




Under the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Forest Service, has responsibility relating to coal man-
agement. Under the Act, the Secretary of Agriculture has consent authority
for federal leases on National Forest lands. The Secretary may add terms
and conditions to coal leases on these lands to protect resource and environ-
mental values. The Secretary of Agriculture, through the Forest Service,
may concur in the approval of mine and reclamation plans for leases on
Forest Service lands.1
54
Coal-related responsibilities have also been assigned to the Department
of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service. These responsibilities include as-
sisting in the identification of prime farmlands within areas that may be
surface mined in the future and reviewing and commenting on permits for
surface mining which involve prime farmland. The Service also administers
the abandoned mine reclamation program for rural lands.
15 5
Through the Department of Energy Organization Act, the Department
of Energy (DOE) has been delegated several areas of coal responsibility
which were formerly DOI's responsibility. Included is the authority to pro-
mulgate reguations for:
- Fostering competition for federal leases;
- Implementing alternative bidding systems for awarding fed-
eral leases;
- Establishing diligence requirements for coal development op-
erations on federal leases;
- Setting rates of production for federal leases; and
- Specifying procedures, terms and conditions for the acquisi-
tion and disposition of federal royalty interests taken in
kind. 156
Due to the overlapping functions of several bureaus and offices within
Interior, as well as duplicative responsibilities between Interior and DOE,
several actions occurred over the past two years to coordinate these varying
responsibilities. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) among three
agencys (BLM, GS, and OSM) was signed after promulgation of the new
coal program in June 1979.157 In addition, wildlife conservation responsibil-
ities have been outlined in an MOU between BLM and FWS which became
effective on September 26, 1978.158
Further, Interior signed an MOU with the Department of Energy on
August 31, 1978, for the establishment and use of production goals for Fed-
eral energy leasing. These national production goals will be used to guide
Interior's setting and revision of leasing programs and lease planning sched-
ules for all federal energy resources, including coal. The process and timeta-
154. 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(A),(3)(A)(i) (1976).
155. 30 U.S.C. § 1236 (Supp. 11 1978).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 7152 (Supp. H 1978).
157. FISCAL 1979 COAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 21. The MOU was signed on October
24, 1979.
158. FISCAL 1978 COAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 18.
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ble for developing these production goals will be repeated biennially. 159
Finally, Interior and DOE have formally executed the charter for the Leas-
ing Liaison Committee. The Committee will serve as an executive level co-
ordinating mechanism on energy leasing matters between the
departments. 
60
2. Issue Analysis and Preparation of Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement
The passage of coal-related legislation, Interior's review of the previous
coal leasing system, and President Carter's energy and environmental policy
statements led DOI to prepare a new programmatic environmental impact
statement (programmatic EIS) rather than a supplemental statement for the
EMARS program, which had been ordered by Judge Pratt in NRDC v.
Hughes. Preliminary drafts of the programmatic EIS were circulated inter-
nally within the Department in the Fall of 1978.161 Concurrent with the
preliminary draft EIS, sixteen "issue-option papers" were presented to Secre-
159. Id. at 19. See notes 228-51 and accompanying text, inqfa, for discussion of coal produc-
tion goals.
160. GAO FEDERAL LEASING REPORT, supra note 95, at 2. See also text accompanying notes
252-64, ihfa.
A variety of other memoranda of understanding have either recently been executed or are
in the process of negotiation. The MOU between BLM and the Forest Service, for example,
will establish a system for coordination between these two agencies on the Federal coal manage-
ment program. The MOU will authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to assess federal lands
within the National Forest System and determine areas acceptable for further consideration for
coal leasing. This delegation will promote the use of surface management agency land-use plan-
ning systems to insure consistent federal resource inventories and evaluation; to avoid duplica-
tion of each agency's efforts and to increase efficiency; and to assure the systematic application
of the unsuitability criteria in agency planning.
Memoranda of understanding will also be developed for each of the regional coal teams.
The MOU among BLM and the governors of the states of Colorado and Wyoming, for exam-
ple, will serve as a model for other states now negotiating MOUs with BLM. These agreements
formally specify the cooperative responsibilities of the states and the BLM for the federal coal
management program within the forum of the regional coal team. The MOU will also commit
the states and the BLM to cooperate in the specified manner to conduct the competitive leasing
of federal coal lands.
A draft Programmatic Memorandum of Agreement (PMOA) has been developed by an
inter-agency task force chaired by BLM. Through the stipulations outlined in the draft PMOA,
BLM, OSM, and GS will insure that historic and cultural properties will be given adequate
consideration in federal coal management program decisions, thus fulfilling the requirements of
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. The cultural resource protection actions
detailed in the PMOA include, but are not limited to, the preparation of coal leasing EIS's,
issuance of new leases, and review and recommendations to the Secretary of Interior regarding
coal mining and exploration plans for either new or existing leases.
Negotiations are continuing on the following MOUs:
(1) Interior and the Small Business Administration on a small business set-aside program;
(2) BLM and GS on coal land exchanges;
(3) FWS and OSM on coal research and operations programs;
(4) FS and OSM on inter-agency cooperation in administering and enforcing SMCRA;
(5) OSM, GS, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs on administering SMCRA on Indian
lands; and
(6) Interior and the Department of justice on consultation procedures.
See FISCAL 1979 COAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 21, 22.
161. FISCAL 1978 COAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 20.
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tary Andrus. The papers were designed to outline the principal issues re-
garding the new coal program.
162
The draft programmatic EIS was released to the public in December,
1978,163 followed by publication of the final programmatic EIS in May,
1979.164 Included in the draft programmatic EIS were "example regula-
tions" prepared to give preliminary notice to the public of the essential ele-
ments of the preferred new coal program and to seek public comment for
proposed programmatic rules. 165 Proposed regulations, modified from the
example regulations after public comment, were published in the Federal
Register with the hope that final regulations would be published sometime
in June, 1979.166
Another aspect of Interior's program development activities included
the preparation of regional EIS's and studies. The amended court order is-
sued June 14, 1978, in NRDCv. Hughes authorized Interior to continue work
on eight regional EIS's and two studies that were already underway on the
date of the order. 167 The regional EIS's and studies are designed to analyze
162. The following Issue/Option Papers were presented to Secretary of Interior Andrus in
the preliminary phases of developing the coal program:
Subject Paper Date Decision Date
Departmental Approach to the Long-term Coal 9/20/77 10/26/77
Leasing Program
Need for Leasing/Leasing- 6/23/78 6/30/78
Systems Choice
Bidding Systems 6/23/78 6/30/78
Setting of Environmental Conditions and Lease 6/23/78 6/30/78
Terms
State and Local Government Participation 6/23/78 6/30/78
Public Participation 6/23/78 6/30/78
Maximum Economic Recovery 6/23/78 6/30/78
Coal Leasing-Surface Owner Consent 6/23/78 6/30/78
Leasing for Limited End Uses 6/23/78 6/30/78
Public Body Leasing 6/23/78 6/30/78
Management of Preference Right Lease Applications 6/23/78 6/30/78
Management of Existing Leases 6/23/78 6/30/78
Intraregional Matters Affecting Design of a Leasing 7/18/78 7/28/78
Process
Environmental Analysis Strategy 8/31/78 9/15/78
Split Estate Leasing Implementation 8/31/78 9/15/78
Land Unsuitability Criteria 9/22/78
See SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 1-188.
163. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT-FEDERAL COAL
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (1978) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT COAL EIS].
164. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22.
165. DRAFT COAL EIS, supra note 163, at A-I through A-39.
166. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,800-16,845 (1979).
167. 454 F. Supp. 148, 150 (D.D.C. 1978).
The following EIS's and studies were prepared while under the amended Court order:
(1) Southwest Wyoming, final EIS completed 9-1-78;
(2) Northwest Colorado study, final study completed 12-4-78;
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the socio-economic and environmental impacts of increased federal coal
mining in specific geographic areas. As well, site-specific actions such as
mine plans and production facilities are included in the regional EIS's and
studies.1 6  Interior plans to use data from the regional EIS's and studies in
the series of new regional lease sale EIS's that will be required if the pre-
ferred program outlined in the final programmatic EIS is adopted. Al-
though boundaries of the existing regions do not coincide with the newly
established coal production regions, much of the data from the ongoing re-
gional EIS's will be used in the new statements.
169
B. The New Federal Coal Regulatogy Program
Final regulations for the FCMP were published on July 19, 1979, fol-
lowing issuance of the final programmatic EIS and publication of the SEC-
RETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT on the FCMP published in June, 1979.170 No
attempt will be made to examine the final rules in every detail for purposes
of this article. Rather, some of the key distinctions between the new pro-
gram and earlier regulations issued to implement the now historic Energy
Minerals Activities Recommendation System-EMARS I and II will be dis-
cussed. This section provides the background for the discussion of the
problems and activities of the Green River-Hams Fork regional coal team in
preparation of the first scheduled federal coal lease sale in January, 1981.171
(3) West Central North Dakota study, completed 2-21-79;
(4) Star Lake-Bisti (New Mexico), final EIS completed 3-1-79;
(5) South Central Wyoming, final EIS completed 3-20-79;
(6) Eastern Powder River Wyoming (supplement), final EIS supplement completed
4-3-79;
(7) West Central Colorado, final EIS completed 4-30-79;
(8) Southern Utah, final EIS completed 5-23-79;
(9) Central Utah, final EIS completed 7-2-79; and
(10) Northern Powder River Montana, draft EIS completed 7-13-79.
See FISCAL 1979 COAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 33.
168. With the completion of these EIS's and studies, the Department of Interior has been
able to take action on several of the proposals analyzed in the EIS's and studies. For example,
on August 3, 1979, Secretary Andrus approved the issuance of a right-of-way across BLM lands
in relation to an application filed by Star Lake Railroad. The application includes plans for a
114-mile rail line to transport an estimated 16.5 million tons of coal annually by 1990 from
northwest New Mexico to the main line of the Santa Fe Railroad. Several additional coal
mining plans are in various stages of review by the Department of Interior. The Black Butte
Mine, for example, which is analyzed as part of the Southwestern Wyoming EIS, received mine
plan approval from Secretary Andrus on December 7, 1978. The plan covers approximately
36,600 surface acres (12,930 federal, 160 state, and 23,510 private) and would result in approxi-
mately 6.3 million tons of production per year.
For a list of other site-specific actions which have been taken by the Department of Interior
and which were analyzed in the various regional EIS's and studies listed above, see FISCAL 1979
COAL REPORT, supra note 21, at C-2 to C-14.
169. For example, the socioeconomic and environmental impacts in a specified region can
be used for those areas that are within both existing and new regions.
170. 44 Fed. Reg. 42,609 (1979), codifed at 43 C.F.R. § 3400 (1979); FEDERAL COAL EIS,
supra note 22; SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, supra note 33.
171. See notes 298-308 and accompanying text, bnfra. Readers familiar with federal coal
regulation will note the absence of any significant discussion herein regarding coal bidding sys-
tems, fair market value (FMV) determinations and diligent development requirements. This
omission is not an oversight, but an exclusion caused by three factors. First, part III focuses
principally on the key dt4stzntons between the EMARS program and the new FCMP. Many of
the issues attendant to bidding systems, FMV and diligence requirements are not distinctly
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For a complete understanding of the FCMP, it is essential for the reader
to go directly to applicable statutes, regulations, the final programmatic EIS,
the SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, and the massive number of issues pa-
pers, memoranda, and studies that have been prepared over the last two
years in anticipation of initiating new federal coal lease sales.
1. General Outline of the Preferred Coal Program
The preferred coal program selected by Secretary Andrus and described
in detail in the final programmatic EIS contains eight major elements:
172
a. A planning system involving close consultation with state and
local government, industry, and the public designed to (i) de-
cide which areas of federal coal reserves are acceptable loca-
tions for coal production, and (ii) delineate, rank, and select
specific tracts of coal for sale;
b. A system for evaluating the national demand for coal and for
different for either system. Second, these issues are treated significantly elsewhere. Finally,
these specific issues appropriately deserve more detailed attention than can be provided in this
article. See Humphreys, Existing Federal Coal Leaseholds-How Strong ir the Hold?, 25 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 5-1, 5-19 (1979); Krulitz, Management ofFederal Coal Reserves, 24 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 139, 158 (1978); FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 3-60 to 3-74; SECRE-
TARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 83-105, 153-78; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT--CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, MANAGEMENT OF FUEL AND NONFUEL MINERALS
IN FEDERAL LAND: CURRENT STATUS AND ISSUES, at 147-67 (1979); BUREAU OF LAND MAN-
AGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SEC-
RETARY ON FAIR MARKET VALUE AND MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE BIDS FOR FEDERAL COAL
LEASES (1979); McGee & Dahl, The Federal Coal Leasing Waltz, 80 W. VA. L. REv. 455 (1978).
172. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 3-2.
With the determinations made by Secretary Andrus regarding the preferred program, sev-
eral other alternatives are briefly described and dismissed in the final EIS, including:
(1) No federal leasing. (Under this alternative, no new federal coal would be leased
until at least 1985);
(2) Processing of outstanding preference right lease applications. (Under this alter-
native, only PRLAs would be processed and leases issued which met the commer-
cial quantities test, and no other federal leasing would occur until at least 1985);
(3) Emergency leasing. (Under this alternative, limited competitive leasing would
occur, including relatively small amounts of coal to avoid bypassing federal coal
and maintain existing operations);
(4) Leasing to satisfy industry's indications of need. (This alternative would effec-
tively continue the processes established in EMARS as proposed in September,
1975);
(5) State determination of leasing levels. (Under this alternative, the states would
have the responsibility to determine the timing and extent of new federal coal
leasing. As such, the state would have "veto power" over which leases would
finally be issued);
(6) Leasing to meet DOE production goals. (This alternative would permit the
DOE regional production goals to drive the tract selection process. DOE would
select the regional leasing targets; no adjustment in DOE national production
projections would occur);
(7) Two other alternatives not seriously considered were:
a) EMARS I, the basic principal of which was that coal development on federal
lands should stem from government interests. Many of the aspects of the
EMARS I proposal have either been incorporated into the preferred alterna-
tive or were superceded by subsequent legislative changes; and
b) Development of federal coal resources by the federal government. While this
alternative was mentioned in the 1975 EMARS Programatic Environmental
Statement, Interior believes Congress is unlikely to approve legislation re-
moving coal development responsibility from the private sector. As stated in
the FEDERAL COAL EIS, "the alternative is unreasonable and does not need
to be analyzed." (FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 3-10 to 3-13.)
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determining production which should be stimulated by the
leasing of federal coal;
c. Procedures to conduct lease sales and issuance;
d. Post-lease enforcement of terms and conditions;
e. Procedures to manage existing leases issued prior to implemen-
tation of the new program;
f. Procedures to process existing preference right lease applica-
tions;
g. A strategy to integrate the environmental analysis require-
ments of NEPA into the new program; and,
h. Procedures for new program start-up and for offering lease
sales in emergency situations.
2. Land Use Planning
The most significant difference between the preferred FCMP and the
EMARS II program 1 73 is the re-orientation of the lease sale process with
regard to land use planning. Specifically, the EMARS II system required
Interior to issue a call for expressions of interest from the coal industry in the
first stages of the coalprogram. Following receipt of industry nominations and
the public's disnominations regarding tracts for coal lease sales, BLM and
other federal agencies were authorized to begin the land use planning phase
of the program. 174 Under the new FCMP, Interior's "call" for expressions of
leasing interest from coal companies, utilities and others is issued as the first
step in the tract selection process.175 The tract selection process, as the figures
below illustrate, begins only after completion of the major phases of the land
use planning programs of Interior. 176 Thus, Interior has re-oriented the
stages of the coal program significantly, and expressions of industry interest
will only come some time in the midst of the "activity planning process."'
1 77
Sections 3420.1-5 through 3420.2-1 of the final coal rules describe the
land use planning process necessary on lands administered by BLM before
those lands will be deemed acceptable for further consideration and before
calls for expressions of coal industry interests are announced. 178 The provi-
sions of the new FCMP regarding land use planning are designed to be con-
sistent with other resource management planning regulations issued by BLM
on August 17, 1979.'79 The part 1600 regulations establish a planning sys-
tem for public lands and resources in general as authorized by the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. The part 1600 rules compliment
other BLM land use rules, including the part 3400 coal regulations, as well
as land use regulations being established by the Forest Service under the
173. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text, supra.
174. Id. See also regulations implementing EMARS II, codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3500 (1979).
175. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.4-4 (1979).
176. Figures 3 to 6, znfra, were adapted from the FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 3-14
to 3-16 and the DRAFT COAL EIS, supra note 163, at 3-15 through 3-17.
177. See Figure 5, middle portion.
178. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3420.1-5 to 3420.2-1 (1979).
179. 43 C.F.R. § 1600 (1979).
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SUMMARY OF PREFERRED PROGRAMS
Land Use Plnning.
a) Identify Coal Lands
b) Unsuitability Findings
c) Resource Tradeoffs
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authority of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act
of 1974.180
The threshold responsibility of the BLM to determine areas for future
federal coal leasing is subsumed into a "screening" process which results in
the designation of land areas acceptable for further consideration for coal
leasing.' 8 ' The following process will be used to determine such acceptable
areas:
a. Only areas with high or moderate development potential coal
deposits are to be considered for leasing;
(i) The determination of high or moderate development
potential will be based on the GS Coal Resource Occur-
rence-Coal Development Potential (CRO-CDP) maps;
(ii) As well, coal companies, states and the public may submit
non-confidential coal geology and economic data during
the early inventory planning phase for consideration re-
garding designation of coal areas as high or moderate po-
tential; 182
b. "Unsuitability Criteria" will be applied to assess where there
are areas unsuitable for all or certain types of surface mining
operations. Areas considered unsuitable for all types of surface
mining operations shall not be acceptable for further leasing
consideration; 183
c. Additional unsuitability designations may occur where multi-
ple land use decisions are made for certain coal deposits to pro-
tect other resource values "of a locally important or unique
nature not otherwise included in the general unsuitability crite-
ria"; 184
d. Areas may be eliminated from further lease consideration
where a significant number of qualified surface owners have
expressed a preference against mining by other than under-
ground mining techniques. Certain exceptions to elimination
of areas based on "surface owner consent" are permitted in the
proposed rules; 185
e. Land use plans may set "impact thresholds to manage coal de-
velopment." These thresholds are defined as pre-set levels or
rates of coal development, measured by impacts on natural, so-
cial or economic resources. Where a threshold is exceeded,
BLM may hault, suspend, or condition further consideration of
the areas acceptable for leasing;186 and, finally,
f. If, in the judgment of the federal land manager, areas which
are otherwise acceptable for consideration contain more
reserves than are likely to be needed for leasing over the life of
180. 16 U.S.C. §§ 581(h), 1601-1614 (1979).
181. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.2-3 (1979).
182. Id. § 3420.2-3(b)(1)-(3).
183. Id. § 3420.2-3(c).
184. Id. § 3420.2-3(d).
185. Id. § 3420.2-3(e)(1)-(3). Ste alro the surface owner consent provisions of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. II 1978).
186. 43 C.FR. § 3420.2-3(l) (1979).
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the land use planning unit, the plan may specify broad areas
greater than 60,000 acres for earliest consideration for leasing, if
any leasing is to be done.'
8 7
3. Regional Coal Teams
Throughout the development of the new FCMP, Interior worked
closely with the six major coal-producing states in the West to insure close
cooperation among the various federal and state agencies which would play
a major role in implementation of the program. 188 Final regulations estab-
lishing state/federal Regional Coal Teams (Teams) formalize Interior's com-
mitment to close state/federal relations in administering program functions
and ensured the consideration of cumulative, region-wide impacts of coal
development decisions. 189
Each Team is comprised of the following members:
- One BLM field representative for each State in the coal region
(this representative will be the State BLM Director or his des-
ignated representative);
- The governor of each State, or his designee; and
- A representative appointed by and responsible to the Director
of BLM.' 9
As determined in several meetings between Interior and representatives of
the major coal-producing states, these Teams will necessarily have more than
three representatives. This decision stems from the geological fact that all
coal regions extend beyond single state borders. Thus, each Team will have
at least five representatives: two governors or their representatives, two state
BLM directors or their designees, and one member appointed by the na-
tional BLM director.' 9' Section 3400.4(b) of the final coal program regula-
tions outlines the general responsibilities of the Teams:
Each regional coal team shall consider and recommend policy for
regional target setting, tract delineation, site-specific analysis
in the coal production region, guide and review tract ranking, and
conduct the selection and sale scheduling process in order to rec-
ommend regional lease sale alternatives to be analyzed in the re-
gional lease sale environmental impact statement and to be
recommended to the Secretary [of Interior] .... 192
Following completion of the final regional lease sale environmental
statement, the Chairman of the Team' 9 3 will submit the recommendations
of the Team to the BLM Director. The Director then will submit the final
regional environmental statement to the Secretary of Interior with recom-
187. Id. § 3420.2-3(g).
188. Letter from Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus to Colorado Governor Richard Lamm
(April 28, 1978).
189. 43 C.F.R. § 3400.4 (1979).
190. Id. § 3400.4(a).
191. Regional Coal Teams have been established for the following coal regions: Green
River-Hams Fork, Uinta-Southwestern Utah, Powder River, Fort Union, San Juan River, Den-
ver-Raton Mesa, Western Interior (Oklahoma Subregion), and Southern Appalachian (Ala-
bama Subregion).
192. 43 C.F.R. § 3400.4(b) (1979).
193. Designated by rule as the National BLM Director's representative. Id. § 3400.4(a).
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mendations for his decision.1 94 Other Team responsibilities include serving
as the general state and federal forum for all other major DOI coal manage-
ment program decisions in the region regarding preference right lease appli-
cations, public body and small business set-aside leasing, emergency leases,
exchange, and readjustment of lease terms and exploration licenses. 195
4. Regional Production Goals and Leasing Targets
The need for additional coal leasing has been the focal point of much of
the controversy surrounding Interior's efforts to manage the federal coal re-
source. Precise determinations of the tonnage of federal coal which should
be leased to meet future energy requirements are not now feasible. A statisti-
cal assessment of the need for additional federal coal leasing is necessarily a
dynamic process which changes according to the assumptions used in the
analysis as well as the specific data included in the forecasts. Resulting from
Secretary Andrus' perception that a continual reassessment of leasing needs
should be an integral part of the preferred coal program, the Secretaries of
Interior and Energy have established regional production goals and leasing
targets which will be updated continually to permit modification of leasing
activity in response to changes in projected demands for coal. 1
96
Under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between
the Departments of Interior and Energy,' 97 the Secretary of Energy will sub-
mit proposed regional production goals to the Secretary of Interior. The
determination of regional goals for specific types of coal will be guided prin-
cipally by industry indications of interest submitted at the start of the activ-
ity planning process. 198 It is expected that DOE will focus on macro-
economic issues regarding the energy needs of the nation's economy and will
consider comments from DOI and other diverse sources for the formulation
of national energy goals and the role of coal production in meeting these
goals. 199 Once final DOE regional coal production goals are established,
they will be presented to the regional coal teams for evaluation as to how the
goals might affect leasing strategies and decisions. 2° ° The Team will then
analyze the goal on the basis of its tract ranking and selection experience, its
detailed knowledge of the region, and public comments received following
publication of the regional goal in the Federal Register and a public hearing
in the region. 20 1 The Team's recommendation for a regional leasing target
(on a reserved tonnage basis) will be provided to the Secretary of Interior for
the next four year period.
20 2
Based on the recommendations of the Team, the Secretary of Interior
194. Id. § 3400.4(e).
195. Id. § 3400.4(d).
196. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 3-57.
197. Id. at Appendix B. Regional coal production goals will be adopted annually by the
Secretary of Interior following consultation with DOE, affected State Governors, Indian tribes
and other concerned parties. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.3-1(b) (1979).
198. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.4 (1979).
199. Id.
200. Id. § 3420.3-2(d) (1979).
201. Id.
202. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 3-58.
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will adopt final regional production goals and will also adopt preliminary
regional leasing targets for logical mining units which will be composed of or
include Federal coal leases.2 0 3 The preliminary regional leasing targets will
reflect the difference between desired levels of production and the estimated
production that would occur without new federal coal leasing. The targets
will include federal and non-federal coal and will be published for public
review and transmitted to the Teams.
20 4
Final DOE regional production goals, as adopted by the Secretary, and
both preliminary and final regional leasing targets, will be used by federal
and state governments to establish data gathering and planning priorities to
insure that a sufficient number of federal coal tracts will be available in the
future, and that adequate site specific information will be available to make
the coal management process workable. The final regional leasing targets
will specifically guide the Teams in the selection and scheduling of ranked
tracts for the four year proposed lease sale programs in each respective re-
gion. 20 5 Regional leasing targets will be adjusted on a biennial basis and
will afford the opportunity for trade-offs in production goals and leasing
targets between regions.
20 6
This process necessarily requires that the Departments of Interior and
Energy have informed estimates of likely production from all lands, includ-
ing existing leases. This information will be generated essentially from
outside sources, including information held by DOE, the National Coal As-
sociation, and the Keystone Coal Manual.20 7 For existing leases, Interior
has relied heavily on estimates from pending and approved mining plan ap-
plications and inquiries and conversations with lessees. To make the infor-
mation easily available and accurate, Interior has developed a new
automated coal data system which centralizes all information on coal leases
for the first time. The information in this system should contain the best
available estimates of planned and potential future production from coal
leases. 20 8 As will be discussed more fully later,20 9 the establishment and use
of regional coal production goals and regional leasing targets have become a
central issue of debate in the development of the new coal program.
203. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.3-2(e) (1979).
204. Id. § 3420.3-2(f), (g).
205. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 3-59.
206. Id. See also 43 C.F.R. § 3420.3-2(k), (1) (1979).
207. For an extensive discussion of how coal data will be used to manage particularly ex-
isting leases and preference right lease applications, see Memorandum from the Director, Oftce of Coal
Leasing, Planning and Coordination to Under Secretaqy oflnterorjamesJoseph, Discussion Paper on Depart-
mental Management of Existing Coal Leases and Preference Right Lease Applications (March 20, 1979),
republished in FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at I-I to 1-47 [hereinafter cited as Existing Lease
Memo].
208. Id. Whether or not the coal data system will contain the best available information for
use in the coal program continues to be an extremely divisive issue. The General Accounting
Office published a severely critical report of DOI's estimates of western coal reserves. The re-
port states:
In order for the Government to make sound coal leasing policy decisions to man-
age the federal coal leasing program effectively, and to comply with federal law, accu-
rate and reliable estimates of these reserves are essential. Timing also is important
because many of the 537 outstanding leases may require "diligent development" de-
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5. Major State Participation in the Federal Coal Program
As stated earlier,2 10 Interior made a concerted effort to involve the ma-
jor coal-producing states in the West in development of the proposed coal
program. The states of Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, Utah, New
Mexico, and Colorado, working through the auspices of the Western Inter-
state Energy Board (WIEB), established a Coal Committee comprised of one
governor-appointed representative from each state to work closely with the
Office of Coal Leasing Planning and Coordination (OCLPC). Primarily as
a result of the extensive staff effort in working with the Department of Inte-
rior, the states were able to realize a significantly greater role in the federal
coal program than has ever before been acknowledged. The major compo-
nents of this increased state responsibility are outlined in this subsection.
(a) Regzonal Coal Production and Leasig Targets. The Regional Coal
Team (Team) will receive the Department of Energy's (DOE) final regional
production goals and related Department of Interior (DOI) information and
may recommend changes in the region's production goals to the Secretary of
Interior based on a number of factors, including state development poli-
cies.2 11 As well, preliminary and final regional leasing targets may be re-
vised by the Teams based on an evaluation of: (1) the expected and
potential production for existing coal leases; (2) noncompetitive coal leases,
non-federal coal holdings and expected non-federal leasing; and (3) the level
of competition within the coal region. 2 2 The Secretary must also consult
with governors of affected states before adopting final regional production
goals and leasing targets.
2 13
The final regional leasing targets will be used to guide the Teams when
ranking and selecting federal coal tracts for sale. The Team, however, with
the approval of the Secretary of Interior, may revise final regional targets
based on a number of broad criteria, including the level of support for devel-
opment by state and local governments prior to adoption of a lease sale
schedule by the Secretary.
2 14
terminations prior to June 1, 1986. Most federal leases had no coal production before
1977.
However, Interior and leaseholder estimates of recoverable coal reserves are not
accurate or reliable.
In a previous report on the federal coal leasing system, GAO stated that Interior
should have as clear a conception as possible of the potential contribution of federal
lands toward meeting the national coal production goal. At that time, GAO con-
cluded that the estimates on existing leases did not provide a sound basis for forecast-
ing production potential. That conclusion has not changed.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INACCURATE ESTIMATES OF WESTERN COAL RESERVES
SHOULD BE CORRECTED, REPORT No. EMD-78-32 (1978) [hereinafter cited as GAO WEST-
ERN COAL RESERVES REPORT].
209. See notes 241-51 and accompanying text, infra.
210. See note 188, supra.
211. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.3-2(d), (i) (1979).
212. Id. § 3420.3-2(e)(2).
213. Id. § 3420.3-2(i),().
214. Id. § 3420.3-3(b)(1)-(6). Circumstances justifying a revision of a final regional leasing
target include:
(1) Expressed industry interests in coal development in the region not reflected in the
final regional leasing target;
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(b) Land Use Planning and Unsuitability Designations. BLM's land use
planning regulations provide for close coordination between the state and
federal governments and include provisions for execution of cooperative
agreements. 2 5 As well, the state may submit coal, geology, and economic
data during the earlier inventory phase of planning.
2 l 6
In the application of the unsuitability criteria and exceptions thereto,
the states are given concurrent power in many cases. 2 17 Prior to assessing
federal lands as unsuitable for coal mining, the Secretary must consult with
state and local agencies.2 18 Finally, before adopting a land use plan that
makes any formal assessment of land acceptable for further consideration for
leasing, BLM must consult with governors of affected states and the state
agency charged with the responsibility for maintaining the state's unsuitabil-
ity program.
2 1 9
(c) Tract Dehneation, Ranking, Selection, and Lease Sale Scheduhg.
(1) Tract Delineation. The Team determines the location, prior-
ity, and timing of both preliminary tract delineation and site-specific envi-
ronmental inventory and analysis, subject to limitations of data availability,
budget, .and manpower.
2 20
(2) Tract Ranking. The Team also determines the ranking factors
and ranks specific coal tracts.
22 1
(3) Tract Selection and Lease Sale Scheduling. The Team selects tracts
(2) Expressed interests and reasons therefor from a community or group of commu-
nities for or against coal development in the adjacent and surrounding areas;
(3) Expressed interests for special opportunity sales;
(4) Adjustments indicated by the success or failure of the scheduled lease sales in
meeting the final regional leasing targets;
(5) An expressed desire on the part of the state or local government to shift or dis-
perse development patterns in the region or sub-region by additional leasing, re-
ductions in leasing, or shifts in locations of lease sales; and
(6) Results from the analyses contained in the regional lease sale environmental
statement.
215. Id. § 1601.4-4-3. These rules were issued separately from the FCMP regulations. The
Part 1600, Planning, Programming and Budgeting rules cover all BLM-managed public lands,
not merely federal coal lands. The use of cooperative state/federal agreements is expressly em-
phasized at § 1601.4-(b) which states,
To facilitate coordination with State government, State Directors shall seek writ-
ten agreements with Governors or their designated representatives on procedural top-
ics such as exchanging information, providing advice and participation, and time
frames for receiving State government participation and review in a timely fashion. If
an agreement is not reached the State Director shall provide opportunity for Governor
or State agency review, advice, and suggestions on issues and topics that the State
Director has reason to believe could affect or influence State government programs.
Final coal leasing targets for the Green River-Hams Fork coal region are repub-
lished at 45 Fed. Reg. 11,919 (1980).
216. Id. §§ 3420.2-3(b)(3), 1601.5-4.
217. Id. §§ 3420.2-6, 3641.1, 3461.3-2. See speitqally criteria numbers 7 § 34 6 1.1(q) (historic
preservation); 15 § 3461.1(o) (fish and wildlife habitat); 19 § 3461.1(s) (alluvial valley floors);
and, 20 § 3461.1(t) (state-specific criteria).
218. Id. § 3420.2-6.
219. Id
220. Id §§ 3420.4-3(h), 3420.1-5(c)(7).
221. Id § 3420.4-4.
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for inclusion in alternative lease sale schedules and submits these to the Sec-
retary of Interior for his final selection. 22 2 Finally, the Secretary of Interior
in consultation with the governor of an affected state may initiate or post-
pone the process to respond to considerations such as planning, updates, new
tract delineations, and changes in production targets.
223
(d) Lease Sales and Related Issues. The Secretary of Interior must con-
sult with the governor on any proposed lease sale. The governor will have
between thirty and sixty days to comment on the proposed sale, with an
option for a longer period when proposed leases are located in national for-
ests.224 As noted earlier, 225 the Teams will each have at least two state rep-
resentatives in addition to federal representatives, and the Teams shall serve
"as the forum for Department/state consultation and cooperation in all
other major Department coal management program decisions in the region
concerning preference right lease applications, public body and small busi-
ness set aside leasing, emergency leasing and exchanges."
226
Finally, the Secretary of Interior must give the governor of an affected
state forty-five days to comment on any proposed lease exchange. If the gov-
ernor objects to the exchange, the Secretary may not exchange the lease for
six months during which time the governor may submit data for the Secre-
tary's reconsideration of the lease proposals.
22 7
IV. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION-MAJOR PITFALLS AND
RECOMMENDED CHANGES
A. The Need for Leasing and Coal Data Requirements
The failure of the Department of Interior to establish a convincing case
on the need for additional federal coal leasing has been the Achilles' heel
which has effectively short-circuited the issuance of new federal coal leases.
As stated by Judge Pratt in his 1977 decision in NRDC v. Hughes,
222. Id § 3420.4-4(c).
223. Id § 3420.5-3.
224. Id The opportunity for governors' comments on particular proposed lease sales was the
subject of a great deal of discussion and debate between state representatives and the Depart-
ment of Interior in development of the new coal program. The subject was initially proposed by
state representatives in negotiations with the Department of Interior that the governor of an
affected state be authorized to comment on a proposed federal coal lease sale whether or not the
particular lease sale would take place within the National Forest System. Initially, Interior
would not acquiesce in this request which decision led to major arguments during the negotia-
tions. Finally, after failing to establish a reasonable rationale for distinguishing between Na-
tional Forests and other federal lands, Secretary Andrus authorized the inclusion of the
comment for all proposed federal coal lease sales.
This requirement was originally included in the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of
1976 which states,
Any lease proposal which permits surface coal mining within the boundaries of
National Forest which the Secretary [of Interior] proposes to issue under the chapter
shall be submitted to Governors of each state within which the coal deposits subject to
such lease are located. No such lease may be issued under this chapter before the
expiration of the 60-day period beginning on the date of such submission.
30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(B) (1976).
225. See notes 188-95 and accompanying text, supra.
226. 43 C.F.R. § 3400.4(d) (1979).
227. Id § 3435.3-6.
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Absent from the draft programmatic EIS was any mention or con-
sideration of the first alternative of 'no action'. This is the most
significant alternative, since only an adequate explanation for its
rejection can provide the new program with its very raison d'etre.
The detailed consideration of 'no action' and its thoughtful rejec-
tion by the Department, would have laid the groundwork for the
consequent implementation of the new policy. Yet the draft was
silent on this point. Since this option was not included in the DEIS
and since a second draft was not issued for comment, the public as
well as governmental agencies were deprived of their statutory
right to comment thereon. . . . The final statement perfunctorily
devoted a few paragraphs to the 'no action' alternative. Appar-
ently, the Department and the BLM believed this to be sufficient
to fulfill their regulatory obligations which specifically require the
consideration of the 'no action' alternative. It appears, however,
that the Department's treatment of this alternative is sufficient
neither under the statute nor under the regulations.
228
Recognizing the importance of a full discussion of the need for addi-
tional coal leasing, the Department of Interior has expanded, in both the
draft and the final programmatic EISs, the Department's determination that
additional federal coal leasing is needed. 229 The final programmatic EIS
places the rationale for the decision that additional federal leasing is neces-
sary on four principal factors:
(1) Additional leasing would give the United States greater assur-
ance of being able to meet its national energy objectives;
(2) New leasing would also provide a means to promote a more
desirable pattern of coal development. It may be possible to
lower overall production costs and reduce the adverse envi-
ronmental impacts resulting from coal mining by altering coal
development patterns;
(3). A resumption of leasing would offer significant legal and ad-
ministrative advantages for the Department of Interior; and
(4) Finally, the state of competition in the western coal industry
would be improved by new leasing.
230
Of the four factors listed above to support the Department's decision to
resume federal coal leasing, the first appears to be the least convincing. Af-
ter devoting a full eight pages to a discussion of "leasing to meet national
energy objectives," the Department concludes that,
The principal consequences of leasing less federal coal than is
needed to meet national energy objectives would likely be to alter
patterns of coal development, both at national and regional levels.
At least on the basis of computer projections, it appears improbable
that total national coal production would be greatl reduced.
23 '
A far more convincing argument for additional federal coal leasing is
presented in the final EIS regarding more desirable coal development pat-
228. 437 F. Supp. 981, 990, 991 (D.D.C. 1977) (footnotes and citations omitted).
229. See DRAFT COAL EIS, supra note 163, at 2-43 to 2-53; Federal Coal EIS, supra note 22,
at 2-48 to 2-61.
230. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at 2-48 to 2-50.
231. d at 2-58 (emphasis added).
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terns. The checkerboard nature of federal, state and private lands, particu-
larly in the Powder River and the Green River-Hams Fork coal regions,
strongly indicates that development of non-federal coal mines in these checkerboard
areas will be extreme~ diffivult without new federal least'ig.232 If federal coal is not
available, non-federal coal mines will probably be developed in inefficient
sizes and configurations, resulting in increased mining costs and more envi-
ronmentally damaging impacts. Further, some existing operations will prob-
ably shut down and additional bypass and window situations will
develop.
233
Finally, even without initiation of new competitive leasing, Interior has
little choice legally but to process outstanding preference right lease applica-
tions and to issue noncompetitive leases for those applicants able to show
commercial quantities of coal. 23 4 In circumstances where applicants are
seeking preference right leases in environmentally unsuitable areas, Interior
intends to exchange or purchase such areas in order to avoid unnecessary
environmental impact. If no new federal leasing takes place, pressures for
development of existing leases and areas covered by preference right lease
applications will undoubtedly be increased.
235
Assuming that Interior has presented a legally defensible rationale sup-
porting the need for additional federal coal leasing, the next issue to be ad-
dressed is a defensible lease schedule. Secretary Andrus has established the
following schedule for leasing:
January 1981--Green River-Hams Fork Coal Region (set to meet-
ing leasing target of 531 million tons);
July 1981 Uinta-Southwestern Coal Region (set to meet leasing
target of 109 million tons);
January 1982-Powder River Coal Region (set to meet leasing tar-
get of 621 million tons).
2 36
The specific lease schedule as set by the Secretary, however, as well as
the time frame within which the new FCMP was developed, have been and
continue to be major points of debate. Western state governors, working
through the Coal Committee to the Western Interstate Energy Board, ex-
pressed concern about the timetable for preparation of the programmatic
EIS and implementation of the coal program in mid-1978. A letter dated
June 29, 1978, from the governors of the States of Utah, New Mexico, Colo-
232. Id Because coal in the Uinta-Southwestern Utah Coal region is largely owned by the
federal government, this region is also relatively more dependent on federal leasing for ex-
panded production beyond already planned and committed levels. On the other hand, there
are major holdings of non-federal coal which could be developed without federal leasing in the
Fort Union and Denver-Raton Mesa coal regions. The San Juan River coal region also appears
somewhat less dependent on new federal leasing because of the presence of Indian coal and
some substantial blocks of developable non-federal coal.
233. Id at 2-59.
234. Id at 2-60. For a discussion of the preference right lease situation see Johns, Federal
Preference Right Coal Leases. How Much "Right" Reallty Exists?, 12 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 389
(1979).
235. Id at 2-61.
236. SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 57-61. Note, Secretary Andrus has
also set a lease sale for July 1981 for the Alabama Coal Region but has not yet set a leasing




rado, Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota,. and South Dakota submitted an
initial list of concerns and recommendations regarding the early phases of
development of the program. The letter states in part:
We western coal state governors have been pleased with the oppor-
tunity you have extended to us to participate in the development of
a new federal coal leasing system. While we are concerned thatyour
ti'ht timetable may prove unworkable, we hope that the working rela-
tionship the Department has established with us in these early
stages will continue.
23 7
Despite continual requests from western state governors to delay ulti-
mate decisions on the preferred coal program, the program was set for imple-
mentation by June 1979, as originally scheduled. The first test of the
program is now underway in the Green River-Hams Fork region of Colo-
rado and Wyoming. As expected, time constraints are plaguing the first ac-
tions of the Regional Coal Team (Team) in its attempts to hold the first
competitive lease sale in January 1981.238 Perhaps the principal reason that
delays seem inevitable is the continual debate over the adequacy of the coal
data being used by Interior to determine leasing targets. Interior itself ad-
mits that the development of leasing goals and targets must necessarily un-
dergo continual revisions.2 39 Regional coal production forecasts initially
developed by the Department of Energy in June 1978 were revised only one
year later and are now being used by the Teams to develop leasing
targets.
24 o
Problems continue to surface with the statistical coal data, however.
For example, the final leasing target for the Green River-Hams Fork (GR-
HF) region has changed three times since the GR-HF Team began meeting.
The target was initially raised from 321 million tons to 416 million tons
based on a change in a variety of assumptions considered by the Team
staff.24' At the January 24 meeting of the GR-HF Team, Chairman Gary
Wickes reported that Secretary Andrus had made a decision that although
the 416 million tons leasing level would be the target for analysis, the Secre-
237. Letter from Montana Governor Thomas Judge to Secretary Cecil Andrus (June 29,
1978).
238. See letter from Wyoming Governor Ed Herschler to Secretary Cecil Andrus (November
16, 1979).
239. See SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 68:
No matter how good the analysis of need for leasing, circumstances seldom re-
main sufficiently constant, and forecasts are not often precise enough, to permit the
competitive leasing component of a coal management program to function continu-
ously on the basis of a single assessment of leasing needs.
Accordingly, a continual reassessment of leasing needs would be incorporated as
an integral and very public part of the preferred program. The reassessment would be
conducted in a process which merges DOE production goals with advice from State
and local governments, the coal industry and other interest groups to determine leas-
ing levels. This process of continual reassessment of future regional coal needs would
permit modification of leasing activity in response to changes in projected demand for
coal.
240. COAL PRODUCTION FORECASTS, supra note 35; LEASING POLICY DEVELOPMENT OF-
FICE, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, INTERIM UPDATES TO 1985 AND 1990 REGIONAL FORECASTS
(1979), republished at SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 65 [hereinafter cited as
INTERIM UPDATES).
241. Meeting Minutes, Green River-Hams Fork Coal Region-Regional Coal Team Meet-
ing, at 2 (October 14, 1979).
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tary had also concluded that this figure should be increased 25 percent to
take care of any contingencies that might come up. This raised the leasing
target to 520 million tons as the basis for analysis in the regional EIS that
would be prepared before the January 1981 lease sale.
24 2
A detailed examination of the use of the regional leasing goals and
targets was undertaken by industry and environmental representatives meet-
ing as the Mining Task Force Coal Leasing Group (Task Force) of the Na-
tional Coal Policy Project.24 3 Although members of the Task Force have
been unable to develop recommendations on the proposed FCMP prior to
publication of the project's first report titled WHERE WE AGREE, a meeting
held in November 1979 resulted in a comprehensive and far-reaching set of
recommendations regarding the new federal coal program.2 44 Stressing the
242. Meeting Minutes, Green River-Hams Fork Coal Region-Regional Coal Team Meet-
ing, at 2 (January 14, 1980) [hereinafter cited as GR-HFMinutes, January 14, 1980].
243. The National Coal Policy Project (NCPP) is sponsored by the Center for Strategic
International Studies of Georgetown University. Initially conceived in 1976, the NCPP over the
last several years has provided a unique forum where representatives of industry groups and
environmental organizations meet and work together in developing policy recommendations for
coal development in the United States. A brief history of NCPP is provided at the beginning of
the project's first report titled WHERE WE AGREE:
The idea of the National Coal Policy Project (NCPP) originated with Gerald L.
Decker, Corporate Energy Manager of the Dow Chemical Company, and certain of
his colleagues in industry. They believed, . .. , that it was important for the United
States to shift from the use of oil and natural gas to coal. It appeared to them, how-
ever, that this would not occur without a reconciliation of environmental and indus-
trial interests.
In connection with Decker's service on the Federal Energy Administration's Envi-
ronmental Advisory Committee, he met Laurence I. Moss, former Sierra Club presi-
dent and chairman of that committee. Decker, with the support and encouragement
of key executives of several major companies, approached Moss and other environ-
mentalists in January 1976, to enlist their support for the project.
The environmentalists were not enthusiastic. Some had met with representatives
from industry on previous occasions and found the discussions unproductive. The en-
vironmentalists felt they could not afford to set aside the considerable time required
for the proposed project unless there was a reasonable likelihood that it would be
productive. On the other hand, many of them were not fully satisfied with existing
mechanisms for resolving disputes, and were receptive to exploring new approaches.
From the environmental point of view, there was a growing feeling that industry had
business to transact with the environmental movement (as it does with shareholders,
labor unions, customers, and regulatory authorities). The lack of a non-adversarial
forum to conduct such business was impeding progress on issues upon which agree-
ment might be possible.
Five Task Forces were organized [following initial caucuses between representa-
tives of the industry groups and environmentalists] to cover the spectrum of coal-
related energy and environmental policy issues. They were: Mining, Transportation;
Air Pollution; Fuel Utilization and Conservation; and Energy Pricing. Later on adhoc
task force, Emission Charges, was organized, drawing from members of the Air Pollu-
tion and Energy Pricing Task Forces. Each side was represented equally on each Task
Force.
The participants in the project took part as individuals. Although they were se-
lected in part because of their leadership roles in environmental and industrial organi-
zations, they do not purport to speak either for their organizations or for the
environmental and industrial communities at large. The issues are too complex and
controversial for either side to speak with a single voice ....
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WHERE
WE AGREE-REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COAL POLICY PROJECT 1-5 (1978).
244. NATIONAL COAL POLICY PROJECT, MINING TASK FORCE-COAL LEASING GROUP,
LAND USE PLANNING AND MARKET FORCES IN FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT, FOURTH Dis-
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need to allow market forces to play a more significant role in coal leasing
decisions, the Task Force concluded, in part:
Current procedures used by the Department of Interior to establish
leasing schedules based on regional leasing targets derived from
production goals set by the Department of Energy's forecast model-
ling are too complex, unreliable and subject to manipulation. A well-struc-
tured planning process that gives industry an active role in
identifying potential lease areas and insures that the location and
pace of actual leasing reflects environmental and social concerns
should eliminate the need for setting regional leasing targets.
245
The statistical modelling and the development of regional leasing
targets that will drive the system has been an item of concern from the initial
development phases of the new program. In submitting comments on the
draft programmatic EIS in February 1979, Montana Governor Thomas
Judge expressed concern with coal data:
The EIS recognizes that the primary demand for western coal is for
electric generation. At least one Montana study of Montana coal
demand .. .strongly contradicts the presumed need for the vol-
ume of coal which the EIS predicts the Montana portion of the
Powder River Basin should be producing in 1985 and 1990 ....
Since the EIS does not include the origin-destination matrices
which show predicted coal flows between 41 production areas and
53 consumption areas, a state cannot precisely examine whether
the projected market area demands for its coal are realistic ....
The coal production targets are the primary determining factor un-
derlying the proposed coal leasing policy and management frame-
work. Considering the important role new federal leasing would
play in the Powder River Basin and other western coal producing
regions, greater accountability for the targets would be desirable.
Congressional review and acceptance of DOE's coal production
forecasts would not be unreasonable in light of the potentially mas-
sive impacts subsequent coal decisions will impose on the West.
2 4 6
An even more critical review of Department of Interior efforts to esti-
mate the potential contribution federal coal will make toward meeting na-
tional coal production goals was issued by the General Accounting Office in
1978. In stressing that Interior should have a clear conception of future pro-
duction from federal lands, GAO concluded that new diligent development
and continuous operations requirements established by the Department of
Energy could "not be effectively or equitably applied because the reserve
estimates are not accurate or reliable."
247
The GAO also questioned the U.S. Geological Survey's (GS) reliance on
reserve estimates which do not include all coal resources underlying the
lease. Further, the GS recoverable reserve estimates are based on general
CUSSION DRAFT (February 12, 1980) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT COAL PROJECT RECOMMEN-
DATIONS].
245. Id at 9.
246. Letter from Montana Governor Thomas Judge to BLM Director Frank Gregg (Febru-
ary 13, 1979), repubhihed at FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at K-152.
247. GAO WESTERN COAL RESERVES REPORT, supra note 208, at 27, 28.
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recovery factors and not on detailed current economic analyses.248
In response principally to the GAO recommendation that Interior de-
velop a computer capability to deal with the coal data, the Department has
developed an automated coal data system which centralizes all information
on coal leases. The information in the system should contain the best avail-
able estimates of planned and potential future production from coal
leases. 249 Nevertheless, problems continue to develop as the Regional Coal
Teams attempt to use these statistics to arrive at regional leasing targets and
schedules. For example, more vigorous geological examinations and applica-
tion of the unsuitability criteria as a result of the site-specific analysis forced
significant revisions by the GS on coal reserve base figures on the sixteen
tracts selected in the GR-HF coal region. The original reserve base for all
sixteen tracts was a little over one billion tons. After the GS had examined
twelve of the sixteen tracts, this reserve base was revised downward by
roughly ten percent to 95.5 million tons.
250
The major problems faced by Interior and the Department of Energy in
the development of reliable federal coal statistics are derived from a variety
of sources. No one suggests that the coal statistics are being deliberately
manipulated to rationalize coal leasing targets. Clearly, though, coal statis-
tics generated to date have not been accurate nor can one presume increased
accuracy in the short term, because computer modelling is an on-going proc-
ess which necessarily changes as more geologic data is accumulated through
actual drilling and exploratory operations. Undoubtedly, the necessary data
will not be comprehensive enough for the presently scheduled January, 1981
federal lease sales. Whether sufficient, accurate statistical data will ever be
developed to serve the purpose originally envisioned by Interior in the new
program is questionable.
While GS coal reserve estimates must necessarily be used to establish
threshhold levels for minimum acceptable bids in a competitive leasing proc-
ess, these reserve estimates will become more accurate as specific geologic
data is prepared. This contrasts significantly with DOE's forecast modelling,
which is used to set regional leasing targets. The DOE modelling data
248. Id. at 28. GAO made the following specific recommendations to the Secretary of Inte-
rior regarding western coal reserve data:
(1) Publish reserve estimate methodology regulations for comment and hold the
public hearing so that a standard methodology can be developed and understood
between industry and government;
(2) As an interim measure require the Geological Survey to use the published esti-
mating criteria contained in GEOLOGICAL SURVEY BULLETIN No. 1450-B for
determining estimates and review and update all reserve estimates on existing
leases. First priority would be given to producing leases and leases scheduled to
come into production within the next five years to assure that the diligent devel-
opment, continued operation, and advance royalty provisions will be accurately
assessed. When diligent development or continued operation requirements are
not met by the lessees, as required by law, the leases would be terminated;
(3) Obtain from leaseholders reserve estimates, cost, and pricing data and develop
procedures for analyzing this information in estimating recoverable reserves; and
(4) Consider acquiring a computer capability to provide for more effective and
timely determination of reserve estimates.
Id at 29.
249. See Ext ttzg Lease Memo, supra note 207, at 1-3.
250. CR-HF Minutes, January 14, 1979, supra note 242, at 1.
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changes markedly as assumptions for the three coal production scenarios are
revised. 25 1 The fuel mix in the United States appears, at least for the time
being, a bit too dynamic and complex to presume regional leasing targets
will be reliable or to presume that this data should be the key driving mecha-
nism for the entire federal coal program. Finally, eliminating the regional
leasing targets from the program will prevent Regional Coal Team meetings
from becoming a "battle of the statisticians," a scene which has character-
ized many of the Team meetings to date.
B. Split DOI/DOE Responsibiiy
Traditionally, the Department of Interior has retained responsibility for
leasing and developing federal lands for energy resources. The passage of
the Department of Energy Organization Act changed all this, however.
252
The Act transferred the leadership role to the Department of Energy (DOE)
in making national energy policy and also transferred certain responsibility
for federal mineral leases to the new department, including:
(1) Setting production rates;
(2) Fostering competition;
(3) Implementing alternative bidding systems;
(4) Establishing diligence requirements for operations on federal
lands; and,
(5) Specifying procedures, terms and conditions for the acquisi-
tion and disposition of federal royalty-in-kind.
253
All authorities not specifically transferred by the DOE Organization
Act are retained by the Department of Interior. Thus, Interior is solely re-
sponsible for the issuance and supervision of federal leases and the enforce-
ment of all regulations applicable to the leasing of mineral resources. 254 The
conceptual basis for this split responsibility comes from the intent of Con-
gress that DOE provide the focus for energy planning and policy making,
allowing Interior to continue its responsibility for managing and leasing fed-
eral resources.
255
The DOE Organization Act also established a Leasing Liaison Commit-
tee to facilitate coordination between the two departments. 25 6 Composed of
an equal number of representatives from each department, the Committee
addresses policy issues and makes recommendations to the respective Secre-
251. The Department of Energy's regional coal production forecasts changed markedly be-
tween June 1978, the date of the first forecasts, and April 1979, the date of the interim updates
which now serve as the basis for the federal coal management program. In less than one year
each of the ten major assumptions which serve as the basis for DOE's regional coal production
scenarios have changed significantly. The ten principal assumptions for the computer program
are: world oil prices; natural gas prices; coal labor costs; coal capital costs; transportation costs;
nuclear capacity; environmental regulations for utilities and other industrial complexes; coal
conversion requirements for utilities; macro-economic forecasts; and coal exports. INTERIM UP-
DATES, supra note 240, at 3.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 7101 (1979).
253. Id. § 7152.
254. Id. § 7153.
255. See S. REP. No. 164, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, repriztedivs [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 854, 855.
256. 42 U.S.C. § 7140 (1979).
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taries to implement what appear at times to be overlapping and conflicting
responsibilities. 2 57 Unfortunately, this split of leasing responsibility between
the departments is not working smoothly. Bureaucratic turf battles have de-
veloped, and coordination problems between the departments continually
erupt.
The departments have attempted to clarify their respective roles with
regard to the Federal Coal Management Program on the development and
use of production goals. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was exe-
cuted covering the coal production goals but was worded in such vague and
subjective terms that little more was delineated than the groundwork for
additional conflicts. 258 Although not specifically required by the DOE Or-
ganization Act, Interior and Energy have agreed to establish coal production
goals but have disagreed as to their essential purpose. Interior officials, on
the one hand, view the production goals as an informational item only.
Thus, the relationship between coal production goals and leasing is indirect.
Interior's interpretation indicates that leasing does not occur to meet produc-
tion goals; rather, the goals are but one factor among many the department
will consider in developing a leasing program.
259
In contrast, Energy officials view the coal production goals as the core of
federal leasing policy and the first among equal factors for development of a
leasing program and schedule. In the words of the Deputy Secretary of En-
ergy at the March 1979 meeting of the Leasing Liaison Committee, "thegoals
drive the schedule." In other words, DOE feels lease schedules should be con-
structed with the intent of attaining production goals.
26°
Even though Interior seems intent on using DOE's coal production
goals as an integral part of the new coal program, Interior officials them-
selves have questioned the production goals methodology, validity and for-
mat.2 6 1 Many of the problems associated with the coal production goals can
be attributed to the short time constraints imposed on DOE for their devel-
opment and from slow and insufficient feedback from Interior. Although
the departments have held several meetings and informal information ex-
changes over the last two years, their respective roles and responsibilities are
as yet not clearly defined.
To remedy the situation the departments have established a coal pro-
duction goal and leasing target working group with the responsibility to:
(1) Facilitate the exchange of information on coal between the
departments;
(2) Coordinate timing, scheduling and other technical aspects in
the execution of the memorandum of understanding between
the departments concerning production goals and leasing
targets;
257. See U.S. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LEASING POLICY-IS THE SPLIT
RESPONSIBILITY WORKING?, REPORT No. EMD-79-60 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GAO RE-
PORT ON LEASING POLICY].
258. FEDERAL COAL EIS, supra note 22, at B-I to B-3.
259. GAO REPORT ON LEASING POLICY, supra note 257, at 5.
260. Id.
261. Id at 6.
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(3) Resolve questions relating to interpretation and application of
coal models used in production goal and leasing target setting;
and,
(4) Generally provide a mechanism for interchange of technical
ideas and views between the departments.
26 2
The working group will serve in an advisory capacity to the Leasing
Liaison Committee and will present non-binding recommendations to the
departments. Essentially, the group is to facilitate communications between
the departments to eliminate problem areas.
The results of the disagreement between the departments have gener-
ally been significant delays in development and implementation of regula-
tions which are integral aspects of the federal leasing program. Significantly,
while some Interior officials regard diligence requirements as having more
impact on coal production than the coal production goals, DOE has yet to
issue final regulations setting new diligence requirements. 263 Similarly, in-
dustry officials have expressed concern about the uncertainty arising from
significant gaps in final regulations. It is thus imperative that the coordina-
tion problems between the departments be resolved and regulations issued as
expeditiously as possible.
In addressing the significance of the problems between the two depart-
ments, the GAO has cited what is perhaps the most critical problem charac-
terizing the coal program in general and the relationship between the
Departments of Energy and Interior in particular. Specifically,
There is an inherent reluctance among (Interior and Energy) staff
members to bring problems to the (Leasing Liaison) Committee.
They are reluctant to place members of the Committee in positions
which could lead to major disagreements. This is coupled with a
fear that an inability to resolve problems reflects poorly on their
capabilities and competence.
264
C. Land- Use Planning and Tract Selection
1. Unsuitability Criteria and Their Application
The critical decision during the land use planning process under the
preferred program is the identification of areas acceptable for further consid-
262. SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT, supra note 33, at 82.
263. GAO REPORT ON LEASING POLICY, supra note 257, at 11.
264. Id at 13. This inherent reluctance by Interior staff to raise major problems with the
development time schedules for the new federal coal program is a continuing source of frustra-
tion, particularly for the major coal producing states in the West. Almost from the moment
western state governors were invited to participate with the Department in development of the
new program, the states have expressed major concerns with the time schedule for program
development. Nearly every meeting held between the Coal Committee of the Western Inter-
state Energy Board and representatives oi the Department of Interior since April 1978 was
initiated with a request by the states for Secretary Andrus to delay implementation of the pro-
gram. As initially proposed, the first federal coal lease sale under the new program would be
held in October 1980-clearly the timing of the first federal coal lease sale was focused on the
1980 presidential election. This particular fact became more evident as significant problems
surfaced and as continual requests from the states for schedule delay were denied by Secretary
Andrus. As the time draws near for the first coal lease sale in January 1981, many of these same
problems continue to plague implementation of the new program.
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eration for coal leasing. 265 The essential tool used in this process is applica-
tion of the unsuitability criteria to excise those areas which are considered
more valuable for other resources than coal development. 266 Application of
the unsuitability criteria, however, has been forced principally as a require-
ment of the federal lands program under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act.2 6 7 SMCRA mandates that the Secretary of Interior re-
view all federal lands for unsuitability, and it allows citizens to petition for
and against designation of lands as unsuitable.268 Therefore, the depart-
ment must have procedures to apply unsuitability criteria both as part of a
comprehensive federal lands review and as part of a petition process.
Although a federal coal lessee's right to produce from the lease could be
affected by both the federal lands review and the petition process, one must
note the federal lands review under Section 522(b) of SMCRA is not a pro-
gram required for the designation of lands as unsuitable for mining by DOI.
Formal deszgnation of federal lands as unsuitable will occur only in response
to a petition to designate by an interested person under Section 522(c) of
SMCRA. The federal lands review, rather than resulting in designation, re-
sults in: (a) land-use planning determinations, or trade-offs between compet-
ing resource values and land uses; and (b) unsuitability assessments or land-
use planning recommendations to condition any leasing or mining, or to
withdraw the lands from leasing.
269
SMCRA prevents the department from approving a mining plan for
coal lands that have been designated as unsuitable. In the absence of a peti-
tion for such designation, however, Interior has stated a preference not to
approve a mining plan for an existing lease until after it has reviewed the
leased lands for possible unsuitability. Nevertheless, Interior lacks legal au-
thority, in some instances, to designate lands as unsuitable or to prevent the
mining of lands in existing leases.
As a result of the varied legal authority for the establishment of unsuita-
bility criteria, the use of specific unsuitability criteria will vary in its applica-
tion to existing leases, new leases or for areas that are subject to a petition for
formal designation of unsuitability under Section 522(c) of SMCRA. For
example, criteria stemming from Section 522(a) of SMCRA (the direct
source of the concept of unsuitability criteria) cannot be applied to lands on
which an operator is producing coal on August 4, 1977, or to operations for
which "substantial financial and legal commitments" have been made by
January 4, 1977.270 As well, unsuitability standards which are derived from
Section 522(e) of the SMCRA cannot divest "valid existing rights.
' '2 7i
265. Se notes 181-87 & accompanying text, supra.
266. Id All twenty unsuitability criteria listed at 43 C.F.R. § 3461.1 (1979) have been "field
tested" in at least three coal regions: Green River-Hams Fork; Unita-Southwestern Utah; and
Powder River. Three new unsuitability criteria are about to be field tested and are under con-
sideration by Interior for addition to § 3461.1: (1) air quality; (2) sole source aquifers; and (3)
wetlands. Interview with DeWitt John, Colo. Dept. of Nat. Res. (March 17, 1980).
267. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)-(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
268. Id § 1272(c).
269. See generally Exi thg Lease Memo, supra note 207, at 1-6.
270. Id See also SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6) (1979).
271. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6) (1979).
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A determination by the department that lands are subject to unsuitabil-
ity criteria does not mean, necessarily, that no mining may occur there. The
Federal Lands Review is to assess whether the lands are "unsuitable for all or
certain types of surface coal mining operations. '272 While the term "surface
coal mining operations" does include "surface operations and surface im-
pacts incident to an underground coal mine, '2 73 clearly some unsuitability
assessments will result in recommendations only against leasing for, or
prohibitions against, mining of certain types. These considerations will be
an integral part of the application of the unsuitability criteria (either in the
land-use planning or in the mine plan approval phase) or in the designation
of lands in response to a formal petition.
274
The unsuitability review process under the Federal Lands Review is set
out in great detail in Department of Interior instruction memoranda issued
in 1978.275 In summary, the assessment of unsuitable areas in the land-use
plan is not the formal designation that may result from a petition under Sec-
tion 522(c) of the SMCRA. As well, the assessment of unsuitable lands in
the land-use planning process will have different consequences for unleased
and leased lands. For unleased lands, the BLM land-use planners will then
determine whether or not to exercise any applicable exception to a criterion.
The department will not further consider for leasing those unleased areas
with identified problems, on which it chooses not to assert an identified ex-
ception.
2 76
A determination that leased lands are unsuitable, however, means that the
department will necessarily apply all exceptions to the criteria in question.
This may happen either in the course of land-use planning or in response to
a submission of a mine plan on the lease. If any exception applies, Interior
will allow mining subject to conditions or mitigating measures inherent in
the exception. If no exception applies, though, Interior will proceed to the
final "screen" and decide whether the lease is exempt from the application of
the criterion in question because, for instance, the operator has made sub-
stantial financial or legal commitments to the lease. If the lease is exempt,
the determination that the lands are unsuitable will not prevent mining.
Where the leased lands are not exempt (not "grandfathered" from adverse
application of the criteria as valid existing rights or as an operation to which
substantial financial and legal commitments were made), the Department of
Interior may continue to prohibit mining and the department may formally
designate the lands as unsuitable in response to a petition for formal designa-
tion under Section 522(c) of SMCRA.
2 77
Unsuitability criteria will also be applied to lands as part of the mine
plan approval process where land-use planning has not been completed on a
272. Id § 1272(b).
273. Id § 1291(28).
274. See Existing Lease Memo, supra note 207, at 1-14.
275. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM (November 8, 1978), repub-
tishedat 43 Fed. Reg. 57,664 (1978); INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM 79-139 (December 15, 1978),
republished at 44 Fed. Reg. 2201 (1979).




leased tract at the time a mine plan is submitted for approval. If a criterion
applies, Interior will evaluate whether, under an exception to the criterion,
the mine plan could be changed to eliminate the harmful impacts on the
value which the criterion is designed to protect. If no change could be made
and some or all of the proposed mine operation could not occur consistent
with the criterion, Interior will decide whether the mine operator is exempt
from application of the specific criterion. If he is not, the department will
condition or prohibit mine operations on some or all of the leased lands
when the department acts on the mine plan.
2 78
Application of the unsuitability criteria in land-use planning and in re-
sponse to a proposed mine plan differs significantly from the formal designa-
tion process initiated by a petition to designate lands as unsuitable under
Section 522(c) of the SMCRA. Formal petitions for unsuitability designa-
tion are filed with the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforce-
ment (OSM) and must contain allegations of facts with supporting evidence
to establish the truth of the allegations regarding unsuitability.279 Designa-
tion of lands as unsuitable, rejection of the petition for such designation, or
termination of a prior designation will occur within one year of the filing of
the petition.280 The formal petition process apparently is not limited to un-
leased federal coal lands. Rather, the process applies to leased lands as well,
subject to the exemptions set out in SMCRA. These exemptions include:
(1) The application of criteria derived from Section 522(e) is sub-
ject to valid existing rights;
(2) The application of criteria derived from Section 522(a) does
not apply to operations in existence on August 4, 1977, opera-
tions permitted under SMCRA, and operations to which sub-
stantial financial and legal commitments were made prior to
January 4, 1977.281
Therefore, the unsuitability of leased lands may be assessed under the peti-
tion process without any mine plan pending, or without any land-use plan-
ning process occurring. As well, the lessee may petition to have any
designation of the leased lands as unsuitable for coal mining terminated
under the same petition process and time limits.
282
Clearly the most perplexing aspect of the above discussion centers on
the tremendous potential for uncertainty this situation poses for federal coal
developers. Most importantly, one must recognize that while the criteria
applied in the federal lands review and the petition process are the same,
OSM controls the outcome of the formal petition process instead of the sur-
face management agency (e.g., BLM). It may be that certain lands which
are not found to be unsuitable in land-use planning may be designated un-
suitable upon petition and, as well, lands deemed unsuitable by the surface
278. Id Mine plan approval procedures for federal coal lands have been outlined among
BLM, OSM and GS, as well as the affected states, in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
executed on October 24, 1979. FISCAL 1979 COAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 21; MOU, repub-
Ishedat 44 Fed. Reg. 7009 (1980).
279. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c) (1979).
280. Id.
281. Id § 1272(a)(6).
282. Id § 1272(c).
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management agency may not be designated unsuitable by OSM upon peti-
tion. This apparent inconsistency occurs because the unsuitability criteria
and their exceptions are designed to insure environmental protection and
mitigate adverse impacts. This contrasts with the formal designation process
which requires consideration of coal demand and socio-economic impacts in
carrying out the environmental purposes served by the criteria. Thus, the
difference in origin and function between the unsuitability criteria them-
selves and the formal designation process will cause a great deal of uncer-
tainty and consternation as mining companies assess particular land
development possibilities.
283
2. Coal Tract Selection
Following completion of the land-use plans and application of the un-
suitability criteria to determine areas for further consideration, the delinea-
tion, ranking, selection and scheduling of tracts for lease sale commences.
Preliminary tracts within acceptable areas are first designated based prima-
rily on technical coal data, resource conservation considerations, and surface
ownership patterns.28 4 Before tracts are officially delineated, however, the
BLM will publish a call for submissions by the industry of expressions of
interest in leasing possible tracts.2 85 The states will also be encouraged to
suggest possible tracts, particularly tracts of importance for state-owned
coal.
28 6
Analysis of potential environmental impacts and geology related to
each tract will follow preliminary tract identification. All three of these
steps-submission of expressions of leasing interests, tract delineation, and
site-specific analysis-are designed to follow the completion of specific land-
use plans and to be undertaken in the land use plan areas. Ultimately, then,
the Secretary of Interior will select specific tracts for lease sale and lease sales
will be held.
28 7
One of the principal differences between the new Federal Coal Manage-
ment Program issued by Secretary Andrus and the EMARS program insti-
283. In order to insure the greatest consistency between OSM's unsuitability designations
and BLM's land-use planning unsuitability assessments, final BLM land-use planning regula-
tions for the new federal coal program require the same detailed statement which will consider
"the potential coal resources, the demand for coal resources, and the impact of such designation
on the environment, the economy, and the supply of coal." 43 C.F.R. § 3461.3-3 (1979).
Seemingly every conceivable opportunity to remove federal coal lands from further consid-
eration for leasing has been provided in the new federal coal regulations. For example,
§ 3461.5(b) provides, "After assessing unleasedlands to be unsuitable in a comprehensive land use
plan or land use analysis, the surface management ageney may petition the Surface Mining Officer to
designate the lands as unsuitable under 30 C.F.R. Part 769." (Emphasis added).
Further, § 3461.5(c) provides, "After assessing leasedlands to be unsuitable under any crite-
rion, its exceptions and exemptions, the surface management agency shallpettlztn the Surface Mining
Officer to designate the lands as unsuitable under 30 C.F.R. Part 769." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, federal surface management agencies have been formally designated by regulation
members of the group "having an interest which is or may be adversely effected" who may
petition for a formal designation of unsuitability. 30 U.S.C. § 
1
272(c) (1979).
284. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.4 (1979).
285. Id § 3420.4-2.
286. Id
287. Id §§ 3420.7-3422.4.
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tuted by former Secretary of Interior Kleppe is the reorientation of land-use
planning and "calls" for industry expressions of interest. 28 8 As expected, the
timing for an official call for these expressions of interest has been criticized
by industry representatives and lauded by representatives of the environ-
mental community. 28 9 However, the Mining Task Force Coal Leasing
Group of the National Coal Policy Project has recently issued a strong rec-
ommendation to change this system. The latest discussion draft of the rec-
ommendations of the Task Force states categorically, "A formal procedure
should be established for expression of industry interest in leasing early in
the land-use planning process. These areas and ecologically related areas
should receive high priority for application of unsuitability criteria. '"29° The
rationale used by the Task Force to support their recommendation is that
early identification by the industry of potential leasing areas will focus the
collection of more detailed inventory information in areas with mining po-
tential, and thus significant financial and manpower resources will be used
to the maximum benefit.
29 '
The Task Force draft recommendations go further in suggesting that
"thresholds" be defined for acceptable levels of environmental and socio-
economic impacts at the land-use planning stage.292 Thus, says the Task
Force, threshold levels should be established at a minimum for wildlife and
socio-economic impacts. The setting of thresholds in the land-use planning
process will, the Task Force suggests, involve difficult weighing of the diverse
interests of local residents, local and state government officials, environmen-
talists, industry and federal policy objectives. To be successful, then, "It is
essential that the threshold setting process be open with ample opportunity
for public participation. To this end, BLM should establish special proce-
dures for public participation in setting thresholds as part of the public par-
ticipation plan that is established for a (Resource Management Plan)
planning unit."
'2 9 3
In concluding and summarizing their recommendations for revisions to
the new coal program, the Task Force states:
All tracts that have been identified as potentially suitable for min-
ing during the land use process should be made available for leas-
ing through competitive bidding procedures. Elimination of
regional leasing targets and identification of tracts of industry in-
terest early in the land use planning process, combined with a rig-
orous application of the threshold approach, eliminates the need
for tract delineation, ranking and selection in the activity planning
stage, as the program is presently structured.
294
Thus, the Task Force, which is represented principally by the environmental
community and industry rather than state and local government, is recom-
mending a major shift back to a key component of the old EMARS program
288. S.e notes 174-77 and accompanying text, supra.
289. FEDERAL COAL EIS, upra note 22, at K23-26; K27-28; K-31-39.
290. DRAFT COAL PROJECr RECOMMENDAIONS, supra note 244, at 2.
291. Id at 6.
292. Id
293. Id at 8.
294. Id at 10.
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and is suggesting the elimination of the entire Regional Coal Teams' activi-
ties for coal tract delineation, ranking and selection. The environmentalists
admit their support for an early expression of industry interest in leasing
represents a significant departure from the position they have taken in the
past.295 Nevertheless, several reasons are presented for their new position:
1. The Task Force cites one of the principal problems in the en-
tire planning process as being the lack of generally available
information for most areas that are potentially suitable for
mining. As a result, the unsuitability criteria are allegedly not
applied very effectively and early expressions of industry inter-
est, "would focus efforts to gather the information necessary to
effective land-use planning and application of the criteria;
296
2. The Task Force also suggests that although the industry is
presently free to identify areas of interest before the activity
planning stage and while still in the land-use planning stage, a
formal request for industry's expression of interest defined "ac-
cording to townships" will insure that the unsuitability criteria
are applied to an area large enough (larger than the area of
specific industry interest) to allow an evenhanded application
of the criteria, "but still smaller than the total areas of medium
and high coal development potential as identified by the
USGS in a coal region."1297 Supposedly, then, data collection
efforts can be more focused.
The rescheduling of the call for industry expressions of interest under
the new program has been a sore point with industry representatives
throughout development of the program. 298 Watching the first test of the
new regional coal team concept and the activity planning process in the
Green River-Hams Fork coal region, however, has provided some interesting
revelations. For example, the purpose of the December 13, 1979, meeting of
the GR-HF regional coal team in Denver was to begin the tract ranking and
selection process for different levels of leasing targets and to evaluate differ-
ent leasing targets in the regional EIS and ultimately to rank tracts on the
three levels of leasing. 29 9 Following completion of the tract ranking process,
the meeting was opened to hear public comments from members of the audi-
ence. On this particular subject, Mr. Brad Klafehn made the following in-
teresting statement:
Also, my review of the expressions of interest show that all the Col-
orado tracts anyway were the subject of at least one expression of
interest by an industry member and out of the eight or so largest
tracts in Colorado, six had been the subject of competitive lease
applications under the EMARS system. The other two had been
listed by BLM in the northwest Colorado EIS as areas of BLM
designated coal leasing areas. . . . So it is obvious that the tracts that
you all have considered up until now have been synonymous with the tracts
295. Id at 11.
296. Id. at 12.
297. Id
298. See note 289 supra.
299. Meeting Minutes, Green River-Hams Fork Coal Region-Regional Coal Team Meet-
ing, at 1 (December 13, 1979).
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under EMARS and I think that this points out that the universe of the tracts
that you all have to choose from to meet the leasing target that either industi
has expressed interest in or BLM has expressed interest in is a response to
indusity's desires under EMARS. Now, I have to say that this is a far
departure from what we had been led to believe would happen
under this federal coal management program. . . . It seems as it
stands now we just aren't given any choice in terms of the environ-
mental impacts of these tracts. It turns out that most of them are
pretty much equal. . . . It just seems to me that the desire isn't
here, instead we are falling back into a EMARS routine. So I
would formally request that additional coal lease tracts be deline-
ated for consideration.
30 0
Clearly, even though the new coal program has technically reoriented
the scheduling for expressions of industry interest, the informal opportunity
provided in regulations for the industry to provide data and areas of interest,
combined with the formal expressions of interest which take place at the
activity planning level, appears to be accomplishing what the Coal Policy
Project Task Force is suggesting. Specifically, the interests of the industry
are in fact being considered, and available manpower and administrative
resources are being focused on those areas where industry interest is greatest
and where detailed information, as a result, may be most available. Argua-
bly, the fact that the specific tracts under consideration by the Green River-
Hams Fork Regional Coal Team are nearly identical to areas where indus-
try has expressed interest may have occurred by default; ite., because of the
paucity of information in other areas, the Team may have been forced to
analyze particularly those areas where industry-generated data was most
available. It is too early to attempt a case study review of the activities and
thus establish a pass or fail grade for the first test of the new federal coal
program. Until such a case study can be completed, however, the proce-
dures outlined for industry input appear to be working well, at least in the
case of the Green River-Hams Fork coal region.
D. Regional Coal Teams
The Task Force recommendation that the Regional Coal Teams be
terminated completely should not be implemented. This recommendation
stems principally from the earlier suggestions by the Task Force that leasing
targets, as well as tract ranking and delineation, be eliminated from the new
coal program. 30 ' Although a recommendation to terminate the Teams com-
pletely may logically stem from earlier Task Force statements that the
Team's responsibilities be eliminated, the Teams as established serve an ex-
tremely worthwhile purpose and are operating with a minimum of difficulty
to date.
Although the Teams have been established by regulations implement-
ing the new coal program, 30 2 Secretary Andrus has recently established a
more formal legal foundation for the Teams by way of a "charter" issued
300. Id at 8.
301. DRAFT COAL PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 244, at 25.
302. 43 C.F.R. § 3400.4 (Supp. 11 1978).
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pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 30 3 A notice of establish-
ment was executed by Secretary Andrus on December 21, 1979, certifying
the creation of the federal-state Coal Advisory Board.30 4 In essence, the
Coal Advisory Board (Board) is comprised of all the eight Regional Coal
Teams established under the program. The duties of the Board mimic ex-
actly the responsibilities of the Regional Coal Teams including the responsi-
bility to: (a) suggest policy for regional lease setting, tract delineation, and
site-specific analysis; (b) guide and review tract ranking; (c) conduct the sale
scheduling process; (d) recommend adjustments to regional production
goals; and (e) serve as the forum for federal/state consultation and coopera-
tion in all major department coal management program decisions.
30 5
Although at first glance, the Teams appear to be little more than a staff
coordinating mechanism to implement the new federal program, in actuality
they are a rather unique experiment in federal/state cooperation. Until
clear and convincing evidence is presented that this experiment is failing,
this author wholeheartedly supports the Department of Interior's decision to
make the Teams the central focus of all policy and implementation activities
for the new program. For those who have participated on or worked with
other federal advisory committees, the unique character of these particular
federal coal advisory committees (the Teams) is clearly evident.
In essence, advisory committees established for the many federal agen-
cies are made up of individuals principally from outside the federal govern-
ment. These committees meet one or more times each year to provide input
to individual federal agency programs and are designed to suggest policy
changes to department heads. As such, these advisory committees are not
comprised of members who have any direct say or responsibility for making
policy decisions within a federal agency.
In contrast, the Regional Coal Teams, and thus the Federal Coal Advi-
sory Board, are comprised of voting members representing the BLM, the
state directors of the BLM, and representatives of the governors of each of
the affected states. These particular individuals will ultimately retain direct
responsibility for making major policy changes and implementing these
changes within the federal establishment, and the state representatives have
an additional responsibility to implement policy in the affected states. So,
although the Teams are termed coal "advisory committees," they are advi-
sory with a twist; i.e., the particular committee members are at once advisors
and the principal persons responsible for implementing their own advice,
subject always, of course, to the ultimate approval of the Secretary of Inte-
rior and individual governors. Moreover, establishment of the Teams and
the authorization for the governors of affected states to nominate a voting
member of the Team was the result of a realization that state government is
not merely another member of the general "public."
If the new coal program is ultimately deemed a failure, the failing will
not be a function of the individuals involved in implementing the new pro-
303. 5 U.S.C. App. I (Supp. II 1978).
304. Charter for Federal-Sate Coal Advsog Board, repubhhed at 44 Fed. Reg. 14,154 (1980).
305. Id at § 7.
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gram; rather, it will be a function of the inaccurate, insufficient, and gener-
ally convoluted data and information which is presently being generated.
Some of the major concerns expressed by state officials with respect to
federal/state cooperation are summarized in the June 1979 GAO report, "Is-
sues Facing the Future of Federal Coal Leasing." 30 6 These concerns include:
1. The interstate character of coal leasing and development in-
cluding the impacts on air quality, water quality and availabil-
ity, and population shifts and housing;
2. Adverse effects on cities and towns of increased coal train traf-
fic including concern about the effects of this traffic on the
availability of needed public services, such as police and fire
protection and medical services;
3. The development of coal production goals and leasing targets
and the possibility that Interior may emphasize low develop-
ment in some states even though the states may encourage high
development or vice versa; and,
4. The importance of intermingled federal, state, and private coal
lands and an interest in working closely with Interior in estab-
lishing logical mining units before lease sale. Without such co-
operation, the ability of the states to plan and control the social
and economic consequences of coal development will be de-
creased. 30 7
As Executive Director and General Counsel of the Western Interstate
Energy Board throughout 1978 and 1979, the author admits to a degree of
self-interest in the categorical support of the Regional Coal Teams. How-
ever, the degree of input now available to affected western states with regard
to the new coal program is clearly unique in the history of federal land and
resource development. This precedent for state/federal cooperation and the
objectives of the state representatives is summarized in the March 23, 1979,
issue of the Weekly Newsletter published by the Western Interstate Energy
Board:
While the [federal coal management] rules are only draft at this
time and additional changes may be forthcoming, the amount and
quality of state participation in all federal coal leasing decisions is
significant. Although no veto power is given to the states, the draft
rules, if successfully implemented, make states through the gover-
nors a major participant in all federal coal decisions. Major partic-
ipation in federal coal leasing decisions has consistently been a
significant energy objective of western governors over the past five
years. While some critical issues remain to be resolved in the regu-
lations, the process used in developing the program and the pro-
posed regulations may be exemplary of good state/federal
cooperation. During the past ten months the major coal states in
the West-North Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado,
New Mexico, and South Dakota-through the (Energy Board's)
coal committee have reviewed all the department's major working
papers, met innumerable times with the persons in DOI who were
306. U.S. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, ISSUES FACING THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL COAL
LEASING, REPORT No. EMD-79-47 (1979).
307. Id. at 7, 26-27.
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developing the program and participated in DOI working sessions
on the draft environmental statement including the example regu-
lations contained therein. Together with the strong backing of coal
state governors, the committee was able to significantly influence
the program's development.
3 08
State government is not merely another member of the general "pub-
lic." Rather, state government retains a distinctly different responsibility for
and vested interest in the development of the major federal coal reserves in
the West. As such, the federal and state governments must develop a "part-
nership" for the development and conservation of all federal resources and
resource values including mineral development, wildlife preservation, and
environmental protection. Without such a partnership, exemplified by the
Regional Coal Teams, federal decisions regarding the development and pres-
ervation of such federal resources will be viewed with anxious suspicion and
distrust by the states and will necessarily fall short of optimum results.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION-PROBLEMS THAT REFUSE
TO Go AWAY
The general public in the United States is aware that the United States
retains the greatest coal wealth in the world. The freedom to enjoy the luxu-
ries attendant to our massive coal wealth, however, has been significantly
constrained by a plethora of federal statutory restrictions on both public and
private coal resources. These constraints have been imposed for the most
part because coal is perhaps the most environmentally "dirty" energy re-
source available in the world today. Whether it is converted to a form capa-
ble of effective use through burning, gasification, or liquifaction, nothing
changes its basic, environmentally damaging character.
Trade associations representing the coal industry continue to view gov-
ernment regulation as the principal deterrent to development of coal as this
country's principal weapon in its struggle for energy independence. For ex-
ample, Mr. Carl Bagge, President of the National Coal Association, ad-
dressed the Denver Coal Club's monthly meeting on February 14, 1980, and
summarized five specific recommendations to open the door to coal develop-
ment and utilization. Mr. Bagge stated:
1. The government must recognize its inherent inability to assem-
ble the monumental amounts of data and information that
would be required to carry out a (federal coal) program such as
Interior has developed;
2. The government must abandon the central economic planning
approach to the identification of quantities of coal for leasing;
3. The government must avoid unnecessary constraints on the
mineability of coal reserves-particularly those which do not
balance adequately the nation's various energy, economic, and
environmental objectives;
4. The government must avoid unnecessary requirements that
push up the cost of coal, or which are based on the ill-advised
308. First Meeting of Precedent-Setting Regional Coal Teams Held, 26 Western Energy Up-
date 10 (1979), Western Interstate Energ, Board Newsletter, Denver, Colorado.
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objective of maximizing government revenue at the expense of
consumers; and,
5. The government must recognize its obligation to give rate and
service protection to captive coal shippers and energy consum-
ers.
309
In essence, the five recommendations presented by Mr. Bagge can be sum-
marized as follows: (1) "government, get off our backs and let us develop our
resource," and (2) "government, please intervene to give us coal developers
some relief from those dastardly railroads which are monopolizing coal
transportation."
The irony is apparent in the recommendations listed by Mr. Bagge;
however, I strongly agree with Mr. Bagge's first recommendation. In fact,
the massive amount of statistical and resource data which is required by the
new Federal Coal Management Program may never be developed to a point
that will satisfy all interested parties. Whereas the major failing of the ear-
lier EMARS II program was the inability of the Department of Interior to
demonstrate the "need for leasing," the Achilles' heel of the new Federal
Coal Management Program is fast becoming the inability to generate timely
and defensible data to implement the many varied aspects of the system.
Without accurate, comprehensive data the program will fail under the
weight of its own primary assumption; i.e., that such statistics and informa-
tion are available and are necessary to implement the program.
Whether the new Federal Coal Management Program will provide the
stimulus needed for a renewed development of this country's most abundant
fuel resource remains questionable. Legal challenges have already been filed
on the new program. 3 10 However, if Interior continues to work as closely
with the coal producing states as it has in promulgating the final program
regulations, the state of federal coal development will improve dramatically
from the depressed and depressing circumstances which characterized fed-
eral coal leasing in the 1970's.
309. Address by Carl E. Bagge, President, National Coal Assocation, to the Denver Coal
Club (Feb. 14, 1980).
310. The National Coal Association and American Mining Congress have challenged sev-
eral FCMP rules in conjunction with their suit on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977. Texaco, Inc., has filed a similar suit in federal district court in Washington, D.C.









1976 total production: 37.4 million tons
1985 DOE projected production: 121.5 (low), 137.6 (medium), 157.3 (high)
million tons
1990 DOE projected production: 291.9 (low), 417.7 (medium), 459.3 (high)
million tons
Currently planned 1985 production: 219.1 million tons
Likely production from existing Federal leases not yet in mine plans: 7.0
million tons
PRLA production potential: 48.5 million tons
Total planned and likely production plus PRLA production potential: 274.6
million tons
Percent Federal coal ownership: 80 percent
Indian coal reserves: Major high quality reserves on Cheyenne and Crow
reservations in Montana
Extent of checkerboard, other fragmented non-Federal coal ownership: At
least two-thirds of non-Federal reserves require complementary Federal
coal to be developed.
TABLE 2
Coal Summary Data
Green River-Hams Fork Region
1976 total production: 25.7 million tons
1985 DOE projected production: 69.2 (low), 102.5 (medium), 113.2 (high)
million tons
Currently planned 1985 production: 49.8 million tons
Likely production from existing Federal leases not yet in mine plans: 6.8
million tons
PRLA production potential: 0.3 million tons
Total planned and likely production plus PRLA production potential: 56.9
million tons
Percent Federal coal ownership: 56.3 percent
Indian coal reserves: Minimal
* SOURCE: U.S. Department of Interior, 2 Secretarial Issue Document Federal Coal
Management Program 14-35 (1979).
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Extent of checkerboard, other fragmented non-Federal coal ownership: Ex-
tensive checkerboard area in Wyoming part of region, Colorado part




1976 total production: 10.1 million tons
1985 DOE projected production: 14.4 (low), 14.5 (medium), 13.9 (high) mil-
lion tons
1990 DOE projected production: 16.9 (low), 17.3 (medium), 20.6 (high) mil-
lion tons
Currently planned 1985 production: 47.2 million tons
Likely production from existing Federal leases not yet in mine plans: 23.3
million tons
PRLA production potential: 13.2 million tons
Total planned and likely production plus PRLA production potential: 83.7
million tons
Percent Federal coal ownership: 82.9 percent
Indian coal reserves: Minor importance
Extent of checkerboard, other fragmented non-Federal coal ownership: No





1976 total production: 11.4 million tons
1985 DOE project production: 24.9 (low), 27.7 (medium), 32.2 (high) mil-
lion tons
Currently planned 1985 production: 21.8 million tons
Total of likely production from existing Federal leases not yet in mine plans
plus PRLA production potential: 19.7 million tons
Total planned and likely production plus PRLA production potential: 41.5
million tons
Percent Federal coal ownership: 39 percent
Indian coal reserves: Substantial
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Extent of checkerboard, other fragmented non-Federal coal ownership:




San Juan River Region
1976 total production: 8.8 million tons
1985 DOE projected production: 13.3 (low), 13.4 (medium), 13.8 (high) mil-
lion tons
1990 DOE projected production: 15.4 (low), 16.8 (medium), 22.5 (high) mil-
lion tons
Currently planned 1985 production: 24.0 million tons
Likely production from existing Federal leases not yet in mine plans: 8.5
million tons
PRLA production potential: 11.3 million tons
Total planned and likely production plus PRLA production potential: 43.8
million tons
Percent Federal coal ownership: 77.3 percent
Indian coal reserves: Extensive on Navajo reservation
Extent of checkerboard, other fragmented non-Federal coal ownership:




1976 total production: 1.9 million tons
1985 DOE projected production: 6.1 (low), 5.1 (medium), 6.9 (high) million
tons
Currently planned 1985 production: 3.0 million tons
Total likely production from existing Federal leases not yet in mine plans
plus PRLA production potential: 20.6 million tons
Total planned and likely production, plus PRLA production potential: 23.6
million tons
Percent Federal coal ownership: 17.8 percent
Indian coal reserves: not important
Extent of checkerboard, other fragmented non-Federal coal ownership: No
checkerboard, extensive large non-Federal holdings
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND ENERGY
TAXATION
JOHN A. CARVER, JR.*
An evaluation of the impact of taxation on energy markets has to be
concerned with the federal system, under which the federal sovereignty and
the state sovereignties' each adopt their own taxing philosophies and taxing
structures. Since there are not fifty different statewide energy markets, and
since political tradition and legal precedent favor continuance of the existing
arrangement, it is desirable to illustrate how the system works in selected
situations. An effective analysis of national energy policies requires an un-
derstanding of energy taxation.
This article will examine those constitutional provisions limiting taxing
power as well as those which furnish a basis for federal preemption or federal
dominance. 2 Additionally, it will consider the "in-lieu-of-tax" aspects of
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; Of Counsel, Head, Moye,
Carver & Raye, Denver, Colorado. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Juliann
Sitoski whose work on this article has been invaluable.
A version of this paper was prepared for the Committee on Energy Taxation of the Na-
tional Research Council. The views expressed are those of the author, however, and should not
be interpreted to represent the views of the Committee, the National Research Council, or the
National Academy of Sciences.
1. This classification includes the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the territories.
2. The federal government's power to tax is derived from art. I, § 8, cl. I of the United
States Constitution, which confers on Congress the power to tax. In commenting on the scope
of this power, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Chase, remarked: -[Tlhe
power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one
exception, and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct
taxes by the rule of apportionment [U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 and § 9, cl. 4] and indirect
taxes by the rule of uniformity [U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1]. Thus limited, and thus only, it
reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion." License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
462, 471 (1866).
State limitations on the power to tax are more circumscribed. Since McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), where the Supreme Court held that a state could not tax a
federal bank, the well-established rule, based on the Supremacy Clause, has been that a state
cannot levy a property tax on federal property. See, e.g., Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S.
151 (1886). An exception to this rule arises if Congress expressly permits such taxation. Id. at
175.
It was not until 1871, however, that state immunity from federal taxation was recognized
in Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 113 (1871) (holding that the salary of a state judge was
immune from the national income tax). Under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity,
first enunciated in McCulloch, limitations are imposed upon both the federal and state govern-
ments with respect to their power to tax each other. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
A further limitation on state taxing power is found under the Commerce Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which vests Congress with the exclusive power to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923). No state may levy
a tax which imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 596. State taxing
power is also limited under the Import-Export Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, which
specifies that no state can levy any imports or duties on imports or exports without congressional
approval, unless it is absolutely necessary to carry out the state's inspection laws. In regard to
sales taxes, Congress, by statute, can prohibit the states from levying sales taxes on the federal
government. Carson v. Roan-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952). This power is not dependent
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provisions for the sharing of revenues from energy mineral production. The
tax-like effects of federal and state mineral leasing policies are also treated in
this article, as are seemingly remote relationships which affect energy mar-
kets in a tax-like way, such as utility regulatory policies, state water laws,
and federal programs for regional development. The effect of state mineral
taxing policies upon mineral production and energy resource development is
also a subject of discussion. And, finally, brief attention is given to the forces
encouraging states to conform their administration and compliance systems
to those of the federal government to facilitate collection and enforcement.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
A. Intergovernmental Immunity
Both the states and the federal government own property or operate
enterprises which, if owned or operated privately, would be subject to the
taxing power of the other sovereignty. The property may consist of energy
minerals reserved by the governmental body upon sale of the surface estate,
or it may consist of real property owned by the governmental body, which
contains energy minerals. 3 Similarly, the states and the federal government
engage independently in various energy-related activities. States either au-
thorize their municipal corporations to engage in the generation, distribu-
tion, and sale of electricity or natural gas,4 or, by general legislation or
specific charter, they authorize municipal districts to perform such functions.
New York sells power through the Power Authority of the State of New
York;5 Nebraska's entire electric utility system is a public system; 6 Washing-
ton has many municipal utility districts (Public Utility Districts or PUD's);
7
and Oregon has a comparable scheme.' The federal government has numer-
ous government-owned and operated utility facilities on its military bases
on the nature of the activity exempted from taxation. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber
Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941).
3. Of the 2.2 billion acres of land within the United States, 755.3 million acres are owned
by the federal government. Preface to PUBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD
OF THE NATION'S LAND at x (1970). The federal government also holds reserved mineral inter-
ests in 62 million acres of land where the surface is in non-federal ownership. Id. at 137. It has
been customary for Congress to grant public lands to states for a variety of purposes. Beginning
with a grant to Ohio of one section of each township for schools, states created from public lands
have received grants of public lands consisting of one, two, and four sections of each township to
use for such purposes. The size of the grant depended upon the date of admission. Alaska, the
last state to join the union, was admitted with a gross grant of 102.5 million acres, which the
state was free to select. In addition to the school grants, generally held in trust, the typical
admission act provided for specific grants to assist in such purposes as building a capitol or a
penitentiary. See, e.g., Colorado Enabling Act, §§ 7-10, 1 COLO. REV. STAT. 43, 45-46 (1973),
which granted sections 16 and 36 for school purposes, 50 sections for public buildings, 50 sec-
tions for a penitentiary, and 72 sections for a university. Mineral lands were excepted, but this
depended on classification as of the date of selection, and the selected lands are in fact rich in
minerals. Texas is a special case, since its "public" land was that of a sovereign nation and was
retained by Texas upon admission. See note 80 infra.
4. See, e.g., CoLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1 (1902, amended 1974); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 31-
32-105, -201(1) (1973).
5. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW. §§ 1000-1015 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1979).
6. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 70-501 to -515, 70-601 to -680, & 70-801 to -808 (1976).
7. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 54.04 010-180 (1962 & Supp. 1978).
8. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 261.005-.730 (1977).
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and on some Indian reservations. 9 The Tennessee Valley Authority'" and
the Bonneville Power Administration'' are the best examples of federally-
operated energy facilities.
The generalized rule that a state cannot constitutionally levy a tax di-
rectly against the government of the United States and that the federal gov-
ernment cannot constitutionally levy a tax directly against the state' 2 does
not answer all questions. If Congress taps a source of revenue that is not
uniquely capable of being earned only by a state, the federal government
may constitutionally levy a tax although it incidentally affects a state.13 The
government may, of course, legislatively choose not to tax state activities it
constitutionally might tax.' 4 It is virtually impossible to find a federal activ-
ity not constitutionally immune from state taxation, but a state may employ
other indirect tactics to collect revenue. The situation of the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority (TVA) is instructive. Under its enabling statute, the TVA is
exempt from state taxation but is authorized to make payments in lieu of
taxes on its power facilities.' 5 It has acquired uranium reserves in Wyoming
but has been denied necessary operating permits by Wyoming unless it
agrees that its production may be taxed under the state's laws. The contro-
versy seems about to be resolved by an agreement between the Chairman of
TVA and the Governor of Wyoming, which provides that the Authority will
take action, possibly by transfer of title to a trustee, to make its production
subject to Wyoming severance taxes. 16 Additionally, the states can and do
successfully levy taxes on the business activity of removing and selling miner-
als from lands leased from the federal government. These excise or severance
taxes are measured by the value of the minerals removed.' 7
There was a time, even after the passage of the sixteenth amendment in
1913, when the salaries of state officials and the income from state bonds
were deemed constitutionally protected from federal income taxes.' 8 The
continued exemption of municipal bond interest is probably not a constitu-
9. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2481(a), 3012(b)(4) (1976); 25 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1976).
11. Id. § 832. The Bonneville Power Administration is now administered by the Depart-
ment of Energy under the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat.
965 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. 1978)). The Bonneville Power Adminis-
tration was formerly administered by the Department of the Interior. 16 U.S.C. § 832(a)
(1976).
12. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 576 (1946). For a discussion of the his-
tory of intergovernmental immunity from taxation, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
373-85 (1975); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAwv 367-70 (1978).
13. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
14. Id.
15. 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1976).
16. Interview with Deputy General Counsel, TVA (Apr. 15, 1980). The agreement be-
tween TVA and Wyoming, dated April 2, 1980, is on file in the governor's office in Cheyenne
and at TVA headquarters.
17. See, e.g., Montana coal severance tax, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to -111
(1979). Not only can states levy severance taxes for the removal of minerals, but the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that an Indian tribe can impose a severance tax on
nontribal members for the removal of oil and gas from the reservation. Merrion v. Jicarillo
Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980).
18. See, e.g., Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
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tional requisite, but it is statutory19 as are many existing tax exemptions.
Being legislative creations, they are subject to elimination by statute.
Tax exemption and tax immunity are alike in their effects on energy
markets. Specific statutory exemptions, such as percentage depletion20 or
expensing of intangible drilling costs, 2 1 are, however, definitionally easier to
change than those which are traditional but nonstatutory.
22
B. The Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
The Commerce Clause2 3 and the Equal Protection Clause24 of the Con-
stitution are the principal bases for attacks on state taxes which add to the
cost of producing, transporting, converting, or selling energy. 25 If there is no
statutory mandate or policy, the question of what does or does not burden
interstate commerce, or what is or is not equally protective of the rights of
citizens, is a matter for judicial consideration. 26 The courts have increas-
ingly been called upon to resolve these constitutional issues.
Louisiana's First Use Tax2 7 is presently under attack in the Supreme
Court of the United States2 8 as an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. The tax is imposed on natural gas brought to shore in Louisiana
from the federal domain offshore and destined for markets beyond Louisi-
ana, principally the northeastern industrial states. The impact of such a
tax-in this case, seven cents per thousand cubic feet- 2 9 would, under nor-
mal ratemaking practices of utility commissions, be passed on directly to
consumers. The challenge has been raised by a group of consuming states,
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has intervened as a party
plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Montana recently rejected the contention of a
group of utility companies that Montana's thirty percent severance tax on
coal violated the Commerce Clause.30 The Montana court also rejected the
contention that the tax was impermissible under the Supremacy Clause as
frustrating national policy3' and particularly the Mineral Lands Leasing Act
of 1920.32 Still another comparable challenge to a state's energy tax re-
19. I.R.C. § 103(a)(l).
20. Id. § 613.
21. Id. § 615 (repealed 1976).
22. See generally S. Blackstone, Mineral Severance Taxes in the Western States: An Eco-
nomic and Legal Analysis of State Tax Policies (Nov. 26, 1979) (dissertation submitted to the
Colorado School of Mines).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. S. Blackstone, supra note 22, at 137-53.
26. For a discussion of the problems inherent in determining what constitutes a burden on
interstate commerce and a review of the Supreme Court's struggle to draw the line between a
permissible and impermissible state tax, see G. GUNTHER, Supra note 12, at 354-56.
27. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1301-1307 (West Supp. 1979).
28. Maryland v. Louisiana, 47 U.S.L.W. 3813 (1979). The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) has submitted an amicus curiae brief in this litigation. FERC also chal-
lenges the Louisiana tax.
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1303(B) (West Supp. 1979).





ceived a different treatment by the United States Supreme Court. New
Mexico's Electrical Energy Tax33 was levied on electrical energy exported
from the state. In lieu of resolving the constitutional controversy, the Court
held instead that Congress, in passing the Tax Reform Act of 1976, had
expressly forbidden the tax in question.
34
One recent severance tax has been declared unconstitutional as a bur-
den on interstate commerce. 35 Ohio imposed a tax on the severance of coal
mined in the state. The tax rate increased as the sulphur content of the coal
decreased. 36 Because most Ohio coal is high in sulphur, the Ohio coal was
favored over competing low sulphur coal in the Ohio utility market. 37 Con-
sequently, the severance tax was held to fall short of the evenhanded treat-
ment demanded by the Commerce Clause.
38
Connecticut has recently imposed a two percent tax on the sale of all
petroleum-based products distributed by companies with refining capabili-
ties. 39 New York is considering a similar tax to help subsidize its mass transit
system. 40 A California proposition to levy a ten percent tax on the profits of
all energy companies except utilities was defeated in June.4 Each of these
taxes will, in all probability, be challenged on equal protection or commerce
clause grounds by the entities affected.
II. ADJUSTMENTS RELATED TO TAX IMMUNITY AND TAX EXEMPTIONS:
"IN-LIEU-OF-TAX" PROVISIONS
The federal government's dominating position as owner of land and un-
derlying or reserved mineral resources has been considered burdensome by
the states. Therefore, numerous laws enacted since at least 1907 have re-
quired the federal government to share with the states proceeds realized
from the management or disposition of such resources.4 2 These revenues dis-
place the need to rely on the stock of private resources as the base for raising
revenues.
The Land Ordinance of 1785 provided that the land areas ceded by the
states then operating under the Articles of Confederation would be owned
by the national government. 43 The Ordinance created a capital stock which
helped to make the federal government viable. Further, it established a pre-
cedent so that when future states were created, the federal government
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-18-3, 7-9-80(B)-(C) (1978).
34. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
35. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley, 58 Ohio St. 2d 465, 391 N.E.2d 716 (1979).
36. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5751.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
37. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley, 58 Ohio St. 2d 465, 474, 391 N.E.2d 716, 721
(1979).
38. Id. at 474, 391 N.E.2d at 721.
39. Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1980, at 13, col. 1.
40. Id.
41. Proposition 11 was submitted to the voters on June 3, 1980.
42. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 235. For a breakdown of all
the programs and payments see 2 EBS MGMT. CONSULTANTS, INC., REVENUE SHARING AND
PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES ON THE PUBLIC LAND (1968).
43. Se, generaly P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 59-74 (1968).
The Land Ordinance of 1785 is reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 123-24 (7th
ed. H. Commager ed. 1963).
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would not automatically lose jurisdiction over its lands in the newly created
states.4 4 Additionally, the Property Clause45 of the United States Constitu-
tion gave Congress a special role with respect to public domain lands by
vesting it with the exclusive right to control and dispose of such lands with-
out interference from the states.
46
This public land has caused an imbalance between the so-called public
land states and the rest of the nation. The attendant controversies sharply
divide the East and the West.4 7 The East fought to get land grants in the
western territories to match those made to new states and was successful
when the Morrill Act was passed.4 8 This Act gave scrip instead of land to
the eastern states for sale to third parties.4 9 The revenue produced was then
used to build agricultural and mechanical arts colleges.
50
Under the federal mineral leasing acts, fifty percent of the lease reve-
nues derived by the federal government are paid to the states where the
minerals are located. 5 ' Congress has augmented this provision by a program
of in-lieu-of-taxes payments based upon the relative percentage of federal
lands in the states. Thus, the states benefit from national park, wildlife ref-
uge, and non-commercial forest and forage acreages as well from the com-
mercial proceeds of mineral, forage, and timber disposition.
52
The nontaxable status of federal minerals is probably a part of the moti-
vation for a program of federal loans to states and political subdivisions
designed to relieve social or economic impacts occasioned by the develop-
ment of federal minerals in such states. 53 The loans are treated as advances
against the states' expected revenues from the federal sharing program for
the subsequent ten years;54 they bear interest equivalent to the lowest inter-
est rate paid on tax exempt bonds of the borrowing state within the preced-
ing calendar year.55 When the loan program was created in 1976, the
interest rate adopted was three percent per annum.
56
III. LEASING POLICIES: ECONOMIC RENT
The federal government and the state governments can and do expect
part of their return from the disposition of energy minerals as rent. The
return is typically derived from a combination of land rentals at a fixed per-
acre basis, royalties at a fixed percentage rate, and lease bonuses received in
44. See generaly P. GATES, supra note 43, at 59-74.
45. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
46. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-43 (1976).
47. See generally PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 243-45.
48. P. GATES, supra note 43, at 22-23 (1968).
49. Id. at 22.
50. Id. For example, Cornell University traces its origin to one of these "land grants,"
which New York sold to the founder of the university.
51. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976).
52. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607 (1976).
53. 43 U.S.C. § 1747(1) (Supp. 1978).
54. Id. § 1747(2).
55. Id. § 1747(5).
56. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, tit. III,
§ 317(c)(1), 90 Stat. 2771 (1976).
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a competitive or auction system.57 Variants include bidding on the royalty
which the bidder is willing to pay and sequential bidding. A complicating
factor is that the federal government operates (or was operating until a mor-
atorium was declared in February 1980)58 a lottery system5 9 for the disposi-
tion of acreage not classified within a known geologic structure of a
producing field. The lottery has been highly productive of revenue, inde-
pendently of the ultimate productivity of the parcels offered. Additionally,
the tracts so disposed of are subject to the usual fixed rentals and fixed roy-
alty provisions.
60
The sheer volume of the federal government's mineral ownership
6'
makes the question of leasing policies extremely sensitive. The timing and
the form of sales tend to dictate the size of the bids. Spacing the sales too
closely together tends to reduce the size of the bids, at least in theory. 6 2 Roy-
alty bidding involves risks to the government which bureaucrats find diffi-
cult to justify if the leased acreage turns out to be dry. 63 A front-end bonus
on a dry hole creates no such problem.
64
Policy considerations are numerous, and the choices are not easy to
make. For example, it is not completely clear that the government's policy is
or ought to be the maximization of the present value of the economic rent
derivable from government-owned minerals.6 5 In the past, management
policies have been manipulated to keep the price of the federally-owned pro-
duction down, thus tending to depress the price realized on the private or
state produced oil or gas. 66 However, the statute permitting production to
resume on acreage set apart in naval petroleum reserves provides for max-
imization of the government's return by an auction of the produced oil.
6 7
Recent sales of oil from naval petroleum reserves have yielded prices in ex-
cess of the OPEC prices. 
6 8
A policy to maximize return to the federal government, given the shar-
ing statutes referred to above, 69 might tend to enrich the states in which the
minerals are located. A particularly striking illustration of this enrichment is
57. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 223 (1976). See also PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION,
supra note 3, at 124.
58. Secretary of the Interior, Order No. 3049, Feb. 29, 1980.
59. 30 U.S.C. § 226(c) (1976); 43 C.F.R. §§ 3112.1-1 to .5-2 (1979).
60. 30 U.S.C. § 226(c)-(d) (1976).
61. The federal government's mineral ownership encompasses the mineral resources under-
lying the one-fourth of the land area of the United States administered by the Department of
the Interior, the resources beneath extensive areas of the public lands that are administered by
other federal agencies, and those underlying approximately 125,000 square miles of land in
private ownership. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINING AND MINERALS POLICY 3 (1979).
62. See generally S. MCDONALD, THE LEASING OF FEDERAL LANDS FOR FOSSIL FUELS
PRODUCTION 77-81, 95-101 (1979).
63. IM. at 98-99.
64. Id. at 95-98.
65. For the view that the federal government has not adopted such policies but that it
should see S. MCDONALD, supra note 62, at 24-46.
66. In 1967, the Interior Department threatened to exclude federal leases from proration-
ing by state conservation authorities if the major oil companies did not roll back an increase in
gasoline prices. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1967, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
67. 10 U.S.C. § 7430(b) (1976).
68. EN. L. SERV. (CCH) 4 (Feb. 7, 1980).
69. See notes 51-52 supra.
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found in the Minerals Leasing Act, which provides that Alaska may receive
ninety percent of the revenues from federal lease sales.
70
The federal government may dominate markets through ownership of
substantial shares of such natural resources as softwood timber or offshore oil
and gas. Not only market dominance, however, but land use, environmen-
tal, and other statutes affect energy prices in confusing and contradictory
ways. The Wilderness Act,7t and various subsequent statutes7 2 authorize
withholding lands from mineral exploitation until their potential as wilder-
ness areas has been evaluated. The Coastal Zone Management Act of
197273 can similarly affect energy markets by constraining port or conver-
sion facilities. And, much mineral-rich land is "checkerboarded" as a result
of the railroad grant statutes,7 4 which gave the odd-numbered sections in
each township to the grantee and effectively blocked access to any public
land without permission from the "checkerboarded" private owner. 75 Con-
versely, the federal government has blocked much private development of




The states do not share in the proceeds of the most prolific oil and gas
producing area, the federal domain offshore. 77 It may be argued, however,
that the Submerged Lands Act, 78 in allotting to the states the three-mile or
three-league band (depending on the traditional legal regime in effect at
statehood) nearest the shore, put the coastal states in a favored position com-
parable to that enjoyed by the western states when they received land grants
upon achieving statehood. 79 Where the state patrimony is substantial, as,
for example, in state-owned areas offshore, in what would have been public
land if Texas had not enjoyed a period of sovereignty,8 0 and in Alaska,
which received a large land grant upon its admission to the Union,8 1 the
states can coordinate their leasing policies with their taxing policies. The
70. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976).
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976).
72. See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act, § 603(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c)
(1976).
73. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976).
74. See, e.g., Pacific Railroad and Telegraph Line Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489 (1862). See also
P. GATES, supra note 43, at 364-79.
75. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (review of the genesis of the
checkerboard pattern).
76. See Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1979), which held that the federal
government had condemned a privately reserved mineral estate by denying access. See also
Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406 (Wyo. 1979) (condemnation of private property by
private oil company).
77. See generally PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 187-95. For a
discussion of the management of our federal offshore resources, see R. Krueger, Management of
Energy Resources on Federal Lands, 2 Energy Law Service §§ I IA.23-.33 (1978). For an analysis of
the 1978 Amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, see Krueger & Singer, An
Analysis of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 909
(1979).
78. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1976).
79. See note 3 supra.
80. See P. GATES, supra note 43, at 80-83.
81. Upon becoming a state, Alaska was granted 102,550,000 acres of public lands and




exemption of state royalty interests from the windfall profit tax8 2 will have a
multi-billion dollar tax expenditure effect from the federal government to
several of the states.
8 3
It has been argued that leasing policies might well be different for coal,
which is abundant, and for oil and gas, which are not. 8 4 A conscious policy
of making coal available from federal lands at lesser royalty rates could cre-
ate additional opportunities for states to increase severance taxes.
IV. OTHER RELATIONSHIPS WHIcH HAVE A TAx-LIKE EFFECT ON
ENERGY MARKETS
A. Regionahism
The tax-exempt status of TVA and the Bonneville Power Administra-
tion has been previously mentioned. 85 The resource policies espoused in
these two laws were based on the use of natural or regional rather than
strictly political boundaries for the allocation of benefits. The pattern
started in 1902, when the Reclamation Act of 190286 created a reclamation
fund, which was initially earmarked for water projects in the states west of
the 100th meridian. This regional pattern was continued under the Miner-
als Leasing Act which directs that forty percent of the revenues received
from the disposition of public lands under this Act and under the Geother-
mal Steam Act of 197087 be deposited into the reclamation fund. 88
The federal purposes included a public ownership preference. The out-
put of federally constructed hydroelectric projects was made preferentially
available to states, municipalities, and other public and cooperative bod-
ies. 89 The resultant rates were "yardsticks" against which the investor-
owned competitors had to compete. A special kind of regional preference
developed when industries capable of adjusting their own loads to peaks in
the loads of the preference customers signed long-term contracts and made
huge investments in such energy-intensive industrial operations as aluminum
82. See I.R.C. § 4994(a). An equivalent exemption applies to Indian-owned oil. See id.
§ 4994(d).
83. Proposals were made during the debates on the windfall profit tax to make this oil
taxable.
84. For example, the oil and gas of the outer continental shelf is under exclusive federal
dominion, and the timing of leases is based upon a variety of considerations, the majority of
which appear to be aimed at maximizing the income to the federal government. Coal leasing,
on the other hand, is constrained by the checkerboard pattern of federal land ownership and the
relative abundance of non-federal coal. McDonald recommends increasing the rate of leasing
for offshore oil and gas but decreasing the rate of leasing federal coal to assure the receipt of a
fair market value for coal lands and also to assure the efficient development of the nation's total
coal deposits in the order of their rent-yielding capacity. See S. McDONALD, supra note 62, at
87-94.
85. See notes 10-16 supra and accompanying text.
86. Pub. L. No. 161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902). The successor Act is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 391
(1976). See also Id. § 522 (1976).
87. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1025 (1976).
88. Id. § 191.




smelting. This caused a major part of the nation's aluminum smelting in-
dustry to locate near the inexpensive power in the Pacific Northwest.
The demands of preference customers in the Bonneville Power Adminis-
tration marketing area in the Pacific Northwest can no longer be met from
federal hydroelectric projects. The base loads now are increasingly being
met with nuclear and fossil-fired plants so that the hydro capacity can be
shifted to its more valuable peaking use.90 As a result, the price gap between
the energy supplied by the government and that furnished from investor-
owned utilities, although still wide, is narrowing. Furthermore, a legislative
proposal sponsored by the congressional delegations from the region would
broaden the authority of the Bonneville Power Agency to contract with in-
vestor-owned utilities to supply bulk power to them from federal plants pow-
ered by fossil fuels and to issue bonds for this purpose. 91 The bill is widely
supported as a way of assuring the region a continued advantage in energy
prices.
Regionalism is the hallmark of the electric power system in this country.
The utility systems, both public and private, have formed a National Elec-
tric Reliability Council, which is composed of nine regional reliability coun-
cils. The system is principally autonomous, although the authority of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to order interconnections has been
expanded. 92 Physical interconnections are supplemented by contractual
agreements for the interchange of economy and emergency energy. With
one exception-that being in Texas-these pools and councils ignore state
boundaries. They permit reductions in costs and savings of petroleum fuels
by calling on the least costly power source first and disregarding the owner-
ship of particular generating stations.
Problems exist, however. Wisconsin, for example, has ruled that out-of-
state utilities cannot own an interest in an in-state generating plant.93 And,
California's public utilities commission has indicated that a California utility
desiring to construct a plant in another state would need, in addition to the
certificate in that state, a California license.
94
Another kind of regionalism is evident in the western section of the na-
tion. There the energy producing states formed a loose association originally
known as the Western Interstate Nuclear Board. In September 1977, the
organization became the Western Interstate Energy Board. 95 As previously
90. See genera/'y BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NOTICE
OF PROPOSED POLICY AND FORMULA TO GUIDE ALLOCATION OF FIRM ELECTRIC ENERGY
AND SYSTEM RESERVE ENERGY FROM THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, 44
Fed. Reg. 57,824 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BPA POLICY REPORT].
91. S. 885, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S 3996 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1979). See also
S. REP. No. 96-272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (to accompany S. 885); H.R. 6677, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H 1502 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1980).
92. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(1978), adding section 210 to Federal Power Act (codified in 16 U.S.C. § 824i (Supp. 11 1978)).
93. Application of Northern States Power for a Certificate, No. CA-5447, Feb. 24, 1978.
94. In the Matter of the Participation of Southern California Edison Company and San
Diego Gas & Electric Company in the Proposed Kaiparowits Electric Generation Plant, No.
88005, Calif. PUC, Oct. 18, 1977, [1974-791 UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) T 22,511.
95. [1977-1978] Annual Report of the Western Interstate Energy Board 3-4.
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noted,9 6 a group of consuming states have brought an action in the United
States Supreme Court to invalidate the Louisiana First Use Tax. It is evi-
dent that lines are being drawn between the energy-producing and energy-
consuming states.
B. Water Po/icy and Energy
It is well recognized that sources of energy to displace both imported oil
and polluting coal could be furnished from the rivers of the West. Such a
use would be at the expense of the agricultural economy to which the waters
are presently committed under a property system known as "prior appropri-
ation." Under this system, a property right can be created by the applica-
tion of water to a beneficial use; the right is superior to those established
later, but junior to those established earlier.
9 7
The rights are transferable, and the markets now existing for them are
administered differently in each of the western states adhering to the doc-
trine.98 In a simplified example, the owner of a water right connected with a
hydroelectric generating station might be limited by the nature of the water
right to operating the dam at less than its rated capacity in low water years
in order to meet the demands of downstream owners of senior water rights.
However, absent legislative constraints within the particular state, a power
company could purchase water rights either with or without land if the
value of the additional power justified it. When the cost of the electricity
acquired in this way (without new investment and without fuel costs) is com-
pared with the price of that generated by new plants burning oil, it is appar-
ent that even productive farm land might be retired to facilitate an energy
policy designed to reduce reliance on oil.
The federal government affirmatively encourages the installation of
generators at existing dam sites in the Northeast, where much of the produc-
tion is oil-fired. There, however, the water rights system operates differently
than it does in the arid West. In the West, much of the electric power pro-
duced from water projects goes to metropolitan centers remote from the
mountainous regions where the water falls and is stored, and where the ear-
lier water rights support the local economies. The political pressures to
maintain the agricultural economy based on these early water rights are very
strong.
Similar analyses can be made with respect to other kinds of energy
projects. In theory, the sponsor of a project to make a slurry of coal and to
transport it by pipeline to a generating station can assemble the required
water by purchasing existing rights alone or by purchasing the lands on
which they are used and retiring the lands from agricultural production.
The economics of the project might justify the purchase of substantial
amounts of agricultural land.
States use their police power to frustrate energy projects requiring
96. See note 28 supra.
97. See generally F. TRELEASE, WATER LAw 32-45, 92-99 (3d ed. 1979).
98. Compare CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973 & Supp. 1979) with MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §§ 85-1-201 to -224 (1979).
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water. In Montana, for example, the legislature has said that using water for
slurry projects is not a "beneficial use." 99 Thus, the energy entrepreneur is
precluded from appropriating water initially and possibly from buying ex-
isting water rights. The constitutionality of this type of statute has not yet
been adjudicated. Colorado, as another example, specifically forbids the ex-
port of "Colorado" water. 0
The federal government's ownership of land in the public land states, 10t
is the basis for an assertion made by the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior on June 25, 1979, that the federal government's rights to waters
needed to make full use of its own lands are superior to most of the state-
administered water rights perfected under state law.' 0 2 This is an extension
of the judicially recognized doctrine of "implied reservation" of water used
by the United States when it created Indian reservations, wildlife refuges,
national forests, and national parks; the water retained must be sufficient to
meet the needs of the federal preserve. The priority of the government's
right is established as of the date the land is reserved for federal purposes. 103
The Solicitor's opinion caused great consternation in the West, for it
cast a cloud on the existing property system. The threat was considered
most real in connection with the development of coal and oil shale on public
lands. Obviously, the federal government could realize a greater return from
leasing these water demanding projects if it could use its sovereign claims to
assure the supply of water necessary to complete them, without having to
pay for the value of the water rights "taken" by the process.
C. Utility Regulatory Policies
It is traditional for each state to review applications for the construction
of utility facilities against the public convenience and the need for such facil-
ities in the state. Where the facility is designed to serve the needs of the
residents of other states, a state can tax the plant's value. Under its police
power, it can also control pollution and regulate the siting process.1
0 4
California requires utilities seeking to locate a plant in another state to
secure a California certificate for the plant.' 0 5 Many applications for new
facilities are being resisted on the basis of an insufficient need for the plant's
99. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-2-104(2) (1979).
100. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (Supp. 1979).
101. Se note 3 supra.
102. 86 Interior Dec. 553, 564 (June 25, 1979).
103. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
104. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, however, a state may not impose a tax on the
generation or transmission of electricity which discriminates against out-of-state consumers or
sellers. 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976). Discrimination is defined as any tax which results in a greater
burden on interstate commerce than on intrastate commerce. Id. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979), where the Supreme Court held a New Mexico tax on exported
electrical energy invalid under 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976). In Arzona the Court also recognized
that generating electricity could result in environmental and other problems for the generating
state; it found no indication under § 391 that Congress intended to prohibit the states from
taxing the generation of electricity to pay for solutions to these problems. 441 U.S. at 150-51.
But the Court warned that the interstate and the intrastate customers would have to be taxed
equally. Id. at 151.
105. See note 94 supra.
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output in the particular state. Thus, the potential is created for acceptance
of a more expensive alternative site in a different state.
It may be necessary for federal preemptive legislation to break through
future impasses to assure conformance with national energy policies, such as
the policy to displace oil-fired electric generation with coal-fired generation.
From the revenue standpoint of states such as Montana or Wyoming, which
are rich in coal resources, utility regulatory policies could be manipulated to
assure cheaper power for the state's own requirements. For example, Wyo-
ming power plants generate several times as much power as Wyoming cus-
tomers consume, thereby assuring Wyoming residents of whatever advantage
there might be in scale. But, Wyoming also might condition the granting of
its certificates on the acceptance of valuation divisions charging a dispropor-
tionate share of facilities' costs to the out-of-state customers. At some point
this would be subject to an equal protection or commerce clause objection in
the courts,' 0 6 but the process is so amorphous that such an attack would not
be brought until the process was flagrantly abused.
Oregon has enacted legislation enabling its domestic and rural power
consumers to take advantage of the preference provisions in the Bonneville
legislation. 107 If other states in the Columbia Basin follow suit, California
could be deprived of the use of the two major high voltage entities between
the Pacific Northwest and Southwest because no excess power will be avail-
able for export.' 0 8
V. EFFECT OF STATE MINERAL TAX POLICIES ON MINERAL
PRODUCTION AND ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
Differentials traceable to the federal system or to state constitutional
principles involving tax immunity patterned after the federal system are
compounded by the variety and complexity of mineral tax policies among
the states. 10 9 Energy production is taxed through income taxes, property
taxes, severance taxes, and production taxes.110
It is virtually impossible to derive data on the effect of these taxes on
mineral production and energy resource development because they cannot
be analyzed in isolation. For example, even though an income tax compares
favorably with many other kinds of taxes on the mineral industry because it
is based on profitability, and it is neutral with respect to ore cut-off grades or
the classification of reserves, I 11 state-to-state comparisons are hampered be-
cause some states do not have income taxes;"12 other states have substan-
tially different rates due to the deductibility or nondeductibility of federal
106. A similar argument might be raised with respect to proposals in Delaware and Georgia
to restrict the sale of shares of lower-cost electric generating facilities to out-of-state utilities. See
Electrical Week, Mar. 3, 1980, at 1.
107. 1977 Or. Laws ch. 888, §§ 1-44, reprinted in OR. REV. STAT. § 262.115 (1977) (note).
108. See generally BPA POLImC REPORT, supra note 90.
109. S. Blackstone, supra note 22, at 99-119.
110. Id. at 11.
Ill. Id.
112. Wyoming and South Dakota, for example, do not impose personal or corporate income
taxes. Id. at 99.
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income taxes.i 3 Similarly, the use of income tax deductions to encourage
mineral development, a practice which is common in the federal system,' '
4
varies from state to state, making it difficult to analyze state tax policies with
any degree of accuracy. The same generalizations can be made concerning
property taxes. In addition to differentials among states in the methodology
for property tax valuation, there may be considerable variance within a state
owing to the autonomy of the assessors.
Severance taxes have the most easily identifiable effects on the econom-
ics of mineral production.' 15 Unit severance taxes differ from ad valorem
severance taxes. 116 A severance tax based on the net proceeds has effects
similar to an income tax.' '1 Severance taxes are also naturally nonneutral in
regard to resource allocation because mineral prices are increased in relation
to other prices to the extent that forward shifting is possible.' 11 Most rele-
vant to this inquiry, however, is not their characteristic of nonneutrality but
their imposition on sources of energy as a means for exporting the tax to
consuming states. Also important, from an intergovernmental relations
standpoint, is the shift of the severance tax from a role of internalizing exter-
nal costs to revenue-raising.
The following chart showing the pattern of mineral taxes in the selected
western states is instructive.' 9
VI. ADMINISTRATION, COMPLIANCE AND INTERACTION
Studies have dealt with the steps states have taken to conform their
income tax statutes with the federal scheme to facilitate administration and
compliance.' 20 The program of deductions and credits for conservation ex-
penditures, now written into federal law, has been rapidly copied at the state
level. 12i In the area of credits for gasohol, the states have moved ahead of
the federal government.'
2 2 To the extent that it amounts to a subsidy,"
23
113. Id. at 11.
114. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 611.
115. S. Blackstone, supra note 22, at 14-16. For a comparison of the effects of severance
taxes with those of income and property taxes, see id. at 11-14.
116. Id. at 15. A unit severance tax is a flat rate per unit of production, and an ad valorem
severance tax is a percentage value of production. The unit tax tends to discriminate against
low-grade ores while the ad valorem severance tax discriminates more against ores with high
mining costs (assuming quality is held constant). The burden of the unit tax decreases with
price increases and increases with price decreases, whereas the burden of the ad valorem tax
varies with product prices. Id.
117. Id.
118. Steele, Natural Resource Taxation: Resource Allocation and Diitribution Implications, in Ex-
TRACTIVE RESOURCES AND TAXATION 247 (M. Gaffney ed. 1967).
119. S. Blackstone, supra note 22, at 100.
120. See, e.g., Stolz & Purdy, Federal Collection of State Indnidual Income Taxes, 1977 DUKE L.J.
59.
121. H.B. 1264, 52d Colo. Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1980) (to be codified in COLO. REV.
STAT. § 39-22-128).
122. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 66-821 to -841 (Supp. 1979).
123. For a qualitative analysis of federal subsidies involving energy see U.S. DE'T OF EN-
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the combination of federal and state tax exemptions or credits has been cal-
culated to be a substantial subsidy.
124
The windfall profit tax 125 illustrates another important aspect of inter-
governmental relations. To the extent that the tax allows the payment of
state taxes on production as a cost, states will be able to tax oil enterprises
without affecting the cost of production. There is likely to be political pres-
sure in each state to take advantage of this "free" revenue.
As structured, the new law continues a shadow price control system to
serve as the beginning or measuring point of that part of the realization of a
producer that is "windfall" and subject to the tax.126 The displaced price
control system was complex, and prior to the enactment of the windfall
profit tax the program was administered by the Department of Energy.
12 7
The compliance and enforcement process now will move to the Internal
Revenue Service. 128 Consequently, the transactional costs, particularly to
small producers, will probably increase.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the utmost care must attend any effort to generalize
about federal-state relationships, uniformity among the states or even within
a particular state, taxes or tax-like effects on energy mineral production, or
energy conversion. The beginning of reform, assuming reform is needed at
all, is comprehension of the existing situation which is staggering in its com-
plexity. The energy market has previously adjusted to the labyrinthine fed-
eral system and presumably will adjust to it in the future, although it will
suffer the costs associated with uncertainty. The problem of coordinating
the interests of the so-called consuming states and the producing states is not
new; many cases have dealt with it in the past.
129
The complexities of policy development in a federal structure are illus-
trated in energy policy development. The federal government's leasing poli-
cies are not integrated with its taxing policies and probably will not be. The
conflicting objectives and the overlapping jurisdictional considerations im-
pede the effort to construct a national policy. Taxes and tax-like effects of
leasing and sales of public lands and resources must be understood if any
progress is to be made.
The federal government faces no practical constitutional obstacle in
passing legislation that would eliminate or tend to eliminate some of the
situations previously identified. The Commerce Clause and other constitu-
tional provisions support legislation like that introduced to put a cap on the
124. R. Crow, The Effect of Use Taxes and Conservation Oriented Tax Incentives on En-
ergy Markets (1980) (unpublished paper on file with Professor Carver).
125. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, I.R.C. §§ 4986-4998.
126. Id. § 4988(a).
127. S. REP. No. 96-394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprznted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1073.
128. Id. at 68, reprinted zi [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1075.
129. See, e.g., FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972); FPC v. Transconti-
nental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
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states' severance taxes.' 30 Moreover, the federal government could legisla-
tively invalidate Louisiana's First Use Tax. 3 1 It could also remove the ex-
emption of municipal bond interest from federal individual income tax
liability. Federal income tax deductions for state gasoline tax payments
have already been eliminated.
t 32
The likelihood that any or all of these things will happen is slim, but it
may be growing. Clearly, the federal government cannot permit frustration
of its energy programs-a frustration which is all too possible.
130. See S. 1778, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S 13,017 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1979)
(limits state severance taxes on energy resources produced from Indian lands or lands owned by
the United States to 12-1/2%). On Aug. 5, 1980, the National Governor's Conference adopted a
resolution endorsing the right of coal-producing states to impose "reasonable" coal severance
taxes. INGAA Washington Report, No. 974, at 9 (Aug. 8, 1980).
131. Congress could invalidate the Louisiana First Use Tax by the same process that it used
to invalidate the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax, that is, by passing legislation that would
expressly prohibit such a tax. See note 104 supra.
132. See I.R.C. § 164.
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A PROPOSAL FOR EVALUATING HYBRID SECTION
1031/453 TRANSACTIONS
By SANFORD M. GUERIN*
INTRODUCTION
In an era characterized by rapidly appreciating real estate, rising inter-
est rates, and an inflationary economy, an investor may wish to cash out an
appreciated real estate investment to obtain greater liquidity while remain-
ing in the real estate market as a hedge against inflation. The investor gen-
erally utilizes three basic methods to dispose of appreciated property while
partially or totally reinvesting in new property: a section 10311 tax-free ex-
change; a full recognition straight sale followed by reinvestment; and a sec-
tion 453 installment sale followed by reinvestment. This article illustrates a
fourth method, the hybrid 1031/453 transaction, a misunderstood and un-
derutilized method of disposition, which may be the most effective tax plan-
ning tool available to an investor wishing to trade down his net real estate
holdings.
2
A typical "tax-planned" section 1031 exchange involves trading low
value and low basis property for heavily encumbered high value property.
In addition to the increased leverage and nonrecognition of realized gain,
another motive for such an exchange is acquiring an increased depreciable
basis.3 Since trading up pursuant to section 1031 does not ordinarily involve
* The author is a professor at the University of Denver College of Law; J.D. 1974, Uni-
versity of San Francisco School of Law; L.L.M., in taxation, 1975, New York University School
of Law. The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge his fondest appreciation to Miss Taylor-
Leigh Guerin.
1. Except as otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 as amended.
2. Subsequent to the writing and prior to the publication of this article, Congress began
considering the issues contained herein in the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980. See Con-
gressional Record, H.R.6883, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H3962 (1980). Portions of
this article are included in the House Ways and Means Committee Report concerning the en-
actment of H.R. 6883.
3. This increase is partially due to the assumption of liability to which the acquired prop-
erty is subject. Section 1031(d) specifies the formula for determining the basis of property re-
ceived in a like-kind exchange: Basis of the property exchanged plus gain recognized minus
money received minus loss recognized. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b)-l(c) (1956), and Treas. Reg.
§ 1. 103 1(d)-2, ex. 2 (1956), provide for the offsetting of liabilities on the exchanged properties.
The taxpayer in the regulation's example transferred property subject an an $80,000 liability,
but received, in exchange, property subject to a $150,000 liability. As a result of receiving
property subject to a greater encumbrance, the taxpayer was deemed not to receive "boot" (see
note 7 in/fa) with respect to the $80,000 of debt relief. (It should be noted that the receipt of
$40,000 cash by the taxpayer did constitute boot because the negative mortgage balance of the
taxpayer did not offset the money or other nonlike-kind property received.) The basis of the
property received by the taxpayer was increased by the taxpayer's negative mortgage balance.
In reaching this result, the liability on the property received was initially added to the basis of
the transferred property (considered as other property under Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-I(a)
(1956)). Then the liability on the property transferred was subtracted from the resulting sum
(considered as money received for purposes of this computation). (I.R.C. § 103 1(d))
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a cashing out of the investment, the desire for liquidity is not met.
4
If an investor wishes to completely liquidate his investment, a straight
sale must be considered. The straight sale of property for cash followed by
reinvestment of the proceeds results in full gain recognition upon disposition
of the old property under section 1001 principles and a fair market value
(FMV) cost basis in the reinvestment property pursuant to section 1012. 5
Between these extremes lie two other tax planning alternatives. First is
the installment method of reporting gain under section 453(b), 6 which while
requiring full gain recognition, permits a taxpayer to spread the reporting of
the gain ratably over the term of the installment payments. Although the
taxpayer may then reinvest in other property at any time, the reinvestment
must be accomplished with after tax dollars. The basis of the newly ac-
quired property is the FMV under section 1012.
Second is the hybrid 1031/453 transaction. This transaction generally
involves the reverse situation of the typical "tax-planned" section 1031 ex-
change; the taxpayer trades higher value property for lower value property,
accompanied by the receipt of nonlike-kind property, cash, or notes. The
"boot" '7 received in the hybrid 1031/453 transaction includes cash, nonlike-
kind property, and the purchaser/exchangee's notes which represent pay-
ment for the value differential of the properties. This transaction is basically
a substitute for installment reporting with one important variation. In the
hybrid 1031/453 transaction, the reinvestment property must qualify as like-
kind property 8 and is considered a payment in the year of sale (PYOS)
4. If the taxpayer refinanced his property prior to the exchange, however, he could cash
out to that extent, possibly without gain recognition. Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner,
198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952). Such a transaction, though, may be subject to attack under the
step transaction or business purposes doctrine.
5. Immediate gain recognition may be avoided if the sale is designed as a deferred pay-
ment sale qualifying for open transaction reporting. Burnett v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). In
such a situation, a taxpayer would not report any gain, as payments are received from the
purchaser, until the aggregate payments exceed the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the old prop-
erty. Each payment, or portion thereof, received after the taxpayer has recovered his basis must
be reported in full. In an open transaction, a taxpayer could reinvest in another property after
payments have been received which are sufficient to complete the new purchase. The basis in
the new property would be the FMV cost basis under § 1012.
6. Gain from the sale or other disposition of real property or from the casual sale or other
disposition of noninventory personal property for a price greater than S1000 may be reported on
the installment method under § 453(b). Under the installment method, the taxable portion of
each installment payment equals:
Gross profit/Total contract price X Installment payment = Amount to be reported as
gain in the year received. See text accompanying notes 24-29 infra.
7. "Boot" is a word of art derived from § 1031(d) and Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b)- I (1956) to
mean the receipt of money and "other property" (ic., nonlike-kind property) which must be
recognized to the extent of realized gain.
8. Like-kind property is defined as property of the same nature or character as the trans-
ferred property and not as property of the same quality or grade. The following are examples of
like-kind property: improved and unimproved realty, Treas. Reg. § 1.103(a)-I (b) (1956); urban
realty and a ranch, Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(c) (1956); a fee interest and a 30-year leasehold
interest in realty, id.; and a fee interest and a mineral interest in realty, Commissioner v. Crich-
ton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941).
Like-kind property must be held by the taxpayer for productive use in a trade or business
or for investment to fall within the provisions of § 1031(a). Further, § 1031(a) specifically ex-
cludes inventory, stocks, bonds, and similar interests as like-kind properties entitled to nonrecog-
nition treatment.
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under the thirty percent test of section 453(b) (2) (B). 9 Thus, the reinvest-
ment is integrated with the sale of the old property into a single plan, with
the taxpayer perhaps selecting the reinvestment property and the purchaser
acquiring and then exchanging the selected property with the taxpayer for
the old property.1°
The taxpayer in a 1031/453 hybrid transaction generally receives the
purchaser/exchangee's notes" which he may elect to report on the install-
ment method assuming that the requirements of section 453 are met.' 2 The
taxpayer who qualifies under both section 1031 and section 453 receives two
advantages over conventional installment reporting. First, due to the appli-
cation of section 1031, if the value of the like-kind reinvestment property
exceeds the adjusted basis of the old property, the realized gain will not be
fully recognized - the gain is recognizable only to the extent of the boot.
This reduced gain recognition is effected by applying a smaller profit report-
ing percentage to each payment received. 13 Second, the reinvestment is ac-
complished with tax-free dollars.14
There is one disadvantage to the partial nonrecognition achieved in the
hybrid 1031/453 transaction. As with all nonrecognition provisions, the ba-
sis of the reinvestment property reflects the nonrecognized gain and is less
than the FMV of the newly acquired property to the extent of the nonrecog-
nized gain.
The following discussion initially sets forth the basic principles of sec-
tions 1031 and 453. The interaction of these sections is then analyzed, with
special attention given to the Service's analysis of the hybrid 1031/453 trans-
action in Revenue Ruling 65-15515 and also the Tax Court's analysis in C/in-
9. Rev. Rul. 65-155, 1965-1 C.B. 356, 357.
10. In order to obtain the benefits of § 1031, the taxpayer must avoid making the pur-
chaser his agent in the transaction. The typical § 1031 exchange consists of the taxpayer select-
ing the property he wishes to receive, then arranging the purchase terms with his exchange
partner, followed by the exchange partner purchasing the taxpayer's property, and the taxpayer
receiving the selected property in return. If the purchaser/exchangee is deemed to be the tax-
payer's agent, the transaction will be restructured into the form of an outright sale by the tax-
payer of his property followed by the taxpayer purchasing the selected property. See Alderson v.
Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1963), where the Service advanced such an argu-
ment. This interpretation of the transaction, of course, negates the exchange requirement of
§ 1031.
The courts have been reluctant to find the purchaser/exchangee to be the taxpayer's agent
in the typical like-kind exchange reasoning that the purchaser/exchangee is at risk since the
transfer of the selected property to the taxpayer is not strictly guaranteed. Id. at 793. The
Service seems to have accepted this theory in Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304, 305 (citing
Alderson) while in addition emphasizing that the purchaser/exchangee was not the taxpayer's
agent since he could not look to the taxpayer for specific performance upon default.
The court in Alderson, at 793, and the Service in Rev. Rul. 77-297, at 304, have not re-
garded the taxpayer's agency for the purchaser/exchangee by selecting the property as vitiating
the application of § 1031 to the transaction.
11. The notes are considered boot for the purposes of § 1031.
12. See text accompanying notes 17-20 t'nfa. The payments received in the year of sale
cannot exceed 30% of the selling price. I.R.C. § 453(b)(2)(B).
13. See text accompanying notes 33-35 infa. Section 453 is altered to take account of gain
recognized-not the gross profit.
14. The nonrecognition provisions of § 1031(a) permit the reinvestment in like-kind prop-
erty without recognizing any realized gain at the time of exchange.
15. See text accompanying notes 33-35 infra.
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lon H. Milchell. '6 By analyzing Mitchell in conjunction with Revenue Ruling
65-155, the problems inherent in each approach are illustrated. Moreover,
the effect of the profit reporting percentage upon the like-kind property re-
ceived under section 1031, the proper computation of PYOS, and the correct
basis allocation formulas to be applied to the like-kind property and the
buyer's notes are considered. Finally, suggested alternatives to the Service's
approach in Revenue Ruling 65-155 are discussed in the context of two-
party and multi-party exchanges.
I. PRINCIPLES OF SECTION 1031
Designed as a tax relief measure, section 1031 has received widespread
acceptance in recent years in the area of real estate investments. The provi-
sion is a nonrecognition section, drafted to provide relief when investment
property is exchanged for property of a "like-kind."'
17
Section 1031 requires that the exchanged properties be: (1) of like-kind;
and (2) held for productive use in the taxpayer's trade or business or held for
investment.' 8 This discussion assumes that these requirements are satisfied,
therefore, they are not addressed. Section 1031 is based on the equitable
notion that a taxpayer who does not completely "cash in" his investment,
but merely changes its form, may not receive cash or other assets of sufficient
liquidity to enable him to satisfy the tax liability if the transaction required
recognition of gain.' 9 It should be noted that the taxpayer does realize gain.
With the exception of boot, however, he does not recognize gain at this time.
Instead, the gain realized but not recognized is reflected in the taxpayer's
basis adjustments in the property which he receives.
20
Although compliance with section 1031 appears relatively simple, com-
plications surface where nonlike-kind property or boot is received in addition
to the like-kind property. Since few, if any, real estate transactions involve
properties of identical value and liabilities, this type of transaction is the rule
rather than the exception. Indeed, there is little reason to undertake such a
transaction unless the taxpayer merely wants different property for purely
nontax, business reasons.
Consequently, the receipt of nonlike-kind property brings the transac-
tion under a special provision of section 1031 whereby nonrecognition of
gain is still available, but only as to the like-kind property received in the
exchange.2' Boot, received in the form of nonlike-kind property, does not
16. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 953 (1964).
17. See note 8 supra.
18. This is a factual question of intent determined by the actions of the taxpayer with
respect to the property. Thus, the purchaser in the typical like-kind exchange described in note
10 supra, is not deemed to hold the property acquired for the productive use in a trade or
business or for investment since he acquired the property for immediate exchange. Rev. Rul.
77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304, 305.
19. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1957): "The underlying assumption [of § 1031] is that
the new property is substantially a continuation of the old investment still unliquidated .... "
20. I.R.C. § 1031(d) provides for a carryover basis in the exchanged property as explained
in note 3 supra. Therefore, upon the subsequent sale of the exchanged property in a taxable
transaction, the realized gain that previously was nonrecognized will finally be recognized.
21. I.R.C. § 1031 (b): "If an exchange would be within the provisions of subsection (a) . . .
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qualify for nonrecognition. Thus, gain must be recognized to the extent of
boot received.
The regulations are specific on what constitutes boot. 22 Money is obvi-
ously nonlike-kind property, as is any evidence of the purchaser/exchangee's
indebtedness. Although mortgage relief to the seller/exchangor is deemed to
be money received, and, therefore, boot, the regulations allow such mortgage
relief to be offset by any mortgage burden (whether taken subject to or as-
sumed) acquired by the seller/exchangor.23 In other words, included among
the boot to the seller/exchangor is the net positive mortgage relief, if any,
which he receives.
In coupling net positive mortgage relief with additional consideration in
the form of the purchaser/exchangee's notes, it is entirely feasible that, de-
spite not receiving any cash, the seller/exchangor may face a substantial tax
liability on the boot received. Additionally, it is also possible that the
seller/exchangor will receive insufficient cash to satisfy the resulting tax lia-
bility. Although benefitting by being able to increase his basis in the new
property by any gain recognized on the exchange, the seller/exchangor who
has agreed to accommodate the buyer/exchangee's desire for deferred pay-
ments may face a substantial liquidity problem.
II. PRINCIPLES OF SECTION 453
The seller/exchangor's tax predicament under section 1031 is no less
perplexing than the analogous situation of a sale of property on a deferred
payment plan. Even though varying degrees of sophistication exist in such
arrangements, they all contemplate the payment of the purchase price over a
specified period of time. Under pre-section 453 taxing schemes, the seller
was required to immediately recognize his entire gain regardless of the eco-
nomic fact that he did not receive the entire amount in the year of sale.
24
It was precisely for such circumstances that section 453 was intended to
provide some measure of relief. While not technically a nonrecognition pro-
vision, it nevertheless allows deferral of gain recognition where the transaction
fits within various criteria designed to strike an equitable balance between
general tax principles and the economic realities of installment or deferred
payment transactions. 25 Since, by definition, the taxpayer who sells on an
installment basis takes time to receive all his profits, he should be allowed to
report those profits by recognizing gain in proportion to the total amount of
gain to be recognized.
if it were not for the fact that the property received in exchange consists not only of property
permitted . . . to be received without the recognition of gain, but also of other property or
money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess
of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property."
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b)-I(b) to -t(c) (1956).
23. See note 3 supra. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b)-1(c), (d)-2, ex. 2 (1956).
24. I.R.C. § 1001(c) states: "Except as otherwise provided . . . the entire amount of the
gain or loss. . . on the sale or exchange of property shall be recognized." The amount of gain
would equal the amount realized, irrespective of when received, less the adjusted basis of the
property sold or exchanged.
25. I.R.C. § 453(a)-(b) provide for the proportionate recognition of gain upon receipt of
installment payments in a given taxable year.
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Conventional installment reporting is allowable when PYOS do not ex-
ceed thirty percent of the selling price.26 Cash and other property received
are included as PYOS in addition to the mortgage relief in excess of basis.
2 7
Expressly excluded from PYOS is evidence of the purchaser's indebtedness.
28
This exclusion is a logical extension of the installment reporting rationale
because part of the seller's profit is represented by the buyer's note, and the
seller typically will not collect on the note until its maturity date. Further,
the seller need not count the note as a PYOS since he will not receive the
cash necessary to pay the consequent tax liability until some filture date.
If the taxpayer satisfies the thirty percent test, he then turns to another
formula to determine the proportion of each installment payment that must
be reported as gain. Section 453(b) provides the formula for calculating the
percentage: payments received are reported as gain in proportion to the ra-
tio that the gross profit bears to the total contract price. 29 In theory, the
proportion not reported as gain represents a return of the seller's capital or
basis. For example, if the taxpayer sells property with an FMV of $100 and
an adjusted basis of $50 and receives $30 in cash plus $70 in purchaser's
notes, the taxpayer can elect section 453 since the PYOS ($30) are not
greater than thirty percent of the $100 selling price. The taxpayer's gross
profit equals his realized gain of $50, and the total contract price equals the
$100 selling price. Thus, each payment that the taxpayer receives, including
the $30 received in the year of sale, has a gain component of fifty percent
($50 gross profit/$100 total contract price). If the purchaser assumes a lia-
bility of the taxpayer for $20, the total contract price would be $80, and the
gain component of each payment would be 5/8 ($50 gross profit/$80 total
contract price). The balance of each payment represents a return of the
taxpayer's basis.
26. I.R.C. § 453(b)(2)(B).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-
4
(c) (1958). Thus, if the taxpayer sold realty with an adjusted
basis of $50 for $100, and the property were subject to a mortgage of $70, the taxpayer could
only receive $10 in the year of sale. The mortgage relief exceeds the taxpayer's basis by $20, and
that debt relief plus the $10 received would equal 30% of the $100 selling price.
28. I.R.C. § 453(b)(2)(B). It is clear, however, that the "evidence of indebtedness" exclu-
sion does have its limitations. Any evidence of indebtedness will be counted as PYOS if pay-
ment is actually or constructively received in the year of sale or if payable on demand. I.R.C.
§ 453(b)(3). Also, a third party's note which the purchaser guarantees does not fit within the
exclusion. Tombari v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1962). Further, evidence of in-
debtedness which is readily tradeable, such as a bond, is considered a PYOS. I.R.C.
§ 453 (b) (3).
29. Gross profit is the taxpayer's realized gain on the sale, or the amount realized (selling
price) minus the adjusted basis. I.R.C. § 1001(a). Total contract price is generally defined in
Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958). To compute the total contract price, use the following formula:
Selling price minus debt relief plus excess of debt relief over adjusted basis.
In situations where debt relief does not exceed adjusted basis, the total contract price sim-
ply equals the amount the taxpayer will actually receive from the purchaser (the net proceeds of
the sale). If the debt relief equals or exceeds the adjusted basis, the profit reporting percentage
will always equal 100%. Thus, if the taxpayer sells realty for $100 subject to a mortgage of $70
and has an adjusted basis in the property of $50, the taxpayer will have: (1) A gross profit of
$50 ($100 (selling price) minus $50 (adjusted basis)); and (2) a total contract price of $50 ($100
(selling price) minus $70 (debt relief) plus $20 (excess of debt relief over basis)). The profit
reporting percentage (gross profit/total contract price) will equal 100%, and, thus, the entire
amount of the installment payments received by the taxpayer will be reported as taxable gain.
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III. COMBINING SECTIONS 1031 AND 453
The foregoing discussion dealt with two widely used but distinctly sepa-
rate planning tools. Whereas section 1031 defers recognition of gain until a
subsequent taxable transaction, section 453 deferral spreads recognition of
gain over the term the note payments are received. 30 Section 1031 applies
automatically to deny recognition of gain or loss, while the taxpayer must
specifically elect the benefits of section 453.31
There is an analogous dilemma facing: (a) a taxpayer who makes a sale
of property on an installment method and receives notes but not enough
cash to satisfy the consequent tax liability; and (b) a taxpayer who effectu-
ates a partially "tax-free" exchange of properties, receiving boot in the form
of notes, but receives insufficient cash to satisfy the resulting tax liability.
The latter situation calls for benefits similar to those afforded the former
situation. This situation led to the hybrid 1031/453 exchange 32 which al-
lows nonrecognition treatment for the like-kind property received coupled
with installment reporting for the boot received.
A. Revenue Ruling 65-155
Although scant attention has been focused upon the viability of the hy-
brid 1031/453 exchange, the Service expressly recognized its viability in
Revenue Ruling 65-155. 33 This ruling introduces an important variation
into the formula for calculating the profit reporting percentage. Whereas
under conventional section 453 reporting, the percentage is determined by
the proportion the gross profit bears to the total contract price, the percent-
age introduced by the ruling is the relationship that the total recognized gain
from the section 1031 boot provision bears to the total contract price. 34 The
ruling's example is illustrative of this change. Taxpayer X exchanged prop-
erty with an FMV of $100 and a basis of $10 for Y's like-kind property worth
$20, plus cash of $10, and notes of $70. Taxpayer X received the like-kind
property and the $10 cash in the year of the exchange. X's total realized
gain is $90 (FMV ($100) - Adjusted basis ($10)), but under section 1031, X is
required only to recognize gain to the extent of the $80 boot received (Cash
($10) + Note ($70)).
The ruling further provides that the $20 like-kind property and the $10
cash received in the year of the exchange constitute PYOS. Thus, since the
payments do not exceed thirty percent of the $100 selling price, installment
reporting is available.
Conventional section 453 reporting yields a profit reporting percentage
of 9/10 (ninety percent), representing the ratio X's gross profit ($90) bears to
the contract price ($100). The ruling's modification, however, substitutes
30. See text accompanying notes 17-29 supra.
31. I.R.C. § 453(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(b) (1958).
32. The phrase "hybrid 1031/453 exchange" is used to describe a transaction involving a
§ 1031 exchange in which the gain recognized under § 1031(b) is reported in accordance with
§ 453 installment sales requirements.
33. Rev. Rul. 65-155, 1965-1 C.B. 356.
34. Id. at 357.
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"total gain recognized" for "gross profit" in the formula, resulting in a profit
reporting percentage of 8/10 (eighty percent). Since this profit reporting
percentage is applied against payments received in the year of exchange and
against all payments received on the installment notes in subsequent years,
all of the gain will eventually be reported. The recognized gain in the year
of exchange is $24 ($30 x 80%), and, over the term of the notes, an additional
$56 ($70 x 80%) is recognized yielding a total recognized gain of $80.
Unfortunately, Revenue Ruling 65-155 is incomplete because it fails to
discuss the impact that a receipt of mortgaged property has upon the elec-
tion of boot reporting under section 453. The ruling indicates that the
"value" of the like-kind property received must be considered a PYOS,35 but
the definition of "value" is unclear. The ruling's example dealt only with
nonmortgaged property, so the FMV controlled. If mortgaged property is
received, the result under this ruling is still unresolved.
B. Clinton H. Mitchell
The case of Chn/on H Mitche/P 6 provides insight into the property treat-
ment of a 1031/453 hybrid transaction when mortgaged, like-kind property
is received in the exchange. In Mitchell, the taxpayer exchanged two parcels
of improved real property for a motel. The exchange agreement set a value
of $148,000 for the taxpayer's properties (subject to an encumbrance of
$18,502.39) and a value of $247,000 for the motel (subject to a deed of trust
of $80,873.61). Of the $247,000 value assigned to the motel, $47,000 was
allocated to tangible personal property used in the motel's operation.
Pursuant to the exchange agreement, the taxpayer/exchangor trans-
ferred two properties (subject to the encumbrance of $18,502.39) plus a note
for $106,127.40 to the owner/exchangee of the motel. In return, the own-
er/exchangee transferred the motel (subject to the deed of trust of
$80,873.61) and a secured note for $69,497.61 to the taxpayer.
In his original return for the year of the exchange, the tax-
payer/exchangor stated that his realized gain was the face value of the note
received from the owner/exchangee, but that his recognizable gain was lim-
ited to the actual payments received on the note. In subsequent returns, the
taxpayer reported no further gains based on the contention that none were
reportable until he had recouped his capital investment. The Commissioner
challenged this method of reporting, ruling that the taxpayer must recognize
gain in the year of exchange equal to the face value of the note received from
the owner/exchangee.
37
The taxpayer brought suit in the Tax Court, and prior to trial both
parties stipulated that the note received was indeed section 1031 (b) boot and
that its face value, $69,497.61, constituted recognized gain. The dispute
then focused upon the taxpayer's assertion that he should be allowed to re-
35. "The value of the like kind property received on the exchange must be treated as a part
of the initial payment for the purpose of determining whether payments in the year of the sale
or other disposition exceed thirty percent of the selling price." Id.
36. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 953 (1964).
37. Id. at 958.
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port this recognized gain under the installment provisions of section 453.
The taxpayer's calculations for section 453 installment reporting paralleled
those which would have been made if he had effected a straight sale of his
two properties for cash and notes. Consequently, he looked to the value of
his own properties in determining his selling price (although he improperly
subtracted the amount of his mortgage) and ignored the value of the prop-
erty he received. The taxpayer argued that under the thirty percent test,
PYOS should include only $6,950-the amount received in principal and
interest on the owner/exchangee's note in the year of the exchange. He fur-
ther argued that the selling price equalled hzs equity in the two properties
($129,498), and, therefore, the thirty percent test was obviously satisfied
since payments received on the note amounted to approximately five percent
of the selling price. The calculations would have been proper (with the ex-
ception of the selling price 38 ) if it had been a straight sale. The court, how-
ever, ruled that he incorrectly ignored both the value of the motel and the
notes received in calculating both PYOS and the selling price.3 9
The significance of Mitchell rests in the court's analysis of section 453
and section 1031 requirements and their application in the context of an
exchange which includes section 1031 boot. The court found that the tax-
payer's selling price could not be determined solely by reference to the value
of the properties he exchanged. 40 Instead the selling price included:4 '
The value of the motel $247,000.00
Less the encumbrance on the motel - $80,873.61
Plus the mortgage relief to the taxpayer + $18,502.39
Plus the face value of the note received + $69,497.61
Selling Price $254,126.39
To qualify the boot for section 453 installment reporting, PYOS could not
exceed $76,237.92 which is thirty percent of the $254,126.39 selling price.
The court also found that PYOS under the thirty percent test does not
include evidence of the purchaser's indebtedness. 42 Thus, while the note
constituted section 1031(b) boot, it was not included as a PYOS. Any pay-
ments made on the note in that year, plus any other payments in cash or
property should have been included.4 3 The court's holding reflects tradi-
tional application of both section 453 and section 1031 provisions.
44
The court also held that the motel received in the exchange must be
counted as a PYOS. Herein lies the court's insight into what constituted the
"value" of the motel. While Revenue Ruling 65-155 indicates that "value"
means FMV, 45 the Mitchell court held that the equity value (FMV less en-
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958) provides that: "In the sale of mortgaged property the
amount of the mortgage . . . shall, for the purpose of determining whether a sale is on the
installment plan, be included as a part of the 'selling price'.





44. I.R.C. §§ 453(b)(3), 1031(b).
45. Rev. Rul. 65-155, 1965-1 C.B. 356, 357. The example given in the ruling uses the value
of "worth" of the like-kind property as the amount which must be included in the PYOS.
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cumbrances) and not the FMV represented the additional amount to be in-
cluded as a PYOS. Thus, the total payments received by the taxpayer in the
year of the exchange included:
Value of the motel $247,000.00
Less the encumbrance on the motel - $80,873.61
Plus payments on the principal
received on the exchangee's
notes in Year One + $3,554.39
Total payments received by the
taxpayer in the year of exchange $169,680.78
Although the taxpayer failed the thirty percent test, the significance of
Michell lies in the court's conclusion that mortgaged property received in an
exchange should be valued at its equity value when applying the thirty per-
cent PYOS test of section 453.46 Obviously, valuing mortgaged property
received by the taxpayer at its equity value under the thirty percent PYOS
test is logical. The irrationality of this position is illustrated by comparing
the results of installment reporting when mortgaged property is valued at
FMV rather than equity value. Assume the following facts: the taxpayer
exchanges his property (FMV ($100); Adjusted basis ($50)) for other prop-
erty, whether or not like-kind (FMV $20), assumes a mortgage of $10 on
such property, and receives $90 of purchaser's notes which are payable over
a six year period. Regardless of whether FMV or equity value is used, the
thirty percent PYOS test is met, and the taxpayer may elect section 453
installment reporting.
The taxpayer's gross profit is $50 (FMV ($100)-Adjusted basis ($50)).
Therefore, $50 is the numerator in the gross profit reporting percentage.
The denominator is the total contract price, which is generally the amount
of money or other property that the taxpayer receives in the sale of his prop-
erty.
4 7
If the mortgaged property is valued at FMV, the total contract price is
$110 (FMV of property received ($20) + FMV of notes assumed to equal
face value ($90)). Therefore, the gross profit percentage of $50/$110 yields a
total recognizable gain of $50 when applied to the $20 of property received
in the year of sale and the $90 of payments received on the notes.
This method of valuing mortgaged property causes the total contract
price ($110) to exceed the selling price ($100). Since the section 453 regula-
tions contemplate a total contract price equal to or less than the selling
price, 48 this result is obviously an anomaly. Furthermore, the selling price
46. 42 T.C. at 965. "The 'selling price' . . . [included] the net value of the motel and fur-
nishings. ... Net value and equity value are functional equivalents.
47. Thus, any liabilities of the taxpayer assumed by the exchange partner would not be
included in the total contract price, unless the amount of liabilities assumed exceeds the tax-
payer's adjusted basis in the exchanged property in which case that excess is included as a
PYOS. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958). See also note 36 supra.
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958) provides that any mortgage of the taxpayer assumed
by the purchaser is to be excluded from the total contract price except to the extent the mort-
gage exceeds the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property. Under Crane v. Commissioner, 331
U.S. 1 (1947), such excess mortgage relief is included in the amount realized which usually
equals the selling price.
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represents the total value the taxpayer realizes on a sale or exchange of prop-
erty, and it is inequitable to tax him on an amount in excess of the amount
that he actually receives.
If the mortgaged property is valued at equity value rather than FMV,
then the total contract price equals $100 (Equity value of property received
($10) + FMV of notes assumed to equal face value ($90)). In this situation,
the gross profit reporting percentage of $50/$100 results in total gain recog-
nition of $50 when applied to the $10 of property received in the year of sale
and to the $90 of note payments received over the six year term of the notes.
The total contract price equals the selling price which is the anticipated re-
sult when no liabilities are assumed.
Therefore, based upon Milche/l,49 and the requirements of section 453
installment reporting, it is submitted that mortgaged property received by
the taxpayer electing the installment method must be valued at its equity
value-not its FMV.
IV. THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN REVENUE RULING 65-155 AND
SECTION 1031
A. The Ruhg's Approach
Although in its modification of the section 453 profit reporting percent-
age, Revenue Ruling 65-155 gives lip service to the apparent purpose of sec-
tion 1031,50 the ruling nevertheless overlooks the basic premise underlying
section 1031. If, under section 1031, no gain is to be recognized on the re-
ceipt of like-kind property, why does the ruling force recognition of gain in
Year One on like-kind property merely because boot is received and install-
ment reporting of the boot is desired?
This anomaly results from the ruling's adherence to an inflexible appli-
cation of section 45351 With the ruling's modification of the profit reporting
percentage, the entire gain to be recognized is not reached unless the report-
ing percentage is also applied to the like-kind property. This fact, however,
defeats the purpose of section 1031 nonrecognition.
This inconsistency suggests that the flaw lies in the ruling's profit report-
ing percentage created by the ruling's failure to recognize the basic premise
underlying section 1031.52 The ruling's modified profit reporting percentage
erroneously assumes that part of the like-kind property (twenty percent in
the ruling's example) is not received in Year One, but instead is received as
the notes are paid in the later years. The net effect of this erroneous assump-
tion results in requiring gain recognition on like-kind property in Year One,
with that forced recognition being returned in subsequent years through the
49. See note 46 supra.
50. "[Tlhe taxpayer should include in his gross income that portion of each payment re-
ceived which the total gain to be recognized under section 1031 (b) of the Code bears to the total
contract price." Rev. Rul. 65-155, 1965-1 C.B. 356, 357.
51. Id. at 356-57. Section 453 requires reporting as income only that percentage of pay-
ments received during the year which equals the ratio of total profit rea/led over the contract
price.
52. See text accompanying notes 17-23 supra.
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modified profit reporting percentage. In sum, the ruling states that the like-
kind property will be taxed now, but the tax will be returned later by not
fully taxing the boot.
B. Suggestd Alternative
A better approach, which permits the continuing viability of section
1031 while still reaching the entire inherent gain, requires an adjustment to
the profit reporting percentage as provided in Revenue Ruling 65-155. If a
transaction similar to that found in the ruling's example is considered a par-
tial exchange for like-kind property and a partial sale for nonlike-kind prop-
erty, and if section 1031's nonrecognition objectives are to be met, then
section 453 installment reporting of the gain logically coincides only with the
receipt of the nonlike-kind property. Achieving this equitable result merely
requires that the profit reporting percentage be derived from and applied
solely to the nonlike-kind property.
While the ruling modified the numerator of the profit reporting per-
centage to reflect the impact of section 1031, the denominator was derived
from conventional installment sale reporting.53 Instead of using traditional
"contract price" in the denominator, only the boot portion of the transaction
should be used to reflect that portion of the property actually "sold." The
portion "exchanged" for like-kind property under section 1031 should be
omitted from the denominator. Using the ruling's example, although this
adjustment increases the profit reporting percentage to one hundred percent,
it still reaches the entire gain when only applied to the nonlike-kind property
as it is received. Thus, in Year One, the taxpayer reports as gain one hun-
dred percent of the nonlike-kind property ($10 cash) received. In Years Two
through Seven, the taxpayer recognizes one hundred percent of the $70
notes, thus eventually recognizing the required $80 gain. Not only does this
approach comport with the underlying rationale of nonrecognition ex-
changes, but also the tax liability upon the taxable portion of the transaction
is more accurately matched to the period in which the money is actually
received.
Because the ruling's approach actually distorts taxable income, it could
have serious tax consequences for the taxpayer. In the ruling's example, the
taxpayer is forced to recognize $24 of gain in Year One, yet he has received
only $10 cash with which to meet the tax liability. A taxpayer would fare
even worse if he received notes of $80 and $0 cash in Year One which is not
an uncommon transaction. If the profit reporting percentage of one hun-
dred percent, as computed by the suggested alternative, however, is applied
only against the nonlike-kind property, the taxpayer recognizes a $10 gain in
Year One while receiving $10 in cash with which to satisfy the tax liability.
The same matching of income received with gain recognition occurs in sub-
sequent years as the notes are paid. Alternatively, if in Year One the tax-
payer receives the like-kind property, $0 in cash, and $80 in notes, he should
not recognize gain that year, but would report as gain under the suggested
alternative, one hundred percent of the amount realized from the notes as
53. I.R.C. § 453(a)(2).
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they are received. Under either approach, the taxpayer recognizes the entire
$80 gain, but the suggested alternative parallels the purpose of section 103 I's
nonrecognition provisions and resolves the inconsistency created by the rul-
ing's approach.
V. TAXPAYER'S NEW BASiS-"To BE" OR NOT "To BE"
Revenue Ruling 65-155 also addresses the substituted basis provision of
section 1031. In the conventional section 1031 tax-free exchange, the tax-
payer's basis in the newly acquired property is calculated in accordance with
Treasury Regulation section 1.1031(d). 54 The ruling provides that in a hy-
brid 1031/453 exchange, the taxpayer's new basis will be:
Basis in the property exchanged $10
Less cash received - $10
Less cash to be received - $70
Plus gain recognized in Year One + $24
Plus gain to be recognized
in five years + $56
Basis in the property received $10
If the taxpayer were to immediately sell the new property for its FMV
of $20, he would realize and recognize a gain of $10. This gain of $10, plus
,the earlier recognized gain of $80 equals the $90 gain he would have recog-
nized had he sold his original property at its FMV ($100 less $10 basis).
This ruling, however, fails to confront another issue raised by Treasury
Regulation section 1.1031(d) regarding the allocation of the basis between
the like-kind and nonlike-kind properties received. Theoretically, notes rep-
resent nonlike-kind property and are so treated in determining the amount
of boot received. 55 The question is then raised as to whether Revenue Rul-
ing 65-155 assigns a $0 basis to the notes received in a hybrid 1031/453
transaction.
An argument can be made for adopting this position. The premise
upon which such an argument can be based is Treasury Regulation section
1.1031(d)-i (c) which provides that:
the basis (adjusted to the date of the exchange) of the property
transferred by the taxpayer, decreased by the amount of any
money received and increased by the amount of gain recognized,
must be allocated to and is the basis of the properties (other than
money) received on the exchange.
56
Revenue Ruling 65-155, as noted above, 57 modified the basis formula of sec-
tion 1031(d) in a hybrid 1031/453 transaction by decreasing the taxpayer's
adjusted basis in the transferred property by the amount of any cash re-
ceived and to be received and increasing it by the amount of gain recognized
and to be recognized. Based partially upon the rationale found in the quoted
regulation that basis is not allocated to the cash received, and also by apply-
54. See note 3 supra.
55. I.R.C. § 1031(a) specifically excludes notes as representing like-kind property. There-
fore, notes must be boot.
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-1(c) (1956) (emphasis added).
57. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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ing the modified basis formula of Revenue Ruling 65-155, it can be asserted
that basis should not be allocated to the cash to be received on the pur-
chaser's notes. A logical extension of this reasoning is that the purchaser's
notes should not receive any basis allocation.
A problem arises, however, when the above reasoning is applied to a
1031/453 transaction because the Revenue Ruling's modified profit report-
ing percentage in the ruling's example is only eighty percent. When this
profit reporting percentage is applied to the note payments as they are re-
ceived, as required by the Revenue Ruling,58 the twenty percent of the pay-
ments which are not reported as gain are necessarily considered a return of
basis. This dilemma is resolved by assuming that the basis of the purchaser's
notes is to be determined independent of the basis adjustments made pursu-
ant to Revenue Ruling 65-155. This proposition assumes that the Revenue
Ruling is not applicable to and was not intended to be applicable to the
basis determination of the notes received.
A. Independent Determtnation of Notes' Basis
Section 453(d)(2) should be consulted to independently determine the
basis of the purchaser's notes. Section 453(d)(2) states that "[t]he basis of an
installment obligation shall be the excess of the face value of the obligation
over an amount equal to the income which would be returnable were the
obligation satisfied in full." The amount of gain "returnable were the obli-
gation satisfied in full" is derived by subtracting the amount of gain recog-
nized in the year of sale from the total recognizable gain. 59 Both the gain
returnable on the obligation and the gain returnable in the year of sale are
functions of the profit reporting percentage under section 453(b). As the
profit reporting percentage changes, so does the amount returnable as gain
upon payment of the notes in the subsequent years. The basis of the pur-
chaser's notes will also be affected by changes in the profit reporting percent-
age.
Applying the above formula to the ruling's example with an assumed
profit reporting percentage of eighty percent, the notes would have a basis of
twenty percent of their value or $14. If the notes were sold at their face
value, the reportable gain would be $56 ($70 - $14). This amount, plus the
recognized gain of $24 in Year One, would equal the total gain of $80 which
should be recognized. Finally, if the newly acquired property with a basis of
$10 is sold for its FMV of $20, this gain of $10 would account for the real-
ized, but not recognized gain, arising from the transfer of the taxpayer's orig-
inal property.
If the profit reporting percentage is one hundred percent, as proposed in
the suggested alternative, and that percentage is applied only against the
nonlike-kind property of cash and notes, the notes have a $0 basis. If the $70
58. Rev. Rul. 65-155, 1965-1 C.B. 356, 357. The example used in the ruling would cause
the recognition of $8 of each $10 of gain realized upon the receipt of the annual installment
payments. By necessity, this would result in $2 of the annual installment payments being classi-
fied as a return of basis.
59. I.R.C. § 453(d)(2); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.453-9(b) to 9(b) ex. 1, -9(c) (1958).
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notes are immediately sold, then the entire $70 is gain. Since the $10 cash
was recognized gain in Year One, the total gain recognized is the required
$80. Again, the remaining $10 of gain realized, but not recognized at the
time of the exchange, is recognized if the taxpayer sells the new property for
its FMV ($20 - $10 basis). Thus, the total $90 realized gain must eventually
be recognized.
B. The Unified Approach
The basis problem presented by Revenue Ruling 65-155 can be resolved
by replacing the ruling's modified basis formula with the normal section
1031 (d) approach, but instead of assigning the notes received an FMV basis,
the notes should be assigned a section 453(d)(2) basis.
The normal section 1031(d) basis formula is: the basis of the new prop-
erty equals the adjusted basis of the exchanged property minus the money
received plus the gain recognized. 6° Using the eighty percent profit report-
ing percentage of Revenue Ruling 65-155 and applying the normal section
1031(d) formula, the aggregate basis to be allocated among the properties
received by the taxpayer under the facts of the ruling equals $24 (Adjusted
basis of exchanged property ($10) - Money received ($10) + Gain recog-
nized ($24)).
This aggregate basis would first be allocated under section 453(d)(2) to
the installment obligations6 1 (which basis is $14 as determined above), leav-
ing $10 of the aggregate basis to be allocated to the like-kind property re-
ceived. This approach is logical since it leaves the taxpayer in the same
position with respect to the basis of the like-kind property received as he
would have been under the ruling's approach, with $10 of realized but un-
recognized gain which will be taken into account upon an immediate sale of
the like-kind property at its FMV of $20. Also, the total recognizable gain of
$80 would be reportable over the term of the installment obligations. A gain
of $24 is reported in the year of sale, and an additional gain of $56 is re-
ported as the notes are paid (the profit reporting percentage remains un-
changed).
The application of this "unified approach" in determining basis alloca-
tion in a hybrid 1031/453 transaction is equally valid if the profit reporting
percentage of the suggested alternative 6 2 is utilized. Applying the suggested
alternative to the facts of Revenue Ruling 65-155 results in $10 of cash being
received, but only $10 of gain is recognized in the year of sale since the gross
profit percentage is determined solely with reference to the amount of boot
received and not with reference to the total contract price. Under the "uni-
fied approach," the aggregate basis allocated to the properties received is $10
(Adjusted basis of exchanged property ($10) - Money received ($10) + Gain
recognized ($10)).
Under section 453(d) (2), the basis of the notes would first be determined
60. See note 3 supra for an expanded discussion of the § 1031(d) basis formula.
61. I.R.C. § 453(d)(2); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.453-9(b) to 9(b) ex. 1, -9(c) (1958).
62. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
1980]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
and would be $0 given a gross profit percentage of one hundred percent.
Because the aggregate basis of $10 is then assigned to the like-kind property
received, the taxpayer is in the same position with respect to the basis of the
like-kind property as he would be if the formula of Revenue Ruling 65-155
were applied. Since the profit reporting percentage remains at one hundred
percent, the $80 of boot to be received will be entirely recognized as gain
over the term of the notes.
It might be argued that utilizing the "unified approach" to determine
basis in the hybrid 1031/453 transaction is invalid since an FMV basis is not
allocated to the notes received as seemingly required by Treasury Regula-
tion section 1.1031(d)-l(c). 6 3 In response to this challenge, it is suggested
that the regulations do not contemplate section 453 installment reporting of
gain recognized on boot received in a section 1031 exchange. For example,
an FMV basis is not assigned to any evidence of indebtedness received when
installment method reporting is elected under section 453(b) because the to-
tal recognizable gain is deferred over the term of the installment obliga-
tions. 64 If FMV is allocated to installment obligations, it is relatively simple
to dispose of the notes immediately thereby causing no gain to be recognized
upon the orginal dispostion when the notes were received. This potential
abuse is prevented by the basis provisions of section 453(d)(2). 6 5 There is no
legitimate reason for a different result simply because installment reporting
of the boot received in a like-kind exchange is elected.
Since the "unified approach" is in harmony with the basis provisions of
both section 453(d) (2) and section 103 1(d), it is suggested that this approach
should be used in determining basis in a hybrid 1031/453 transaction. Re-
gardless of which approach is used to allocate basis to the notes, it is appar-
ent that the notes must have a basis other than $0 whenever the profit
reporting percentage is less than one hundred percent and that Revenue
Ruling 65-155 is clearly incorrect if it is interpreted as holding that the notes
received in a hybrid 1031/453 transaction can never have basis. Using the
ruling's figures and accepting, for the sake of discussion, that the notes re-
ceived cannot have a basis, the like-kind property received has a basis of $10,
and the notes have a basis of $0. Assuming that the FMV of the notes equals
their face value and that the taxpayer immediately sells the notes, he would
recognize a gain of $70 resulting in total gain recognition of $94. This result,
of course, is incorrect since only $90 of gain was realized in the transaction of
which only $80 was recognizable due to section 1031 nonrecognition. There-
fore, it is clear that the basis provisions of Revenue Ruling 65-155 must be
revised to incorporate either of the suggested approaches discussed above.
66
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-1(c) (1956): "For the purpose of the allocation of the basis of
the properties received, there must be assigned to such other property an amount equivalent to
its fair market value at the date of the exchange."
64. I.R.C. § 453(b)(2)(B) expressly excludes any evidence of indebtedness when determin-
ing the 30% test for payments made in the year of sale since, by their very nature, payments are
not received until a later date.
65. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.




Hybrid 1031/453 exchange treatment can also be utilized in multi-
party exchanges. The following discussion examines two variations of the
multi-party exchange and considers the hybrid exchange tax treatment from
the standpoint of both the Revenue Ruling and the suggested alternative.
A. The Alderson Exchange Hypolhelcal
6'
In this type of three-party exchange, assume B wishes to purchase A's
apartment building, which has an FMV of $100 and an adjusted basis of
$20, but A is only willing to exchange his property for a smaller property. B
locates a duplex owned by C, which has an FMV of $30 and which is accept-
able to A, but C is only willing to sell to B on an installment basis. B
purchases C's duplex, giving $9 cash and a note secured by the property for
$21. B and A then exchange properties with A assuming the $21 mortgage
and B giving his note for $91 to A. What are the tax consequences to each
party?
C qualifies for conventional section 453 installment reporting. The $9
cash received equals thirty percent of the selling price of $30. C will recog-
nize gain based on the applicable profit reporting percentage applied against
the $9 cash in the year of sale and the subsequent installments as they are
received.
Although B would not qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition treat-
ment because he acquired C's duplex expressly for the purpose of effectuat-
ing the exchange, he still suffers no adverse tax consequences. B's basis in
the duplex is $30 under general Crane68 principles. Although B receives $121
in property from A, the note he gives to A plus his basis of $30 offsets the
amount realized to produce a gain of $0.
A is the candidate for hybrid 1031/453 treatment. Under section 1031,
A should recognize gain on the lesser amount of boot received or gain real-
ize. Although A receives $90 of boot (B's note), A's realized gain is only $80
(Property received ($30) + Note ($91) - Basis ($20) - A's assumed mortgage
($21)). A will eventually have to recognize gain of $80 and will want to
report this gain on the installment method.
Following the Mdlche/ 69 pattern, A's selling price is $100, consisting of
the net value of the property received ($9) plus B's note of $91. Assuming
67. Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963). In Alderson, the taxpayers
amended a sales contract regarding their property to provide for an exchange of properties with
the purchaser rather than a straight sale. The taxpayers located the desired exchange property
(then owned by an independent third party), negotiated the sale with the third party to the
purchaser (even writing buyer's escrow instructions), and then exchanged their property for the
purchaser's simultaneously acquired property. The court held that the transaction was a valid
§ 1031 exchange finding that the purchaser did not act as the taxpayers' agent and that even if
he had done so, § 1031 nonrecognition treatment was not precluded. See also note 10 supra.
68. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). Under Crane and Parker v. Delaney, 186
F.2d 455 (lst Cir. 1950), a taxpayer's cost basis in property includes the amount of a purchase
money mortgage or the amount of an assumed mortgage which the purchaser takes subject to or
acquires.
69. 42 T.C. at 965.
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that there are no other PYOS, the net value of the property received ($9) is
less than thirty percent of the $100 selling price. Thus, A can elect install-
ment reporting.
1. The Ruling's Approach
A's profit reporting percentage under the ruling's approach is eighty
percent which is derived by calculating the ratio that the total gain to be
recognized (lesser of boot - $91 or gain realized - $80) bears to contract
price ($100). Assuming no other PYOS, the profit reporting percentage is
applied to the net value of the property received in the year of exchange
($9), and A recognizes a gain of $7.20 in Year One. As discussed previ-
ously, 70 however, this method forces recognition of gain on the like-kind
property received-a result inconsistent with section 1031 principles of non-
recognition. As the $91 note is paid in subsequent years, eighty percent or
$72.80 will be returnable as gain. Thus, the Service reaches the entire recog-
nized gain of $80 ($7.20 + $72.80), but only at the expense of forcing recog-
nition of gain on the like-kind property.
2. Suggested Alternative Approach
Again, modification of the reporting percentage would cure the above
inconsistency. By substituting the $91 of boot for the contract price in the
reporting percentage and applying that ratio ($80/$91) only against the
nonlike-kind property, section 1031 objectives are met. Total gain eventu-
ally recognized is $80 (Notes ($91) X $80/$91), but this result is achieved
without distorting section 1031 nonrecognition principles.
3. A's New Basis
It is assumed in determining A's new basis that an allocation of basis to
the notes must be made and that the Revenue Ruling does not prohibit the
assignment of basis to the notes. This allocated basis to the notes may be $0,
if the profit reporting percentage equals one hundred percent, but the alloca-
tion process must still be considered.
Applying the basis formula from the Revenue Ruling and indepen-
dently determining the basis of the notes under section 453(d) (2), A's basis in
the newly acquired duplex is:
Old basis $20
Plus gain recognized/Gain
to be recognized + $80
Less cash received/Cash
to be received - $91
Plus mortgage assumed
by A + $21
A's basis in newly
acquired duplex $30
A's basis in the purchaser's notes would vary depending upon whether the
70. Set text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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method and profit reporting percentage of the Revenue Ruling or of the
suggested alternative was used.
Ruling's Approach Alternative Approach
$80 $80$8 X $91 Note = $80 Gain $- X $91 Note = $80 Gain
$100 $91
Therefore: Therefore:
$20 .$11$20 X $91 Note = $18.20 Basis $- X $91 Note = $11 Basis
$100 $91
Applying the "unified approach" in determining basis, but otherwise
following Revenue Ruling 65-155, the aggregate basis of the properties re-
ceived is:
Adjusted basis of exchanged property $20.00
Less cash received -$ 0
Plus gain recognized +$ 7.20
Plus mortgage assumed 7' +$21.00
Aggregate basis of properties received $48.20
After first assigning the section 453(d)(2) basis to the notes, which is $18.20
using the eighty percent profit reporting percentage of the ruling's approach,
the remaining basis allocated to the duplex is $30.
In contrast, application of the "unified approach" in determining basis
and use of the suggested alternative yields an aggregate basis of the proper-
ties received of:
Adjusted basis of exchanged property $20
Less cash received -$ 0
Plus gain recognized +$ 0
Plus mortgage assumed +$21
Aggregate basis of properties received $41
As computed above, the section 453(d)(2) basis of the notes is $11, leaving
$30 to be allocated to the basis of the duplex.
Assuming that the note was sold at its face value of $91 and that the
newly acquired property with a basis of $30 was sold at its FMV of $30, then
the result under the ruling's approach and the alternative approach is:
Ruling's Approach Alternative Approach
Gain on note $90- $18.20 = $72.80 $91 - $11 = $80
Plus gain recognized
in Year One $ 7.20 $ 0
Plus gain on property
if sold $30-$30 = $ 0 $30 - $30 = $ 0
Total gain ultimately
recognized $80.00 $80
71. When mortgaged property is exchanged under § 1031, the basis formula of § 1031(d) is
modified to take into account mortgages assumed and property which is received or exchanged
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B. The Baird Publishing Company Exchange HpolhelzcaP
I 2
This version of the multi-party exchange differs slightly from the 4lder-
son 7 3 situation with respect to the roles assumed by the various parties. Al-
though B's intent still is to acquire A's apartment building, B purchases it
from C after A and C have exchanged properties. Assume that the same
properties and values as discussed under the Alderson hypothetical above ap-
ply. 74 In a transaction, C and A exchange properties, C giving his property
with an FMV of $30 and a note of $70 in return for A's apartment building.
Then C transfers the apartment building to B in return for $9 cash and a
secured note of $91 from B.
C cannot qualify for section 1031 treatment since the apartment build-
ing was acquired solely for immediate resale. Since C's role is that of
"seller," his transfer of the apartment building to B in return for cash and
notes will be a taxable event. 75 Depending on the numbers involved, C may
qualify for section 453 reporting just as he did in the Alderson structure.
B, the "buyer," faces no tax consequences. He merely calculates his
basis in the apartment building in accordance with Crane principles.
Again, A is the candidate for hybrid 453/1031 treatment. Applying the
principles previously discussed,7 6 the following columnar presentation will
demonstrate the tax consequences to A and the calculation of his new basis:
Ruling's Approach Alternative Approach




(b) Boot received Notes $70 SAME
(c) Gain recognized $70 SAME
(lesser of a or b)




(e) 30% PYOS test Satisfied: Property $30 SAME
subject to a mortgage. The modified formula under § 1031(d) is: Adjusted basis of the ex-
changed property - Cash received - Taxpayer's liabilities assumed + Gain recognized + Ex-
change partner's liabilities assumed.
72. Baird Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608 (1962). In Baird, the three party
exchange essentially took the following form: the taxpayer wanted to exchange his property for
another property he selected, which property was to be improved according to his specifications;
the owner of the selected property (a real estate agent who agreed to improve the property)
located a purchaser for the taxpayer's old property; the real estate agent sold the taxpayer's
property to the purchaser. Viewing the real estate agent as an independent third party (as the
court did), this transaction differs from the Alderson transaction in that the exchange is between
the taxpayer and the third party, and the sale to the purchaser from the third party follows the
exchange. The court found that the transaction was a valid like-kind exchange and that no
disqualifying agency relationship existed between the taxpayer and the realtor.
73. 317 F.2d 790.
74. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
75. I.R.C. § 1001.






Gain recognized $70 Gain recognized $70




= $21 kind property re-
ceived
(h) Gain recognized $70 Notes X 70% = $49 $70 Notes X 100% = $70
in later years
(i) Total gain recog- $70 ($21 + $49)
nized (g+h)
$70 ($0 + $70)
(j) New basis:
(1) Applying the basis formula of Revenue Ruling 65-155 to determine the basis of the








to be received -$70
$20
(b) Notes
70% of $70 = $49 Gain
30% of $70 = $21 Basis









Section 453(d)(2) basis of the
notes equals $21, with $20 of









to be received -$70
$20
100% of $70 = $70 Gain









Section 453(d)(2) basis of the
notes equals $0, with $20 of the
basis allocated to the duplex.
Alternative Approach
(k) Gain recognized if
new property (FMV
$30) is sold
(1) Ultimate gain real-
ized and recognized
(i+k)
$30 - $20 = $10
$80 ($70 + $10)
If instead of being paid, the note were sold at face value, the following would result:
(m) Basis and note $21 $0
(n) Gain on note if sold
at face value
(o) Gain recognized in
Year One (g)
(p) Total gain recognized
(n + o)
$49 ($70 - $21) $70 ($70 - $0)




$70 ($70 + SO)
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(q) Gain realized if new
property (FMV $30)
is sold (see k) $10 SAME
(r) Ultimate gain real-
ized and recognized
(p + q) $80 ($70 + $10) SAME
VII. CONCLUSION
As illustrated in the preceding hypotheticals, the "trade-down" ex-
change is best viewed as a partial exchange and a partial sale of property.
The exchange aspect of the transaction results in the receipt of like-kind
property entitled to section 1031 nonrecognition, while the sale results in the
receipt of nonlike-kind property or boot which may be taxed upon receipt.
This duality strongly militates against Revenue Ruling 65-155's interpreta-
tion and application of the profit reporting percentage. The ruling's ap-
proach, requiring gain recognition in the year of the exchange on the like-
kind property received is inconsistent with the underlying intent of section
1031. It is logical to consider the like-kind property received as partial pay-
ment for the property transferred, and further, to include the net value of
the property received in applying section 453's thirty percent PYOS test, but
it does not follow that the like-kind payment received should be taxable. To
so hold completely contravenes the purpose of section 1031.
The solution lies in the suggested alternative which places proper em-
phasis upon section 1031 objectives while still allowing the proper amount of
gain to be recognized. Section 453 installment reporting purposes are like-
wise furthered in that reporting of gain is matched with the periodic receipt
of payments.
Finally, the proper time and amount for reporting recognized gain in a
hybrid transaction must logically be accompanied by a proper basis alloca-
tion for the properties received. The allocation of basis is not extensively
analyzed in either Revenue Ruling 65-155, the Mitchell decision, or the
Treasury Regulations. To avoid the untenable result of recognizing more
gain than was realized, while allocating a transferred basis to the like-kind
property, basis must also be allocated to the noncash nonlike-kind property
whenever the profit reporting percentage is less than one hundred percent.
Either the suggested alternative or the unified approach will accomplish this
objective and accurately reflect the realities of this hybrid transaction.
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THE PASSAGE OF PATENT RIGHTS UPON MERGER: PPG
Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp. -THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT EQUATES ASSIGNMENT
WITH TRANSFER BY OPERATION
OF LAW
INTRODUCTION
Patent licensing rights traditionally have been personal and nontrans-
ferable.' Thus, unless express consent to assignment is contained in the li-
censing agreement, patent rights cannot be assigned or otherwise transferred
to a third party. An exception to this rule has been recognized when two
licensees merge to form a single corporation. 2 In this instance, the consoli-
dated company is considered the successor rather than the assignee of the
original company.3 Accordingly, it is arguable that even though a patent
right may be nontransferable to a third party, a license would fall within the
ambit of the common law and statutory rule allowing all the rights, privi-
leges and franchises of a constituent corporation to pass by operation of law
to the surviving corporation in a merger.
4
This line of reasoning has been rejected by the Sixth Circuit in PPG
Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp.,5 a case of first impression, which
held that the surviving corporation in a statutory merger did not acquire
patent license rights where provisions in the original licensing agreement
against assignment and transfer did not contain an exception for merger.
6
1. The long line of federal cases recognizing patent rights as personal and nontransferable
have as their principal case Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886) which, in turn, relies on
Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75 (1883) and Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 193 (1852). See generall6 cases cited note 19 n/ra.
2. In Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893), the Supreme Court announced
that the rule of nonassignability was inapplicable to the case of merger. Citing Lightner v.
Boston & A.R. Co., 15 F. Cas. 514 (C.C. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,343), the Court stated that "a
license, though not usually transferable, is transmissible by succession to a corporation formed
by the union of two licensees succeeding to the obligations of both, for the reason that the consoli-
dated company is the successor rather than the assignee of the original companies." 150 U.S. at 196 (em-
phasis supplied). The Supreme Court has thus recognized that Lightner v. Boston, in the case of
patent licenses, supplies a basis for the proposition that a merger is an exception to the general
rule of nonassignability.
3. Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, 196 (1893).
4. As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognizes, it is well-settled statutory
and common law rule that all the rights, privileges, franchises and liabilities of a constituent
corporation vest in the successor corporation upon merger. Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Altes, 511 F.2d
280 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736,
741 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); In re Penn Central Sec. Lit., 335 F. Supp.
1026, 1034 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
This rule is embodied in the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 76(d) (1972) which
outlines the effect of merger or consolidation. This section of the Model Act has been adopted
by the legislatures in all states and the District of Columbia. COMM. ON CORP. LAWS, MODEL
BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT ANNOTATED § 76 (2d ed. 1971, 1977 Supp.) [hereinafter referred
to as the M.B.C.A. ANNOTATED § 76(d)]. See the full text of § 76 of the Model Act in note 40
in/ra.
5. 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 272 (1979).
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Although the subject matter of PPG Industries concerns the effect of merger
on nontransferable patent rights, unless isolated, Judge Lively's holding that
a transfer is a transfer, whether it occurs by operation of law or by a particu-
lar act of the parties, could affect a substantial body of law predicated on the
theory of continuity. 7 This would disrupt the orderly succession of corporate
rights by merger, as envisioned by the common law and the Model Business
Corporation Act.
8
PPG Industries. was predicated upon two theories, one factual and one
legal. The factual theory was that the trial court interpreted the licensing
contract incorrectly, and that the evidence indicated that the parties had
agreed to prohibit the transfer of the license to a successor in the event of
merger. The legal theory suggested that, even in the absence of an express
clause prohibiting the transfer upon merger, the passage of rights by merger
is the equivalent of assignment such that the general rule of patent nonas-
signability was controlling. Under both of these theories, Guardian was held
liable for infringement. Since the licensing contract contained no express
provisions regarding merger, and since the court's factual interpretation of
the contract was the result of traditional rules of construction, 9 this comment
will focus on the legal theory utilized by Judge Lively.
This comment will consider the competing principles of patent nonas-
signability and the free passage of rights by operation of law in order to
assess their applicability to the merger situation. It will be suggested that the
transfer of rights by operation of law is not the equivalent of assignment, and
furthermore, that there is little justification for the treatment of patent rights
as being distinct from other contract rights which would pass by operation of
law to the surviving corporation in a merger.
6. Although the cross-licensing agreements did not contain an express provision regarding
the passage of the licenses to a successor in the event of merger, the court of appeals construed
the contracts as impliedly prohibiting transfer by merger. See note 10 infra.
7. The theory of corporate continuity is illustrated in Vulcan Materials Co. v. United
States, 446 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971). In Vulcan Materials, it was
necessary for the court to distinguish merger from dissolution to determine whether a claimed
capital expenditure was deductible under the Internal Revenue Code. The court defined
merger as:
[Tihe absorbtion of one corporation by another, which retains its name and cor-
porate entity with the added capital, franchises, and powers of the merged corpora-
tion. It is the uniting of two or more corporations by the transfer of property to one of
them, which continues in existence, the others being merged therein.
446 F.2d at 694. The theory of continuity thus maintains that a corporation only loses its sepa-
rate existence in a merger, and that all the franchises and powers of the merged corporation
continue in the surviving corporation. See Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch.
262, 92 A.2d 311 (1952); Argenbright v. Phoenix Finance Co., 21 Del. Ch. 288, 197 A. 124
(1936). See generally 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 7041 (perm. ed. 1971,
1979 Supp.).
8. See. note 40 infa for the full text of § 76(d) of the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION
ACT.
9. As Corbin has stated: "[A] condition that is truly 'implied' is substantially an express
condition. It is a condition for the reason that the parties have so agreed; but their intention to
make it so has not been expressed in definite language." 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 653, at 132 (2d ed. Supp. 1971). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 267 (1973). Contra, S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 610, 610A (3d ed. Supp.
1979) (Williston's position is that the courts may not "rewrite the contract for the parties." Id.
§ 610A).
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I. T14E BACKGROUND OF PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp.
The primary issue in this case was whether the surviving corporation in
a statutory merger acquired the patent license rights of its constituent corpo-
ration, where provisions in the licensing agreement prohibited assignment or
transfer and did not contain an exception for merger.' 0 The issue arose as a
consequence of a 1964 licensing agreement between two glass manufacturers
10. There were eleven patents involved in this infringement suit. Two of the patents
originated as a result of the development work carried out at PPG Industries. The other nine
patents originated as a result of work carried out at Permaglass. The parties granted each other
rights to "gas hearth system" patents in the following language:
SECTION 3. GRANT FROM PERMAGLASS TO PPG
3.1. Subject to the reservation set forth in subsection 3.3 below, PERMAGLASS
hereby grants to PPG an exclusive license, with right of sublicense, to use
PERMAGLASS Technical Data in Gas Hearth Systems throughout the United States
of America, its territories and possessions, and all countries of the world foreign
thereto.
3.2. Subject to the reservation set forth in Subsection 3.3 below,
PERMAGLASS hereby grants to PPG an unlimited exclusive license, with right of
sublicense, under PERMAGLASS Patent Rights.
3.3. The licenses granted to PPG under Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 above shall be
subject to the reservation of a nonexclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free, world-wide
right and license for the benefit and use of PERMAGLASS.
SECTION 4. GRANT FROM PPG TO PERMAGLASS
4.1. PPG hereby grants to PERMAGLASS a non-exclusive, non-transferable,
royalty-free right and license to heat, bend, thermally temper and/or anneal glass
using Gas Hearth Systems, under PPG Patent Rights, excepting in the Dominion of
Canada, and to use or sell glass articles produced thereby, but no license, express or
implied, is hereby granted to PERMAGLASS under any claim of any PPG patent
expressly covering any coating method, coating composition, or coated article.
SECTION 9. ASSIGNABILITY
9.1. This Agreement shall be assignable by PPG to any successor of the entire
flat glass business of PPG but shall otherwise be non-assignable except with the con-
sent of PERMAGLASS first obtained in writing.
9.2. This Agreement and the license granted by PPG to PERMAGLASS here-
under shall be personal to PERMAGLASS and non-assignable except with the con-
sent of PPG first obtained in writing.
SECTION 11. TERMINATION
11.2. In the event that a majority of the voting stock of PERMAGLASS shall at
any time become owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a manufacturer of
automobiles or a manufacturer or fabricator of glass other than the present owners,
the license granted to PERMAGLASS under Subsection 4.1 shall terminate forthwith.
597 F. 2d at 1092.
The § 11.2 termination provisions only relate to the two patents granted to Permaglass by
PPG. There were no express provisions regarding merger of stock voting control regarding the
nine patents granted to PPG by Permaglass. Nevertheless, the court of appeals concluded that
the parties intended that the license wouldn't pass to a successor in a merger because the patent
was to be "personal" and "for the benefit and use of Permaglass." 597 F.2d at 195. If this was
their intention, why were the two PPG patents treated differently than the nine Permaglass
patents in the termination clause? Only the PPG patent licenses would terminate if Permaglass
came under the control of a competitor glass manufacturer. Given the specificity of the termi-
nation clause for the two PPG patents, and the inconsistent treatment of the nine patents vis-a-
vis the two patents, it is hard to agree with the court's construction that a general intent to
prohibit transfer by merger of all eleven patents appear through an examination of §§ 3, 4, and
9 of the cross-licensing agreement. If the court's construction is inaccurate, and there was no
implicit agreement to prohibit transfer in the event of merger, then the court's holding is only
supported by its legal theory that the passage of right by merger is the equivalent of assignment,
which theory is criticized by this comment.
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and the subsequent merger of the licensee with a third glass manufacturer,
Guardian Industries.
The licensee, Permaglass Inc., was a small Ohio glass fabricator who at
first fabricated only flat glass pieces used in the appliance and automotive
industries. As the company began to prosper, its managers developed new
product lines and improved technologies. One development was a "gas
hearth" or "air float" process by which glass could be tempered and
fabricated while being supported on a bed of hot air. Permaglass soon
moved this process from the experimental to the production stage, and the
first gas hearth furnace became operational in 1963. At approximately the
same time, Permaglass discovered that PPG Industries had been working,
independently, on the same technology.
The two corporations soon entered into negotiations to ascertain their
respective patent positions. These negotiations culminated in a cross-licens-
ing agreement dated January 1, 1964. Under the terms of this agreement,
Permaglass granted PPG an "unlimited exclusive license, with right of subli-
cense" to use the patent.11 Permaglass reserved personal and nontransfer-
able rights to use its own process. In return, PPG granted Permaglass a
"nonexclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free right and license" to use the
PPG gas hearth patents.' 2 This cross-license also was personal and non-
transferable and made no express provision for the event of merger.
In 1969, Permaglass merged with Guardian Industries Corporation, a
manufacturer of windshields for the automotive industry. In economic
terms, this consolidation was a textbook case of a front windshield manufac-
turer combining with a rear windshield manufacturer for the benefit of both.
Permaglass had by this time entered into the fabrication of tempered glass
for automobile side and rear windows. To increase its sales, the company
needed a larger distribution system and a more reliable source of raw glass.
Guardian manufactured front windshields, had a large national distribution
system, and needed an outlet for its raw glass producing facility. Thus the
merger not only solved the internal supply and marketing problems of both
companies, it also made the resulting company more competitive in the orig-
inal autoglass market since automobile manufacturers prefer to fill all of
their glass needs from the same source.
Guardian was the surviving entity in the merger and it continued to
operate the furnace units that had been constructed and operated by
11. The patent statute specifically permits the issuance of exclusive licenses. Patent Act of
1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976). The grant of an exclusive license precludes the licensor from
granting other licenses, although the licensor may reserve the right to practice the invention
himself. Rollman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1957); Agrashell, Inc. v. Composition
Materials, 40 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
12. Nonexclusive licenses have no statutory basis, and are merely a waiver of infringement
under the licensed invention. L.L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroloid, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 857
(S.D.N.Y. 1939), affd 118 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1941). "In its simplest form, a license means only
leave to do a thing which the licensor would otherwise have a right to prevent. Such a license
grants to the licensee merely a privilege that protects him from a claim of infringement by the
owner of the patent monopoly." Western Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116,
118 (2d Cir. 1930). See generally Scaffetta, Nonexclusive Patent Licensees." The Lack of Riht to Sue for
Intfringement, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
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Permaglass. PPG soon filed suit in federal court claiming patent infringe-
ment by Guardian through its use of the apparatus and process licenses
which had been granted to Permaglass. Guardian raised the defense that it
was a valid licensee because it had succeeded by merger to all the rights,
privileges and franchises which had been granted to Permaglass. The trial
court dismissed the action on the merits, holding that there had been no
assignment or transfer of patent rights. Rather, under the Delaware and
Ohio merger statutes, 13 the rights had passed to Guardian by operation of
law. The court noted that the "continuity of interest inherent in a statutory
merger distinguishes it from an ordinary assignment or transfer case. Differ-
ent policy considerations are involved and they justify different treat-
ment." 1 4 On appeal, the court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and
held that the merger transferred the license to the successor by specific act of
the parties (2e. the intent to merge) and thus was equivalent to assignment.'
5
Accordingly, Guardian was held to have infringed upon PPG's patent rights.
While this holding provides clear guidance for the issue of the effect of
merger on patent rights, its rationale does not clearly flow from the holdings
of earlier patent cases, from case law relating to the passage of rights in a
merger, or from the merger statutes as represented by the Model Business
Corporation Act. 16 Moreover, Judge Lively's dismissal of the theory of con-
tinuity as being too "metaphysical"' 7 could disturb areas of law beyond that
13. Both the Delaware and the Ohio merger statutes follow § 76(d) of the MODEL BuSI-
NESS CORPORATION ACT. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.81 (A)(4) (Page 1978).
14. 428 F. Supp. at 796. The court in Segal v. Greater Valley Terminal Corp., 83 N.J.
Super. 120, 199 A.2d 48 (1964), concluded that different policy considerations require that the
passage of assets in a statutory merger be distinguished from ordinary assignment. The court
noted:
One who deals with a corporation must realize that the beneficial ownership of that
corporation can be changed at any time. Merger is only one of the ways which that
change can be made. To deny the benefit of a merging corporation's nonassignable
contracts in a merger authorized by statute would sharply limit the utility of such
statutes.
83 N.J. Super. at 124, 199 A.2d at 51.
15. Patent rights may still be transferred to the successor corporation in a merger, but only
by the rules governing assignment. Thus, should the parties wish transfer by merger, they
should make express provision in the contract. It is interesting to note that, in a 1969 patent
licensing agreement, Permaglass and Guardian provided that the licenses under that agreement
were not assignable "except to a successor to the entire business to which this agreement relates
. .. 597 F.2d at 1097. The 1969 agreement, however, was not intended to modify the 1964
agreement which was the subject of the litigation. Id.
16. See note 40 infra for the full text of the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 76(d).
17. 597 F.2d at 1096. Judge Lively referred to an earlier case decided by the Third Cir-
cuit, Koppers Coal & Transp. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1939), in which the
court of appeals disparaged the theory of continuity by characterizing it as a theory whereby
"the underlying assets of the constituent corporation are taken up into the resultant corporation
precisely as specks of dust floating in drops of water are taken into a single merged drop." 107
F.2d at 707. Thus, the theory of continuity was dismissed as "metaphysical" and completely at
odds with the merger statute. Koppers held, as did the court of appeals in PPG Industries, that a
transfer by merger was not "wholly by operation of law" since a merger necessitates the volun-
tary act and participation of the constituent corporation. Id. at 708. Despite the eloquence of
Koppers' language, it appears that this holding, and not the theory of continuity, is completely
at odds with the merger statutes which state that "all property ... shall be taken and deemed
to be transferred to and vested in such corporation without further act of deed." See the full text
of the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION CODE § 76(d) note 40 infra. A fair reading of the stat-
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governing the drafting of patent licenses. The following section will discuss
these interrelated themes.
II. PATENT RIGHTS ARE GENERALLY NOT ASSIGNABLE WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE GRANTOR
Although the Congress has specified that any interest in a patent has
the attributes of property and may be assignable,' 8 patent licenses have long
been held to be personal to the licensee and nontransferable to a third party
absent an express grant allowing assignment.' 9 This rule of construction
owes its existence to a long line of federal cases predicated upon the 1886
Supreme Court case of Hapgood v. Hewitt. 20 This case established a sturdy
foundation for a general rule of nonassignability; however, it does not pro-
vide guidance for the issue of whether patent rights may pass to a successor
corporation in a merger, because it does not specify that transfer by opera-
tion of law is the equivalent of assignment. This section will analyze the rule
of assignability in order to assess its applicability to the merger situation.
The rule of patent nonassignability arises independently of the patent
statute. 2 1 It derives from the case of Hapgoodv. Hewitt which, in turn, relied
for authority on the earlier Supreme Court decisions in Troy Iron &Na/ Fac-
lory o. Corning2 2 and Oi'ver v. Rumford Chemical Works.2 3 These three cases
supply the fundamental principles for the view that patent licenses, unless
otherwise provided, are personal and nontransferable.
In Hapgood, the Court considered the effect of an assignment on the
ute indicates that the legislature intends that the assets should pass by operation of law and not
by act of the parties.
18. The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976) provides:
Section 261. OwnershtAp assignment
Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal
property.
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law
by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal represent-
atives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application
for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States.
19. Lane & Bodley v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893); Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886);
Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75 (1883); Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 193 (1852); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelly Corp., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973); Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Filben Mfg. Co., 168 F.2d 919 (8th
Cir.), cert. dented 335 U.S. 892 (1948); Bowers v. Lake Superior Contracting, 149 F. 983 (8th Cir.
1906); Woods Harvester Co. v. Minneapolis Harvester Co., 61 F. 256 (8th Cir. 1894). See gener-
aly A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 409 (2d ed. 1965).
This view has not been shared universally. In a well-reasoned opinion, Justice Traynor
rejected the federal view that patent rights are nonassignable noting that such a view "miscon-
ceives the policy of the federal patent statute and the relation between federal and state law in
the area of patent rights." Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 215, 308
P.2d 732, 740 (1957). Arguing that there is no specific federal policy governing the transferabil-
ity of patents in merger, and that none of the Hapgood line of cases had been decided after Erie
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1933), Traynor applied the California policy of the free transferabil-
ity of contracts. As indicated by the subsequent Unarco and Rock-Ola cases, Traynor's analysis
has had little impact on federal cases which have considered the assignability of patents after
Erie.
20. 119 U.S. 226 (1886).
21. See note 18 supra.
22. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 193 (1852).
23. 109 U.S. 75 (1883).
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grant of an equitable patent license.24 The controversy arose when a small
manufacturer of agricultural equipment, Hapgood & Company, hired the
defendant to manage the production of "sulky" plows and to design an im-
proved iron plow.25 After the defendant completed the work in 1877, he left
the company and obtained letters patent on his improved design. Subse-
quently, believing that they had obtained an equitable license to use the
improved design because it had been designed while the defendant was in
their employ, Hapgood & Company assigned its license rights to a third
party. 26 Hapgood & Company then brought suit to enforce the transfer of
the letters patent to its assignee on the theory that patent rights are freely
assignable. The Supreme Court concluded that Hapgood & Company had
obtained an equitable license to use the patented plow design, but it held
that "[wihatever license resulted to the Missouri Corporation [Hapgood &
Company], from the facts of the case, to use the invention, was one confined
to that corporation, and not assignable by it."' 2 7 For this proposition the
Court cited Troy Iron & Nail Factorg v. Corning and Oliver v. Rumford. In Troy,
after concluding that the parties impliedly had agreed to prohibit transfer,
the Court held that "[a] mere license to a party, without having his assigns
or equivalent words to them, showing that it was meant to be assignable, is
only the grant of a personal power to the licensee, and is not transferable by
him to another."'28 Similarly, in Oi'ver, after the Court held that the parties
impliedly had prohibited transfer, the Court noted:
It is apparent that licenses of this character must have been
granted to such individuals as the grantor chose to select because of
their personal ability or qualifications to make or furnish a market
for the self-raising flour and thus for the acid [the invention], all of
which was to be purchased from the grantor. The license was to be
made revocable by the grantor on the failure of Morgan to per
form his covenants and agreements.
29
In each of these cases the facts indicate that the parties had intended
that the license be personal, and that the licensor was dependent upon the
personal qualities of the licensee as a condition of the grant. None of the
cases cites a policy which would allow the generalization of such a conclu-
sion into a fixed rule that all licenses are personal and nontransferable. The
bases for the Hapgood rule are the Troy and Oliver cases. But as Justice Tray-
nor observed in a 1957 California patent case: "The statement in the Troy
24. Equitable licenses, or "shop rights," are implied licenses that usually arise when an
employee perfects a patentable device or process in the course of his employ. Equitable licenses
consistently have been held to pass to the resultant corporation in a merger. See, e.g., Papazian
v. American Steel & Wire Co., 155 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1957); Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v.
Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D. Pa. 1931); Wilson v. J.G. Wilson Corp., 241 F.
494 (E.D. Va. 1917).
25. The sulky, or riding plow, was arranged so that the plow was carried on a frame sup-
ported by wheels, and that the driver of the horses rode on the frame. During the year 1876, the
officers of Hapwood & Company thought it desirable to substitute an iron frame for the wooden
one. 119 U.S. at 229.
26. Although the Hapgood Plow Company did become the successor to the assets of
Hapgood & Company, it did so by assignment and not by statutory merger. Id. at 227.
27. Id. at 234.
28. Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 193, 216 (1852).
29. Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75, 83 (1883).
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case, however, was not necessary to the decision, and in Oliver v. Rumford
Chemical Works there were provisions in the license calling for the personal
skill of the licensee even under ordinary rules of construction." 30 Traynor
concluded that the federal rule of nonassignability "misconceives the policy
of the federal and state law in the area of patent rights."
3 1 His criticism
illustrates a conceptual flaw in the federal rule of nonassignability. What
policy is served by a presumption ofnontransferabi/ity? At first glance, the stated
congressional policy that all "patents shall have the attributes of personal
property . . . [and] shall be assignable in law" 32 is disserved by such a pre-
sumption. Moreover, if it is the protection of the inventor that is sought, it is
unclear how a presumption that patent holders rely more on the personal
qualities of the licensee than do other holders of property promotes the pro-
tection of inventions. Such a presumption is more appropriate in a world of
guilds and artisans than in the highly commercial world of today. It is clear
that if an inventor does wish that his patented process or apparatus only be
used by certain individuals or industries, he could quite easily place such
restrictions in his grant.
Despite its inapt beginnings, the rule of patent license nonassignability
is a rule to which federal courts have consistently adhered. 33 Although
many of these cases can be explained on the ground that the language of the
licensing contract clearly excludes assignability, 34 many others have fol-
lowed the holding of Hapgood v. Hewtt as an unquestioned rule of patent
law. 35 For example, citing Troy and Hapgood, the Seventh Circuit recently
held that:
We are of the opinion that the question of assignability of a
patent license is a specific policy of federal patent law dealing with
federal patent law. Therefore, we hold federal law applies to the
question of the assignability of the patent license in question ...
The long standing federal rule of law with respect to the assignabil-
ity of patent license agreements provides that these agreements are
personal to the licensee and not assignable unless expressly made so
in the agreement.
36
Similarly, in WoodHarvester Co. v. Minneapohs, the Eighth Circuit considered
that "the absence of any words of assignability in [a] license shows an intent
to make it run to the [licensee] alone, as clearly as if words of nonassignabil-
30. Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal.2d 208, 215, 308 P.2d 732, 740 (1957).
31. Id. at 213, 308 P.2d at 737.
32. The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976).
33. See note 19 supra.
34. See, e.g., Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Filben Mfg. Co., 168 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 892 (1948); Reynolds Spring Co. v. L.A. Young Indus., Inc., 101 F.2d 257, 260
(6th Cir. 1939); Niagara Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Hibbard, 179 F. 844, 845 (7th Cir. 1910).
35. Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, 195-96 (1893); Kenyon v. Automatic Instr.
Co., 63 F. Supp. 591, 593 (W.D.S.D.) rev'don other grounds, 160 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1947); Neon
Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D. Pa. 1931); Bowers v. Lake
Superior Contracting, 149 F. 983 (8th Cir. 1906); Wood Harvester Co. v. Minneapolis-Esterley
Harvester Co., 61 F. 256 (8th Cir. 1894). See also A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 409 (2d ed. 1965).
36. Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 929 (1973).
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ity had been incorporated therein." 3
7
By such analysis, the federal courts have created a fixed rule of nonas-
signability based upon the theory that a licensor relies on the personal quali-
ties of the licensee. Regardless of the merits of this rule of nonassignability, it
does not appear to be applicable to the merger situation. To the contrary,
under the theory of corporate continuity, merger fulfills the presumed reli-
ance upon the licensee's personal qualities, since all the qualities and assets
of the merging corporation continue in the successor corporation. At the
very least one could argue that, in the absence of a policy prohibiting trans-
fer in a merger, the presumption that all rights and privileges pass by opera-
tion of law in a merger should prevail. The next section will analyze such a
presumption to determine its applicability to the passage of patent rights
upon merger.
III. ALL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND FRANCHISES OF A CONSTITUENT
CORPORATION PASS BY OPERATION OF LAW TO THE
SURVIVING CORPORATION
The merger of one corporation with another does not contemplate the
winding up of the business of the merging corporation and the liquidation of
its assets. Rather, a primary object of merger is to continue the business of
the constituent, or merging, corporation. The extent to which the surviving
corporation may enjoy the assets of the former corporation, however, de-
pends upon the legislatures that govern merger, since it is the sovereign who
confers the authority to consolidate. 38 With respect to the effect of merger or
consolidation, the legislatures of all jurisdictions of the United States have
adopted section 76(d) of the Model Business Corporation Act 39 which states
that in the event of merger, the "surviving or new corporation shall there-
upon and thereafter possess all the rights, privileges, immunities, and
franchises .. .of each of the merging or consolidating corporations .. .
land such property] shall be taken and deemed to be transfered to and
vested in such single corporation without further act or deed. .... 40
37. 61 F. 256, 258 (8th Cir. 1894).
38. Clearwater v. Meredith, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 25 (1863); Pearce v. Madison & I.R. Co., 62
U.S. (21 How.) 441 (1860); Roddy v. Norco Local 4-750, Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union, 359 So. 2d 957 (La. 1978). The sovereignty which determines the existence or nonexis-
tence of a power in a corporation is the state. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d
971 (6th Cir. 1936).
39. M.B.C.A. ANNOTATED § 76(d), at 401-03.
40. Id. The statute provides as follows:
Section 76 EFFECT OF MERGER OR CONSOLIDATION
Upon the issuance of the certificate of merger or the certificate of consolidation by the
Secretary of State, the merger or consolidation shall be effected.
When such merger or consolidation has been effected:
(a) The several corporations parties to the plan of merger or consolidation shall be a
single corporation, which, in the case of merger, shall be that corporation designated
in the plan of merger as the surviving corporation, and, in the case of a consolidation,
shall be the new corporation provided for in the plan of consolidation.
(b) The separate existence of all corporations parties to the plan of merger or consoli-
dation, except the surviving or new corporation, shall cease.
(c) Such surviving or new corporation shall have all the rights, privileges, immunities
and powers and shall be subject to all the duties and liabilities of a corporation orga-
nized under this Act.
1980]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
Some states have supplemented the basic language of the Model Act to
make clear that the transmission of rights by merger is not governed by the
usual rules of law with respect to assignment. 4  For example, in 1977, Colo-
rado added a sentence to its version of section 76(d) that reads:
Such transfer to and vesting in the new or surviving corporation
shall be deemed to occur by operation of law, and no consent or approval
of any other person shall be required in connection with any such
transfer or vesting unless such consent or approval is speifically required in
the event of merger of consolidation by law or by express provision tn any
contract, agreement, decree, order, or other provision to which any
constituent corporation is a party or by which it is bound.
42
Thus, in Colorado, general provisions of nontransferability, such as those
involved in the patent licenses in PPGIndustries, would not operate to hinder
the passage of rights to the surviving corporation unless the particular con-
tract contained express provision prohibiting transfer upon merger.
Even in the absence of a clear statutory presumption of the free trans-
ferability of rights, under the case law of numerous jurisdictions, the passage
of rights by merger long has been distinguished from assignment. For exam-
ple, two Illinois cases, Albers v. McNuzho/s 43 and Essex International, Inc. v.
Clamage,44 illustrate the view that usually nontransferable instruments of
guaranty pass to the surviving corporation in a merger. 45 In Albers, the de-
fendant, seeking recovery under an instrument of guaran'ty, argued that 1) a
party cannot gain benefit under a guaranty unless he is named in the origi-
nal instrument, and 2) that the constituent corporation cannot transfer the
guaranty to the surviving corporation in a merger because the instrument is
non-negotiable. The trial court held for the defendant. The plaintiff argued
on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to distinguish between assign-
ment and succession by merger. The court of appeals agreed with the plain-
tiff and reversed the judgment. The court supported its holding by quoting
from a similar New York case, Bank of Long Island v. Young 4 6 (the New York
(d) Such surviving or new corporation shall thereupon and thereafter possess all the
rights, privileges, immunities, and franchises, of a public as well as of a private nature,
of each of the merging or consolidating corporations; andallproperty real, personal and
mixed, and all debts due on whatever account, including subscriptions to shares, and
all other choses in action, and all and every other interest of or belonging to or due to
each of the corporations so merged or consolidated, shall be taken and deemed to be trans-
ferred to and vested in such single corporation without further act or deed; and the
title to any real estate, or any interest therein, vested in any of such corporations shall
not revert or be in any way impaired by reason of such merger or consolidation;
d. (Emphasis supplied).
41. Discussing the 1977 addition to the Colorado Corporation Code, it has been noted that
"the addition makes it clear that contracts which provide that they 'cannot be assigned without
the consent of the parties hereto' do transfer to the surviving corporation in a merger or consoli-
dation, unless the contract specifically requires consent to transfer in the event of a merger or
consolidation." Maer & Giacomini, The 1977 Revzswtns to the Colorado Corporation Code; 7 COLO.
LAW. 911, 926 (1978).
42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-7-105(2) (Supp. 1979) (emphasis supplied).
43. 301 Ill. App. 551, 23 N.E.2d 220 (1939).
44. 440 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying Illinois law).
45. An instrument of guaranty is an agreement to guarantee the payment of the obligation
of a third party to a creditor.
46. 101 A.D. 88, 91, 91 N.Y.S. 849, 850-51 (1905).
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and Illinois merger statutes are parallel):
The legislature did not contemplate that the property of one bank
merger in another should rest in the corporation in which the
merger takes place by operation of any assignment, or that such
transfer should be attended with the usual rules of law with respect
to assignment. The scheme is that the corporation which is merged
with another should lose its identity only so far as its separate exist-
ence is concerned, and that it should be swallowed up in the other,
and become an integral part thereof, carrying into the corporation
which survived all its rights, powers, liabilities and assets except the
indicia of a corporate body distinct from that into which it is
merged.
47
Essex v. Clamage also addressed the question of whether a corporate merger
would discharge the obligation of a debtor under a guarantee. The court of
appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, although Illinois recognized the
general rule of nonassignability of guarantees, merger does not affect an as-
signment because the essentials of the original contract are not materially
altered from that first contemplated. 48 Thus,
a merger involving a creditor corporation does not discharge a
guarantor any more than does a new change in corporate name.
Unless there is some material change either in the business dealings
between the debtor and the creditor or in the risk undertaken by
the guarantor, the obligation of the guarantor is not discharged.4 9
Accordingly, there are dual rationales supporting the general rule that in-
struments of guaranty pass to the surviving corporation even though they
are not transferable to a third party: 1) the legislatures intend that all prop-
erty should pass freely upon merger, and 2) merger, unlike assignment, does
not materially alter the expectations of the parties since all of the qualities of
the former corporation survive in the resulting corporation.
50
These principles have been applied to many other types of nonassigna-
ble contracts: municipal licenses,5 liability insurance contracts, 5 2 real estate
leases,5 3 federal contract claims, 54 and equitable licenses. 55 In each of these
47. 301 Il1. App. at 554, 23 N.E.2d at 222.
48. Essex v. Clamage, 440 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1971).
49. 440 F.2d at 550. This rule recognizing that instruments of guaranty pass to the succes-
sor in a merger, despite the fact that they are generally non-negotiable, has also been recognized
in New York and Ohio. Metro Corrugated Containers v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 85 F. Supp.
359 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (applying Ohio and New York law); Pantex Pressing Mach. v. United
States, 71 F. Supp. 859 (Ct. Cl. 1947) (construing federal tort claims statute and holding that
merger did not affect an assignment); Bank of Long Island v. Young, 101 A.D. 88, 91 N.Y.S. 849
(1905).
50. See, e.g., Metro Corrugated Containers v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 185 F. Supp. 359
(E.D.N.Y. 1960); Chase Nat'l Bank v. Burg, 32 F. Supp. 230 (D. Minn. 1940); Bank of United
States v. Glickman, 241 A. D. 92, 271 N.Y.S. 90, aJ'd 265 N.Y. 539, 193 N.E. 309 (1934); W. H.
McElwain Co. v. Primavera, 180 A. D. 288, 167 N.Y.S. 815 1917).
51. Diamond Parking, Inc. v. Seattle, 78 Wash. 2d 778, 479 P.2d 47 (1971).
52. Syracuse Lighting Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 226 N.Y. 25, 122 N.E. 723 (1919).
53. Dodier Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Nat'l Baseball Club, 361 Mo. 981, 238 S.W.2d
321 (1951); Segal v. Greater Valley Terminal Corp., 83 N.J. Super. 120, 199 A.2d 48 (1964).
54. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 256 U.S. 655 (1921). In Seaboard, a successor
corporation sought payment for transportation services. The claim was acquired through
merger. The government defended with the argument that a federal claims statute prohibits
assignment of claims against the United States. The Supreme Court held that since the claim-
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cases a primary rationale was that the principles governing merger are dis-
tinct from rules of ordinary assignment. 56 A significant case in the area of
non-assignable contracts is Diamond Parki'ng, Inc. v. Seattle.57 In Diamond Park-
ihg, the city of Seattle sought the payment of licensing fees from a newly
formed corporation that was operating several parking lots. The corporation
had acquired licenses to operate the lots through statutory merger with three
parking lot companies. 58 The city argued that since the licenses were nonas-
signable, the corporation had to pay new licensing fees to operate the park-
ing lots. The corporation argued that it had acquired the licenses through
statutory merger, not by assignment, and thus was authorized to operate
under the licenses granted to the constituent corporations in the merger.
The Supreme Court of Washington held that the Washington version of sec-
tion 76(d) of the Model Business Corporation Act governed the construction
of the Seattle ordinance which rendered the licenses nontransferable. 59 The
Court noted the legislative purpose underlying the merger statute:
It was the evident legislative intent, in enacting these provisions, to
encourage the continuation of businesses so that their obligations
can be discharged. A corporation cannot reasonably be expected
to discharge its obligations and liabilities if it is deprived of its valu-
able assets, and the value of a license in carrying on a business can
hardly be questioned . . . . The statute does not provide that the
surviving corporation shall succeed to the rights, privileges and
franchises of the merger corporations, provided those rights, privi-
leges and franchises are made assignable by the authority which
granted them. It provides, without condition, that they shall pass
upon the merger.
60
ant had acquired his interest by operation of law and not by assignment, the claim should be
allowed. The Court noted:
As agreed and provided by the laws of the two states, the rights, privileges, franchises,
and all property, real, personal, and mixed, and all debts on every account, as well as
stock subscriptions and other things in actidn belonging to each of the constituents,
were transferred to and vested in the consolidated corporation without further act or
deed "as effectually as they were in the former companies."
256 U.S. at 656.
55. Papazian v. American Steel & Wire Co., 155 F. Supp. Ill (N.D. Ohio 1957); Neon-
Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Sign Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D. Pa. 1931); Wilson v.
J.G. Wilson Corp., 241 F. 494 (E.D. Va. 1917).
56. Counsel for Guardian only relied on two classes of cases (shop rights and real estate
leases) to support his argument that rights of a constituent corporation may pass by merger,
even though they may not otherwise be transferable. 597 F.2d at 1094. The court of appeals
concluded that these types of cases were explainable by other factors and could not be used to
support such a proposition.
57. 78 Wash.2d 778, 479 P.2d 47 (1971).
58. It is interesting to note that in Diamond Parking, the owner of the surviving corporation
had also owned all of the stock of the thee constituent corporations. Thus, under the guise of
an "assignment," the city of Seattle was trying to charge the same operator twice for the same
licenses because he had changed the form of his corporate existence.
59. SEATTLE CODE § 10.02.050 (1967) provided that: "No license issued under the provi-
sions of this chapter shall be transferable or assignable, unless specifically otherwise provided
for." Because of the legislative policy of the Washington version of the MODEL BUSINESS COR-
PORATION AcT, WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.20.060 (1969), this ordinance, which parallels the
assignment in the PPGlnditstris contract, was held to not prohibit the passage of the license by
merger.
60. 78 Wash.2d at 782, 479 P.2d at 49.
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Thus, the city's theory that the merger effected an assignment was found to
be in irreconcilable conflict with the legislative intent to promote merger:
If a surviving corporation must pay an additional license fee in
order to continue to enjoy a license lawfully acquired by one of the
merging corporations, an additional burden is attached. It is not
acquired subject to the same burdens and the restriction which at-
tached thereto in the hands of the consolidating corporations.
6 1
Accordingly, to require the surviving corporation to repurchase the licenses
it had acquired from the merging corporation would have been a tax on the
merger, which was contrary to the intent of the Model Business Corporation
Act.
There is very little difference between the situation in Di'amond Parking
and that presented by PPG Industrtes. Although the subject matter differs-a
nonassignable patent license versus a nonassignable municipal license-the
legal theory is the same. As was pointed out in Diamond Parking, there are
different policy considerations in a merger as compared to an assignment.
The next section will assess PPG Jndustrs in light of this theme.
IV. THE PASSAGE OF PATENT RIGHTS BY MERGER IS NOT THE
EQUIVALENT OF ASSIGNMENT
The legal issue in PPG Industrs was whether generally nontransferable
patent licenses may pass to the surviving corporation in a statutory merger.
The district court found that the continuity of interest inherent in a statu-
tory merger distinguishes it from ordinary assignment or transfer,62 and held
that the patent licenses pass to the resulting corporation by operation of law.
The court of appeals reversed and held that the merger had effected a trans-
fer of rights in violation of the licensing agreement. 63 Because the licensing
agreement contained no express provisions prohibiting transfer in the event of
merger, the court's conclusion that "[a] transfer is no less a transfer because
it takes place by operation of law rather than by a particular act of the
parties . . . ,"64 effectively equates the general rules governing the assign-
ment of patent licenses with those governing the passage of rights by merger.
This is the first instance in which these two competing principles have been
utilized to determine the effect of statutory merger on nonassignable patent
licenses. But, given the lack of a clear federal policy favoring the nontrans-
ferability of patents in the merger context, and given a strong statutory pre-
sumption of the free passage of rights, it is doubtful that the holding in PPG
Industries may be properly taken as support for the proposition that generally
nonassignable rights do not pass to the surviving corporation in a merger.
First, the court appeals found that the cases cited by Guardian in sup-
port of their theory that patent licenses pass to successors by operation of law
could not be used for support, because their facts took them outside the gen-
61. Id. at 783, 479 P.2d at 50.
62. 428 F. Supp. at 796. For a general discussion of the policy considerations involved in
statutory merger, see W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 7086 (perm. ed. Supp.
1979).
63. 597 F.2d at 1090.
64. Id. at 1096.
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eral rule of nonassignability. Thus, in the court's view, the surviving corpo-
ration in Lightner v. Boston & AR. Co.65 retained patent licenses from a
merger because the licensor had chosen both of the constituent corporations
as licensees. Accordingly the patent licenses pass to the successors in the so-
called "shop rights" cases because of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
66
Similarly, the court considered that real estate leases pass to successors in a
merger because of the policy against restraints on alienation. But, as the
Supreme Court later recognized in Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke,67 the court in
Lighlner v. Boston held that a license "is transmissible by succession to a cor-
poration formed by the union of two licensees succeeding to the obligations
of both, for the reason that the consolidated company is the successor rather than the
licensee of the orinthalcompanies. *68 and not because the constituent corpo-
rations were licensees. Similarly, several of the "shop rights" and real estate
lease cases cited by Guardian do distinguish between an assignment of prop-
erty from an acquisition of corporate property by a successor corporation in
a merger.6 9 Thus, the proposition that the rules of assignment are distinct
from the rules governing merger is supportable.
Second, it is uncertain whether the general rule of patent nonassignabil-
ity based on Hapgood v. Hewitt can be extended from a third-party assign-
ment context to the merger situation. No clear federal policy emanates from
the cases that would inhibit the passage of rights through merger. To the
contrary, in view of the congressional intent that patent licenses shall have
all the attributes of property, 70 and considering the view of section 76(d) of
the Model Business Corporation Act and of the cases relating other nonas-
signable contracts to the merger statutes, 7 1 it is doubtful that any fixed rule
65. 15 F. Cas. 514 (C.C. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,343).
66. See note 24 supra.
67. 150 U.S. 193 (1893).
68. Id. at 196 (Emphasis supplied). In Lane &Bodley, the Supreme Court cited the follow-
ing factors as being relevant to the application of the Llghtner V. Boston rule (that a license is
transmissible to the successor in a merger):
In the present case, it clearly appears that the company was organized on the same
basis as the firm; that the business of the company was to be the same as that carried
on by Locke & Bodley, and to be carried on in the same premises; that the entire
property and assets of the firm and its liabilities and obligations were devolved upon
the company; Locke himself, in his evidence, repeatedly speaks of the Lane & Bodley
company as the successor to the firm.
Id. This appears to be an early formulation of the theory of continuity. See note 7 supra.
69. See Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793 (W.D.Pa.
1931); cf Segal v. Greater Valley Terminal Corp., 83 N.J. Super. 120, 199 A.2d 48 (1964) (In
Segal, the New Jersey Court of Appeals considered the effect of merger on a non assignment
clause in a real estate lease. Although the court did note that for real estate there is a general
doctrine disfavoring restraints on alienation, the court held on separate grounds that merger
was not the equivalent of assignment, because the legislature had mandated that
[T]he rights, privileges, powers, franchises 'and all and every interest' of each constitu-
ent corporation shall vest in the successor corporation. The passage of such interest
under the statute, whether labeled an assignment, sub-lease, or transfer, is by opera-
tion of law and it will not operate as a breach of a covenant barring assignment.
Id. at 123, 199 A.2d at 50. Accord, Dodier Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Nat'l Baseball Club,
361 Mo. 981, 238 S.W.2d 321 (1951) (holding that the merger sections of the National Banking
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 34(a) (1946), precluded a claim that an assignment had been effected). See
generally 3a G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1212, 68,73 (Supp. 1980).).
70. Patent Statute of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976).
71. See note 40 supra for the full text of the Model Business Corporation Act.
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of construction can be drawn based on licenses where there are no express
provisions regarding merger.
Finally, the view that a transfer by operation of law is the equivalent of
transfer by act of the parties is clearly inconsistent with the language of the
merger statutes as represented by the Model Act, section 76(d), which pro-
vides that all rights, privileges, and franchises in a merger are transferred to
and vested in the surviving corporation without further act or deed. 72 This
language has been interpreted as authorizing the transfer of property by op-
eration of law and not by act of the parties. 73 Therefore, the principles gov-
erning the transfer of property are not equivalent to the principles governing
assignments and transfers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals broke new ground with its analysis
of the effect of statutory merger on generally nonassignable patent licenses.
The precedential value of PPG Industries, however, is uncertain because the
court utilized two distinct approaches for its conclusion that several patent
licenses had not passed from a constituent corporation to the surviving cor-
poration in a merger. In its first approach, the court applied traditional
rules of construction to conclude that the parties had intended to prohibit
the transfer of the licenses in the event of merger. This analysis serves as
useful instruction to future drafters of patent licensing contracts to include
express provision for merger in the agreement. The second approach is more
problematical.
The court devised a sophisticated legal theory to affect the curious met-
amorphosis of a transfer by operation of law to a general rule of patent li-
cense nontransferability. The court's conclusion that "[a] transfer is no less a
transfer because it takes place by operation of law rather than by particular
acts of the parties . . .74 effectively equates the general rules governing the
passage of rights by merger with the principles of assignment and transfer.
This equation irreconcilably conflicts with the statutory rules of merger and
departs from a large body of law predicated on the theory of corporate con-
tinuity. The holding in PPG Industries is expansive, but it should be limited
72. Id.
73. As was held in American Cement Corp. v. Dunetz Bros., Inc., 47 Misc.2d 747, 752, 263
N.Y.S.2d 119, 123 (Sup. Ct. 1965), discussing the effect of merger on a nontransferable lien, the
court considered the New York version of § 76(d) of the Model Act:
More comprehensive language could not be employed to indicate the intention
that any right, privilege, or property of any and every nature and kind that was vested
in the old corporations should be by operation of law transferred to and vested in the
new corporation unimpaired by the act of consolidation. It would be contrary to the
expressed intention of the Legislature by a narrow construction to cut down or limit
the broad and comprehensive language of this statute.
74. 597 F.2d at 1096.
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to its facts with the view that the parties had agreed to prohibit transfer
upon merger. Otherwise, this case provides a basis for the disruption of the
orderly succession of corporate rights as envisioned by the common law and
the Model Business Corporation Act.
Peler T Moore
PAYTON V NEw YoK." THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES
THE COMMON LAW WARRANTLESS ARREST
REQUIREMENTS
INTRODUCTION
In Pajton v. New York' the Supreme Court held that a warrant is re-
quired for arrests in a home or dwelling. In doing so the Court moved to
harmonize the fourth amendment protection for both arrests and searches.
The purpose of this comment will be to explore the protection provided by
the fourth amendment in the context of arrests, and to discuss the areas of
warrantless arrests not yet resolved.
I. THE FACT SITUATIONS
The Supreme Court's decision in Paton was the result of two New York
cases. 2 In both cases, People o. Palon3 and People v. Riddck,4 the police acted
with probable cause, but without arrest or search warrants, when they went
to the defendants' homes to make ordinary felony arrests. The New York
trial judge in each case refused to suppress incriminating evidence seized
after entry into the homes.
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of
New York statutes authorizing police officers to enter a home or dwelling
with necessary force, but without a warrant, to make a routine felony arrest.
5
In Pajion police went to the defendant's apartment in the early morning
hours without a warrant to arrest him for the murder of a gas station attend-
ant. The officers observed light under the door and music coming from in-
side. There was no response to their knock on the metal door. The officers
called for assistance and approximately thirty minutes later they used crow-
bars to open the door. Upon entering the apartment and searching for the
suspect, the police discovered in plain view a shell casing which they seized.
The motion to suppress the casing was denied.
In Riddick police officers went to the suspect's apartment without a war-
rant to arrest him for two armed robberies. The officers knocked on the door
and it was answered by Riddick's three-year-old son. Riddick was sitting in
1. Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
2. The New York cases of People v. Payton and People v. Riddick were consolidated by
the Supreme Court on appeal.
3. People v. Payton, 84 Misc.2d 973, 376 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
4. People v. Riddick, 56 A.D.2d 937, 392 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1977).
5. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw §§ 177, 178 (McKinney 1971). The Court cited the applicable
portions:
[Section 177] A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person,. .. 3. When a
felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the per-
son to be arrested to have committed it. [Section 178] To make an arrest, as provided
in the last section [Section 1771, the officer may break open an outer or inner door or
window of a building, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admit-
tance.
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bed with a sheet over him several feet from the door. The officers identified
themselves, declared their purpose, and then entered the bedroom and
placed Riddick under arrest. Before allowing him to dress they searched a
chest of drawers two feet from the bed. The search turned up narcotics and
related paraphernalia. Riddick was subsequently indicted on narcotics
charges and a motion to suppress the evidence was denied.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in a single
opinion holding the seizures were proper because the police were authorized
by state statute to make warrantless arrests in a home and to use necessary
force to gain entry to effect the arrest.
6
Although many Supreme Court opinions concerning fourth amend-
ment problems have alluded to the question of the constitutionality of war-
rantless home arrests, 7 and although the Court has ruled on warrantless
arrests in public places, 8 the question had repeatedly been reserved by the
Court for resolution. Consistent with its custom of restricting its holding to a
narrowly defined question, the Court's opinion in Palon leaves other related
questions unanswered.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Fourth Amendment Protection
The fourth amendment by its first clause extends protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures executed without a warrant.9 The amend-
ment was interpreted in Boydv. Uni'ted Sates' ° as applying to all invasions by
the government of "the sanctity of a man's home and the privcies of life."' I
It is well settled that the fourth amendment was directed at physical entry of
the home.' 2 The Court has, however, extended fourth amendment protec-
tion to citizens outside of the home.
13
Prior judicial decisions construing the first clause of the fourth amend-
ment are numerous, but have been primarily applicable to invasions for the
purposes of searches and seizures of evidence, not persons. These cases have
held warrantless searches and seizures presumptively unreasonable,' 4 but
6. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 309-310, 380 N.E.2d 224, 228, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 399
(1978).
7. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971).
8. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
10. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
11. Id at 630.
12. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See also Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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have utilized a balancing test to evaluate the reasonableness of a search or
seizure conducted without a warrant.15 The Court has balanced the need to
search without a warrant, usually due to time constraints, against the inva-
sion of privacy entailed by the search. 16 From this balancing test some ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement have been developed. Such doctrines as
exigent circumstances, 17 plain view,' 8 and search incident to arrest, 19 may
be invoked in determining the reasonableness of dispensing with the search
warrant requirement.
B. Arrests are Seizures for Fourth Amendment Purposes
While case law on warrantless searches is extensive, few decisions on
arrest warrant requirements have been rendered by the Supreme Court. The
Court has stated that a warrantless arrest of a person is a seizure and, there-
fore, must be reasonable.20 While the Court has stated that warrants are
favored, there are few decisions relating to the arrest warrant requirement,




The lack of judicial decisions and the confusion concerning the arrest
warrant requirement is due, in part, to the widespread acceptance of an of-
ficer's authority to make a warrantless arrest. Justice White cited an early
case, Kurtz v. Mofitt, 2 2 in his opinion in United Slates v. Watson:2 3 "The rule of
the common law, that a peace officer or a private citizen may arrest a felon
without a warrant, has been generally held by the courts of the several States
to be in force in cases of felony punishable by the civil tribunals."
' 24
United Stales v. Watson 25 dealt with the question of warrantless arrests in
public places. Justice White, writing for the Court, held that warrantless
15. See Johnson v. United States, 330 U.S. 10, 14 (1948):
Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested deter-
mination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes se-
cure only in the discretion of police officers. . . . When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer,
not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
16. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
17. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
18. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
19. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
20. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
21. Accord, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1974); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Ker v. California, 387 U.S. 23 (1963).
22. 115 U.S. 487, 504 (1885).
23. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
24. Id at 419. See also ALl CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 308 (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft) (1975).
25. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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arrests in public places are not violative of the fourth amendment. Justice
White based this ruling upon two grounds: 1) the common law decisions
expounding the validity of warrantless arrests in public places; and 2) the
acceptance of this precedent by both Congress and a majority of the states.
This decision pertained only to warrantless arrests in public places and did
not address the issue of warrantless arrests in private residences.
A step toward resolution of this question was taken in the decision an-
nounced in United States v. Sanlana.26 Although this case was resolved under
the exigent circumstances exception, the Court held that an arrest without a
warrant was proper when it began in a public place and ended inside the
defendant's home. In this case, the Court reasoned that a warrantless arrest
which was initiated outside the defendant's residence and ended inside the
doorway to the residence could not be thwarted by the defendant's retreat
into her home.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ad-
dressed the question of warrantless home arrests in Dorman v. United States27
by declaring them unconstitutional. 2  Prior to Payton, however, the
Supreme Court had not directly addressed this particular issue.
III. PAYTON
In Payton v. New York, 29 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for the
Court declaring that warrantless arrests in the home absent some exigent
circumstance are violative of the fourth amendment. The Court first dis-
cussed the applicability of the fourth amendment to warrantless searches
and seizures. 30 It then cited cases holding that an arrest is a seizure of a
person and, as such, is afforded protection by the fourth amendment. 31 The
Court also reiterated that " 'physical entry into the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the fourth amendment is directed.' "32
A. Intrusiveness of Entries
Next, the Court considered the nature of the intrusion presented by
26. The case involved an arrest without a warrant which started in a public place (door-
way) and ended inside a dwelling. 427 U.S. 38, 41 (1975).
27. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
28. Id.; accord, United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978); Accarino v. United
States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The warrantless home search question has been ad-
dressed by United States Courts of Appeals. See generally United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 97 (1979); United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir.
1979); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978). For further discussion of war-
rantless arrests prior to Payon, see generally O'Connor, Fourth Amendment and Warrantless Home
Arrests, N.Y.L.J. 1 (Sept. 1979); Note, The Consti/utionality of Warrantless Home Arrests, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1550 (1978); Comment, Forcible Enty to Efect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection
ofthe Castle, 82 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1977); Comment, Warrantless Arrests in Homes: Another Crisis
for the Fourth Amendment, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 93 (1978-79).
29. 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
30. Id at 1379.
31. Id
32. Id at 1380 (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972)).
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both an entry to search and an entry to arrest. Justice Stevens recognized
that an entry to search may involve more of an intrusion than an entry to
arrest, but, he stated, a difference in degree does not negate the warrant
requirement for an arrest.
The two intrusions share this fundamental characteristic: the
breach of the entrance to an individual's home. The fourth
amendment. protects the individual's privacy in a variety of set-
tings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an in-
dividual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific
constitutional terms: "The right of the people to be secure in their
• ..houses . . .shall not be violated."
33
B. Pubhc v. Private Places
The issue of warrantless arrests in the home was also addressed by the
Payton Court. New York argued that the holding in Watson
34 required a
similar result in the instant case. In Watson the Court relied on: 1) the com-
mon law rule that warrantless arrests in public places were proper; 2) the
fact that a majority of the states followed that rule; and 3) an expression of
congressional intent indicating such arrests were reasonable. 35 The Court
considered each of the reasons as it applied to warrantless arrests in homes.
C. The Common Law
The Court first noted that the common law understanding of an of-
ficer's authority must be examined in considering what the framers of the
fourth amendment may have felt was reasonable. But, Justice Stevens
pointed out, the interpretation of the fourth amendment is an evolving proc-
ess adjusting the law to changing societal norms and conditions. "Thus, this
Court has not simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement
practices that existed at the time of the fourth amendment's passage."
36
Further, the common law rules of arrest were developed mainly in civil
damage actions for trespass or false arrest, the Court stated. The modern
trend revolves around the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence
gained as the result of an arrest or search. 37 The Court cited English cases
33. 100 S. Ct. at 1381-82 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
34. 100 S. Ct. at 1382.
35. United States v. Watson, 423 US. 411, 418-23 (1976).
36. 100 S. Ct. at 1382.
37. Application of the exclusionary rule to situations involving illegal arrests concerns the
admissibility of evidence at trial, just as in illegal searches and seizures. Payton v. New York,
100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381 (1980). See United States v. Crews, 100 S. Ct. 1244 (1980). See also Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is relevant in this
context. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
In Crews, the Court explained that the defendant is not suppressible.
"An illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prose-
cution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction [citations omitted] . . . .Respondent is
not himself a suppressible 'fruit,' and the illegality of his detention cannot deprive the
Government of the opportunity to prove his guilt through the introduction of evidence
wholly untainted by the police misconduct."
United States v. Crews, 100 S. Ct. at 1251. See also Gerstein v: Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1974);
19801
DENVER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1
concerning an officer's authority to enter a home for service of process.
Semayne's Case38 spoke to the issue of forcible entry into a dwelling "either to
arrest him or to do other execution of the K.s [King's] process . . .39
Some commentators have argued that this phrase supports the contention
that warrants were not necessary. Others believe that the context implies
that it was descriptive of the extent of the authority of the King's writ. The
Court felt that the language in Semayne did, at best, ambiguously authorize
warrantless entries. 4°
Proceeding from the language found in Semayne, Justice Stevens referred
to the views held by various English commentators whose writings on arrests
were practically contemporaneous with the framing of the fourth amend-
ment. 4 1 Stevens concluded that the diversity of views on this issue illustrated
that the common law rule concerning warrantless arrests in the home was
certainly not as authoritative as the rule on arrests in public places. This
diversity of views and the absence of any early English cases on point, cou-
pled with the often repeated adage that "a man's house is his castle" in the
common law, 4 2 led Justice Stevens to the conclusion that the common law
and the intent of the framers of the fourth amendment was that arrests
should not be made without a warrant unless the arrest was the result of hot
pursuit.
D. Widespread Acceptance of Common Law Rule by the States
The Court acknowledged that a majority of states have taken a position
on warrantless arrests in homes. It noted that 24 states permitted such ar-
rests, 15 states prohibited them, and 11 took no position at all. 43 Justice
United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illi-
nois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Cf Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (confession sup-
pressed after illegal arrest); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (confessions or statements
obtained during an illegal arrest); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (fingerprints taken
after arrest suppressed).
38. 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
39. 100 S. Ct. at 1383.
40. Id. at 1383-84.
41. Id at 1385.
42. d at 1386.
43. Id. at 1387. The Colorado Supreme Court's position on warrantless arrests in the home
has recently been clarified. In 1971, in People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1971),
the court held that a police officer could not enter a private residence to effect an arrest without
a warrant. In a case decided in 1976 the court held that an arrest warrant must be obtained
whenever possible. People v. Hoinville, 191 Colo. 357, 553 P.2d 777 (1976). In People v. Casias,
193 Colo. 66, 563 P.2d 926 (1977), the court held that a warrantless arrest in a home was not
valid absent exigent circumstances. The high court adopted the ruling of United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U.S. 41 (1975), in People v. Tangas, 190 Colo. 262, 545 P.2d 1047 (1976), for warrant-
less arrests in public places.
Prior to 1977 peace officers were required by statute to obtain an arrest warrant whenever
practicable. In 1977, however, the state legislature deleted the warrant requirement from the
statute authorizing peace officers to make arrests.
A peace officer may arrest a person when: (a) He has a warrant commanding that
such person be arrested; or (b) Any crime has been or is being committed by such
person in his presence; or (c) He has probable cause to believe that an offense was
committed by the person to be arrested.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102(1) (1973). In People v. Coto, 611 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1980), the
Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed its position as reflected in the Moreno decision concerning
warrantless arrests in the home. See generally Moore & Multz, Arrest, Stop and Frisk: An In-depth
Analysis, 9 COLO. LAW. 646 (1980).
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Stevens pointed out that only two of the states permitting warrantless entries
which have faced a constitutional challenge upheld those entries. Ten other
states have held similar statutes unconstitutional, on either state or federal
constitutional grounds.
Even though the weight of state law authority on the question was
clear, the Court felt that the kind of unanimity which existed as to warrant-
less arrests in public places was lacking. "A longstanding, widespread prac-
tice is not immune from constitutional scrutiny."'44 Justice Stevens found
that the acceptance of the common law rule on warrantless arrests in homes
was not sufficient to validate the practice.
E. Congressional Expression
The Court briefly addressed congressional expressions concerning war-
rantless arrests in homes, stating that no congressional manifestations of the
reasonableness of such arrests had been called to its attention. Justice Ste-
vens stated that none of the federal statutes cited in Watson indicated a posi-
tion on warrantless arrests in the home. He ended his consideration by
saying "[N]either history nor this Nation's experience requires us to disre-
gard the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been em-
bedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic."
45
F. Warrant Requirement
Lastly, the majority spoke to the argument concerning the practicality
of a warrant requirement. New York had argued that such a requirement
would impose an unreasonable burden on the police and contribute to more
arrests of innocent persons and hasty investigations. Justice Stevens' reply to
this argument was to point to a lack of evidence that effective law enforce-
ment had suffered in those states which required such a warrant. Further, he
noted that in this instance the constitutional command was to be accorded
priority over policy considerations.
New York had also argued that if a warrant were required to protect
the privacy interests involved, a search warrant, rather than an arrest war-
rant, would be required. While Justice Stevens conceded that an arrest war-
rant provided less protection than a search warrant in terms of the intrusion
into the home, he stated that the protection of an arrest warrant would suf-
fice. "Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a
dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect
is within."
46
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, advocated the use of a bal-
ancing test on fourth amendment issues. He felt that in balancing the gov-
ernment's interests and the individual's interests, the correct result was
44. 100 S. Ct. at 1387.




reached both in Payton and in Watson.
4 7
IV. THE DISSENT
Justice White wrote the dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice White developed the common law
authority of an officer to arrest, concluding that the framers of the fourth
amendment intended to extend the same inherent powers to law enforce-
ment officers as those possessed by officers before the adoption of the amend-
ment. Their concern about warrants was directed to the writs of assistance
which enlarged the authority of the officer leading the abuses which were
obnoxious to the colonists.
48
Justice White then examined prior judicial decisions on warrantless ar-
rest entries. He noted the lack of case law prior to the 1900's and suggested
that the lack was due to the acceptance at common law of warrantless arrest
entries. 49 He also pointed to the adoption of state codes of criminal proce-
dure endorsing the inherent authority of a peace officer to arrest without a
warrant. 50
Justice White cited Commonwealth v. Phelps5 ' as the first United States
judicial holding on the subject. In that case the Massachetts Supreme Court
held such arrests constitutional. He suggested that the assumption of the
constitutionality of such arrests was responsible for the long standing accept-
ance of the practice. 52 Justice White then cited Jones v. Unied States53 and
Coolidge v. New Hampshire54 which, in dicta, questioned the constitutionality
of warrantless entries to arrest during the night.
5 5
Justice White's response to the majority's failure to find guidance in any
federal statutes was to note the existence of a statute authorizing federal
agents to make warrantless arrests. 56 To Justice White, the absence of any
language concerning homes indicated that Congress felt an explicit grant of
authority to enter a home to arrest was not necessary.
White reiterated the principle that the fourth amendment protects peo-
ple, not places.5 7 He also asserted that the protections developed under the
47. Id. at 1388-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
48. Id at 1391 (White, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1393.
50. Id
51. 209 Mass. 396, 95 N.E. 868 (1911).
52. 100 S. Ct. at 1393.
53. 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
54. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
55. [I]f Mr. Justice White is correct that it has generally been assumed that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated by the warrantless entry of a man's house for purposes of
arrest, it might be wise to re-examine the assumption. Such a re-examination "would
confront us with a grave constitutional question, namely whether the forceful night-
time entry into a dwelling to arrest a person reasonably believed within, upon proba-
ble cause that he has committed a felony, under circumstances where no reason
appears why an arrest warrant could not have been sought, is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment".
Id at 480 (citing Justice White's dissent in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 770 (1969)
(White, J., dissenting)).
56. 100 S. Ct. at 1394 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1976)).
57. Id. at 1395.
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common law and the requirement of probable cause provide adequate pro-
tection of the individual's interests.
58
Finally, Justice White criticized the decision for its effect on law en-
forcement. He raised issues concerning the average police officer's ability to
evaluate circumstances as to exigency and the resulting endless litigation.
He also commented on the possibility that a warrant obtained immediately
after probable cause has arisen might go stale.59
V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
A. The Arrest Warrant Requirement
The Court in Payton held that the fourth amendment "prohibits the
police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's
home in order to make a routine felony arrest." 60 The questions not ad-
dressed by the Court included: 1) whether a warrantless arrest could be
made under exigent circumstances; and 2) the authority of police, without
either a search or arrest warrant, to enter a third party's home to arrest a
suspect. Other related unresolved problems are: 3) the requirements for an
arrest warrant which would authorize entry into the home; and 4) the nature
of the interests to be protected.
These problems arise, in part, from the distinction between arrest and
search warrants. Probable cause must be shown before a warrant will issue,
whether it be an arrest warrant or a search warrant. Beyond the basic re-
quirement of probable cause, the types of information necessary for each are
different. An arrest warrant will be issued after showing facts sufficient to
convince a magistrate that a crime has been committed and the person for
whom the warrant is being sought probably committed the crime. It does
not specify where or at what time the person is to be arrested.
The issuance of a search warrant, on the other hand, must be supported
by evidence that shows that the items sought are seizable because they are
connected with criminal activity and that the items will be found in the
place to be searched.6 1 Since the location of the items may change, a search
warrant must be sought and executed immediately to prevent "staleness."
1. Staleness of Arrest Warrants
In both Watson and Payton the arrest warrant requirement was discussed
as an unreasonable burden on law enforcement officers. Justice Powell sug-
gested in his concurring opinion in Watson that if police officers procured a
warrant as soon as they had probable cause, and then postponed the arrest
in order to develop more evidence, they run the risk of the warrant growing
58. Justice White named four restrictions which he felt were adequate safeguards: felony,
knock and announce, daytime, and stringent probable cause. Id.
59. Id. at 1397. Most problems with warrants growing stale are associated with search
warrants, not arrest warrants. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 449 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). But see id. at 432 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. 100 S. Ct. at 1375.
61. See generally Comment, Search and Sei ure un the Supreme Court- Shadows on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961).
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stale. 62 He explained the possibility of staleness as being more remote for
arrest warrants than search warrants, but that such a possibility did exist.
63
Justice White in his dissenting opinion in Payton also noted the possibility of
an arrest warrant growing stale.64 Justice Marshall pointed out in Watson
that
[t]here is no requirement that a search warrant be obtained the
moment police have probable cause to search. The rule is only
that present probable cause be shown and a warrant obtained
before a search is undertaken [citations omitted]. The same rule
should obtain for arrest warrants, where it may even make more
sense.
6 5
In view of the differing opinions expressed above, it would appear that
there may be future problems with arrest warrants, especially on the issue of
staleness.
2. Entry into Third Party Home to Arrest
Another problem surfacing after Payton is whether the police may enter
a third party's home without either a search warrant or arrest warrant to
arrest a suspect. Further, even if the police enter with an arrest warrant, is a
search warrant also necessary, if a warrant is required at all?
First, it would seem that if the fourth amendment is indeed directed
towards the protection of "the sanctity of a man's home,"' 66 it would also
protect the sanctity of any home, regardless of whether or not it was the
suspect's home. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in Fisher v. Vo/z
6 7
that the police may not enter a third party's home to arrest a suspect. 68 In
cases concerning searches of third party's homes, the suspect may receive
fourth amendment protection if he has a reasonable expectation of privacy
there.
69
The second question pertaining to the necessity of a search warrant in
addition to an arrest warrant in order to enter and arrest in a third party's
home appears to be easily answered. In entering a third party's home to
arrest a suspect, the police are, in essence, entering to search for the sus-
pect.70 In the absence of exigent circumstances "a search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a
valid search warrant. ' 71 If entry into a third party's home to arrest a suspect
62. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 432 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
63. "But in some cases the original grounds supporting the warrant could be disproved by
subsequent investigation that at the same time turns up wholly new evidence supporting proba-
ble cause on a different theory. In those cases the warrant could be stale because based upon
discredited information." d at 432 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. 100 S. Ct. at 1397 (White, J., dissenting).
65. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 449 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
67. 496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974).
68. Id.
69. &Se Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (Suspect held to have standing to object
to search of apartment owned by third party).
70. Rotenberg & Tanzer, Searching for the Person to be Seized, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 56 (1974).
71. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). "Search warrants are not
directed at persons; they authorize the search of 'place[s]' and the seizure of 'things', and as a
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is considered to be a search, then it can be assumed that the rules governing
consent to search would be applicable to arrest situations.
7 2
3. Additional Requirement for Arrests in the Home
Justice Stevens concludes the majority opinion in Pay/on by stating that
an arrest warrant implicitly carries with it the authority to enter a suspect's
home to make an arrest. Thus, a search warrant is not necessary for the
limited purpose of making an arrest. 73 Because the Court in Payton found
the reasoning of two courts of appeals persuasive, 74 language from those
cases would indicate that something more than an arrest warrant would be
required. 75 For example, Judge Leventhal reasoned in Dorman that an entry
into a home to arrest also entails a search for the suspect. 7 6 While Judge
Leventhal does not state that a search warrant is necessary, he does not
explicitly preclude that possibility.
Even if a search warrant is not required for entry into the suspect's
home to arrest, the dissent expressed concern that under Payton police officers
will not only have to show probable cause for the arrest, but will also be
required to show a reasonable belief that the suspect is in the home at the
time of execution of the warrant.
77
B. Nature of the Interests to be Protected
The Court in Payton relied on the right to privacy as the interest to be
protected in requiring warrants for home arrests. Of paramount importance
in this decision is the clearly defined, historical "zone of privacy" which the
home represents.
The individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not expressly ad-
dressed in Payton. 78 The narrowness of the question to which the Court lim-
ited itself precluded any discussion of one's reasonable expectation of
privacy. Thus, other areas in which an individual may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy are left open as to the arrest warrant requirement.
79
If the Court were to apply the principles developed in search and
seizure cases with respect to areas in which an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the warrant requirement for arrests would be ex-
constitutional matter they need not even name the person from whom the things will be seized."
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 555 (1977). See also LaFave, Search and Seizure." 7'he
Course of True Law. . Has Not. . . Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L. FoR. 255.
72. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964).
73. 100 S. Ct. at 1388.
74. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d
385 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
75. 100 S. Ct. at 1380-81.
76. Id
77. Id at 1395.
78. The reasonable expectation of privacy concept was first enunciated by the Court in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
79. Areas which might be called into question are: places of employment, private clubs,
motor homes, third party's homes, and hotel or motel rooms.
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tended to other places besides the home.80
C. Exigent Circumstances
Nor did the Court address the question of whether exigent circum-
stances would permit a warrantless arrest in a home.8 1 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has addressed the issue in UnitedStates
V. Williams,
8 2 in which the court held that a warrantless arrest is unlawful in
the absence of exigent circumstances.
8 3
In Mincey v. Arizona84 the Supreme Court indicated that the State has
the burden of proving exigent circumstances for a warrantless search of a
suspect's apartment conducted after his arrest. If the Court were to follow its
reasoning in search and seizure cases,8 5 one could logically assume that war-
rantless arrests under exigent circumstances are permissible.
In addition, the Court held the warrantless entry to arrest and search in
Warden v. Hayden8 6 was legal since exigent circumstances existed. In Santana
the Court again stated that exigent circumstances would justify the warrant-
less entry into a suspect's home for the purpose of arresting him. Justice
Marshall, dissenting in Santana, warned that police should not be allowed to
create exigent circumstances in order to avoid obtaining an arrest warrant.
8 7
VI. UNWARRANTED DECISION?
Perhaps the most unsettling characteristic of the holding in Payton is its
reversal of the long accepted common law practice. As the Court pointed
out, numerous state codes and model codes have endorsed warrantless ar-
rests.8 In Watson the Court noted that section 120.1 of the Model Code of
Prearraignment Procedure formulated by the American Law Institute pro-
vides for warrantless arrests,8 9 and "thus adopts the traditional and almost
universal standard for arrest without a warrant." 9
In his concurring opinion in Watson, Justice Powell examined the intru-
80. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (automobile is an area in
which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364 (1968) (expectation of privacy extends to business offices); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964) (search of hotel room without warrant and without guest's consent was violative of
fourth amendment); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
81. 100 S. Ct. at 1378. In People v. Caldwell, 102 Cal. App.3d 461, 162 Cal. Rptr. 397
(1980), the California Supreme Court held that a warrantless arrest in a home was justified by
exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances were defined as emergencies requiring swift ac-
tion to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property or to forestall the immi-
nent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.
82. 612 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1979). The Court defined exigent circumstances as those situa-
tions involving hot pursuit, fleeing-suspect, and destruction of evidence.
83. Id. at 739.
84. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
85. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
86. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30
(1970).
87. Santana v. United States, 427 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. 100 S. Ct. at 1386-87.
89. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422 (1976).
90. Id
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siveness of a search as compared to an arrest. He concluded that the intru-
sion of an arrest may have a more serious effect on the arrestee than a search
might have. Logically, arrests should be subject to the same warrant re-
quirements as searches. Justice Powell stated, however: "But logic some-
times must defer to history and experience. The Court's opinion emphasizes
the historical sanction accorded warrantless felony arrests." 9'
Justice Marshall's dissent in Watson, however, indicated a weakness in
this historical argument. He pointed out that felonies have changed in their
meaning since the adoption of the fourth amendment. Many crimes which
are now classified as felonies would have been misdemeanors under the com-
mon law.92 Marshall's argument that the Court is historically wrong when
it states that the policy derived from the common law of allowing warrant-
less arrests for felonies has survived is most persuasive.
9 3
VII. CONCLUSION
The result in Payton is logical if viewed from the perspective of the pro-
tection provided by the fourth amendment for similar types of intrusions
into the home. The problem with the decision originates from its reversal of
a long standing, widely accepted common law practice.
While those engaged in law enforcement may perceive the Payton deci-
sion as another technical restriction placed upon them or as erecting one
more obstacle to efficient enforcement of the laws, the ruling is consistent
with the warrant requirements for searches and, as such, is proper.
The long standing, widespread practice of allowing warrantless arrests
for felonies must bow to changing societal conditions and values. As Justice
Marshall commented in his dissent in Watson, crimes classified as felonies
today are in many instances different in nature than felonies under the Eng-
lish common law. The necessity for obtaining an arrest warrant should not
hinge on a legislature's classification of a crime as a felony or a misdemeanor
for penalty purposes.
94
This long overdue ruling on the question of warrantless home arrests
will be welcomed by many. But it also heralds the beginning of the clarifica-
tion process for those related issues which remain unresolved, such as war-
rantless arrests in the home under exigent circumstances, entry into a third
party's home to make an arrest, and other areas (besides public places) in
which a warrantless arrest might be made.
Ann McEntire
91. Id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 438-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Seegenerall Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22
MICH. L. REV. 541 (1924).
93. As a matter of substance, the balance struck by the common law in accomodating
the public need for the most certain and immediate arrest of criminal suspects with the
requirement of magisterial oversight to protect against mistaken insults to privacy de-
creed that only in the most serious of cases could the warrant be dispensed with. This
balance is not recognized when the common-law rule is unthinkingly transposed to
our present classifications of criminal offenses.
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